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The Great Depression has received relatively little attention from South African 
historians and economists. Most studies of the period concentrate almost 
exclusively on political aspects, and ignore the economic realities. Little attempt has 
been made to quantify and analyse the effects of the depression and drought, nor 
has a proper integration of these economic realities and their impact on politics been 
attemp.ted. There is perhaps good reason for this. There is such a wealth of 
material to be digested that the task has been perceived as too daunting for a single 
researcher. Local or thematic studies have therefore been undertaken. This thesis 
is essentially a local history study which examines the effects of the Great 
Depression on the then province of Natal. 
The depression affected all areas of economic activity in the region; industry, coal-
mining, and both commercial and subsistence agriculture. Hardly any aspect of life 
was untouched. It scarred the collective consciousness of an entire generation. 
Under the twin onslaughts of the depression and drought, the people of Natal turned 
to the state for assistance. The state turned out to be a poor provider, preferring to 
devote its efforts to alleviating distress ' among white farmers, while forcing the 
major burden of relief onto the urban local authorities. Such authorities were 
obviously reluctant to assist anyone other than their own burgesses. 
Prevailing racist sentiments ensured that the major economic burden was passed 
onto those who could least afford to bear it, the African majority. Government 
policy held that Africans were expendable components of the urban work-force; 
when the economy shrank they were simply expected to return to their places of 
origin. During these years the idea that the reserves could accommodate all the 
"surplus" African workers was finally exploded. 
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Isolated from the centres of power, and under intense pressure from the depression 
and drought, white Natalians reacted with characteristic jingoism and agitated for 
the secession of the province from the Union. Black politics, which had reached 
boiling point prior to the depression, fell into a slump, also occasioned by the 
prevailing economic woes. Militancy turned into co-operation. 
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The economic catastrophe known as the Great Depression has received relatively 
little attention from researchers of the South African past. Despite the profound 
and lasting impression it left on the collective consciousness of those who lived 
through it, on reading the existing history of the Union of South Africa covering the 
period 1929-1933, one might easily get the impression that the phenomenon 
bypassed the Union almost entirely, or that it merely coincided with a period of 
political change at the national level. Such perceptions distort the past; they tell an 
incomplete and often incomprehensible story and militate against a sound 
understanding of the forces which both underlay and facilitated political change. 
Nor do they begin to provide an adequate understanding of the profound changes 
that were wrought on society during "the years of red dust". 1 
The Union of South Africa did not suffer the same degree of economic, social or 
political upheaval which many other developed or developing capitalist countries 
experienced2 in these years of Sturm und Drang. Its position as the world's major 
gold producing nation, at a time when gold still formed the base of the world 
monetary system, did afford the country a measure of protection} However, as the 
Union was part of the international capitalist economy, some adverse effects were 
unavoidable; the great slump in world trade and the drastic decline in demand for 
!Dajor export products (apart· from gold) did have a significant effect on the 
economy of the Union. This, in turn, raised social dislocation, distress, 
unemployment and political frustration to levels never before experienced in the 
Union's history. To exacerbate matters, the depression years coincided with one of 
the worst droughts ever experienced; outbreaks of malaria, various livestock 
1. I am indebted to Jeff Guy for this African phrase descriptive of the early 1930s. It apparently 
refers to the dust storms caused by drought. 
2. See A J H Latham, The Depression and the Developing World, 1914-1939, Croom Helm, 
London, 1981. 
3. See L Katzen, Gold and the South A/rican Economy: The In/luence 0/ the Gold Mining 
Industry on Business Cycles and Economic Growth in South A/rica, 1886· 1961. A P Balkema, 
Cape Town, 1964. 
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diseases, and invasions of locusts all conspired to bring misery and distress. 
Thousands of people were forced by these circumstances to leave the rural areas 
and seek new lives in the urban areas. The patterns of demographic settlement in 
the Union were markedly altered during these years. 
Despite the significant impa~t of the depression, until recently little attention has 
been devoted to the period by South African historians. Research into the history of 
twentieth-century South Africa has been focused mainly on political developments, 
without giving due weight to the economic and social dimension. Many studies of 
the coalition between, and later fusion of, the two dominant white political parties 
exist, for example, but relatively few, if any, examine the economic factors leading 
up to these events. This lacuna was symptomatic of much of South African 
historiography, until the advent of the radical and revisionist schools. Yet even 
historians from these more modem schools, while they do address the major socio-
economic themes of the twentieth century, have largely confined themselves to the 
reinterpretation of past views of government policies of segregation and apartheid. 
They have found their major themes in the development of the mining industry, and 
other major capitalist ventures, and their relationship to the state; little attention has 
been devoted to the study of particular periods, especially the early 1930s. 
There is good reason, however, why a holistic study of the Great Depression in 
South Africa has not yet been accomplished; the phenomenon is so complex and the 
task so formidable that to attempt an adequate and rigorous analysis of the entire 
phenomenon over the length and breadth of the entire Union has been seen to be an 
almost Herculean task for a ' single researcher.4 Economists, too, have been 
somewhat daunted; there are few studies of the economic consequences of the 
depression in South Africa. Those that do exist are dated and, while they are still of 
considerable value, they generally deal with macro-issues, which might be of only 
passing interest to the local historian.5 Even the economic histories of the Union of 
4. See remarks made by Minnaar in the preface to his thesis. A de V Minnaar, "South African 
White Agriculture and the Great Depression (1929-1934)", D.Litt. and Phil. thesis, University 
of South Africa, 1988, p. v. 
5. See C W G Schumann, World Depression, South Africa and the Gold Standard, Juta & Co., 
Cape Town, 19321 and his subsequent volume StructUl'ai Changes and Business Cycles in 
South Africa, 1806-1936, P S King & Son, London, 1938 and A P Ravenscroft "The Course of . , 
the DepreSSIon in South Africa", M.Com.m. thesis, University of SteUenbosch, 1940; 
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South Africa do not do full justice either to the depression or to its impact on Natal.6 
The result is that studies are not only few in number, but tend to be thematic 
(examining only certain aspects of the depression or its effects),7 or conducted at the 
level of local history.8 This study has followed the latter approach; it is essentially a 
local history of the phenomenon, concentrating on the province of Natal. It now 
seems generally accepted that only through putting together the pieces at a local 
level will the countrywide picture of the depression eventually emerge. 
Even at the local level, "depression studies" are still in the pioneering stage; much 
remains to be done. In Natal itself, only three studies have been specifically devoted 
to the depression. The first, a paper presented by John Sellers,9 was to prove part 
of the inspiration for this study. The second was my previous thesis which examined 
the effects of the depression on greater Durban; 10 while the third, by Charmaine 
Singh, 11 examined the social and economic effects of the depression on Indians in 
J J Stadler, "Die Bruto Binnelands Produk van Suid-Afrika", D.Comm. thesis, Pretoria, 1962 
and M H de Kock, The Economic Development of South Africa, P S King, London, 1936. 
6. See C W de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and Economic, Oxford University 
Press, 1941; F Cole~an, Economic History of South Africa HAUM, Pretoria, 1983; D H 
Houghton, The South African Economy, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1964, 
Reprinted 1975; J Nattrass, The South African Economy, its Growth and Change, Oxford 
University Press, Cape Town, 1981; A L MUlIer (red.), Die ekonomiese ontwikkeling van Suid-
Afrika, Academica, Pretoria, 1979. 
7. This was Minnaar's experience. After having researched the history of Graarf-Reinel during 
the depression years, he was emboldened to begin researching the effects of the depression on 
the entire country but he was forced to restrict himself to a particular theme (white 
agriculture) because he discovered that the entire depression " ... was too wide a topic". Other 
works following a thematic approach include R A Lewis, "A Study of some aspects of the Poor 
White Problem in South Africa", M A thesis, Rhodes University, 1974; D R Owen, "White 
Unemployment and Poor Relief in Pieternulritzburg from 1919 to 1934 with special reference 
to the Depression Period", B A(Hons.) Long Essay, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), 
1982. 
8. A de V Minnaar, "Graaff-Reinet in the Depression Years", M A thesis, Rhodes University, 
1978; D W MEdley, "Population, Poverty and Politics: A Study of Some Aspects of the 
Depression in Grealer Durban, 1929-1933", M A thesis, University of Natal (Durban), 1983. 
9. J M Sellers, "Natal and the Great Depression." Paper presented at the Workshop on Natal 
History, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), 1980. 
10. Edley, "Population". 
11. C Singh,"The Effects of the Great Depression on the Economic and Social Conditions of the 
Indian Community in Natal, 1929-1948", M A thesis, University of Durban-Westville, 1990. 
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Natal. More studies will surely follow. 
Any study of a particular period in the history of Natal and Zulu land must be 
located in the context of the wider historiography of this region. A significant 
development in this regard has been the growth of the "Natal School" of historians 
over the last twenty or so years. This school has, through intensive research in 
various fields, largely succeeded in dispelling the once widely accepted attitude that 
developments in Natal and Zululand had little relevance in the wider South African 
context. It has clearly demonstrated the inaccuracy of the view that this region had 
little to offer the researcher beyond whites " ... who merely had a walk-on part in 
broader studies of South African politics as a bedraggled and often ludicrous 
minority ... ",12 and "Zulu" whose only significance lay in their part in the Mfecane or 
their sullen belligerence in the Anglo-Zulu War. Natal was the birthplace of and 
testing ground for a host of policies of considerable significance to the rest of South 
Africa; the "Durban System" of urban African control, and "Shepstonism", the basis 
of the reserve system, to name but two. 
Over the past twenty or more years, considerable time and effort has been expended 
by historians either in researching, or in directing research into, all aspects of the 
colourful history of the province. These efforts have borne considerable fruit; there 
is today a steadily accumulating literature on all aspects of life in the region.13 Nor 
is all the research concentrated in the nineteenth century; historians such as 
Swanson, Duminy, Maylam and Marks, and their proteges, have gradually been 
uncovering the history of twentieth-century Natal. Interestingly enough, the 1920s 
and 1930s have received considerable attention from the "Natal School". Research 
was, ho~ever, initially strongly biased towards political activity)4 More recently, 
12. G Martin, "Identity and Interaction: A Defence of Natal History", Journalof Imperial and 
Commonwealth Studies, Vol. 22, No.2, May 1994. 
13. See A Duminy and B Guest, "Natal Historical Writing During the Last Two Decades: A 
Conspectus", in The Debate on Zulu Origins, Department of Historical Studies, University of 
Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1992. 
14. B C Vickers, "Natal and the Provincial Councils, 1929-1932", M A thesis, University of Natal 
(Durban), 1970; M Walker, "The Provincial Councils and Natal, 1924-1932", M A thesis, 
University of Natal (Durban), 1976; F G Millington, "Years of Decision for Natal" B A 
(Hons.) dissertation, University of Natal (Durban), 1973; A H Duminy, "The Death 'Of the 
Natal Federal Movement, 1932-1934", Paper given at Workshop on Natal History University 
of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), 1980. ' 
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greater effort has been devoted to "history from below" and studies have focused on 
the experiences of ordinary Natalians, especially Africans. Studies by Maylam on 
strategies of urban African control,15 Hemson on the dockworkers, 16 La Hausse on 
the "Durban System",17 Nuttall on the period 1929-1949,18 Edwards on Cato 
Manor 19 and Kelly on trade-unionism20 are examples of this. 
Cope has added an important dimension to these studies by illuminating the role of 
the Zulu royal family, and especially Solomon kaDinuzulu, in the political and social 
life of the region during the 19205 and 1930s.21 Shula Marks in her studies of 
Solomon, Dube and Champion has clearly demonstrated the duality and ambiguities 
in the roles of the African political leaders of this time;22 yet much remains to be 
done. Definitive biographies remain to be written; studies of the lives of major 
political figures, both black and white, similar to those undertaken by La Hausse on 











P R Maylam, "Strategies of Control and Evasion: African Urban History in South Africa, c. 
1900· 1950", Paper presented to the 8th Biennial Meeting of the South African Historical 
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D Hemson, "Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: Dockworkers of Durban", Ph.D. 
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M A thesis, University of Natal (Durban), 1989. 
N L G Cope, "The Zulu Royal family under the South African Government, 1910.1933: 
Solomon kaDinuzulu, Inkatha and Zulu Nationalism", PhD. thesis, University of Natal 
(Durban), 1985; and the published version of this thesis, N Cope, To Bind the Nation: 
Solomon kaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933, University of Natal Press, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1993. 
S Marks, The Ambiguities 0/ Dependence in South A/rica: Class, Nationalism and the State in 
Twentieth-Century Natal, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1986. 
La Hausse, "Ethnicity". 
M Marable, "African Nationalist: The Life of John Langalibalele Dube", Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Maryland, 1976. 
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other major political leaders, would shed more light on the personalities of the 
period. 
But the greatest vacuum that remains in the history of Natal in the twentieth century 
is that created by the absence of any comprehensive economic history. Even the 
recent publication of a volume of essays edited by Guest and Sellers,25 on the 
economic history of the region, although addressing this imbalance, does not go far 
enough towards the writing of an integrated economic history. This is not to decry 
the considerable amount of research that has been focused on aspects of the 
economic history of this province in the twentieth century; studies such as R H 
Smith's monumental work on the labour resources of Natal,26 and Guest's and 
Edgecombe's research on, amongst other areas, the coal-mines of Natal,27 are all 
invaluable sources of information and guidance to any scholar working in this field. 
Particularly valuable, although now a little dated, is the series of Natal RegiolUlI 
Survey volumes, which covered many areas of economic interest including, amongst 
others, the Port of Durban, the reserves and agriculture. 
Just as serious a shortcoming is the lack of integration between the political and the 
economic history of the region; most studies, particularly of this period, are fairly 
rigidly compartmentalised. Judging by them, it would seem that the one aspect 
never impinged on the other; that the economic and the political animals were of 
different species. This study seeks, to some extent, to redress this balance - it sets 
out to show how the economic situation in Natal in the years 1929 to 1933 impacted 
on the political behaviour of people. While stopping short of claiming that all 
political activity was determined by the economic situation, it attempts to show that 
the economic dimension to political behaviour cannot simply be dismissed with a 
passing reference to the effects of the depression and drought. FulJ account has had 
to be taken of the scope and impact of the depression and the drought on all aspects 
25. B Guest and J SeUers (eds), Receded Tides 01 Empire: Aspects 01 the the Social and Economic 
History 01 Natal and Zululand since 1910, University of Natal Press, Pietermaril.lhurg, 1994. 
26. R H Smith, "The Labour Resources of Natal", M.Comm. thesis, University of the 
Witwatersrand,I945. 
27. See Chapter Four. 
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of economic life in the province. This has necessitated considerable research into 
areas of economic activity that initially appeared quite discrete; once that had been 
completed it was possible to draw out certain threads of commonality that ran 
through the entire period and had a definite impact on political activity. Some of 
the conclusions reached are tentative; the lack of evidence, particularly concerning 
some political movements, make this unavoidable. 
In researching this topic, use has been made of a variety of sources. As so little has 
been written on the depression locally, guidance has been sought in the experience 
of researchers in other countries, notably Great Britain and the United States of 
America, where such studies are considerably more advanced. A wealth of material 
exists concerning the events of the depression in the former and extensive use was 
made of such material in the preparatory stages of this research.28 Extensive use 
has also been made of American resources in discussing the origins of the slump; the 
foremost experts in this field are undoubtedly American.29 As far as the depression 
in the Union of South Africa is concerned, so little has been written that much of the 
research was of necessity of a primary nature. Not that primary evidence abounds, 
for the parsimony of the Hertzog governm~nt, during some of the depression years, 
meant that statistical evidence, today considered of value to historians, was then not 
considered important enough to expend valuable state resources in collecting.30 
Fortunately, enough material does exist to provide a basis for understanding and 
analysis.31 Perhaps most valuable of all state documentation consulted was the 
28. See for example, R Culforth, 'Later. Than we Thought: A Portrait 01 the Thirties, David and 
Charles, Devon, 1976; J Hayes and P Nutman, Understanding the Unemployed, Tavistock, 
London,1981; M Muggeridge, The Thirties: 1930-1940 in Great Britain, Collins, London, 
1940; G Rees, The Great Slump: Capitalism in Crisis, 1929-1933, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London, 1971; J Stevenson and C Cook, The Slump: Society and Politics During the 
Depression, Jonathan Cape, London, 1977; J Symons, The Thirties: A Dream Revolved, Faber, 
London, second revised edition, 1975. 
29. See J K Galbraith, The Great Crash,1929, Penguin, London, 1961; C P Kiodleberger, The 
World Depression, 1929-1939, Lane, London, 1977; B Mitchell, Depression Decade, Harper, 
New York, reprinted 1969. 
30. The collection of statistics, including those pertaining to agriculture and industry, was balted as 
an economy measure. Even the general population census of 1931 was restricted to the 
"European" population alone, thus robbing later historians of much valuable information. 
31. This does not mean that such material is accessible to researchers. The Natal records of the 
Department of Labour for this period were still in the process of being sorted and catalogued 
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evidence presented to the Holloway Commission, otherwise known as the Native 
Economic Commission or NEC.32 Thousands of pages of evidence relating to Natal 
and Zululand and beyond were consulted, and valuable material was extracted from 
these. For any researcher of this period these records are a sine qua non.33 Equally 
important, but of a more restricted applicability, are the files of the Chief Native 
Commissioner (CNC) of Natal, housed in the Natal Archives. Much valuable 
information regarding the effects of the depression and the devastating drought on 
the African population of the region was found there. 
Searches of parliamentary records and the personal records of white politiCal 
personalities of the time proved disappointing; little of value was found. The only 
possible exception to this was the collection of Heaton Nicholls papers housed at 
Killie Campbell Africana Library. Nicholls appears to have been possessed of a 
sense of History (or perhaps felt the need to justify his often controversial political 
positions), for he documented much of the local white political scene in Natal during 
the depression years. This collection has long served as the source of much of our 
knowledge about the Natal Devolution League. The papers of this movement, if 
indeed any survived, have yet to be located. Like many of the other transitory 
movements, their activities are known only through the medium of other sources, 
especially the press. 
The press has proved to be a valuable source but, as fact and opinion were often 
confused in these highly partisan times, newspapers had to be treated with caution. 
To some extent, however, they serve as mirrors of the times; reflecting the views and 
~pinions then held by their editors (and to a lesser extent, their readers) and as such, 
have been valuable. Extensive use has been made of the Natal Mercury, Natal 
Witness, Indian Opinion and lIanga lase Natal. Other newspapers have also been 
consulted, but have not proved as valuable as these four. 
and were thUS..nOl available for use. 
32. The Commission reported in 1932. Union of South Africa, Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Social and Economic Conditions of Natives in South Africa, U.G. 22 of 1932. 
33. Marian Lacey ~s d~monslraled the usefulness of these records for any researcher working in 
the field of Afncan life and labour. See M Lacey, Working for Boroko Ravan Johannesburg 
1981. " , 
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On a local level, records of the various town and city councils and their magistracies 
have been extensively utilised, and much valuable information has been gleaned 
from them. A vast amount of correspondence of this type was consulted but, as 
much of it is concerned with minutiae, it is possible to become entirely enmeshed in 
the local affairs of a single town. These records will doubtless prove valuable to any 
future researchers working on the depression in particular urban areas, but when 
writing what is essentially an overview, overindulgence in this direction is a luxury 
which cannot be afforded. 
In writing the chapter concerned with industry in Natal, extensive use had to be 
made of Smith34 and of Katzen.35 Although the latter only deals with greater 
Durban, both made intelligible the rather incomprehensible census and other 
statistical data and were valuable guides to other source material which was then 
consulted. Similarly, the chapter on the coal-mines owes much to the minutes of the 
Natal Coal Owners' Society (NCOS), which as Edgecombe and Guest have 
shown,36 are vital sources for this important industry.37 The writing of the chapter 
on white agriculture was more difficult, mainly due to its diversity in Natal and to 
the lack of any holistic secondary source other than Hurwitz,38 which although 
valuable, did not provide the kind of material required for the depression years. 
Fortunately, Minnaar's work on white agriculture during the depression did provide 
an overview, although on a national level, and it was possible to use his work for 
guidance on state policy and pricing structures, for example. Recourse was then 
taken to both official and unofficial sources on agriculture. Particularly valuable 
were the various journals which served agriculture in the region: The South African 
Sugar Journal and The Farmer in particular, as well as other journals of this type 
that were less parochial in character. The records of the Natal Agricultural Union 
34. Smith, "Labour Resources". 
35. M F Katzen, Industry in Greater Durban Part 1; its Growth and Structure, Natal Town and 
Regional Planning Reports, Vol. 3, Pietermaritzburg, 1961. 
36. Both researchers have made extensive use of these minutes in the studies they have made 
individually and collectively of the mining industry in Natal. 
37. I am deeply indebted to Ruth Edgecombe who willingly lent me copies of these, and other 
valuable sources, pertaining to the coal industry in Natal. 
38. N Hurwitz, Agriculture in Natal, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1957. 
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and its varlOUS affiliated Farmers' Associations39 were less helpful, but 
nevertheless gave some insight into the views of organised agriculture in the 
province. 
Details on the economy of the African reserves of Natal and Zululand were 
extremely difficult to uncover. Fortunately the records of evidence to the NEC are 
quite extensive and much valuable insight was gained from them. It is necessary, 
however, to sort fact from opinion, especially in dealing with the evidence given by 
proponents (and, for that matter, opponents) of the segregationist ideal. The CNC 
files also shed valuable light on the reserves; it was quite illuminating to see how 
concerned certain officials were for the welfare of Africans under their 
administration. Cope's research in Zululand was also a useful pointer. The reserves 
are an area in which a great deal more research is required; so little is known about 
the considerable differences between the reserves of Natal and those of Zululand, 
and between mission reserves an~ state reserves. In a global study of this nature, 
limited as it is by space and scope, it was not possible to delve too deeply into these 
variances, so they must await further research from subsequent historians. 
Quantifying unemployment and distress, and uncovering what was done about it, 
were equally difficult; much of what has been done, especially in terms of 
quantifying unemployment, is necessarily tentative as official statistics are not yet 
available. Fortunately, the issue was of such importance that regular bulletins were 
issued to the press, from which (together with other sources) some idea of the extent 
of this "social evil" has been obtained. 
White politics in Natal has received considerable attention; much has been written 
about the separatist and other "jingoistic" movements. Thompson40 has collated 
much of this work, thereby greatly facilitating an understanding of the nature of 
white politics during the depression. My earlier study of the Natal Devolution 
Movement41 contributed an excellent building-block towards this research. Black 
39. I am grateful for the permission granted by the NAU to consult these records. 
40. P S Thompson, Natalians First: Separatism in South Africa, 1909-1961, Southern, 
Johannesburg, 1990. 
41. D W MEdley, "The Natal Devolution League, 1931-1933", B A(Hons.) dissertation, 
University of Natal (Durban), 1981. 
11 
politics, apart from the obvious focus on the Beer Hall riots and the activities of the 
Communist Party, remains an area awaiting considerable investigation.42 This also 
applies, even more strongly, to the political activities of Indian Natalians during this 
period, which have been almost entirely ignored. La Hausse has indicated what can 
be achieved through a penetrating study of particular historical characters, but many 
more aspects require examination before a complete understanding of black politics 
in Natal can hope to be achieved. 
This thesis, as a local history study, has both strengths and weaknesses; it seeks, for 
the first time, to provide a fuller picture of the depression years across the broad 
geographical area of the then province of Natal, taking account of the diversity of 
experiences and impact. Yet at the same time, because of its nature it must, of 
necessity, be something of a general overview.43 It could not take full account of 
every area, nor of every debate, nor of every tale. Oral evidence has not been 
extensively used, not because oral evidence is not valued, but simply because it is 
felt that a framework of reference has first to be established before the true value of 
oral evidence can be demonstrated. The collective consciousness is replete with 
tales of hardship and suffering during "the years of red dust", but many of these 
would remain unintelligible and inaccessible on their own. More than sixty years 
after the event, hardly any of the significant characters are still alive; myth and 
legend have largely replaced first-hand accounts. These too are valuable and 
deserve to be recorded and analysed once a fuller understanding of the phenomenon 
is established. 
Such a stance may indeed fly . in the face of post-modernist views of history as a 
discipline. However, as many of the mote radical post-modernists appear to reject 
the very bases of current historical endeavour,44 to the extent that almost nothing 
42. Bradford has shown the way in this with her work on the ICU in the countryside. including 
Natal, but much more still has to be done. See H Bradford, A Taste 0/ Freedom: The ICU in 
Rural South A/rica, 1924-1930, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1988. 
43. While some local history purists might take issue with an area as large as the then province of 
Natal being the subject of "local history", I have foUowed the lead given by both Kammen and 
Ke,,:, both of wh~m a~ that researchers might set their own parameters in local history 
studies. See quotabons m C C Eloff, "Aspekte van Plaaslike en Streekgeskiedcnis: Teorie en 
Praktyk", Contree, Vol. 35, June 1994, pp. 11- 12. 
44. See K Jenkins, Re-Thinking History, Routledge, London, 1991. 
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worthwhile can be salvaged, this ideological framework (or the lack of it!) cannot be 
employed. U ntiI historians and philosophers of history have had time to reflect on 
the intellectual challenges posed to their discipline by post-modernists, and have 
formulated adequate responses to it, if indeed such responses can be found, 
research must continue within paradigms that might very well later be shown to be 
outdated and of limited value. In a sense this does not constitute a negation of 
already accepted views of the historian's endeavour, for all accept that there exists 
no definitive version of the past; everything is constantly under scrutiny and subject 
to review. This study lays no claim to being an exception. 
Even a local history study has to make use of some intellectual framework to mould 
the formulation of an hypothesis and to provide a modus operandi for examining the 
evidence. Some rather limited theoretical material has been written about local 
history in South Africa45 and so guidance has had to be sought from English 
historians such as Douch,46 Hoskins47 and Finberg and Skipp.48 Such historians 
have viewed local history as having an important role in building the meso-
narratives so detested by the post-modernists. Only through research and rigorous 
analysis of the local can the general be arriyed at with any degree of accuracy. This 
also appears to be part of the purpose of many of the local history studies produced 
in South Africa.49 
45. Even the excellent collection of local history essays in honour of Wmifred Maxwell omits a 
theoretical chapter. See J A Benyon, C W Cook, T R H Davenport and K SHunt (eds), 
Studies in Local History: Essays in honour of Professor Winifred Maxwell, Oxford University 
Press, Cape Town, 1976. Afrikaner historians, by contrast, have been more active in this field. 
See for example references in Elof(, "Aspekte van Plaaslike en Streekgeskiedenis". 
46. R Douch, Local History and the Teacher, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, reprint 1972. 
47. W G Hoskins, Fieldwork in Local History, Faber and Faber, London, 1967. 
48. H P R rmberg and V H T Skipp, Local History: Objective and Pursuit, David and Charles, 
Newtown Abbot, 1973. 
49. Many of these emanated from the Human Sciences Research Council's Institute for Historical 
Research in the 198Os. See for example, A Minnaar, Empangeni: A Historical Review to 1983, 
HSRC, Pretoria, 1984; A Minnaar, Graal/-Reinet, 1786-1986, HSRC, Pretoria, 1987 and A G 
Oberholster (ed.), Paarl Valley, 1687-1987, HSRC, Pretoria, 1987. The HSRC was also 
~sponsible, for much of this time, for the publication of the journal Contree, which described 
Itself as a Journal for South African Urban and Regional History. Responsibility for the 
publication of this journal was later assumed by the Rand Afrikaans Universiteit. Another 
work worth consulting is C Saunders et al(eds), Studies in the History of Cape Town, Centre 
for African Studies, University of Cape Town, Vol. 5, 1984. 
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Attention shall therefore be focused on the sources that help to explain . the 
phenomenon known as the Great Depression in the geographical area of the then 
province of Natal. Such sources shall be subjected to a rigorous scrutiny and 
analysis in an attempt to explain both the actual impact on the various sectors of the 
economy and on the political activities of the people who lived through the "years of 
red dust". Through this, the hypothesis that the explanation for the political 
behaviour of Natalians during the depression years lies largely in an understanding 
of the socio-economic context of the time, will be tested. It is also hoped that a 
thorough examination will show why the phenomenon known as the "Great 
Depression" has scarred the collective consciousness of all who lived through it. 
Depression studies in this country are still very much in their infancy; in the fullness 
of time a deeper and fuller understanding of the human experience during those 
years will be achieved. Once further work is done elsewhere in the country, 
comparisons will become possible and eventually the complete, integrated history of 




THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
There are nearly as many theories about the causes of the great economic slump that 
struck the western capitalist world in 1929 as there are economists, economic 
historians and historians. It is not the purpose of this study to investigate or 
document these theories in great detail, but any attempt to deal with the Great 
Depression, as it has become known, even in a relatively small province of a remote 
colonial outpost like the Union of South Africa, must take some account of these 
explanations. Although this economic disaster began in Europe and the United 
States of America, its effects rippled out and within a relatively short period of time, 
almost the entire world felt its consequences. · What clearly emerges from a study of 
these causes is how complex and inter-connected they are, but this is hardly 
surprising given the complexity of the world economy. 
Although the collapse of the Wall Street stock market is often regarded as the 
beginning and prime cause of the Great Depression, there were other factors, many 
of which pre-dated the Crash. One of the foremost writers on the depression, J K 
Galbraith, identified one of the early indicators of a financial malaise in the United 
States in the speculative land sales during the 1920s in the state of Florida, where 
Americans " ... were ... displaying an inordinate desire to get rich quickly with a 
minimum of physical effort". 1 Galbraith saw disaster presaged in this, for: 
the Florida land boom · contained all of the elements of the classic 
speculative bubble. There was the indispensable element of 
subStance. Florida had a better winter climate than New York, 
Chicago or Minneapolis. Higher incomes and better transportation 
were making it increasingly accessible to the frost-bound North. The 
time was indeed comin$ when the annual flight to the South would be 
as regular as the rmgrations of the Canada Goose. On that 
indispensable element of fact, men and women had proceeded to 
build a world of speculative make-believe. This was a world inhabited 
not by people who haye t0
2
be persuaded to believe but by people who 
want an excuse to believe. 
1. Galbraith, Great Crash, p. 32. 
2. Ibid., p. 32. 
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Galbraith argued that the importance of this speculative "bubble" lies not in the 
considerable amounts of money involved, but in the fact that the faith of the average 
speculator was not at all shaken by the sudden collapse of the Florida land market. 
He wrote: 
The Florida boom was the first indication of the mood of the twenties 
and the conviction that God intended the American middle class to be 
rich. But that this mood survived the Florida collapse is still more 
remarkable. It was widely understood that things had gone to pieces 
in Florida. While the number of speculators was almost certainly 
small compared with the subsequent participation in the stock market, 
nearly every community contamed a man who was known to have 
taken "quite a beating" m Florida. For a century after the collapse of 
the South Sea Bubble, Englishmen regarded the most reputable joint 
stock companies with some suspicion. Even as the Florida boom 
collapsed, the faith of Americans in quick, effortless:fnrichment in the 
stock market was becoming every day more evident. 
And indeed it was. The prices and number of shares traded on the stock market, 
despite a few fluctuations, increased dramatically throughout the 1920s. Taking the 
Dow-Jones industrial average as a barometer, the index stood at 191 in early 1928; 
by September 1929, the index had risen to a massive 381, or nearly double in two 
years.4 Even more spectacular was the rise in the The New York Times index of 25 
industrial stocks, which had stood at 110 in early 1924. By January 1929 the index 
had climbed to 338 and by September of that year to 452.5 This massive surge was 
only distantly related to the performance of the American economy which, 
according to some figures, was already beginning to show the first symptoms of a 
deep-seated malaise. It was far more directly related to speculation. 
That self-same desire to enrich themselves with little or no actual physical effort 
which had led Americans to speculate in land in Florida, Galbraith and others have 
argued, led Americans to speculate in shares on the stock market. 6 Shares were not 
3. Ibid., p. 35. 
4. Kindleberger, Depression, p. 108. 
S. R Robertson and G Walton, History of the American Economy, Harcourt Brace Janovich, 
New York, 4th edition, 1979, p. 407. 
6. Galbraith was especially harsh in his criticisms of explanations of the stock market crash that 
regarded it as the result of a lack of governmental control; he explained it rather as another 
example of the "get rich quickly" mentality of the American middle class. See Galbraith, Great 
Crash, p. 39. 
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bought with the primary purpose of investing money in dividend-paying enterprises, 
but with the idea of selling those shares as soon as possible at the greatest possible 
profit.7 Such was the demand for shares from the speculating public, that prices 
were driven ever higher, as the number of buyers often far exceeded the number of 
shares available. Shares thus acquired an entirely artificial value, a demand value, 
often totally unrelated to the actual performance of the company concerned. This 
heated climate also proved ideal for the less than scrupulous, and there were any 
number of bogus companies whose shares were offered for sale on the market, and 
whose shares were actually traded long after the confidence tricksters behind them 
had taken the initial investment and disappeared.8 
Trading in shares of companies quoted on the stock exchange was not restricted to 
the rich, for most of the purchases were made "on margin" - credit which the 
stockbroker advanced to the client against the security of the shares bought - and, 
this facility was open to practically anyone who had enough capital to meet the 
initial margin demanded by the stockbrokers.9 Such people were not necessarily 
tycoons, and included even waiters and taxi drivers.10 Soon many thousands of 
people all over the United States (and even abroad) had an interest in the market 
and watched its fluctuations avidly, each buying and selling shares according to 
whim or to "information" received. So great was the speculation that the amount 
loaned by brokers to their clients in such transactions rose dramatically in the late 
1920s. From a figure of between $1 billion and $1,5 billion in the early years of the 
decade, it rose to $2,5 billion in 1926, to $3,5 billion in 1927, and then by the end of 
1928, to a staggering $6 billion. 11 The indebtedness was offset by loans from banks, 
as the shares had to be paid for. 
7. Ibid., p. 46. 
8. IGndleberger, Depression, p. 109. Such fmanciaJ chicanery was not restricted to the United 
States. In September 1929, the fraudulent enterprise of Clarence Hatry who had attempted to 
take control of British iron and steel companies was exposed, causing great consternation and 
loss of confidence in the City of London. This incident may very well have contributed to the 
general instability of the fmanciaJ world. Minnaar, "South African White Agricuhure", p, 14. 
9. Galbraith, Great Crash, pp. 46-50. 
10. Ibid" p. 101. 
U. Ibid., pp. 48 - 49. 
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Shares were also sold in holding companies which were merely paper corporations, 
resulting in a "paper chain" structure with as much substance as a house of cards. 12 
When, in late September and early October 1929, the market finally began to falter, 
and the brokers began to call in their margins,13 the entire house of cards came 
tumbling down. Speculators, unable to supply the extra cash and eager to save 
whatever they could, unloaded their shares in a massive selling spree that resulted in 
the shares of even the most reputable "gilt" companies trading for a fraction of their 
real value. Millions of shares were traded and the ticker tape, for so long the 
harbinger of good fortune, could not keep up with the rapid plunge of prices.14 
Despite valiant efforts from some of the major bankers like J P Morgan,15 the 
prices continued to fall and as they did, the panic set in. 
That thousands of speculators stood to lose everything they had invested was bad 
enough, but what greatly exacerbated matters was the fact that some bankers had 
invested the savings of clients in the heady days of the rising market, when it seemed 
that such speculation was more than justified because of the enormous returns that 
could be had. 16 Such banks, once the market began to falter, could not meet their 
normal commitments because they now held wads of useless paper which they could 
no longer convert into cash. A shortage of ~ency ensued which naturally alarmed 
all those depositors who had entrusted their savings to such institutions and they 
rushed to withdraw their money. The result was a ''bank run" which turned into a 
mass panic. Even the larger banks were thus affected and eventually thousands 
were forced to close their doors. 
Within a four year period the number of banks in the United States 
declined from 25 568 with assets in excess of 572 billion, to 14771, 
with assets of 551 billion. . Perhaps no figures more dramatically tell 
the . story of the depression. Certainly the depression cannot be 
attnbuted solely to oanking practices, yet they were intrinsic to its 
coming. Banks enthusiastically committed themselves to the stock 
market and_ investment booms of the 19205, but of course they were 
not alone. 17 
12. Minnaar, ·South African White Agriculture", p. 13. 
13. Robertson and Walton, History 01 the American Economy, p. 407. 
14. Galbraith, Great Crash, pp. 118 - 119. 
15. Ibid., pp. 123 - 125. 
16. See K L Bryant and H C Dethloff, A History 01 American Business, Prentice HaU, New 
Jersey, 1983, pp. 227 - 230. 
17. Ibid., p. 227. 
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Even the Federal Reserve Board, the federal agency which allowed the government 
of the United States a measure of control over the banking system, did not take firm 
enough action to control the money supply and this helped both precipitate and 
deepen the crisis.18 Furthermore, it was through the banking sytem that the crisis in 
the United States assumed world-wide proportions. 
The larger banking institutions of the United States had been in the habit of lending 
money not only domestically, but also abroad, including to the defeated powers of 
the First World War.19 The great inflation in Germany in the early 1920s, which so 
destabilised the country that it threatened to bring about chaos and anarchy, was 
prompted by the payment in gold of war reparations. Attempting to meet the 
outrageous demands of the victorious allies, the German government was unable to 
meet its domestic commitments and the country was teetering on the brink of total 
collapse. Fighting for survival, the German government printed massive amounts of 
paper money, but without the gold to back this up in accordance with the gold 
standard, this merely resulted in inflation on a scale never before witnessed in the 
capitalist world. This hyperinflation had the printing presses running day and night, 
printing ever larger denominations of near worthless paper money. So severe was 
the crisis that the elabOrate notes of the Reichsbank gave way to paper money 
printed on smaller sized paper and on one side only!20 The Dawes Plan of 1924, 
and the Young Plan of 1929, had pulled Germany back from the brink by the 
rescheduling of her debt, and by the massive injection of dollars loaned on a short-
term basis by the larger American banks. When these banks suddenly found 
themselves in trouble at home, they immediately set about recalling their foreign 
loans. 
The consequences were severe indeed, especially in Germany and Austria. In the 
latter country, one of its largest banks, the Kredit Anstalt, failed as a direct 
consequence. Not only were American loans recalled, but credit dried up too. The 
fragile economies of Europe found themselves without capital and, because of the 
18. Ibid., pp. 228 - 229; Robertson and Walton, History 0/ the American Economy, pp. 409 - 413. 
19. American loans to Europe stood at $3,5 billion by 1929. F P Chambers, This Age 0/ Conflict; 
the Western World, 1914 to the Present, New York, 1962, p. 304. 
20. German banknotes in my possession illustrate this cleady. 
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crash, without markets. A lack of markets meant a lack of income and as a result, 
world trade began to shrink dramatically. The spiral of the depression began, 
because without markets enterprises in Europe (and elsewhere) found themselves 
having to layoff workers. Such unemployment only resulted in a diminution in the 
domestic buying power, which in turn led naturally to more unemployment. 
But it would be fallacious to attribute the entire economic catastrophe to the chain 
of events consequent upon the Wall Street Crash, for many economists and 
economic historians point to other, more subtle and pre-existing economic 
conditions which undoubtedly also played their role in the tragedy. One of these 
factors is directly related to the Union of South Africa, as it concerns the 
overproduction of primary products, particularly agricultural products. During the 
Great War, other nations of the world began to supply food to the belligerent 
parties. Their production increased to make good the shortfall occasioned by falling 
European manpower21 and the loss of farm land which resulted from the conflict.22 
This was particularly true of the United States, Australia, Canada and some South 
American countries. Farmers in these countries were encouraged to produce more 
as prices tended to drift sharply upwards and were at a higher level in the early 
1920s than they had been in 1913.23 The increased production was made possible 
by the farmers borrowing money and so falling into debt. Indebtedness among 
farmers world-wide increased dramatically between 1913 and 1928.24 Moreover, 
this increased production did not cease when the war ended and so the world market 
,became saturated with an oversupply of agricultural goods after the war. In fact, by 
1928, the returns that farmers the world over were receiving for their produce had 
experienced a marked and steady decline.25 This did not only apply to food, but to 
other products like wool, which, was also facing stiff competition from newly 
discovered man-made fibres.26 
21. D H Heaton, Economic History of Europe, Harper & Row, New York, 1966, p. 673. 
22. Ibid., p. 675. 
23. Kindleberger, Depression, pp. 100 - 107. 
24. Ibid., p. W. 
25. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 5. 
26. Although rayon had been in use before the war, the difficulties in obtaining supplies of wool 
during ~e conflict had promoted its use. After the war, demand for rayon increased 
substantially. S B Clough and C W Cole, Economic History of Europe, D C Heath & Co, 
Boston, 1966, pp. 544 and 777. 
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To recoup the losses occasioned by falling prices, farmers produced even more, thus 
further aggravating the already serious oversupply.27 While this was often a "knee-
jerk" reaction, there were times when the surpluses were deliberate government 
policy, as in the case of the Soviet Union in the early 1930s. So desperate were the 
communist rulers to turn their agricultural exports into foreign exchange to buy 
machinery, that they flooded the world market with wheat while their own peasants 
starved to death. Some figures serve to illustrate this. In 1929, the USSR exported 
100000 metric tons of grain. By 1930, deliberate policy had seen this increase to 
2 290 000, and in 1931 to 5 220 000 tons. Although the amount of grain exported rose 
dramatically, the returns were actually falling, and did not keep pace with the 
increasing rate of production.28 
To complicate matters further, underlying fiscal measures in the shape of tariff 
barriers prevented free trade, particularly in agricultural products. It was impossible 
for governments to stockpile the surplus products endlessly, so it had become 
customary to "dump" the surplus on unsuspecting countries - often at a loss - just 
so that the farmers in the producing countries would receive some return, no matter 
how small. 29 This procedure naturally undermined the domestic markets of the 
receiving countries, as farmers could then not sell their products as the "dumped" 
goods always undercut domestic prices. To prevent "dumping" and to protect 
domestic economies, protective tariffs were introduced throughout the world. But 
this did not only apply to agricultural products; a whole range of domestic industries 
throughout the world also enjoyed such protection. 
The Congress of the United State~ passed several such measures in the first few 
decades of the twentieth century.30 The Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 and the 
Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930 protected a whole host of domestic producers.31 The 
latter also prompted a rash of similar tariffs and quotas in other countries around 
27. KindJeberger, Depression, p. 107. 
28. Ibid., p. 93. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Bryant and Dethloff, A History 0/ American Business, p. 244. 
31. C Saint-Etienne, T~ Great Depression, 1929-1938: Lessons lor t~ 198Os, Hoover Institution 
Standford University, Stanford, Cal., 1984, p. 13 - 15. ' 
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the globe,32 all of which contributed to a decline in trade. Thus the rise in political 
nationalism during this period was coupled with a kind of economic nationalism as 
countries engaged in tit for tat protectionism and strove for national self-
sufficiency.33 
Lastly, but by no means of least importance, was the institution of the gold standard. 
Adherance to the gold standard required that the value of a country's currency 
should be determined by a specific mass of gold.34 But as Lubbe points out, there 
were many different forms of the standard, variations brought about by convenience 
and the availability of gold.35 In 1922, however, the Geneva Convention instituted 
a new form of the gold standard under which banknotes were no longer freely 
convertible into gold.36 Control of the value of a specific currency would 
thenceforth be in the hands of governments in conjunction with central or reserve 
banks}7 By this means, the main trading nations of the world were attempting to 
impose a measure of stability on exchange rates.38 But this system could not 
alleviate the imbalance of international payments, or the loss of confidence in the 
financial world. These factors tended to nullify the benefits derived from adherence 
to the gold standard.39 It is obvious then, that the entire basis upon which the post-
war economic system had been constructed was unstable and unpredictable.40 
When the Austrian and German banks found themselves in difficulties as a result of 
the withdrawal of short-term loans,~1 British holdings in Germany were frozen, 42 
32. Ibid., pp. 28 - 29. 
33. D H Aldcroft, The European Economy: 1914-1980, Croom Helm, London, 1982, p. 83. 
34. A J Lubbe, "Die Goudstandaardkwessie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1931 -1932", M A 
thesis, Potchefstroom University for Chris~ Higher Education, 1986, p. 1. 
35. Ibid., pp. 1-7. 
36. P Einzig, The Destiny of Gold, MacMillan, London, 1972, p. 36. 
37. M Palyi, The Twilight of Gold, 1914-1936: Myths and Realities, H G Regnery & Co, Chicago, 
1972, p. 113. 
38. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture" p. 18. 
39. Ibid. 
40. C R Curtis, The'Goid Standard and the Crisis, Charles Griffm & Co, London. l\l~l. p. 31. 
41. See above, p. 18. 
42. W A Br~WD, The International Gold Standard Re-interpreted, 1919-1934, Nalinnal Bureau of 
Econoauc Research, New York, 1940, pp. 1044 - 1045. 
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causing panic and the withdrawal of funds from Britain.43 This compounded the 
problems caused in 1925 when Great Britain returned to the gold standard with an 
over-valued pound.44 Gold was withdrawn from Britain, despite attempts by the 
Bank of England to keep it in the country by raising the bank rate. Investors wanted 
to secure their capital and were less concerned about the interest they might earn.45 
Loans from outside Britain failed to improve matters46 and eventually, on 21 
September 1931, Britain was forced to leave the standard.47 
The value of the British pound sterling fell from its traditional level of $4,86 to 
$3,2548 and this set up a ripple effect in the Empire and in Europe.49 Countries 
which had Britain as a major trading partner had to follow suit, as they suddenly 
found their goods more expensive in Britain, while British goods became cheaper in 
their own countries, thus upsetting their balance of trade.50 The Union of South 
Africa refused to follow suit, a decision which was to have dire consequences for the 
South African economy.51 
While the gold standard was undoubtedly a major cause of instability, its effects 
were exacerbated by the prevailing woes of the capitalist world. Some of the effects 
of the slump have already been outlined but perhaps it remains to point out the cost 
in human terms of this "crisis of capitalism". Stevenson and Cook, in their study of 
the effects of the depression in the United Kingdom, highlighted the social impact of 
unemployment, poverty and the general feeling of helplessness, and held that the 
experience was imprinted on the "collective consciousness" of the British people.52 
Other studies from elsewhere in the world also highlight these aspects.53 
43. R G Hawtrey, T~ Gold Standard in T~ory and Practice, Longmans, Green & Co, London, 
1947, pp. 134 - 135. 
44. Lubbe, "Goudstandaardkwessie", p. 8. 
45. Rees, Great Slump, p. 185. 
46. Lubbe, "Goudstaodaardkwessie", p. 12. 
47. Ibid., p. 14. 
48. Latham, Depression, p. 57. 
49. Ibid., p. 58 and Heaton, Economic History of Europe, pp. 702 - 703. 
SO. Latham, Depression, pp. 58 - 66. 
51. This will be discussed at length below. 
52. Stevenson and Cook, T~ Slump, pp. 3 - 4. 
53. See (or example K Amos, T~ New Guard Movement, 1931-1935, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne, 1~6; W K Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. 2, 
P~oblems of Economic Policy, 1918-1939, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1940; 
KindJetx:rger, Depression; Latham, Depression; W Woytinsky, T~ Social Consequences of t~ 
Economlc Depression, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1936. 
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Unemployment occurred on a massive scale in the main industrialised countries. By 
1933 there were three million unemployed in Britain, five million in Germany and at 
least six million in the United States.54 This massive unemployment was perhaps 
the most obvious and tangible of the effects of the depression on ordinary people 
who experienced them. Statistical analyses and graphs of the decline in Gross 
Domestic Product meant little to those not initiated into their mysteries, but those 
accustomed to work surely felt the impact when their livelihoods were removed -
for reasons which they could not even begin to fathom - and they and their 
dependants suddenly felt the cutting edge of poverty. Wotinsky put it well: 
The tragic aspect of the situation of the workers during the depression 
was that they were struggling with an unseen foe. They felt the 
presence of the depression; they were in its grip; but th5~ could not 
see whence it came and they did not know how to fight it. 
The Union of South Africa, although far removed from the great financial capitals, 
was nevertheless part of the world economy through its dependence on trade. The 
Union was largely a producer of primary products, many of which were exported for 
further processing overseas. 56 As the economies of the major industrialised 
countries waxed and w~ed, the South African market responded. This is nowhere 
more evident than in the way in which the agricultural sector of the South African 
economy was affected by the rapid decline in prices during the latter half of the 
1920s and early 1930s.57 
Long before the Wall Street Crash, the ills of the domestic agricultural sector were 
becoming apparent. Declining prices had already made themselves felt during the 
latter half of the decade, particularly among the most important agricultural exports 
- wool, sugar, tobacco, wattle bark and wattle extract, skins and hides, maize and 
mohair.58 These falls in price, caused largely by the oversupply to markets in the 
54. J Tinbergen, Lessons from the Past, Elsevier Pub. Co, New Yorlc, 1963, pp. 60 - 61; Aldcroft, 
European Economy, p. 94. Some authors put the fJglUe as high as 13 million in the United 
States alone. See H N Scheiber, H G Vatter and H U Faulkner, American Economic History, 
Harper and Row, New York, 1976, p.357. 
55. Wolinsky, Social Consequences, p. 192. 
56. Nattrass, South African Economy, pp. 110 - 111. 
57. See above, pp. 20 - 21. 
58. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 21. 
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developed world, impacted negatively on the fortunes of local farmers. At the very 
best of times, farming was a risky venture. The weather, pests and diseases often 
acted in concert to undermine the profitability of the commercial farmer. Indeed, 
during the depression years, natural disasters joined with the prevailing economic 
situation (both domestically and overseas) to rob the South African farmers of their 
expected profits, as there were plagues of locusts, tsetse flies and mosquitoes. More 
serious than any of these, however, was the great drought that turned much of the 
interior of the country into a wasteland. 
Farmers regarded natural calamities as part and parcel of their 
farming operations and accepted them as such. But they could not be 
blamed for despairing when they experienced all of them at the same 
time. The cumulative effect of all these natural disasters coupled with 
their existing economic hardships ... came veryS9close to crippling 
permanently the farming industry in South Africa. 
When instability of price for the final product was added into the formula, it became 
a recipe for disaster. 
Farmers could never be certain what price their produce would fetch on the open 
(overseas) market and, despite tariff protection afforded some products, and 
attempts at price control of others through control boards, their fortunes had been in 
decline throughout the latter half of the 1920s.60 Many farmers responded to the 
decline in their incomes by increasing production, further saturating the market and 
driving prices even further downwards. To make matters worse, many farmers had 
saddled themselves with large debts, incurred during the heady days of the First 
World War, when capital was needed for expansion and mechanisation. Prices were 
~o fall even further during the depression, as the already oversupplied markets 
shrank with the reduction in the spending power of the consumers who were the 
end-users. The laws of supply and demand worked to the detriment of the South 
African farmer, not ooly overseas, but also domestically. 
Agricultural products such as wool, mohair, maize, skins, hides, tobacco, wattle bark, 
wattle extract and sugar, formed the basis of agricultural exports, earning the 
country valuable income. However, the declining demand for agricultural produce 
59. Ibid., p. 188. 
60. Ibid., pp. 33 - 135. 
25 
on the world market saw the income of producers fall by £5 million in the second 
half of 1929 alone.61 This unhealthy situation continued to deteriorate as can be 
clearly illustrated by the decline in the value of agricultural produce, livestock and 
food exported between 1928 and 1931. In 1928, such exports totalled £31820 000, 
but fell drastically to only £12 936000 in 1931, rising marginally again in 1932 to a 
total of £13 373000.62 This decline does not reveal the full extent of the problem, 
as these figures only represent exports. If the domestic market is included, as 
Minnaar has shown, the value of agricultural production in South Africa also fell 
precipitously, declining by almost 70 per cent between 1929 and 1932.63 
Obviously some geographical areas and agricultural sectors were more affected than 
others but generally, by 1933, farmers countrywide were on the brink of ruin. Stock 
losses ran into the millions, and it was to be several years before the South African 
farmer recovered from the trauma of this period, and then only with considerable 
government assistance.64 
Yet the agricultural sector was only one of the major economic sectors in the country 
which was hard hit by the depression and drought. Other sectors were also directly 
linked to world trade and therefore to the fluctuations of the world business and 
trade cycle. The products of the great mineral wealth of the country were largely 
exported. Diamonds, which had been one of the major exports of the Union, 
earning £10 751126 in 1929, suddenly found no market in the depressed conditions 
overseas and the prices obtained fell dramatically, from 80s 8d per carat in 1929, to 
only 35s 1d in 1932. This had severe repercussions on the local diamond mines and 
related industries, with certain mines being closed and others placed on short time. 
Eventually, in 1932, most diamond.mining ceased altogether as stockpiles of stones 
had been built up. Workers were laid off until conditions improved. The value of 
diamonds exported in 1933 was a paltry £991540.65 
61. Ibid, p. 21. 
62. Union of South Africa, Year Book, No.18, 1937, p. ~5 and pp. 1009 - 1010. 
63. Ibid. 
64. For a full discussion of the various misfortunes that plagued South African farmers, see 
Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", pp. 186 - 198. 
65. Union of South Africa, Year Book, No. 17, 1934-35, p. 661. 
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Although only approximately 10 per cent of the Union's coal production was 
exported, another 10 per cent was sold as bunkering coal to steamships and can thus 
also be included in "exports". The price of coal fell continuously throughout the 
depression66 and, although the falls were certainly not precipitous, it is interesting 
to note that the price of coal from the mines in Natal fell by 12,4 per cent between 
1928 and 1932, a much greater percentage than the 2,3 per cent fall in prices of coal 
from the mines in the Transvaal during the same period. This was due to the fact 
that Natal mines depended very heavily on exports and bunkering, while the 
Transvaal mines catered for the internal market. However, a number of warm 
winters on the highveld reduced the internal demand for coal, so the true picture of 
the decline of the Union coal-mining industry is only revealed when production 
levels are taken into account. Union coal production fell from 13913 000 tons to 
10 650 000 tons between 1929 and 1932 (some 23 per cent), while the value of coal 
fell by 28 per cent in the corresponding period.67 Again, the slump in this sector of 
the mining industry had severe repercussions, especially in Natal, where several of 
the mines were closed or placed on short time, resulting in further unemployment 
and hardship. 
Only in the gold-mining sector was the situation any better.68 Katzen has pointed 
out that gold played a crucial role in sheltering the Union economy from the worst 
effects of the depression, when other sectors of the economy were to collapse before 
the onslaught.69 This view is supported by 0 Hobart Houghton and C G W 
Schumann, both of whom point out that if the price of gold is maintained then 
during times of domestic depression the decline in production costs makes gold 
mining more profitable.70 Not only did this factor allow the operations of the 
"marginal" mines to continue,71 but it also enabled dividends to be maintained. 
66. P E HaU; "The Coal Industry in the Union of South Africa; South African Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 16, 1948, p. 248. 
67. Ravenscroft, "Depression", pp. 20 - 21. 
68. D G Fransen and H J J Reynders (eds), Die Ekonomiese !.ewe van Suid-Afrika. Pretoria, 1963, 
p.55. 
69. Katzen, Gold, p. 29. 
70. Hobart Houghton, South African Economy, pp. 112 - 113; Schumann, Structural Changes, p. 
333. 
71. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 69. 
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Employment on these mines actually increased during the depression.72 As 
Schumann wrote: 
Summing up, we may say that the total effect of the gold-mining 
industry on the general business cycle of South Africa, through the 
demand for labour and the distribution of the total mining income, has 
been distinctly stabilizin~. lf3 this respect South Africa is in a unique 
and very fortunate position. 
When Britain left the gold standard in September 1931, the price of gold rose and 
this rise continued when the Union Government left the standard in December 
1932. By 1934, the gold price had increased by a massive 60 per cent.74 Not only 
did the gold mines remain profitable during the depression, but it bears emphasising 
that they maintained and even increased employment at a time when unemployment 
in other sectors of the economy was rife. The gold mines also had a "ripple effect" as 
their increased consumption of goods helped to buoy up the otherwise stagnant local 
economy. The gold mines spent £36 000 000 in the Union in 1931, of which 
£15 200 000 was spent on wages and £16 000 000 on stores and supplies. 
Furthermore, it was argued that 33 per cent of all government revenue was 
attributable, in one form or another, to the gold-mining industry.75 
This assertion is borne out by the following table, in which the net contribution of 
the gold-mining sector to the national income of the Union is made quite clear. Of 
particular interest must be the large increase between 1931/32 and 1932/33, the 






Net contributions of various mining industries 
to the national income of the Union of South Africa 
in £ millions 
Year Gold Other 
1928/29 31,1 13,9 
1929/30 32,4 11,4 
1930/31 32,4 7,0 
1931/32 34,8 4,4 
1932/33 51,7 4,7 
1933/34 53,6 4,8 
Source: Katzen, Gold, pp.' 48 - 49. 
Hobart Houghton, South African Economy, pp. Ill· 113. 
Schumann, Structural changes, p. 333. 
Katzen, Gold, p. 29. 









The economic growth of the Union was dependent on imports, particularly of the 
machinery required to nurture its nascent industrial capacity. In the early decades of 
this century consumer items were also largely imported.76 The Union of South 
Africa then, could be classed very much as a "developing nation", although its great 
mineral wealth gave it a position in the world economy different to that of other 
developing nations within the British Empire.?7 
However, since the import/export relationship is often used by economists as an 
indicator of the health of an economy, it is worthwhile examining this for the period 
of the depression. 
Table 2.2 
Annual Value of Imports into the Union (including Government stores) but 
excluding specie, and Annual Value of Exports, (including ship stores) 
Year Imports (£) Exports (£) 
1928 79087656 96460170 
1929 83449196 97757484 
1930 64558504 83409477 
1931 52945175 71829564 
1932 32672539 68938001 
1933 49121020 95275389 
Source: Union of South Africa, Union Year Book, No. 16, 1933/34, pp. 597, 602. 
It is interesting to note that while imports fell by almost 59 per cent between 1928 
and 1932, exports only decline~ by approximately 29 per cent in the same period, a 
result of the stabilising influence of 'gold e~ports. This had a fairly positive effect on 
the balance of payments, but indicates to what extent the domestic market for 
imported goods had declined. 
The Gross Domestic Product (GOP) of the Union reflects a similar decline during 
the depression years, as Table 1.3 shows: 
76. Nattrass, South African Economy, p. 269. 
77. Latham, Depression, pp. 170 - 171. 
Table 2.3 
Gross Domestic Product of the Union of South Africa 










Source: J J Stadler, "Die Bruto Binnelandse Produk van Suid-Afrik~ 1911-
1959", D.Comm. thesis, University of Pretoria, 1962, p. 503. 
The GDP therefore, declined by £67,3 million between 1928 and 1932, or by some 
23 per cent.79 The GDP of 1932 was the lowest since the disastrous year of 1922, 
when the strike by miners on the Witwatersrand and the post-war depression had 
disrupted the economy.80 The real Net Domestic Product calculated on a per capita 
basis fell from £3118s in 1928 to £24 8s in 1932.81 
As the economy spiralled deeper and deeper into depression economic activity 
slowed, resulting in cost-cutting measures to keep business enterprises afloat. One 
of the largest cost factors in most enterprises is labour and it therefore stands to 
reason that labour costs were trimmed. This was done in several ways; short time 
was introduced, more expensive labour was replaced by cheaper labour, and wages 
were cut. If all else failed, workers were retrenched. Such retrenchments had 
further unforeseen consequences in that the buying power of retrenched workers 
was greatly diminished, further shrinking demand, especially for consumer items. 
This resulted in enterprises supplying these items becoming unprofitable and more 
workers being laid off, thus continuing the downward spiral of the depression. 
The Hertzog government became aware of the rising tide of unemployment in the 
Union, but their appreciation of the problem was limited as their statistics were 
78. Stadler uses rands, but I have coverted these to pounds on the basis of R2 = £1. 
79. Edley, "Population", p. 4. 
SO. Stadler, "Bruto Binnelandse Produk", p. 503. 
81. Ibid., p. 518. 
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based on the numbers of white males registered as unemployed with the 
Department of Labour offices in urban areas and the Post Office exchanges in rural 
areas. There was no unemployment insurance in the Union at that time82 and 
there was no obligation placed on the unemployed to register as unemployed. The 
Department of Labour acted merely as a placement agency, directing men where 
employment could be found, either on relief works or in private enterprise. When 
there seemed to be little likelihood of employment, men either did not register or 
did not renew their monthly registrations. The Divisional Inspector of the 
Department of Labour.in Durban, Mr M Tobias, put it thus: 
There is no compulsory registration, so the Department is unable to 
give an accurate estimate of the actual number out of employment. 
Although we are in fairly close touch with the position in Durban, it 
must be realised that there is obviously no incentive for men to 
register when there is almost no likelihood of .the Department being 
able to find vacancies for these persons to fill.83 
This was by no means a local problem, as the Minister of Labour, Colonel Cresswell, 
had admitted in 1931 that the government had only a vague idea of the 
unemployment situation for the number of registered unemployed did not reflect 
the true situation.84 A Durban Member of Parliament, Mr H B Borlase, suggested 
that not only was the situation twice as bad as it seemed, but no account was being 
taken of dependants of the unemployed. The Carnegie Commission did include 
dependants when it reported in 1932 that 300 000 white South Africans were "very 
poor" and were living below the poverty datum line.85 
It is also worth noting that very little was done at the time to document the 
unemployment of women or people of colour.86 The prevailing ethos was that the 
governmenfs first priority should lie with adult white males. 
82. R H Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, 1910-1960, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1979, 
p. 90 (Note 9) and pp. 316 - 317. 
83. Natal Mercury, 16 April 1932. 
84. Natal Mercury, 29 September 1931. 
85. J J Breitenbach, South Africa in the Modern World (1910-1970), Shuter and Shooter 
Pietermaritzburg,I977, pp.371 - 372. These ftgures mean that one out of every five whit~ 
South Africans feU into this category. 
86. See below pp. 209 - 210. 
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Even though the statistics have severe limitations, the unemployment situation in 
the Union must be examined through this avenue, as there is no other analytic tool 
available to the researcher. The unemployment statistics of the Union reveal that in 
1929 there were approximately 3 800 white men registered as unemployed with the 
Department of Labour.87 Registrations increased steadily throughout the 
depression, reaching a peak of 39 309 in October 1933.88 Actually there were only 
some 13 703 white men registered as unemployed at that point, but the figure of 39 
309 includes those whites employed on relief works.89 It has been argued that relief 
works were nothing other than "disguised unemployment", for they did not create 
full-time long-term employment. Employment on relief works was inferior, was 
performed at a reduced rate of wages, and was only accepted in the face of 
unemployment in the formal sector of the economy. 
The argument is, no doubt, that these persons would have been idle 
had it not been for relief works, at best; it is a matter of "disguised 
unemployment". 90 
It is necessary therefore, to keep the number of men employed on relief works in 
mind when endeavouring to recreate the unemployment situation that prevailed in 
the Union during the depression years. 
Table 2.4 
Index of Employment in the Union, 1928 - 1935 




























Source: Union of South Mrica, Year &ok, No. 18, 1937, p. 923 and No. 19, 





Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 46. 
Davies, Capital, p. 247. 
Union of S.outh Africa, Report of the Department of Labour, U.G. 37/1933, p. 5. 
Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 47. 
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The apparent conflict over which year represents the nadir of the depression in the 
Union is easily explained. The depression did not manifest itself evenly over the 
whole of the Union simultaneously; the situation in the urban areas was worst in 
September/October 1932, while the situation in the rural areas continued to decline 
in 1933, probably as a result of the prevailing drought, locust infestations and an 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.91 Be this as it may, it is now generally 
accepted that the turning point of the depression was in October 1932.92 
As the depression worsened and the ranks of the unemployed were swollen by 
further retrenchments and population migration to the major urban centres, the 
question of ultimate responsibility for alleviating the distress began to arise. Unlike 
governments in most other countries of the world affected by the depression, the 
Union government, headed by Hertzog, was slow to accept ultimate responsibility 
for the solution to the problem in urban areas. It preferred to force local authorities 
to meet most of the attached costs and used the depression to advance greatly the 
implementation of their "civilised labour" policies throughout both the state and 
private sectors of the economy. 
The local authorities, however, while doing what they could, were not prepared to 
incur debts to assist any other than their own burgesses. Individual capacities to 
assist also varied greatly from town to town, often forcing unemployed people to 
migrate to where the capacity to assist was greater. Most assistance provided by the 
state, at local, provincial and even central government level, was in the form of 
relief works which involved strenuous forms of manual labour, which was not 
feasible for all the unemployed. Conditions on the relief works were such that men 
were not encouraged to stay any longer than was absolutely necessary. Many of the 
unemployed considered such work for the low wages paid as beneath them and so 
refused this type of assistance. No one in government wanted to create an entire 
class of people dependent on the state for employment; nor were any measures such 
as cash payments to assist the unemployed (the "dole") ever contemplated during the 
depression years. The official view, shared by a large proportion of the unemployed 
themselves, was that such assistance was charity and was degrading and demeaning 
91. Ibid., p. 46. 
92. Schumann, Structural changes, pp. 245 - 252. 
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and would not contribute towards social upliftment, but would ultimately destroy 
the work ethic of the people. 
A small proportion of the unemployed were enterprising enough to eke out a living 
in the informal sector of the economy, although some of their activities, such as the 
sale of liquor to Africans, were illegal. Some others became charity cases and 
"milked" the situation for all it was worth. To combat this, efforts were made at the 
local level to co-ordinate assistance to ensure that it was evenly distributed. 
In the rural areas, however, great expense and effort was expended in assisting the 
"poor whites". Numerous schemes were instituted to keep farmers on their farms 
and to provide relief for those forced to leave. Vast amounts of scarce state 
resources were expended in bringing relief to farmers, which helps to explain why 
the government was hampered in doing more for the urban unemployed.93 
Very little was done to improve the situation of race groups other than white, or of 
women. Ultimately, what was done was barely adequate and the distress caused by 
the most visible effect of the depression was to live on, long after the economy 
recovered and the unemployed were reabsorbed. 
Unemployment was one of the more tangible effects of the depression, for it 
affected many in the Union. The psychological effects on people raised to believe 
that work was both a divine institution and a human necessity were severe. Many 
complained of social inadequacy, despondency, chronic depression and a feeling of 
helplessness.94 Many men were unable to fulfil their role as breadwinners and 
some simply deserted their families, unable to bear the stress of failure. The 
unemployed felt trapped in a web of circumstances beyond their control; it was 
almost as if unemployment were a divine visitation for which no human agency 
could be held responsible.95 Some of the unemployed found ways to make a living 
in what may only be termed the "informal sector" of the economy, selling homemade 
articles, matches, meat to Africans in compounds and even liquor, to make ends 
meet. 
93. For a full discussion of unemployment and relief see A Minnaar, "Unemployment and Relief 
Measures during the Great Depression (1929-1934)", Kleio, 26, 1994. 
94. See letter from "Grudge against Society" in Natal Mercury, 19 November 1930. 
95. Rees, Great Slump, p. 89. 
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Another result of unemployment was migration, as many were forced to leave the 
rural areas and migrate to the towns to seek work. Hurwitz wrote this of the 
situation in Natal: 
Rapid rural depopulation was caused by the depression of 1929-32 
when, during a prolonged period of low prices for agricultural 
products, farmers' incomes dropped so low that the desire to remain 
on the land weakened considerably. Opportunities for economic 
improvement were therefore sought in the urban areas. The 
depression also ' resulted in foreclosures on farm properti~~ and even 
some of those who wished to remain were forced to leave. 
Although these remarks pertain to Natal, they apply equally to the situation in the 
rest of the Union. There were other reasons for the rapid urbanisation of the 
population, as Smith pointed out: 
... Furthermore, charity and relief are better organised in the towns, so 
that there is a minimum standard of life (however low) below which 
urban families rarely sink. This in itself, is an attraction to the 
depressed classes of the rural community.~J7 
Lewis, in his study of the "poor whites", also supported this contention.98 The rapid 
urbanisation of the population of the Union is obvious when one contrasts the 
census statistics for 1921 with those of 1936.99 
Table 2.5 
Population in Urban Areas expressed as a percentage of the whole of that 
Province and of the Union, 1921-1936. 
Province Year Whites 
Cape 1921 57,8 
1936 65,1 
Natal 1921 74,3 
1936 79,4 
Trans- 1921 64,2 
vaal 1936 72,5 
O.F.S. 1921 41,9 
1936 49,9 
Union 1921 59,55 
1936 66,73 


























These figures show that fairly rapid urbanisation of all population groups had taken 
place in the period between the censuses and, although there was some degree of 
urbanisation in the years following the depression, it is clear that much of the 
migration occurred during the depression years. The influx to the towns naturally 
placed an added burden on the ratepayers of such towns, as they then became 
responsible for the welfare of their fellow citizens. Cries went up to the government 
to try and stop the influx and, although the government did much to try and keep the 
farmers on the land and the blacks in their reserves,100 residential qualifications for 
assistance were soon imposed by most towns. Government officials and local 
magistrates were virtually helpless. Despite the considerable obstacles placed in 
their paths, unemployed whites still streamed into the urban areas, arousing 
considerable antipathy from the inhabitants. While there was general hostility 
towards the influx of unemployed whites, there was a very limited measure of 
understanding for their plight, but no such understanding extended to the black 
population. On the contrary, the prevailing idee fixe was that blacks were merely 
"temporary sojourners" in the urban areas, tolerated as long as their labour was 
required. When their labour was no longer required it was expected that they should 
return to the rural areas from whence they had come. The situation in the rural 
areas was every bit as desperate (if not more so) for blacks as it was for whites, 10 1 
but the unemployed blacks were still expected to return to their homes in the rural 
areas. 
However comforting this idea might have been to the white segregationists of the 
time, the truth of the matter was that in certain areas of the country, hard hit by the 
depression and the prevailing drought, the inhabitants had no other option but to 
make their way to the towns to survive. Despite measures taken by local 
96. N Hurwitz, Agriculture in Natal, 1957, p. 17. 
f17. R H Smith, Labour Resources of Natal, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1950, p. 25. 
98. Lewis, ·Poor White Problem". See particularly Chapter 2. 
99. The census of 1931 was scaled down as an economy measure and was restricted to the white 
population alone. 
100. These measures will be discussed in a later chapter. 
101. As the Native Economic Commission revealed. See also Lacey, Boroko. 
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authorities, 102 there is no doubt that practically all the urban areas of the Union 
experienced a large influx of blacks during the depression. Such an influx posed 
problems of control for the authorities and a number of measures were 
implemented to deal with the black population. 
Political activity in the Union was also affected by the depression, as might have 
been expected. It is axiomatic that political activity during a time of economic crisis 
will exhibit different characteristics to politics in a time of relative wealth and 
prosperity. The Great Depressio~ 1929-1933, has been described as a "crisis of 
capitalism"; 103 a period in which the capitalist system suffered a severe setback, 
probably the most severe setback in recorded history. This setback starkly 
illustrated the inability of the system to maintain the level of material benefits which 
could be derived from it; a level of benefits to which the population of the western 
world had become accustomed. Mass unemployment, poverty and a decline in living 
standards were all signs of failure. It is not surprising then, that there were many the 
world over who began to question the system . 
... Nor was it only the direct victims of the depression who were 
affected by it. Others, observin~ what was happening to their fellow-
men, began to wonder what kind of justification there was for a 
society which produced such results. The depression ceased to be 
merely an economic problem; it became a question mark directed at 
the values of western civilisation and there were many who, finding no 
satisfactory answer, decided that there was no altemative other than 
to build a new society on totally different principles. lU4 
This kind of questioning, sprung of discontent, was evident in most western 
countries during the depression years and often led to the restructuring of political 
groupings, the formation of new political "parties and movements, or the formation 
of coalition groupings. Sometimes the new movements were of an extremist nature, 
seeing salvation only in a drastic reshaping of society. Not all were anti-capitalist, 
but most were vocal in their condemnation of the system's perceived shoncomings. 
102. Such measures included the tightening up of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act or 1923 through 
an amendment in 1930 (Act 25 of 1930). 
103. Rees, Great Slump, pp. 281 - 282. 
104. Ibid., p. 88. 
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It is impossible to exclude the Union of South Africa from this trend, for there is 
ample indication of it, but it must be borne in mind that comparatively, the Union 
was far less affected than some other capitalist powers. It did not suffer the same 
degree of mass unemployment, social dislocation and upheaval, as did the United 
States, United Kingdom, Germany or even Australia. Nevertheless, the inhabitants 
of the Union certainly felt that the Great Depression was the worst economic crisis 
they had yet faced. Economics did not, however, entirely dominate the domestic 
political scene, for there were other significant issues which distracted the attention 
of the politicians, especially in the early years of the depression. 
One such issue was the "Native Question". The General Election of 1929 had been 
fought almost entirely on this issue. lOS In a well-orchestrated campaign, the 
National Party (N P) government was able to play on the fears of the electorate. 
Smuts, leader of the South African Party (S A P), inadvertently played right into the 
hands of the Nationalists when he made a speech in which he said he foresaw a time 
when other territories in southern Africa would join the Union. Pointing to the large 
black population in the territories mentioned by Smuts, the Nationalists accused him 
of wanting to add to the "Native Problem" and even accused him of wanting to form 
a "Kaffir Republlc".l06 These "swart gev:aar" tactics persuaded the largely white 
electorate to return the Nationalists to power with an overall majority for the first 
time.107 Yet even this victory was not sufficient to extricate the so-called "Hertzog 
Bills" from the legislative quagmire maintained by the SAP since 1926, and the 
"Native Question" remained unsolved. lOB 
Another issue of significance was the relationship of the Union to Britain. The 
~ertzog government was eager to loosen the ties that bound the Union to Britain. 
The passage of the Statute of Westminister in 1931 had largely been as a result of 
Hertzog's efforts, and fears had been aroused among English-speakers in the Union 
105. T R H Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, (3rd ed.), MacMillan, Johannesburg, 
1987, p. 271. 
106. R Lacour-Gayet, A History of South Africa, Cassel, London, 1977, p. 271. 
107. Davenport, !t!odern South Africa, Appendix 2. 
lOS. For a f~ dis:cussion of this issue sec: R J Haines, "The Opposition to General Hertzog's 
Segregabon Bills, 1925-1936 : A Study m Extra-Parliamentary Protest", M A thesis, University 
of Natal (Durban), 1975. 
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that Hertzog intended to form an Afrikaner republic.109 Fear of the erosion of 
their British citizenship rights and threats of increased "Afrikanerisation" caused 
many English-speakers, particularly in Natal, to view almost every act of the 
Hertzog government as a threat against their heritage. An attempt by the 
government to abolish the provincial councils, ostensibly as an economy measure, 
thus resulted in a furore of significant proportions,ll0 which had important 
repercussions on the national political scene. 111 
Turning to the Hertzog government's handling of the economic crisis, the major 
bone of contention was undoubtedly its handling of what became known as the 
"Gold Standard Crisis".112 When Britain left the gold standard in September 
1931,113 the Union government, through the Department of Finance, announced 
that the Union intended remaining on the standard.114 Advocate N C Havenga, 
Minister of Finance, advanced the rationale that as the world's largest gold-
producer, the Union could and would demonstrate its confidence in the metal as the 
basis of the international monetary system. lIS Hertzog put it even more forcefully 
at the Cape Congress of the National Party in October 1931: 
The position of a country which leaves the Gold Standard is precisely 
the same as that · of a ship that sails in bad weather, throws away its 
rudder, lifts its anchor and gives itself over to the mercy of the waves. 
You never know when you are above or below the waves, when you 
are going to run aground on the rocks ... ,,116 
109. C F J Muller, Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa, Academica, Cape Town, 1969, 
p. 406. 
110. For a full discussion of this issue see Vickers, "Provincial Councils" and Walker, "Provincial 
Councils". 
111. See below p. 326. 
112. For a full discussion of this issue see Lubbe, "Goudstandaardkwessie". 
113. Rees, Great Slump, p. 189. 
114. Lubbe, "Goudstandaardkwessie", p. 18. 
115. 0 Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog, n.d., p. 139. 
116. Report.in Die Burger, 2 October 1931, quoted in Lubbe, "Goudstandaardkwessie", p. 18. (My 
translabon.) 
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This stance, later supported by a Parliamentary Select Committee (on which the N P 
naturally had a majority)117 did not find favour with many in Natal, who saw it as a 
government attempt to demonstrate the Union's economic independence of 
Britain.118 
Furthermore, the stance did not make economic sense, as Britain remained South 
Africa's largest trading partner. By going off gold, Britain had effectively devalued 
sterling by almost 30 per cent. This meant that British goods became 30 per cent 
cheaper in the Union, but more importantly, South African products became 30 per 
cent more expensive in Britain.119 This had a severe effect on the producers of 
primary products, particularly those farmers who depended on the export 
market.120 At a time of overproduction, with markets flooded, few buyers were 
going to spend more on South African products when they could obtain the same 
products more cheaply from other countries within the empire which had also 
devalued their currencies to the same level as sterling. Agitation among the farmers 
of the Union, many of whom were also supporters of the National Party, grew apace 
in 1932121 and speculators began to remove large amounts of capital from the 
Union, in anticipation of the government leaving the gold standard.122 This was 
despite the fact that the government tried, through export subsidies, to make good 
the losses that some farmers were suffering. Hertzog's support among the farmers 
dwindled, as many were finding a political home in Dr Steenkamp's Farmers' and 
Workers' Party. It appears that Hertzog was all too well aware of his diminishing 
support,123 but having committed his government to stand or fall by the gold 
standard, he could not alter his stance without damaging his credibility. 
117. Union of South Africa, Report' of ·the Select Committee on the Gold Standard, S.c. 9/1932. It 
may be noted that the SAP members of the Committee resigned en bloc as soon as they were 
appointed. 
118. Pirow, Hertzog, p. 139 and Natal Mercury, 2 December 1931. 
119. Davenport, Modern South Africa, p. 213. 
120. For a discussion of this issue see A de V Minnaar, "The Farmers and the Gold Standard Crisis, 
1931-32", Journal for Contemporary History, Vol. 14, No.1, June 1989. 
121. A G Barlow, Almost in Confidence, Juta, Johannesburg, 1952, p. 238 and D W Kruger, 
Making of a Nation, MacMillan, Johannesburg, 1969, p. 160. 
122. Pirow, Hertzog, p. 145 and Katzen, Gold, p. 29. 
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University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar P~pers, Vol. 7: 
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In the event, his hand was forced by Tielman Roos, former Nationalist Party 
Cabinet Minister and Leader of the National Party in the Transvaal, then a Judge of 
Appeal.124 Rumours had been circulating towards the end of 1932 that Roos would 
step down from the Bench and return to politics and, either on his own, or in concert 
with General Smuts's SAP, 125 or Dr Steenkamp's movement,126 would force the 
Hertzog government from office. On the announcement of his resignation from the 
Bench, a rush of capital estimated at several million pounds left the country and the 
government was forced to leave the gold standard on 27 December 1932.127 From 
that moment on, it seemed that the depression had begun to lift. Actually, as has 
been shown, the depression had bottomed out in October of 1932, but the departure 
from gold seemed to be a visible sign that the government had reversed its earlier 
disastrous policy. 
Departure from gold did not immediately ameliorate the position of the farmers of 
the Union, as the widespread drought was still hampering their recovery.128 The 
idea of the formation of a "Government of National Unity" as propounded by Roos, 
had really taken root in the political minds of the electorate, and agitation to this 
end continued. Neither Smuts nor Hertzog trusted Roos, seeing "him as the worst 
kind of political opportunist; neither would commit himself to any sort of alliance 
with him. However, it was obvious to both leaders that there were sound reasons for 
burying the political hatchet in some sort of coalition. In February 1933, the two 
leaders agreed on the formation of a coalition government. 129 
The coalition and later fusion of the two major political parties seemed to defuse 
many of the underlying tensions ~d to allay the fears of many. Most of the 
extremist political groupings which had sprung up during the depression began to 
wither, losing support to the centre coalition. It is true that the fusion resulted in the 
124. Kruger, Making of a Nation, p. 160. 
125. Ibid., p. 161. 
126. J P Brits, Tielman Roos: Sy Rol in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, Makro-Boeke, Pretoria, 1979, 
p.373. 
127. Katzen, Gold, p. 29. 
128. Kruger, Making of a Nation, p. 158. 
129. Ibid., p. 165. 
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new United Party being somewhat weakened by the formation, from within the 
ranks of the two joining parties, of the Dominion Party of Colonel Stallard and the 
Purified National Party of Dr Malan, but these were not immediately significant, 
and the political climate was greatly improved by the coalition: this was the alliance 
that most believed could effectively combat the lingering after-effects of the 
depression. 
The late 1920s saw a great upsurge in African militancy throughout the country. The 
activities of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union and its breakaway Natal 
branch, the ICU yase Natal, were a cause of great concern to the ruling white 
authorities. When this political militancy flared into open violence in 1929, the 
concern deepened. Interestingly, this took place in Natal, which highlighted the key 
role the province was playing in African politics in the Union. The Durban Beer 
Hall riots had sent a frisson of fear through the bureaucracy, for they had taken 
place in a densely populated urban area during a time of perceived prosperity. It 
was suggested that the "danger" from Africans would be much greater when the full 
effects of the world depression reached the Union. The issue of controlling African 
political activity therefore became of paramount importance. Not only did the state 
feel obliged to restore order and inculcate a healthy respect for the law, but 
additional measures were also indicated: firmer control over the "surplus" 
populations of Africans in urban areas would have to be exercised and more 
effective ways of dealing with so-called agitators would also have to be found.130 
To achieve these goals, additional powers were sought from parliament. 131 
Blacks politics in the Union was in a far from healthy state during the depression 
years. Riven with factions and 'hampered by an increasingly ominous financial crisis, 
the African National Congress was largely ineffective and ineffectual. The shortage 
of funds due to unpaid subscriptions was hampering the organisation in carrying out 
its functions. In an effort to recoup its losses the President, Pixley Seme, was 
engaged in a process of re-incorporating traditional leaders (who were supposed to 
supply the bulk of these funds) into the organisation in a more meaningful way. By 
130. Ironically, these were the very aims of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. See T R H 
Davenport, The Beginnings of Urban Segregation in South Africa: The Nat ives (Urban Areas) 
Act of 1923 and its background, Institute of Social and Economic RC!>Carch Rhodes 
University, Occasional Paper No. 15, 1971. ' 
131. These measures will be discussed in Chapter Ten. 
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so doing, Seme was actually further alienating some of the organisation's support, 
which was critical of the role "backward" and "uncivilised" chiefs were playing in the 
organisation. Little meaningful was therefore achieved during the depression 
years. 132 
Nor was the ICU any better off. It, too, was riven by competing factions. In Natal, 
Champion had broken away with his followers to form the ICU yase Natal, which 
deprived the central organisation under the leadership of Clements Kadalie of 
much-needed income. Not that the ICU yase Natal was much better off; its 
activities were also hampered by a lack of funds and political infighting.133 
Indian politics in the Union during the depression years was similarly afflicted with 
the disease of factionalism; the community was divided over the approaches that 
should be taken to combat the ever-increasing levels of anti-Asiatic sentiment 
throughout the country. 134 Anti-Asiatic sentiment was almost at fever pitch during 
the depression years, as whites believed it to be their right to elbow anyone else, but 
especially Indians, out of "their" jobs and so used naked racism to justify the 
unjustifiable.135 The government through its "civilised labour" policy naturally 
supported the full employment of whites at the expense of others and had tabled 
highly discriminatory legislation to halt so-called Indian penetration and 
competition.136 Cal pin argues that these issues, although they did affect Natal, 
were really aimed at the Indian community in the Transvaal. Very little significant 
political activity took place in the Natal Indian community during the depression 
years, especially while the Feetham Commission was in the process of collecting 
evidence about so-called Asiatic penetration.137 
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It is not yet possible to reflect in a meaningful way upon the totality of the 
experience of all South Africans during the "years of red dust"; much historical work 
remains to be done before the early years of the thirties can be seen in their 
complete and complex context, before they become truly accessible and 
comprehensible to the modem reader. Even before this is done, however, it is 
possible to state that the phenomenon that South Africans experienced as the "Great 
Depression" did leave an almost indelible mark on the people. The garden province 
of Natal did not escape the blight. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INDUSTRIES OF NATAL DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
Secondary industry in Natal formed an important part of the economic activity in 
the province, both in terms of its output and the employment it offered. It is beyond 
the scope of this work to analyse the entire history of secondary industry in Natal 
prior to the depression of 1929-1933, but as the effects of that economic downturn 
cannot be fully appreciated without some idea of the pre-existing state of secondary 
industry in the region, a brief overview is necessary. 
Smith began his analysis of industry in Natal by pointing out that: 
In most "new" or colonial countries, secondary industry is 
usually the last type of industry to develop. This is because in 
its early stages of development, the colony usually relies on its 
mother country to provide its manufacturing requirements. 
Early economic actiVIties are directed towards the handling of 
incoming supplies and their exchange for the primary products 
of the indigenous inhabitants. As the settlement extends, the 
production of food becomes more important and so farming 
and perhaps fishing also develop alongside trade. Only once 
these b~lC needs have been met, can secondary industry 
develop. 
Smith further argued that the first secondary industries to develop are usually those 
industries associated with the 'processing of basic foodstuffs: flour mills, bakeries 
and the like. The construction industry and industries supplying the basic 
requirements of settled life like furniture, soap and candles, then also develop, as do 
industries associated with the provision of transport requirements. Natal was no 
different in this regard.2 
Prior to 1900, however, almost all industry in Natal made relatively slow progress. 
The reasons for this are quite simple: a shortage of capital an~ an undeveloped 
1. Smith, "Labour Resources", pp. 529 - 530. 
2. Ibid., p. 530. 
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infrastructure had hampered growth. These deficiencies had dictated that what little 
growth did take place, occurred along narrow lines; food and the processing thereof 
(sugar, especially), coal-mining, shipping and allied service industries constituted the 
major industrial activities of the colony of Natal.3 The discovery of minerals in the 
interior and the subsequent creation of new markets, however, radically altered this 
situation, stimulating the growth of the infrastructure, particularly the railway 
network and the harbour.4 The latter assumed cardinal importance as the gateway 
to the rest of the colony and indeed, to the whole of the sub-continent. Without 
detailing the great developments that took place in Durban harbour in both the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries,5 it can be stated that by 1910, Durban had 
established itself as the premier port of the Union of South Africa, handling a 
greater percentage of seaborne traffic than all the other ports of the country 
combined.6 Similarly, the expansion of the rail network not only to the 
Witwatersrand, but throughout the province, also had a significant effect on the 
expansion of various types of industry. 
The fact that the port of Durban was seen as the gateway to the lucrative market of 
the Witwatersrand (and to many other markets such as the Natal hinterland, Orange 
Free State, Basutoland [Lesotho] and parts of Transkei) meant that the town of 
Durban became the logical place for the development of industries dependent on 
imported raw materials or semi-processed materials. This accounts for the high 
concentration of industries such as the chemical industry (particularly paints, 
fertilizers, crude oil refining, soaps and edible oils), textile and clothing industry, and 
other miscellaneous industries such as tea blending and packaging, printing and 
~tationery in the Durban region. · The development of industries involved in the 
processing of local raw materials, especially sugar and wattle, was also a logical 
3. C Ballard, "Traders, Trekkers and Colonists" in A Duminy and B Guest (eds), Natal and 
Zululand Irom Earliest Times to 1910: A New History, University of Natal Press, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1989, pp. 137ft 
4. B Guest, "The New Economy" in Duminy and Guest (eds), Natal and Zululand, pp. 303 - 338. 
5. For this see L Heydenrych, "Port Natal Harbour, c.1850-1897" in B Guest and J SeUers (eds), 
Enterprise and Exploitation in a Victorian Colony: Aspects 01 the Economic and Social 
History 01 Colonial Natal, University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1985 and A Lumby 
and I Mclean, "The Economy and Development of the Port of Durban" in Guest and SeUers 
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6. Katzen, Industry, p. 7. 
46 
development, given the fact that many of the finished products were exported in a 
processed or semi-processed form'? Geographical location, then, was an important 
factor in the concentration of industrial development in the greater Durban region.8 
Other factors determining that greater Durban should be the focus of industrial 
development in Natal were market-related: according to population, Durban was 
the third-largest town in the Union and consequently had, as a district, the highest 
purchasing power in the region; Durban and the Natal South Coast had already 
become festooned with popular holiday resorts attracting thousands of tourists to 
the province; and Durban had relatively easy access to abundant supplies of labour. 
The last factor was a significant one, for the very abundance of the labour depressed 
wage levels. By the time of the depression, wages for industrial workers in greater 
Durban were, as they had always been, significantly lower than in the other major 
centres of the Union.9 Durban also had in its Asiatic population a ready supply of 
semi-skilled labour, suited to "process-minding", in the textile and clothing industries 
in particular)O 
By 1929/30, some 44 740 workers were engaged in industrial employment in Natal, 
of which number 26 018, or 58,2 per cent, were to be found in the greater Durban 
area. In this same period, Natal accounted for 20,49 per cent of all industrial 
workers in the Union; the workforce of greater Durban alone constituted ll,92 per 
cent of the total Union industrial workforce. 11 Similarly, using industrial output as 
a measure, in 1929/30 the greater Durban region accounted for 63 per cent of the 
total output of the province of Natal. 12 
Industrial activities outside the greater Durban region were largely confined to the 
processing of agricultural raw materials: sugar mills, wattle bark processing mills, 
7. Ibid. 
8. By this is meant the districts of Durban, Pinetown and Mobeni. Mobeni onJy hccame part of 
Durban in 1945. 
9. Katzen, Industry, p. 8. 
10. Ibid., p. 9. 
11. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 533. 
12. Katzen, Industry, p. 6. 
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dairies and bakeries. The manufacture of clay bricks and other construction 
materials also took place locally as these were difficult and expensive to transport. 
Essentially, then, industry in the rest of Natal was greatly overshadowed by that of 
greater Durban and so any investigation of the effects of the Great Depression on 
secondary industry in Natal is essentially an examination of secondary industry in 
the greater Durban region.13 
Before beginning such an investigation, however, it is necessary to take cognisance 
of a number of government policies which directly impinged on industry in the 
Union of South Africa in general during this period. The first of these concerns the 
economic relationship between the Union and Great Britain. Although never really 
part of the mercantilist system, the British colonies in South Africa had traded 
almost exclusively with Britain. After Union, this relationship continued and 
Britain remained the Union's major trading partner)4 Generally, raw materials 
were exported and many forms of processed goods, including most machinery, were 
imported from Britain. This led to a situ.ation where the development of local 
industry was, to some extent, hampered by the imperial connection. Having been 
elected on a platform of increasing South Africa's independence from Britain, the 
Hertzog government continued, with fresh impetus,15 to pursue policies aimed at 
stimulating local industry and opening up and broadening trade links with other 
countries.16 Hertzog's rallying call "South Africa first", meant that the Union's 
interests should be placed above those of any other country, including those of 
Great Britain. It was in this climate that the Union signed a trade agreement with 
Germany in 1928 that conferred upon that country "most-favoured trading nation" 
status, on a par (in theory, at least) with Britain.I7 This did not mean that the Union 
13. For a full discussion of this, see 0 J L McWhirter, Industry in Greater Durban, Part II, Natal 
Town and Regional Planning Reports, Vol. 4, Pietermaritzburg, 1959, pp. 1 - 9. 
14. P J Cain and A G Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990, 
Longman, London, 1993, pp. 127 - 128. 
15. Berger makes the point that such policies had been initiated earlier. He therefore suggests that 
the Tariff Act of 1925 did not represent a major departure in government policy. See 0 L 
Berger, "White Poverty and Government Policy in South Africa: 1892-1934", Ph.D. thesis, 
Temple University, 1983, pp.339ff. 
16. Ibid., p. 130. 
17. Thompson, Natations, p. 48. 
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had abandoned Britain or her empire as trading partners. On the contrary, the 
Union appeared to wish to continue trading within the empire and to make use of 
the system of imperial preference which held considerable benefits for the Union. 18 
During the depths of the depression, in fact, the Union participated in the firmer 
establishment of the system by signing the Ottawa Agreements of 1932,19 which 
gave the countries of the Commonwealth greater preferential treatment20 once 
mutual tariff concessions had been made.21 It appears then that the Hertzog 
government wanted to combine some degree of "free trade" with the economic 
benefits that the empire could confer. This rather contradictory position helps to 
explain the measures the government took to protect local industry and perhaps 
explains why more in this direction was not attempted during the depression years. 
Secondly, the policy of industrial protection through the imposition of protective 
tariffs was greatly extended by the Hertzog government soon after it came to power 
for the first time in 1924.22 The measures taken were designed to foster industrial 
growth in the Union and reduce dependence on foreign manufactured goods. 
According to Archer: 
The key instrument of policy in the inter-war years was the 
tariff. It was a schedule of taxes, in the form of customs duties 
levied on imported commodities, aimed at shielding local 
manufacturers from foreign competition. This process or 
strategy of industrial development has come to be termed 
'import substitution' (sometimes 'import reproduction'), 
defmed for the present purpose in the simple accounting sense 
as a decre.ase in the shan~ of imported goods in the total supply 
to the natIOnal market.:l3 
18. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, pp. 130 - 131. 
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23. S Archer, "Industrial Protection and Employment Creation in South Africa during the inter-
war Years", South African Journal of Economic History, Vol. 4, No.2, September 1989, p. 6. 
49 
Tariff measures were intensified and extended during the depression years, 
affording many key industries protection from overseas competition.24 In some 
instances, the government found it expedient to protect industries from the 
"dumping" of manufactured goods on the local market at prices so low that local 
manufacturers could never hope to compete.25 The government passed a series of 
legislative measures known as the Customs and Tariffs Acts, which had by the end 
of the depression greatly broadened the number of industries and types of goods 
protected.26 In addition, a levy was placed on all imports, the proceeds of which 
(together with other state contributions) were used to subsidise exports, mainly of 
agricultural produce.27 This policy was not entirely successful but did contribute to 
maintaining employment in parts of the industrial sector to a certain extent. 28 Some 
industries were, however, not afforded protection and it is not surprising that the 
depression exacted a higher toll in these industries.29 
Although the use of tariffs pre-dated the depression, their manipulation became the 
chief vehicle through which the Hertzog government attempted to assist industry in 
weathering the crisis. This was because this strategy not only lessened the Union's 
dependence on imported items (which was a cornerstone of government policy), it 
was also aimed at maintaining employment in local industry, thus cushioning the 
economy from the worst effects of the depression. In this respect, Hertzog's policy 
was akin to the autarky policies followed both by Mussolini in Italy and later by 
Hitler in Germany. The government's policy of "South Africa first" was clearly a 
policy of self-sufficiency and protectionism. 
!he third policy was closely allied with the protectionist policy and also had its 
origins in the Hertzog government's first term of office. This was the "civilised 
labour" policy. "Civilised labour" was defined as: 
24. A B Lumby, "The Customs Tariff and the Development of Secondary Industry in South 
Africa, 1924 - 1939", Ph.D. thesis, University of Natal (Durban), 1975, pp. 78 - 94. 
25. Ibid. , p. 87. 
26. For a full discussion of these measures, see Lumby, "Customs Tariff", pp. 78ft. 
27. The Export Subsidies Act, No. 49 of 1931. 
28. Kaplan, "Industrial Protection", p. 87. 
29. Lumby, "Customs Tariff", p. 83. 
... the labour rendered by persons whose standard of living 
conforms to the standard generally recognised as tolerable 
from the European standpoint. Uncivilised labour is to be 
regarded as the labour r~ndered by persons \.V~ose ~m is 
restricted to the bare reqwrements of the neceSSItieS of
3
Yfe as 
understood among barbarous and undeveloped peoples. 
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This policy envisaged the promotion of white employment throughout the economy 
and was largely the result of the influx of rural Afrikaners (many of whom could be 
classified as "poor whites") into the urban areas. These people were largely 
unskilled or had no skills suitable for the urban job market, so by entering this 
market they found themselves in direct competition with Africans for unskilled 
work, usually involving manual labour.31 This was considered to be an 
unacceptable state of affairs as these people could soon become disaffected.32 
They possessed the vote and could thus influence government policy through the 
ballot box.33 The "danger" was also perceived, according to Lacey, that such 
disaffected whites could ally them~elves with the black proletariat.34 
Hence the Hertzog government felt the necessity for a general policy which 
promoted white employment at the expense of black workers. The policy was first 
implemented through government departments and parastatals, the South African 
Railways (SAR) being the most notable. Salmon showed that the proportion of 
white unskilled employment on the SAR rose from 9,5 per cent in 1924 to 39,3 per 
cent in 1933, while the proportion of Africans employed declined from 75 per cent 
to 48,9 per cent in the respective years.35 The policy was expected to filter down to 
provincial and even municipal levels, where the government undertook to reimburse 
municipalities for the extra expense incurred by employing more expensive white 
30. Circular No.5 emanating from the Prime Minister's Office dated 31 October 1924. Quoted in 
W K Hancock, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. II, Part n, Oxford, 1942, p. 48. 
31. MacMillan, Complex South Africa, p. 131. 
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34. Ibid., p. 245. 
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labour instead of cheaper black labour.36 
The private sector of the economy was initially hesitant to implement the policy as it 
would inevitably entail greater expense on labour which, especially during the 
depression, it was unwilling to incur. The government, however, had equipped itself 
with "persuasive" powers to encourage the adoption of this policy. It could 
discriminate in favour of those enterprises maintaining a satisfactory level of 
"civilised labour" when awarding government contracts.37 Furthermore, 
manipulation of the tariff could also ensure "satisfactory labour conditions", this was 
made possible by the differentiated rates system, where the government could 
choose to implement either a maximum or minimum rate of the tariff. The 
government could remit duties, wholly or in part; and it could implement or suspend 
duties by proclamation.38 It could even prohibit or restrict the supply of raw 
materials to any factory which maintained "unsatisfactory" labour ratios,39 although 
there is no evidence to suggest that this power was ever utilised. Lacey suggested 
that employers became co-operative when it was realised that the aim of the 
"civilised labour" policy was as much to abase the rising tide of wealthy Africans as it 
was to uplift the poor whites: 
The iron law of South Africa's 'civilised labour' policy was not 
the upliftment of 300 000 or so indigent Whites, but rather the 
super-exploitation of 80% of the workforce, who happened to 
be Africans. What alarmed the State in the 1920s and 1930s 
was not poor Whites, but that a fraction of the African labour 
force had risen above this group of Whites and were even 
becoming wealthy.40 
The bitter pill of having to pay higher wages for white labour would therefore be 
sweetened in a two-fold manner: firstly, the government would indirectly reimburse 
36. Ibid. This was the vehicle through which the government operated when subsidising relief 
works for the unemployed. See below, p. 
37. S T van der Horst, Native Labour in South A/rica, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1942, 
p.252. 
38. Archer, "Industrial Protection", p. 13. 
39. Salmon, "Economic Background", p. 234; Archer, "Industrial Protection", pp. 1.3 . ,-' . 
40. Lacey, Boroko, p. 243. 
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employers through subsidies and protective tariffs and secondly, black labour would 
stay ultra-cheap.41 Opinion on the exact nature of the interrelationship between the 
policies appears divided: Horwitz argued that the tariff policies of the Hertzog 
government were primarily designed to ensure the implementation of the "civilised 
~abour" policy in the private sector of the economy,42 while Kaplan argued that the 
primary aim was to influence the development of industry in the Union, and only 
secondly to further white employment,43 Whatever the merits of the arguments, it 
is clear that the policies did have a significant effect on the economy during the 
depression years. 
Another measure which influenced the economic life of the Union during the 
depression was the Wage Act, first passed in 1925 and amended in 1930.44 Wage 
determinations made under this act were meant to prevent gross exploitation. In 
most cases, determinations raised the wages of both black and white workers, thus 
cutting into the profit margins of employers. This often produced a negative 
backlash, as employers reduced staff, which aggravated unemployment,45 These 
determinations discriminated against blacks by fixing their wages at lower levels 
than those of white workers. Many commercial and industrial undertakings were 
subject to wage determinations, but such determinations were often opposed by the 
very people they were meant to assist - the workers.46 
This apparent paradox may be partly explained by the influence of the Labour Party 
in the Pact government, which appeared to be determined not to allow employers to 
take advantage of the unemployment caused by the depression to exploit workers. 
~enator Boydell, a prominent l:.abo\lI' Party leader and cabinet minister. was reputed 
to have said " .. .it is better to die of ·starvation out of employment than in 
employment,"47 Unfortunately, when wage determinations pushed the wages of 
41. Ibid., p. 236. 
42. R Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London, 1967, 
p.245. 
43. Kaplan, "Industrial Protection", p. 87. 
44. Act 27 of 1925, as amended by Act 23 of 1930. 
45. CAD, NEC, K26, F7, Evidence of A Z Mazingi at Durban on 2 April 1931, at p. h.U 7. 
46. CAD, NEC, K26, F7, Evidence of A Z Mazingi at Durban, 2 April 1931, at p. Id Yl ; See also 
Natal Mercury, 27 October 1930. 
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workers up, employers who found they were unable to pay increased wages to all 
affected employees, simply retrenched some staff and paid remaining workers the 
higher wage. For this reason then, wage determinations were generally unpopular 
with the workers they were designed to assist. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act,48 meant as a legislative device to facilitate the 
solution of industrial disputes, tended to discriminate against African workers for 
their wages could be fixed by white trade union officials and employers, without 
involving African workers in the negotiating process at all.49 There is some 
evidence of collusion between such trade union officials and white employers, which 
enabled white workers to retain their privileged positions, for the most part, even in 
the darkest days of the depression.50 
The gold standard policy of the Hertzog government also deserves consideration. 
When Great Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931, the Union 
government chose not to follow suit. This resulted in the appreciation of the South 
African pound against sterling and all other currencies of countries which had 
abandoned gold, thus making South African exports more expensive on the world 
market. Admittedly, this policy also made imported goods, including many of the 
raw materials used by secondary industry, cheaper. As many of the articles 
manufactured by secondary industry in Natal were for domestic consumption, this 
only affected such industries to their benefit, by lowering input costs and thus 
increasing their profit margins. As the full effects of the depression struck Natal, 
those industries which did rely, to a greater or lesser extent, upon the export market, 
~egan to become voluble in their. opposition to the government's policy. The 
protests of secondary industry in Natal; with few exceptions,51 were however 
47. See Natal Witness,2O October 1930. 
48 Act No. 11 of 1924, as amended by Act 24 of 1930. 
49. Section 9 (4). The act defined "worker" as workers of white or "coloured" origin, thus making 
it easy to discriminate against Africans. 
SO. Lacey, Boroko, p. 234. 
51. Some of the members of Durban's "Parliament of Commerce", the Chamber of Commerce, 
were.quit~ outspoken in this regard, but do not appear to have represented the majority. 
~(ficial ~utes ~f annual ~eneral meetings of the Chamber contain relatively few examples of 
dissent until relatIvely late m the depression. 
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strangely muted, possibly because the government had offset the negative effects of 
its policy with tariff and other protection. The Durban Chamber of Commerce, for 
example, prided itself on being a " ... non-political parliament of commerce, indirectly 
but vitally influencing the course and shape of legislation bearing upon the 
widespread interests of commerce".52 It was not able to influence the government's 
decision on the gold standard and, despite the opposition from many quarters, the 
government persisted until December 1932, before leaving the gold standard. It is 
extremely difficult to measure the impact of this policy on secondary industry in 
Natal but what can be said is that those industries which depended either wholly or 
in part on the export trade, must have suffered substantial losses during the years 
1931/32. 
Government policies and legislation, both prior to and during the depression, had a 
profound and far-reaching effect on the industrial sector of the economy. These 
policies helped to shape the fortunes of commerce and industry in Natal during the 
depression years. 
One of the economy measures instituted by the government during the depression 
years was the decision to halt all census-taking during the economic crisis and as a 
consequence, no information on the state of Natal's industries is available for 
certain of the critical depression years. In certain industries, the dearth of general 
information has also complicated research. However, enough information exists to 
attempt an analysis of the effects of the depression. To complicate matters, the 
census-takers only enumerated those concerns which either employed machinery in 
~heir operations, or more than four workers, so the smaller concerns generally 
escaped notice. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the various sectors of 
industrial activity will be dealt with separately, as far as possible, before an overview 
is attempted. 
52. Annual Report of the President of the Durban Chamber of Commerce, Mr T Eriksen, 
22 March 1929, p. 3. 
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Raw Materials53 
This industry includes all those establishments processing agricultural products such 
as wattle bark, cotton, wool, seeds and the like. The industry experienced a period 
of growth during the early decades of this century and even the depression did not 
have a marked affect on employment, the number of workers rising from a total of 
239 workers in 1916/17 to 754 in 1932/33. This does not mean that the depression 
passed entirely unnoticed for a number of the smaller concerns were forced to close 
or amalgamate with others, so that by the end of the depression, the number of 
concerns had fallen but those which survived had become larger. By 1936 (the year 
of the first census following the depression) the industry had more or less regained 
the position of 1929. Interestingly, by 1936/37, almost three-quarters of the industry 
was located in the greater Durban area, the concerns in the outlying regions having 
closed during the depression.54 
Stone ~d Clay Industry 
This category included firms that manufactured bricks and tiles, worked in marble, 
glass, asbestos and asphalt for road surfacing and the like. Due to the high cost of 
transport of what are bulky yet relatively cheap products, and often also to the 
availability of suitable raw materials locally, these industries were spread far more 
evenly throughout the whole of Natal. Only 50 per cent of them were concentrated 
in the greater Durban area. One of the largest concerns was situated in the greater 
Durban area, being the Coronation Brick and Tile Company, which in 1927 
employed over 1 000 persons and produced an average of 4,5 million bricks and 
350 000 tiles per month, makipg it the largest concern of its type in the southern 
hemisphere.55 This industry was directly linked to the fortunes of the building 
industry as a whole, for it supplied essential building materials to construction firms 
throughout the province. The building industry was, as is usual, especially sensitive 
to economic conditions and building activity declined markedly during the 
depression years, causing unemployment.56 
53. While ~t ~ms strange for "Raw Materials" to be considered a sector of industry, this 
categonsation was employed by the census-takers. Smith has used the categorisation to 
include those industries specified. 
54. Smith, "Labour Resources", pp. 536 - 540. 
55. Katzen, Industry, p. 117. 
56. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 40. 
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The fall in employment in the stone and clay industry was even greater. In 1925/26, 
some 2 524 workers were employed but in 1932/33, this figure had dropped to 1 153, 
a decline of 54 per cent. Although the industry did not require tariff protection, it is 
possible to deduce that the "civilised labour" policy did operate to a certain extent in 
this industry, for the retrenchments that took place were not evenly spread across 
the racial categories: 32,6 per cent of white workers were retrenched, 63,3 per cent 
of Indian workers and 55,8 per cent of African workers. The "coloured" workforce 
was, comparatively small (only 16 workers) and remained relatively stable.57 
Earnings of workers in this industry were also affected by the depression, falling on 
average by 55 per cent although, again, this was not evenly distributed: white wages 
fell by 43 per cent and those of Africans by 66,5 per cent, while the other racial 
categories more or less maintained their positions.58 It appears that employers in 
this sector economised on the wages of both the highest and lowest paid workers 
during the depression; the wages of African employees were amongst the lowest in 
any industry in Natal.59 . 
The Building Industry 
As has already.been pointed out, the building industry was, and still is, extremely 
vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations in the trade and business cycle. This may be seen 
in just one example: in greater Durban, the building industry had been experiencing 
a minor boom period in the years immediately prior to the depression, which made 
the difficulties of the depression years appear all the more severe. Table 3.1 
illustrates this: 
Table 3.1 
Value of Building Plans passed in Durban, 1928/29 to 1933/34 















Source: 78th Annual Report of the Durban Chamber of Commerce, p. 151. 
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It must be pointed out that the passing of plans did not necessarily mean that 
construction was undertaken immediately, for the fall in employment in the building 
industry only ceased in 1933. At this point, 40 per cent of all workers in the .industry 
in greater Durban in 1929 had been retrenched, the highest proportion of the 
workforce in this industry in the entire Union.60 The income of the industry fell by 
66 per cent in greater Durban, again the highest fall in the Union. Individual wages 
of those still in employment, however, were well maintained during the depression 
years.61 
The picture for the whole of Natal is somewhat different, for employment fell from 
a peak of 3 760 in 1925/26, to a low of only 1443 in 1932/33.62 Falls in employment 
were severe, with only the small "coloured" contingent of the labour force actually 
improving its position. White employment declined by 48 per cent, that of Indians 
by 63,8 per cent and that of Africans by a massive 70 per cent.63 Average African 
wages were more or less maintained, while those of Indians declined nominally, by 
4,7 per cent. Average white earnings fell by 21,7 per cent, while those of "coloureds" 
declined by 73,5 per cent. So while numerically this component of the workforce 
had improved its position, their average income declined markedly, to only slightly 
above that of Africans.64 
There is some evidence that the policies of the government impinged directly on this 
industry, for although it received no tariff protection and was only indirectly 
affected by the gold standard policy, the operation of the "civilised labour" policy 
57. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 541. 
58. Ibid., p. 544. 
59. Ibid., p. 546. 
60. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 40. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 640. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Ibid., p. 642. 
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can clearly be seen. However, it must be noted that most employment in the 
building trade is seasonal and increases and decreases in employment directly 
coincide with the demand for construction. Employers would, therefore, only retain 
the services of unskilled labour when there was a distinct need for them. That this 
need declined cannot be disputed, but it is unlikely that the "civilised labour" policy 
was responsible for all the retrenchments that occurred. 
Metal and Engineering Industries 
There was a great variety of concerns which were classified in this category. They 
ranged from firms which made iron cooking pots, to boilermakers, shipbuilders, 
makers of metal trunks and tin cans, sheetmetal works, general machine 
maintenance and repairs, foundries, locksmiths, gunsmiths and plumbing works.65 
The engineering industry, which was largely dependent on repair and maintenance 
work for other industries, soon felt the effects of the depression, as such repairs and 
maintenance were either done "in-house", or reduced to the absolute minimum. 
This was especially noticeable in the sugar industry, where replacements and routine . 
maintenance at sugar mills were curtailed ~ue to the adverse economic climate and 
the prevailing unfavourable sugar price.66 The downturn in the building trade also 
affected the engineering sector, as structural work diminished. 
The government's adherence to the gold standard also played a role, as repairs to 
shipping, which had formed a significant part of this sector's activities, were 
transferred overseas in the latter part of 1931 and 1932 because of the unfavourable 
rate of exchange. This was unfortunate because the local industry had only just 
begun to recover in the latter half of the 19205 from intense foreign competition in 
this sector.67 When the Union abandoned the gold standard in December 1932, and 
the unfavourable exchange rate disappeared, the industry began to show signs of 
recovery and expected to regain lost ship-repair business.68 
65. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 554; Katzen, Industry, pp. 57 - 63. 
66. Union of South Africa, Annual Reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories, U.G. 25 of 1932, 
p. 5 and U.G. 37 of 1933, p. 15. 
67. Katzen, Industry, p. 62. 
68. Industrial and Commercial South Africa, February 1933. 
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The gross output of the metal and engineering industries declined by 37 per cent, 
from £936 000 in 1929/30 to a low of £594000 in 1932/33. It was not until 1934/35 
that the output for 1929/30 was exceeded.69 According to Ravenscroft, 
employment in these industries fell by some 34 per cent and group income declined 
by a massive 55 per cent,70 but Katzen puts the decline at 20 per cent71 and Smith 
at only 15,3 per cent,72 a stark reminder of the unreliability of statistics for this 
period.73 The retrenchment of workers was not evenly spread across racial 
categories: in greater Durban, the African component was reduced from 41 per cent 
to 35 per cent between 1929/30 and 1932/33, while the positions of white and 
"coloured" employees remained relatively stable.74 In Natal as a whole, the position 
was somewhat different, with white employment falling by 14,3 per cent, "coloured" 
by 22,9 per cent and African by 18,8 per cent. Indian employment suffered the least 
reduction, namely 3,8 per cent.75 It appears that the areas outside of greater 
Durban experienced more unemployment in this sector but no direct evidence of 
this can be found. 
Taken as a whole, it can be seen that the economic downturn did have profound 
consequences for these industries. Once the worst of the depression had passed and 
the Union left the gold standard, however, confidence returned and the industries 
experienced a period of considerable growth, which was further stimulated by the 
advent of the Second World War.76 
69. Katzen, Industry, p. 62. 
70. Ravenscroft, "Depression", pp. 40 - 41. 
71. Katzen, Industry, p. 62. 
72. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 553. 
73. Although not explicidy stated, it appears that both Katzen and Ravenscroft only use figures for 
greater Durban, while Smith is dealing with the entire province. There are still unexplained 
discrepancies between the two former sources. 
74. Katzen, Industry, p. 177. 
75. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 553. 
76. Katzen, Industry, p. 63. 
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The Clothing and Textile Industries 
Under this category were included the manufacturers of clothing, tailors, dry 
cleaners and laundries, blanket makers, textile manufacturers, and those firms 
making ropes, bags, sacks and tarpaulins.77 The larger industries were located 
almost entirely in the greater Durban region in the 1920s and 1930s; this region 
accounting for some 95 per cent of all employment by 1936.78 
The clothing industry in Natal had been slow to develop, as most clothing was 
imported.79 What little was made, was usually in the cheaper range, particularly 
cheap men's wear. Working conditions were poor but, surprisingly, wages for white 
and "coloured" women, who formed the backbone of the industry, were higher than 
in other areas of the Union and the working week had been fixed at 45 hours, 
compared to other areas, where as many as 50 hours were worked.80 The wages of 
Indian workers, however, were amongst the lowest in the industry in the Union, and 
piece-work was common. Piece-work was extremely exploitative, as a test case (Rex 
vs Cohen, 1933) had laid down the principle that no minimum wage could be fixed 
by law for this type of work. A reduction in the level of earnings of employees who 
had been forced by "economic pressure" to accept the piece-work rates set by the 
employers was evident.81 It appears that it was a result of their exploitability that 
the employment of Indians was advanced during the depression and in the years 
immediately after it. The Natal Garment Workers' Union was formed in 1934 to 
combat this exploitation. 
~n contrast to many other induStries, the clothing industry only felt the cutting edge 
of the depression after 1930. Unemployment in the industry was rife during the 
following three years but, after 1933, the industry experienced a period of rapid 
growth. 
77. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 570. 
78. Ibid., p. 574. 
79. Unfortunately, statistics relating to such imports in the twentieth century could not be found. 
80. Katzen, Industry, p. 34. 
81. Union of South Africa, Annual Report of the Department of Labour, 1933, U.G. 11 of 1936, 
p.78. 
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The fortunes of the textile industry differ only in that the industry enjoyed a 
reasonable measure of government protection after 1925.82 The manufacture of 
blankets, shawls, rugs and "kaffir" sheeting had a very long history in the Union of 
South Africa, as that sector of secondary industry was one of the first to develop.83 
The efforts of entrepreneurs in this sector in Natal, however, were shortlived and it 
was not until 1925, when the government imposed virtually prohibitive duties on 
imported cotton blankets and "shoddy",84 that the local industry was stimulated. 
The object of the government had been to force producers to make use of South 
African wool in their products: 
... to promote the interests of the Union as a wool-producing 
country by protecting the industry existing at the time which 
produced woollen blankets, and as a consequence to foster the 
use of woollen in prefer~nce to cotton articles among all 
classes of the population.~~ 
The government failed to attain its objective for merino wool produced in the Union 
was (at this time) too expensive to be used in the manufacture of blankets for the 
use of the large African market. What the protection did do was to enable the local 
industry to manufacture cotton blankets at competitive prices. Throughout the later 
1920s, enterprises manufacturing all types of cotton goods sprang into existence in 
the greater Durban area. Even during the depression, this industry continued to 
show signs of growth, as locally produced articles began to take a larger and larger 
share of the local trade in cotton blankets, chiefly intended for the "native trade". 
Greater Durban was particularly suited to this industry, given the proximity of large 
!Darkets in Zululand and elsewhere, and the fact that the raw materials were almost 
entirely imported. Furthermore, the abundance of cheap labour in the region was a 
great advantage, as the industry was labour-intensive.86 By 1933, once the Union 
82. Smith, "Labour Resources", p.572. 
83. Katzen, Industry, p. 47. 
84. The new tariff involved duties ranging from 197~ per cent to 312 per cent. See Katzen, 
Industry, p. 49. 
85. Union of South Africa, Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 290: The South African 
Blanket Manufacturing Industry, Pretoria, 1946, p. 2. 
86. Katzen, Industry, p. SO. 
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had abandoned the gold standard and the doom-laden atmosphere of the depression 
had given way to increased business confidence, the industry had made considerable 
progress and had captured about 80 per cent of the Union market for of all types of 
blankets, rugs and "kaffir" sheeting,87 and factories were reported to be working at 
full capacity.88 
The sector of the textile industry concerned with the manufacture of ropes and 
matting was represented in Durban by a factory established in 1918. Durban was an 
ideal location as a humid climate was essential to the production of a quality product 
and, before raw materials were produced locally they were imported, chiefly from 
India, East Africa and the Philippines. Durban supplied the needs of most of the 
Union and even exported surplus both deeper into Africa and overseas. 
Competition was keen, especially from India, the United States and Canada but by 
1928 the factory was being run day and night to keep pace with demand. This sector 
did suffer slightly during the depression, especially from the unfavourable exchange 
rate during the gold standard crisis.89 However, due to the cessation of industrial 
censuses and the grouping of this ind~try with others in this sector in statistical 
returns, a more detailed exposition is impossible. 
Taken together, the clothing and textile industries did not suffer greatly during the 
depression and, although there was some measure of unemployment, the overall 
employment trend in the industries was upwards. How much of th is can be 
attributed to the measure of tariff protection the industries enjoyed, is difficult to 
determine. Total employment in these industries rose from 1 290 in 1925/26 to 
~ 856 in 1932/33, or by 121 per cent, but increases in employment were not equally 
spread across racial categories. White employment rose by only 63 per cent, while 
that of Africans rose by 98 per cent, "coloureds" by 121 per cent and Indians by a 
massive 245 per cent.90 Indian workers were mostly male and their employment 
was perhaps due to their exploitability under the piecework system. This may be 
clearly seen when the wage structures of the various groups is compared: although 
87. Union of South Africa, Boord 01 Trade and Industries, Report No. 290, p. 13. 
88. Katzen, Industry, p. SO. 
89. Ibid., p. 53. 
90. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 571. 
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total earnings in these industries fell by 17,7 per cent between 1925/26 and 1932/33, 
the average wage of Indian workers fell by 21,6 per cent, compared to only 6,5 per 
cent for Africans and 6,2 per cent for white workers.91 By 1936/37, Indians 
constituted 48 per cent of the total workforce in these industries.92 
Footwear and Leather Industry 
The footwear and leather industry, in contrast to most of the other secondary 
industries in Natal, was not centred on greater Durban. Proximity to the wattle 
plantations of the Natal midlands made Pietermaritzburg the natural seat of this 
industry, for a tannery had been established there as early as 1862. Pietermaritzburg 
was also on the route used by the transport riders to the two Boer Republics before 
the advent of the railway network and was thus an appropriate place for harness-
making and saddlery.93 Establishments offering boot- and shoe-repairs were to be 
found in most of the towns of Natal but were generally small cobblers' works and 
may not have been enumerated under the industrial census. There were, however, 
19 such establishments that were included in the census of 1936/37.94 
By the time of the depression, there were only two shoe factories of note; the Eddels 
Company of Pietermaritzburg and Greatrex and Company of Durban (both 
specialising in men's footwear) but there were 18 smaller establishments in the 
leather and footwear industry in the greater Durban area alone.95 The period 
immediately prior to the depression had not been without difficulties, as local 
footwear manufacturers had faced strong competition from imported footwear, 
!Jlainly from Czechoslovakia and Japan. Such footwear was sold at prices with 
which the local manufacturers could not compete. The entire industry of the Union 
was under threat from these cheap imports and agitation resulted in the imposition 
of a protective tariff of 30 per cent in 1930.96 
91. Ibid., p. 573. 
92. Ibid., p. 572. 
93. Katzen, Industry, p. 43. 
94. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 632. 
95. Katzen, Industry, p. 169. 
96. Lumby, "Customs Tariff", pp. 82, 89. 
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Although somewhat sheltered by this tariff, the industry nevertheless experienced 
difficulties during the depression, as declining demand resulted in retrenchments 
and short time in most establishments between January 1931 and September 1932. 
Gross output, however, recovered quickly after this and by the following year output 
was 25 per cent higher than in 1929/30 in the greater Durban area. Contributing to 
the relative success of the footwear industry was not only the protective tariff, but 
the fact that the hides used by the industry had fallen in price due to market 
saturation.97 
The "civilised labour" policy appears to have operated with a great deal of success in 
this industry in the greater Durban area. Between the years 1929/30 and 1932/33, 
the number of white workers in employment rose by 103 per cent, while all other 
groups declined; the Indian component of the workforce was reduced by 19 per cent, 
the African by 21 per cent, and the "coloured" by 18 per cent.98 It cannot be 
deemed merely coincidental that this should have occurred during the depression 
years. Comparative figures for the whole of Natal also indicate the dominant 
position of white workers. In 1932/33, 46 per cent of all workers in this industry in 
Natal were white, 24 per cent Indian, 10 per cent "coloured" and 20 per cent 
African.99 It must be pointed out that the average wage of the white worker 
(because of the high number of women employed) was on a downward curve even 
prior to the depression, and they continued to fall during the depression. It appears 
that employers in this sector were employing more women in an effort to cut 
costs. 100 
The Paper and Printing Industry 
Included in this category were printers; engravers and lithographers, and 
manufacturers of paper bags. The printing industry, the most important of these, 
97. EdIey, "Population", p. 26. 
98. Katzen, Industry, p. 169. 
99. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 632. 
100. Ibid. 
65 
had a long history in the province, with newspapers such The Natal Witness, The 
Natal Mercury, and The Natal Advertiser (Daily News) all having been established 
in the nineteenth century. The first predominantly Zulu newspaper, Jlanga lase 
Natal, appeared in 1903. Smaller newspapers also operated in many of the smaller 
towns of Natal. Most newsprint and other paper was imported. Other printing 
works were also established to print letterheads, price lists, catalogues and the like. 
Although relatively small in comparison to other industries, the printing industry was 
well established by the time of the depression. 10 1 This industry was also centred in 
the greater Durban area; all but 312 persons employed in the industry in 1932/33 
were to be found in this area of the province. 102 
Conditions in the industry during the First World War were very good, as the 
isolation of the Union had forced Natal companies to make use of local printers, and 
also because of the increase in the number of items that were packaged in printed 
cardboard containers. After the war, however, fierce overseas competition returned 
and the local industry went into something of a decline. The Hertzog government 
responded by affording the local South African printing industry a measure of tariff 
protection ranging from 30 per cent upwards on "printed, ruled, lithographed and 
embossed matter".103 This measure had the effect of stimulating the local industry 
and new concerns were established in the later 1920s. All was not well in the local 
industry, however, as the Natal branch of the South African Typographical Union, 
to which virtually all printing-industry workers belonged, had made wage demands 
which had to be met. This had the effect of increasing costs, resulting in a decrease 
in orders.104 
On the outbreak of the depression, the industry in the greater Durban area alone 
employed some 1 095 persons, while the gross output was some £601 000.105 The 
industry was naturally dependent on commerce and trade for much of its business 
101. Katzen, Industry, pp. 104 - 105. 
102. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 583; Katzen, Industry, p. 106. 
103. Union of South Africa, Board of Trade and Industries Report No. 353 : The Printing Industry, 
23 June 1955, p. 30. 
104. Katzen, Industry, p. 106. 
105. Ibid., p. 106. 
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and so the general slump in these activities meant that orders declined and the gross 
output of the industry in greater Durban in 1932/33 fell to only £505000.106 As a 
consequence, workers had to be retrenched. In 1932/33, 1 067 workers were 
employed in the industry in greater Durban,107 while 1 379 were employed in the 
whole province. 108 Although these official figures show that employment in this 
industry had not suffered drastically during the depression, smaller concerns did feel 
the depression quite keenly, for in 1932 there were reputed to be 175 unemployed 
persons formerly associated with the printing industry in Durban alone.109 It 
appears that many of the larger concerns felt obliged to retain the services of skilled 
and semi-skilled Indian employees during the depression for fear that dismissed 
workers would go into business for themselves and provide competition. IIO 
Interestingly, most Indians engaged in the printing industry were members of the 
South African Typographical Union, which had become multiracial in 1929111 and, 
although they formed a minority of all employees in the industry in Natal (some 
24 per cent in 1932/33),112 their skills made white employers wary of retrenching 
them. Wage determinations, however, forced wages up and some retrenchments of 
this category of worker were in fact made, resulting as predicted in the 
establishment of several small Indian-owned printing firms. l13 
The protection afforded this industry had succeeded in promoting white 
employment as, between 1924/25 and 1932/33, the number of white employees had 
increased by 17,5 per cent, while that of Indians had actually declined by 1,8 per 
cent. The employment of Africans, however, had increased by a remarkable 62 per 
cent.114 It can be seen, therefore, that if the strategy of the protectionist and 
"civilised labour" policies was to abase African workers, this strategy had failed in 
106. Ibid. 
107. Ibid. 
108. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 583. 
109. Natal Mercury, 23 Apri11932. 
110. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 504. 
11I. Ibid. 
112. Ibid., p. 584. 
113. Natal Mercury, 23 Apri11932. 
114. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 583. 
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this industry in Natal. Protection had assisted the industry by shielding it from the 
effects of foreign competition during the crisis. 
The Chemical Industry 
Included in this category were a great number of important industries in the Natal 
economy. Such industries included manufacturers of paint, fertilizers, candles and 
soap, polish, matches and oil, as well as pharmaceutical concerns. In almost all 
cases, not only were these industries centred in greater Durban, but they accounted 
for a very significant proportion of the entire production of such industries in the 
Union. US One such example is the paint industry. 
Prior to the depression, Durban had become one of the most important centres of 
this industry in the Union, with several large concerns having been established in the 
area. This trend continued well after the depression, so that by 1953 the Board of 
Trade and Industries could remark that Durban was " ... the centre of gravity" as far 
as the industry was concerned.116 This was due to the fact that almost all the raw 
materials for the manufacture of paint were imported, and because the products 
were extensively used in the shipping trade.117 The proximity of a large population 
in the immediate area, and the relative closeness of the Witwatersrand market, also 
contributed to this industry being located in the greater Durban area. 118 
The paint industry received government protection as early as 1923, when the Smuts 
government imposed a 25 per cent duty on all imported paint and varnish. 119 This 
~easure forced some overseaS manufacturers, who had set up local agencies to 
distribute their paint, to begin manufacturing paint locally. These included concerns 
such as Warden and Hotchkiss Ltd (Wardkiss), G C Shave Ltd, Herbert Evans Ltd 
and Lewis Berger and Sons Ltd. 120 The imposition of the tariff, then, had definite 
benefits for the local industry. 
115. Katzen, Industry, p. 71. 
116. Union of South Africa, Boord of Trade and Industries Report No. 339: The Paint 
Manufacturing Industry, 7 November 1953, p. 5. 
117. Ibid. 
118. Katzen, Industry, p. 72. 
119. Union of South Africa, Report of the Board of Trade and Industries, No. 339, p. 71. 
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There is little evidence of the effects of the depression on the paint manufacturing 
industry in Natal, but it would seem reasonable to suppose that the economic 
downturn in both the shipping trade and the local building industry must have had a 
negative impact on the industry. This cannot, however, be confirmed by a study of 
the employment statistics of the industry, as no statistics are available for crucial 
years. There is considerable evidence, however, to show that some of the end-users 
of paint, namely painting contractors, did suffer greatly during the depression. 121 
An appeal was made by Mr W Skipper, President of the Durban and District 
Painters' Society, for the public to employ only white painters: 
The members of the Durban and District Painters' Society wish 
to call the attention of the general publick (sic] to the 
enormous amount of renovation work that is bemg done by 
Indian and Native labour. Our members are no good at pick 
and shovel or relief work. We ask the public on the Berea and 
the Beach to giv.e this work back to Europeans. There are 215 
first-class craftsmen unemployed at the present time, with no 
money to buy bread. Think what this may mean to Durban. 
We have had enough of riots and strikes, we w~ public 
sympathy. We only want work and good fellowship. 
The only statistical information regarding the paint manufacturing industry in this 
period shows that in 1929/30,451 persons were employed in the industry but in 
1934/35, (the next year for which there are data available) there were 705 workers. 
These figures reveal little about the intervening period as, by the latter year, the 
depression had waned and the industry was experiencing something of a minor 
boom which greatly boosted employment and output. Gross output had risen from 
£364 000 in 1929/30 to £607 000 in i934/3S.123 
Another important sector of the chemical industry was that associated with the 
manufacture of soap, candles and edible oils. Again, this industry was centred in the 
120. Katzen, Industry, p. 73. 
121. See as examples: Natal Mercury, 20 June 1930; 7 July 1931. 
122. Natal Mercury, 11 February 1931. 
123. Katzen, Industry, p. 74. 
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greater Durban area and employed just over 40 per cent of all the workers engaged 
in this industry in the Union.124 The location of the industry was again related to 
the importation of raw materials. All of the industries in this sector had long been 
established in Durban by the time of the depression, mainly due to the fact that they 
had been given considerable tariff protection during the 1920s.125 Despite this, 
competition was fierce and local industry faced strong competition from a wide 
range of other countries during the 1920s.126 This competition greatly intensified 
during the depression years, when cheap soap was imported from Japan. As a result, 
the duty on imported household soap was raised to lOs per 100 lb., while the tariff 
on toilet soap was increased from 25 per cent to 40 per cent for all imports except 
those emanating from the United Kingdom.127 Similarly, protection for the 
hydrogenated fats industry also originated during the depression,128 while the 
edible-oil expressing industry had to wait until 1934.129 
No data of a comparative nature exist for this sector for the crucial years of the 
depression but it seems clear, from the amount of protection afforded, that the 
depression had profoundly negative effects. A similar unsatisfactory situation exists 
with regard to information concerning the fertilizer and pharmaceutical industries. 
This is indeed irksome as the fertilizer industry was one of the largest employers in 
the greater Durban area, one of the biggest concerns being African Explosives and 
Chemical Industries (AECI) at Umbogintwini. It appears that the industry was not 
afforded any protection at this time, as keeping agricultUral input prices as low as 
possible was apriority .130 
raken as a whole, the chemical . industry of Natal suffered severely from the 
economic downturn of the early 1930s. Employment in the entire industry declined 
124 Ibid., p. 76. 
125. See Union of South Africa, Report of the Board of Trade and Industries No. 338: The Edible 
Oils, Hydrogenated Fats and Soap Industries of the Union, 31 October 1953. 
126. Katzen, Industry, p. 79. 
127. Union of South Africa, Report of the Board of Trade and Industries No. 338, p. 84. 
128. Ibid., pp. 49 - SO. 
129. Ibid., pp. 47 - 49. 
130. Katzen, Industry, p. 87. 
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from a high of 4194 in 1916/17 to only 2260 in 1932/33.131 In greater Durban, the 
centre of the industry, employment fell from 2 966 in 1929/30 to a low of 1841 in 
1933/34, a fall of some 38 per cent. The fall in employment was not evenly spread 
over all racial categories, for white employment declined by 5,7 per cent, while that 
of Indians declined by 53 per cent, "coloured" employment by 60 per cent and 
African by 48 per cent.132 It is obvious then, that in return for the protection 
offered to the industry by the state, the industry sheltered its white employees from 
the worst of the depression at the expense of the other components of the 
workforce. White salaries in the industry were unaffected, but the average wages of 
white workers did decline by 25 per cent, while those of the other categories fell far 
more: Indian workers by 50 per cent, "coloured" by 53 per cent and African by 
44 per cent.133 This serves to strengthen the hypothesis that the protection of 
whites in this industry was a quid pro quo for tariff protection. 
Food, Drink and Tobacco Industry 
This sector of industry was amongst the most important in the Natal economy, 
employing more than 20 per cent of the industrial workforce in 1929/30.134 It 
included bakeries, flour mills, sugar mills, distilleries, breweries and concerns 
engaged in the manufacture of cheese, butter, condensed milk, aerated waters, 
"native" beer, bacon, sweets, pickles, jams, jelly powders, ice, vinegar and many 
more. It also included tobacco factories and tea- and coffee-packing concerns. 135 
The sugar industry as a whole played a vital part in the economic fortunes of Natal, 
~ the growing of sugar-cane 'was . the most important agricultural activity in the 
province in the 1920s and 1930s. As much of the milling was undertaken by the 
same people who grew the cane,136 both aspects are examined in the chapter of this 
131. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 616. 
132. Katzen, Industry, p.179. 
133. Adapted from Katzen, Industry, p. 179. 
134. Ibid. , p. 91. 
135. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 562. 
136. The so-called millers-cum-planters. 
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thesis which deals with agriculture.137 Closely linked to the sugar industry were 
those concerns which utilised a large proportion of sugar in their products: 
sweetmakers and the producers of aerated minerals. These industries were to be 
found both in greater Durban and in the Pietermaritzburg areas. Unfortunately, 
little evidence of their performance during the depression years can be found. 
Next in importance must rank the grain milling and refining industry which also, 
strange as it may seem, was centred in the greater Durban area. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the production of wheaten flour was undertaken almost 
entirely from imported grain, while the milling of maize was undertaken for the 
large domestic market. 138 Little data exist to document the fortunes of this industry 
during the depression years, but as it may be supposed that there was a steady 
demand for their products, even though some may have switched to the cheaper 
maize product,139 it seems unlikely that the industry suffered greatly during the 
depression. 
Tea was produced in Natal by J L Hulett on his Kearsney Estate but could not meet 
the demands of the local market either in quality or quantity. Most tea was 
imported from Ceylon and Indonesia, reason enough for locating the industry in 
greater Durban, but in addition the humid climate was a vital component in the 
blending process. Tea was then distributed both locally in Natal and the Union, 
while a proportion was also exported to destinations elsewhere in Africa. 140 Sadly, 
no data exist concerning the fortunes of this industry during the depression. 
!he manufacture of dairy and' related products like infant foods, custard powders 
and the like was not centred in the greater Durban area, because of the distribution 
of the dairy herds and the difficulties of transporting milk under Natal's climatic 
conditions. Over 40 per cent of these industries were to be found in the Stanger, 
Underberg, Estcourt, Merrievale, Winterton, Ixopo, Donnybrook and Bergvi11e 
137. See below Chapter Five. 
138. Katzen, Industry; p. 99. 
139. No firm evidence of this can be found, but it seems a reasonable supposition that domestic 
economy was practised to some extent. 
140. Ibid., p. 100. 
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areas of the province, while only 21 per cent were to be found in the greater Durban 
area.141 The fortunes of this industry, because of its close links with agriculture, are 
also dealt with in Chapter Five below. 
The fortunes of the Natal tobacco industry were closely tied with those of local 
tobacco growers. By the time of the depression, tobacco growing had declined 
significantly in importance and as a consequence, the local industry had dwindled to 
only three concerns based in the greater Durban area.142 
Seen as a whole, the food, drink and tobacco industry in Natal did suffer during the 
depression years, as employment fell from a high of 12481 in 1925/26 to only 10 800 
in 1932/33, or by 13,5 per cent, with the greatest fall being in the case of Indian and 
"coloured" workers, whose numbers fell by 41,3 per cent and 74 per cent 
respectively. White employment in this industry actually increased in this period, by 
some 39 per cent, as did the employment of Africans but by only 1,2 per cent.143 
Taking the greater Durban area alone, a somewhat different picture emerges: the 
decline in employment was in the order of only 9,7 per cent between 1929/30 and 
1933/34. The employment of white workers fell by 2,7 per cent, that of Indians by 
6 per cent, and that of Africans by 16,6 per cent, while the employment of "coloured" 
workers actually increased by 25 per cent.144 On average, workers' earnings 
increased during the period 1925/26 and 1932/33, but the wages of white employees 
declined by an average of 7,6 per cent.145 In greater Durban, by contrast, while 
white salaries were hardly affected by the depression, average white wages fell by 
38 per cent, those of Africans by 41,5 per cent, Indian wages by 25,9 per cent and 
~hose of "coloured" workers by 57,8 .per cent between 1929/30 and 1932/ 33. 146 
Several of the component sectors of this industry did indeed receive government 
tariff protection, and it is perhaps for this reason that the industry as a whole did not 
141. Ibid. 
142. Ibid., pp. 101 - 102. 
143. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 560. 
144. Katzen, Industry, p. 183. 
145. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 564. 
146. Katzen, Industry, p. 183. 
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suffer as severely as some others. It is also interesting to note the overall increase in 
white employment between 1925/26 and 1932/33, due partly to tariff protection. It 
appears that this sector of the economy in Natal was fairly responsive to the 
government's call to promote white employment at the expense of other groups; 
even the sugar mills began to employ more "civilised labour" during the depression 
under pressure from the government.147 Several beachfront cafes and hotels also 
began to employ white waiters in place of Indians.148 This was welcomed in typical 
fashion by "Job Hunter" in the Natal Mercury: 
I think it is a terrible shame that so many Indians are employed 
when there are so many Europeans out of work who would be 
very grateful to accept these PO~itions and would work just as 
well as the Indian, if not better. 1 ·9 
Jlanga lase Natal, however, was scathing about the replacement of these waiters so 
" ... that poor whites might take the few pounds which are paid for this kind of work". 
The article continued: 
Again we ask did anyone try to find other work for them? To 
our knowledge not a hand was held out to them, and under the 
pressure of poverty they hay~ drifted all over Natal seeking 
work and finding little of it.1':'u 
The anti-Asiatic feeling expressed by "Job Hunter" was fairly common during this 
period and was by no means restricted to this industry alone. 
!he Furniture Industry 
Included in this industrial category are not only the manufacturers of furniture but 
mattress-makers, picture framers and coffin-makers. This sector was one of the 
smaller of the industries of Natal. The industry was centred in the greater Durban 
region, which accounted for all but 10 of the 57 concerns in this industry in 
147. See below, p. 135. 
148. Natal Mercury, 22 Apri11931. 
149. Natal Mercury, 24 Apri11931. 
150. /langa lase Natal, 12 June 1931. 
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1936/37.151 By far the most important component of the industry was furniture 
manufacturing, both in terms of gross output and in terms of employment. 
The sale of furniture and its production was, and still is, very sensitive to economic 
fluctuations. The industry in Natal had survived many trying times before the 1920s, 
whereafter the situation began to improve due to the introduction of sales on hire 
purchase. Other factors which aided this revival were the manufacture and sale of 
. less durable and cheaper items of furniture, many of which were in increasing 
demand by Natal's large African population.152 This revival suffered a setback in 
the later 1920s but then again surged in the years immediately prior to the 
depression. By 1929/30, there were 842 persons employed in the industry in the 
greater Durban area and the gross output amounted to some £251 000.153 
The depression had a very severe impact on the industry and retrenchments and 
unemployment were rife, especially in the greater Durban area. In 1932/33, only 
395 persons were employed in the industry in this region, a decline of some 53 per 
cent from the 846 persons employed in 1929/30. All categories of workers were 
retrenched: the number of white employees fell by 39,5 per cent, the Indian 
workforce by 61,8 per cent, the "coloured" by 68,4 per cent and the African by 53 per 
cent.154 The industry in Natal fared somewhat better than elsewhere in the Union, 
as the fall in employment for the entire Union was some 56 per cent.155 The 
retrenchment of Indian workers had negative consequences for the more well-
established companies, as such dismissed workers displayed considerable enterprise 
and began to set up their own "backyard" factories, producing furniture at prices 
~hich undercut the market, much to the chagrin of their former employers156 and 
their fellow unemployed white colleagues, who tried through intimidation to close 
such "factories". Information on these "factories" is unfortunately very sketchy, but 
151. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 599 and Katzen, Industry, p. 189. 
152. Union of South Africa, Annual Report 0/ the Department 0/ Labour, U.G. 31 of 1927, p. 19. 
153. Katzen, Industry, p. 111. 
154. Ibid., p. 189. 
155. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 40. 
156. Natal Mercury, 23 June 1932. 
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they seemed to have posed a real threat to the employment of whites in the entire 
industry, for the secretary of the Furniture Workers' Union, Mr J C Bolton, led a 
protest march against their existence through the streets of the town accompanied 
by 100 union members. The march ended with "visits" to factories staffed or owned 
by Indians. Their actions were clearly intimidatory.157 Despite these actions, 
however, little appears to have been achieved and many furniture workers were 
forced to accept employment on relief works. Wages for those still in employment 
also suffered greatly, the average wage falling by 50 per cent. White wages declined 
by 44 per cent, while all other wages declined by 50 per cent or more. Interestingly, 
white salaries also declined by 50 per cent between 1929/30 and 1932/33.158 
The industry was not afforded any tariff protection as most of the materials, 
especially the various types of wood used, were imported and local manufacturers 
actually benefited from the stronger currency and the "dumping" of plywood from 
Europe.159 Almost all products were sold locally and thus sales were unaffected by 
the exchange rate. 
The industry took some considerable time to recover from the slump of 1931-33 and 
it was not until as late as 1936/37 that employment in. the industry reached pre-
depression levels. Gross output had, however, recovered more rapidly and had, by 
1935/36, exceeded the 1929/30 level to stand at £305 000.160 
Conclusion 
Despite the limited material available to researchers, it is possible to see that the 
depression did have far-reaching consequences for secondary industry in the 
province of Natal. Secondary industry in the province appears to have been more 
severely affected than that of the Transvaal, where the relative prosperity of the 
gold mines filtered through to local industries and sheltered them somewhat from 
the worst of the depression.161 By contrast, Natal's other major industries, sugar 
157. Natal Mercury, 27 June 1932. 
158. Katzen, Industry., p. 189. 
159. Ibid., p. 115. 
160. Katzen, Industry, p. 189. 
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and coal, suffered markedly during the depression and thus instead of buoying up 
local industry, actually further depressed it. 
The decline in shipping and in the tonnage of goods shipped also assisted in 
depressing secondary industry in Natal as, especially in the greater Durban area, 
there were many concerns intimately linked with the shipping trade. These included 
those enterprises which supplied the vessels with basic necessities (ships' chandlers) 
and those who were associated with the repair and maintenance of ocean-going 
vessels. Engineering and painting contractors, manufacturers of paints and ropes, to 
provide just a few examples, all depended to some extent on the shipping trade. 
When this trade declined due to the fall-off in imports and exports, and the 
government's gold standard policy made Durban's facilities and services more 
expensive, local industry did suffer. 
It is extremely difficult to ascert~ accurately what the consequences of the gold 
standard policy of the Hertzog government were for secondary industry in Natal, as 
many of the products it produced were intended for sale in local markets and were 
thus not affected. In fact, imported raw materials used in the manufacture of many 
of the items Natal industries produced actually fell in price because of the stronger 
South African pound. Against this must be set the very injurious effects that the 
policy had on Natal's major enterprises, namely the sugar industry and the coal-
mining industry, which filtered through to secondary industry. Politicians of the day 
made much of the negative effects of the government's policy, but it is difficult to 
separate reality from rhetoric, and genuine concern from Natal jingoism, as far as 
secondary industry was concerned. . 
The government's policy of protecting local industry from foreign competition, 
especially at a time when most industrial countries were looking to bolster declining 
sales on domestic markets by obtaining export markets elsewhere in the world, did 
materially assist secondary industry in Natal. A wide range of products produced by 
secondary industry in the province enjoyed some measure of tariff protection, 
161. Until. ~urther research is undertaken to investigate the effects of the depression in the 
remammg former provinces, comparative analyses of various industries and sectors are not 
possible. Straight comparison of Union-wide statistics was not considered to be very 
meaningful, due to regional variation. 
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ranging from entirely prohibitive 162 to partially effective. These tariffs shielded, to 
an extent, those protected local industries from the worst effects of the depression. 
It is impossible to speculate with any degree of accuracy what the state of secondary 
industry would have been without this protection, but certain of Natal's industries 
would definitely have faced strong international competition without it. As far as 
can be determined, this protection did not win the Hertzog government and the 
National Party support from Natal's industrialists (apart from some in th~ sugar 
industry), on the contrary, the prevailing sentiment in the major urban centres where 
most industry was located was decidedly anti·government, to the point of outright 
jingoism. There appear to have been other more pressing issues, such as the 
maintenance of links with the British Empire and the government's gold standard 
policy, which diluted the gratitude of Natal industrialists and kept relations cool.163 
Similarly, it is difficult to determine exactly what impact the "civilised labour" policy 
had upon employment in secondary industry in Natal during the depression years. It 
is clear that in most industries white workers were favoured and protected during 
the retrenchment processes that were necessitated by the economic downswing. Yet 
there are examples of industries in which this did not happen, or happened to a 
lesser degree. It may be argued that much depended on the nature of the industry, 
for in some, a proportion of expensive skilled white labour was easily replaced by 
semi·skilled workers of colour. Furthermore, this did result in a saving of wages, 
thus boosting profits while still getting the work done. 
There are, however, examples where attempts to employ white labour caused 
~istinct problems with the rest of the workforce: 
162. In the sense that it became futile to try and seD such highly-rated goods; there were cheaper 
local alternatives. Imports of such goods did decline and exporters in foreign countries did 
withdraw their products in favour of other, less protected markets. 
163. It is obvious that a great deal more research on the chilly relationship between industry and 
government in this region during the depression is required. Organised commerce and 
industry in the shape of organisations like the Chambers of Commerce, were ovenly apolitical 
in nature, as they elaimed to represent all political persuasions and this is a complicating factor. 
However, it is possible to make some judgements based on the public utterances llf prominent 
industrialists and businessmen. Almost all such statements were critical of the Hertzog 
government and its policies. Certain leaders were open supporters of anti-government political 
movements as will become apparent in the course of the thesis. 
... a local factory owner ... wanted to try European labour. He 
agreed to take four youths at £2/5/- per week and to take four 
more every month until he had a completely European Staff. 
He was given four youths of excellent character, but the day 
after they started work the Natives went on strike. The owner 
is faced with strong competition and could do no othe.r than 
dismiss the European youths. A certain amount of skill was 
necessary and it i~impossible to carry on the work with all 
unskilled labour. 1 
78 
A similar case was related to the Wage Board, where it was submitted that African 
employees in a certain industry approached the owner and asked his intentions as 
far as European labour was concerned; " ... the Natives made it clear that if a single 
white worker was introduced, they would leave the works at once." 165 This stance 
was perhaps only possible in very competitive industries where some degree of skill 
was required from African workers, which prevented their wholesale discharge and 
replacement by white or other workers. 
The favouring of white workers might also have been a result of ingrained racial 
prejudice - a tendency to "look after one'~ own" - during the economic crisis. As 
MacMillan wrote: 
With the best will in the world, many South Africans see only 
the desperate plight of their own kith and kin, the Poor Whites, 
and the devastating effect of their exposure to competition 
with poor blacks for unskilled employment. lOO 
He went on to write that white employers were convinced that African workers only 
worked when they wanted to and if dismissed, could simply return to the rural areas: 
.. .in South Africa at the time there was a general conscience-
comforting idee fixe that a Native is a lucky being, able to live 
on very little, working only when it sujted him - passing lightly 
between town house and country seat. l6T 
164. Mr S D Roberts, Employment Officer at the Durban office of the Department of Labour in 
an interview with The Natal Mercury, 26 September 1930. ' 
165. Natal Mercury, 8 January 1931. 
166. MacMillan, Complex South Africa, p. 131. 
167. Ibid., p. 118. It will be shown that the "country seat" of Africans was also severely affected by 
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Some of the tensions operating between the various racial categories of workers and 
the African response to suggestions that Africans ought to make way for whites 
during this time of crisis may be gleaned from the pages of the black press. An 
article from l/anga lase Natal on this topic is worth reproducing at length, as it sums 
up the position . 
... The self-constituted guardians of the white man's interest in 
South Africa ... see a vision of repatriated Natives trekking away 
from the towns into some invisible part of the country where 
there is supposed to be work and food for them and this trek 
will result, of course, in more jobs for the white men who now 
find it "degrading" to compete with black men on the labour 
market. .. Who encouraged the Natives to come to the towns? 
Was it not the White man who wanted cheap and sufficient 
labour? Who has "desraded" the white man by competing with 
the black man? Is It not the white man himself who sees 
degradation in the work of his hands? And where is the black 
man who has become urbanised in habit, to go when he leaves 
the town? Where are these places in the country which provide 
suitable spheres for him? What about his children, who have 
grown up and have been educated in the towns? Where are 
they to find a livelihood in the Backveld? The white man has 
practically-created this problem of urbanised Natives to serve 
his own ends, and now he proposes to solve it, again to serve 
his own ends, by squeezing the people out of the homes they 
have in so many cases established with sacrifice and toil and 
sending them on a trek to some unknown part of the 
co~trysidel6They call this segregation. We call it scabrous 
selflshness. g--
The generally privileged position of white labour during the depression cannot be 
entirely ascribed to the operation of the "civilised labour" policy - accurate 
quantification is simply too difficult. That this was the perception of those 
discriminated against, if not of those who benefited from it, is not open to doubt. 
The chief consequence of the economic downturn in secondary industry in Natal was 
not so much the decline in output, as unemployment and social dislocation. As 
employees were retrenched because of the depression, they found that they could 
the depression and that many were in fact trying desperately to obtain work in the urban areas 
in order to survive. See below, Chapter Six. 
168. /langa lase Natal, 12 February 1932. 
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not find other employment because the job market was flooded with similarly 
discharged workers and most industries were retrenching, not hiring, workers. Many 
of these unemployed persons drifted to the major urban centres, where they posed a 
serious problem to the local state. The problem of unemployment and the 
attempted solution to this will be discussed later in the thesis. 169 
169. See Chapters Seven and Eight. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COAL-MINES OF NATAL DURING THE DEPRESSION 
The early history and development of the coal-mines of Natal has been well 
documented by Edgecombe and Guest1 and also by Scott.2 From its very 
beginning, the Natal coal industry had to contend with a great number of difficulties. 
Coal-mining was generally more difficult and expensive in Natal than elsewhere in 
the Union. However, the major problem which faced Natal collieries was the sale of 
the coal produced by their mines. By the 1920s and 1930s, Natal coal-mines had 
been forced by circumstances to rely very heavily on the export market and on the 
bunkering trade. This made the entire industry very vulnerable to the vagaries of the 
international commodities market and also exposed the industry to the fluctuating 
influence on world shipping of the, world trade cycle. In these factors lie the key to 
any explanation of the misfortunes suffered by this important industry during the 
period known as the Great Depression. 
Coal had been discovered in Natal as early as 1838.3 By 1842 small quantities of 
coal, transported by ox-waggon, were being sold in Pietermaritzburg. Coal from 
areas closer to the port of Durban was used in British steamships on a trial basis as 
early as 1852, thus beginning a long association between Natal coal and the bunker 
trade.4 However, mining operations were complicated, and often limited, by 
difficult conditions5 and the exorbitant costs involved in transporting coal by ox-
1. B Guest and R Edgecombe,"An Introduction to the Pre-Union Natal Coal Industry" in Guest 
and Sellers, Enterprise and Exploitation, pp. 309 - 352. 
2. P Scott, "The Development of the Northern Natal Coalfields," South African Geographical 
Jownal, Vol. 32, September 1951. 
3. Ibid., p. 57. Edgecombe and Guest suggested that there is little evidence of coal-mining prior 
to the arrival of the V oortrekkers although they argued that it is extremely likely that 
prominent coal outcrops might have been utilised for fuel by the early inhabitants of the 
region. The "discovery" of coal was reputed to have been made by Voortrekkers under the 
command of Andries Pretorius who camped near Dundee in the late 1830s and early 184Os. 
See Edgecombe and Guest, "The Pre-Union Natal Coal Industry", p. 309. 
4. Ibid., p. 310. 
5. For a discussion of the difficulties faced by coal miners in Natal see Scott, "Development", 
p. 53ff; R Edgecombe and 8 Guest, "The Natal Coal Industry in the South African Economy, 
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waggon. Expansion was therefore somewhat restricted until the advent of the 
railways. With the expansion of the railway network of the colony in the 1880s and 
1890s, chiefly in response to the discovery of diamonds and gold in the interior, the 
Natal coal-mining industry experienced a period of considerable growth. This 
growth was closely linked to the expansion of the railway network and many 
speculative ventures were launched to coincide with the advent of the railway; some 
60 mines were opened between 1888 and 1909, although only a few remained in 
operation by the latter date.6 Production, however, did increase enormously; a 
mere 25 609 tons had been produced in 1889 but, in 1909, the mines produced 
1 786 583 tons.7 
The opening up of the coalfields of the Transvaal in the 1890s brought competition 
in the supply of coal to the gold mines and related industries on the Rand. Natal 
coal, although it was generally of a superior quality, was virtually excluded from the 
lucrative Rand market on the grounds of cost.8 Mining conditions in Natal were, in 
the main, far more arduous, causing higher pithead prices. Once transport costs 
were included, Natal coal could not compete with Transvaal coal on the basis of 
cost. 9 This difference in production costs was to endure well into the twentieth 
century. to To make matters worse, the highly anthracitic nature of much of the coal 
mined in Natal made its marketability problematic in the early years.1! Faced with 
a relatively small domestic market in Natal, and largely excluded from the Rand 
market, Natal mine owners had to find alternative markets for their coal, or face 







1910-1985," South African Journal· of Economic History, Vol. 2, No.2, Sept. 19X7. p. SO and 0 
R Edgecombe and W R Guest, "Wessel's Nek: A Natal Mining Community in Depression and 
War", Unpub. paper presented at a Workshop on Natal History, University of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1982, pp. 1 - 2. 
Edgecome and Guest, "The Pre-Union Natal Coal Industry", p. 317. 
Ibid., Appendix 1, p. 337. 
Edgecombe and Guest, "The Natal Coal Industry", p. SO. 
HaU, "Coal Industry", pp. 240 - 241. 
Edgecombe and Guest, "The Natal Coal Industry", p. 51. 
Ib~., p. SO. Anthr~cite only a~umed importance in the 194Os, while the valuClhk deposits of 
coking coal fo~d m Natal which were so necessary for the production of ... Icd were only 
properly explOIted once the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) began production in the 
193Os. See also Scott, "Development", pp. 62 - 64. 
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(NGR)12 and after Union to the South African Railways (SAR), on a contract basis, 
did improve matters somewhat, as did contracts to supply coal-fired electricity-
generating stations both in Natal and the Cape. However, the major outlet was 
found in the export markets and in the bunkering trade. 
Natal coal was exported to a great variety of destinations including India, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Argentina and Singapore in the nineteenth century.13 In 
the early years of the twentieth century, further markets had been found, as 
Edgecombe and Guest stated: 
Natal's 'normal' markets consisted of East Africa ports such as 
Dar-es-Salaam and Port Sudan to supply the steam coal 
requirements of the Tanganyikan, Kenyan and Sudanese 
railways, and other African ports such as Aden [sic 1 and 
Djibouti for bunkering purposes. Other bunkering outlets were 
Karachi in Pakistan, Colombo in Ceylon and the islands of 
Madagascar and Mauritius. In the latter case coal was also 
required for the sugar estates and the railways. Bunkering 
outlets further afield were acquired in Java, Singapore and 
Hong Kong, and ~~tal coal also met the railway requirements 
of the Philippines. 
Links were established between the Natal mines and many London-based shipping 
agents, most of which had offices world-wide, as well as in Natal. Through the 
networks of concerns such as Mann George, Mitchell Cotts, Smith and Sons, and 
Lambert Brothers, Natal coal was marketed to countries on virtually every 
continent.15 Competition was fierce and grew fiercer when the developing coal 
industries in the East, namely those of India, Japan, China, Malaya and the Dutch 
East Indies, began to produce coal in marketable quantities. Competition was based 
~ot only on quality and price, 'but also on political considerations. For example, 
from the late 1920s, Natal coal was excluded from the Indian market on account of 
the Union's racial policies.16 The erection of protectionist trade and tariff barriers, 
12. Edgecombe and Guest, "The Pre-Union Natal Coal Industry", pp. 322 - 323; also Appendix 2, 
p.338. In 1909, the NGR consumed 266 286 tons. 
13. Ibid., p. 327. See also Scott, "Development", p. 61. 
14. Edgecombe and Guest, "The Natal Coal Industry", p. 52. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid., pp. 52 - 53. 
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a relatively common feature of world trade in the late 1920s,17 also did much to 
harm the export of Natal coal. 
However, the Natal coal industry did benefit from upheavals and resultant shortfalls 
in production elsewhere in the world. The First World War (1914 - 1918) had an 
initially disastrous effect, but as the existing suppliers were ravaged by the conflict 
and the European mining industry had subsequently suffered major disruption, an 
enormous demand for shipment coal (the term used for both bunker and export 
coal) was generated. This caused an increase in demand for Natal coal. Strikes in 
Great Britain in 1921 and 1926 and in Australia in 1923, and the occupation of the 
coal-rich Rubr Valley in the same year, caused increased interest in Natal coal and 
the local industry had to increase production to meet these new demands.18 Exports 
of Natal coal are given in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
Coal Exports from Natal, 1912 -1928 


















1928 1544 393 
Source: Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek-, Appendix B. 
17. 
18. 
See Latham, Depression. 
R Edgecombe and B Guest, "The Black Heart of the Beautiful Mountain: Hlobane Colliery 
1898-1953", South African Historical Journal, Vol. 18, 1986, p. 194. ' 
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Unfortunately, these demands were most often of a temporary nature and when the 
crises were over and normal coal production resumed, the unfavourable cost factor 
once again worked to the local industry's detriment, forcing cutbacks in production 
and consequently in labour.19 The Natal coal industry, because of its dependence 
on exports, was subject to considerable fluctuations; demand was sporadic and 
difficult to anticipate, resulting in what Edgecombe and Guest term a "slack/rush 
rhythm".20 This caused complications in regard to transport and labour 
requirements and negatively affected the running costs of mines. Investors were 
also reluctant to put money into such unpredictable ventures. 
Relatively more stable, but still uncertain, was the bunker trade. Coal was used for 
the generation of steam in almost all power-driven, ocean-going vessels at the turn 
of the century. This trade was therefore relatively stable; as long as vessels called at 
Durban for " purposes of trade, or plied the southern Indian ocean en route to the 
East and Australasia, the need for bunker coal would exist. However, the 
competition in this trade was equally fierce and quality and price were determining 
factors in the successful marketing of bunker coal. The fiercest competition in the 
East African bunker trade came, somewhat surprisingly, from coal produced in the 
northern hemisphere.21 Welsh coal was highly prized as it had a high calorific value 
and a low ash content. It was made even more attractive by the very low freight 
charges pertaining to British coal in the inter-war years.22 
Natal Navigation Collieries and Durban Navigation Collieries were two of the 
mining groups specifically established to cater for the bunker trade, although most 
of the other collieries in the region had some share, no matter how small, in the 
bunker trade.23 The mines would sell their coal to agents who would then obtain 
the best price possible from the ships' agents. As the bunker trade was often seen as 
an economic lifeline in an extremely competitive market, local mines competed, 
often attempting to undercut prices, when times were hard.24 In an attempt to 
19. Edgecombe and Guest, ''The Natal Coal Industry", p. 53. 
20. Ibid., p. 58. See also Edgecombe and Guest, "H1obane Colliery", p. 194. 
21. Edgecombe and Guest, "H1obane Colliery", p. 194. 
22. Edgecombe and Guest, "The Natal Coal Industry", p. 52. 
23. Ibid . 
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improve matters, an assocIation of mine owners, the Natal Coal Owners' 
Association, was formed in 1913.25 Although price fixing was supposedly beyond 
the ambit of the Association, it did bring about some degree of co-operation in an 
otherwise cut-throat industry.26 
This organisation differed in purpose to the Natal Coal Owners' Society (hereafter 
NCOS) which had been formed as a counter to more stringent mining legislation in 
the wake of the great mining disaster at Glencoe in 1908. The Society was Natal's 
"Chamber of Mines" and dealt mainly with working conditions and wages.27 
The bunker trade was not only bedevilled by fierce competition but, as the twentieth 
century progressed, shipowners began the slow process of converting their fleets 
either to diesel power or to oil-fired boilers, thus slowly reducing their dependence 
on coal.28 The motivation for this appears to have been the increasing availability 
of suitable fuel oil and the limited space that oil occupied on a vessel compared to 
coal.29 Furthermore, oil could be stored in regions of the ship where coal could not, 
thus greatly increasing the carrying capacity of the vessel. Larger vessels could also 
be constructed, as diesel engines were more powerful. More cargo could thus be 
conveyed on a single voyage, thus making shipping more cost effective.30 The 
change, nonetheless, was to some inexplicable, as the triple-expansion coal-fired 
engine fitted to many vessels plying the Cape sea route had proved itself to be 
extremely reliable.31 Perhaps more sigruficantly, oil-burning and diesel ships were 
24. F S Hatton, Manager of the Natal Steam Coal Company, was reputed to have visited the local 
railway siding where coal was being shipped by rival companies to their customers, whereupon 
he would hastily offer the customers coal at Y2d less per ton. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's 
Nek", pp. 3 - 4. 
i5. Edgecombe and Guest, "Hlobane Colliery", p. 195. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Personal communication, Ruth Edgecombe. 
28. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek", p. 3. 
29. Although oil was generally more expensive and diesel engines for marine usage were still 
experiencing teething problems, the advantage of increased space was seen to outweigh these 
difficulties. See Latham, Depression, p. 44. 
30. B Guest,"An Introduction to the Post-Union Natal Coal Industry" in Guest and Sellers, 
Receded Tides 0/ Empire, p. 97. 
31. Latham, Depression, p. 44. 
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faster and, for mailships and passenger liners which had contracted schedules of 
arrival and departure, such speed was a vital necessity.32 Whatever the motivation 
for the change, this factor was to have a significant effect on the Natal bunker 
market during the depression.33 
As can be seen from Table 4.2, the sales of bunker coal in the period 1912· 1928 did 
fluctuate, especialJy during the First World War, but after the war sales remained 
fairly constant, though exhibiting an overall downward trend. 
Table 4.2 
Sales of Bunker Coal from Natal Mines, 1912 -1928 



















Source: Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Net", Appendix B. 
Competition and the ever-decreasing number of vessels requiring coal for bunkering 
purposes were not, however, the bunkering trade's biggest concern. Far more 
serious were fluctuations in the world trade cycle, or disruptions caused by war, both 
of which had an extremely negative effect on maritime traffic. The former, of 
32. Guest, "Post-Union Natal Coal Industry", p. CJ7. 
33. See below, pp. 108 - 109. 
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course, occurred on a large scale during the years of the Great Depression, with 
unfortunate results for the Natal coal industry. Yet another concern was the ability 
of the industry, often at relatively short notice, to produce coal for bunkers when 
demand suddenly surged. This was aggravated by the constant problems associated 
with railway transport on the single line to the port of Durban. As Guest stated: 
The maximization of profits during phases of upswing in the 
shipment trade had been frequently impeded by congestion on 
the single-line rail-link to the port, by accident-induced delays 
or summer rain damage to the line, or by the perennial 
shortage of trucks which was aggravated by the seasorw 
preferences accorded to "more perishable agricultural freight. 
At the onset of the depression then, the Natal coal industry was accustomed to 
facing challenges. The prosperity of the Natal industry depended on the precarious 
and volatile export market and on the almost equally uncertain bunker trade. As 
Brigadier White, Chairman of the Coal Commission of 1946/47 put it: 
... the Natal export trade depended very largely upon the 
crumbs that fell from the rich man's table; that really (Natal) 
gained at the expense of troubles in other countries: a strike in 
Australia, or troubles in othe~ parts of the world. j) 
The fact that Natal mines had been forced to depend on the unstable bunkering 
trade was highlighted by the evidence of A H Fletcher, Managing Director of the 
Dundee Coal Company to the same Commission, when he said that Natal: 
had to build up its business on bunkering and it is rather subject 
to wide fluctuations, according to the state of the business in 
the rest of the world. " We are dependent on business in other 
parts of the world. It has always been a struggle in Natal.3b 
That "struggle" was an apt description of the years of the depression cannot be 
denied. The Natal coal industry was faced with the biggest challenge it had had to 
meet in its relatively short existence. It did not emerge unscathed from these trying 
times. 
34. Guest, "Post-Union Coal Industry", p. 96. 
35. Quoted in Edgecombe and Guest, "The Natal Coal Industry", p. 51. 
36. Ibid. 
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The year 1929 was a record one for the Natal coal industry and it in no way presaged 
what was to follow. Sales of both export coal and of coal supplied to the inland 
market were at their peak. The former stood at 1 555 654 tons, or 31 per cent of the 
record 5012652 tons produced during the year, while the latter also reached an all 
time high of 2 261 400 tons, or 45 per cent of the total. The bunker trade, however, 
continued on the slow and steady declining trend it had exhibited since peaking in 
1917. The fall was not really serious; a mere 19 925 tons or 1,6 per cent from 
1215 523 tons to 1195 598 tons.37 However, although the entire industry might 
have been doing well, individual mines did not necessarily share in this boom. Mr J 
Townley Williams, Chairman of the Vryheid (Natal) Railway, Coal and Iron 
Company Ltd (hereafter VNRCIC)38 made the following remarks: 
(The results) were not so ~ood as they were in the previous 
year, owing to reduced pnces brought about by more active 
competitive conditions not only overseas in regard to export 
tra~e, ~'9t also locally as affecting sales in the Union of South 
Afnca. 
The SAR had been promoting competition in the Union market, in an effort to 
bring down prices.40 'This appears to have been somewhat balanced by a slight 
reduction in railway rates on shipment coal, by 1 Y2d to 3d per short ton.41 Purchases 
of Natal coal by the SAR were increased in 1929, from 588 649 to 650 446 short 
tons.42 Despite this, the only conclusion that may be drawn is that although 
production was at a record level, this did not mean that profit levels at all mines had 
also soared. The profits of the VNRCIC, for example, increased by £4 030 to 
P2 226 but this was still considerably lower than the £47 302 of 1927.43 
37. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek", Appendix B. 
38. This mine was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Natal Navigation Collieries and Estates Company 
and exploited the vast resources at IDobane. See B Guest, "Fmancing an Infant Coal Industry: 
The Case of the Natal Collieries", South African Journal of Economic History, Vol. 3, No.2, 
September 1988, p.44. 
39. Talana Museum (hereafter TM), 22nd Annual Report of the Directors of the Vryheid (Natal) 
Railway, Coal and Iron Company Ltd. (hereafter VNRCIC), 30 June 1930, p. 13. 
40. Ibid., p. 14. 
41. TM, Minutes of the Natal Coal Owners' Society (hereafter NCOS), 16 January 1929. 
42. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minute 1929. 
43. TM, VNRCIC, 21st Report of the Directors. 
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This competitive element makes all the more sense when seen against the 
background of increasing production by the Transvaal coal-mines. By 1928, Natal's 
share in the total production of the Union had declined to 34,62 per cent from 
37,62 per cent in 1926, a worrying trend that was to continue throughout the 
depression. This trend was not only related to the inland market. Because the 
distance from the mines in the Eastern Transvaal to Delagoa Bay was almost the 
same as that from the Northern Natal coalfields to Durban, it meant that the 
Transvaal mines could also compete in the bunker and export markets.44 
By 1930, the preliminary effects of the slump overseas had begun to filter down to 
the local coal-mining industry as the market for both shipment coal and for inland 
consumption began to weaken. Rumours of a decline in orders from the SAR sent 
shivers through some mining houses and, at VNRCIC, all recruiting was stopped in 
anticipation. Urgent communications were sent to the mine's agents, Mitchell Cotts, 
urging them to find alternative overseas markets.45 As the position continued to 
weaken, an unfavourable reply was received from Sir William Mitchell Cotts in 
London, stating that " ... difficulties were being experienced in selling Natal coal 
oversea".46 In fact, the SAR, far from reducing its consumption, had actually 
increased it in the year ended 30 June 1930, to the amount of 702 702 short tons of 
Natal coa1.47 This may have been a result of the accounting system which ended the 
financial year at the end of June, thus allowing for a carry-over from 1929, when the 
situation was somewhat better. The general impression, however, was one of 
declining demand. These figures might also serve as an indication of reduced 
~onsumption by the rest of the inland market. 
Production was lowered to 4 454 842 short tons48 as the shipment trade declined 
markedly, only accounting for 2 197 244 tons, as against 2 751 252 tons for the 
44. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minute for 1928. 
45. TM, VNRCIC Minute Book, Minutes of a Directors' Meeting, 25 March 1930. 
46. TM, VNRCIC Minute Book, Minutes of a Directors' Meeting, 28 Apri1193O. 
47. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Report, 1930. 
48. Ibid. 
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previous year, a decline of 554 008 tons, or some 20 per cent.49 In August 1930, the 
first suggestion was made of a wage reduction for miners in Natal.50 Although 
wages varied considerably, a minimum basic rate of pay had been agreed on by 
NCOS in 1928 and was fixed at 1s 8d per day.51 This proposed reduction met with 
opposition from some mine owners, who pointed out that Natal coal-miners already 
earned on average 2s less per day than their counterparts on Transvaal mines and it 
would be necessary for the Transvaal mines to lower their wages first, " ... or it would 
cause friction with the Mine Workers' Association".52 Some mines posted losses as 
early as May 1930.53 Even though production was reduced at most mines during the 
year and the recruitment of labour was temporarily halted, mines still had 
considerable running costs. Even the working of "short time" (only a few days of the 
week), while it saved on wages to miners, did not reduce costs to nothing. The 
unfavourable economic climate of this year saw the closure of the Ballengeich 
Colliery, while the Buffalo Colliery was sold to Enyati Colliery. 54 These mines 
were the first of many casualties~ The labour force of the industry in Natal was 
reduced from 16372 to 13479 men in the period 1929-1930.55 
The onset of the depression was seen as having a small advantage in that as 
conditions in industry worsened, more African labour became available for the 
mines: 
Generally there has been no shorta~e of labour in Natal mines. 
The period of general depression IS always acCompanied by a 
full supply of labour for the mining industry. Boys withdrawn 
from other
5 
industrial activities find their way to the mines to 
seek work. () . 
49. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek". Appendix B. 
50. An attempt to standardise the working hours of African miners on mines in Natal and thus 
more or less standardise rates of pay had been made in 1929. See TM, NCOS Minutes of 
Meeting. 16 January 1929. • 
51. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek". p. 10. 
52. TM. NCOS. Minutes of Meeting. 18 August 1930. 
53. TM, VNRCIC Minute Book, Minutes of Directors' Meeting, 10 June 1930. The loss amounted 
to £1112 for the month of May 1930. 
54. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 21 November 1930. 
55. TM. NCOS. Chairman's Report. 1930. 
56. TM. NCOS. Chairman's Report 1930. 
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The greater availability of labour, caused by the rapidly deteriorating economic 
situation, especially in the reserves of Natal and Zululand, meant that labour came 
under increasing pressure and that less favourable conditions of employment were 
generally meekly accepted. 
The deteriorating conditions in the inland markets prompted discussions about the 
formation of a closer association of some kind amongst the mines to control the 
price of coal in Natal other than that sold for bunkering purposes. The General 
Manager of the Northfield Colliery (owned by De Beers), Mr F Steart, outlined the 
reasons for this association by stating that the current supply of coal far exceeded 
the demand and that there was insufficient business to go round. This situation had 
resulted in the undercutting of prices for inland coal. "Prices had dropped to an 
absurdly low and uneconomic level."S7 Steart further pointed out that a similarly 
unsatisfactory situation had existed in the Transvaal until such an association had 
been formed there. The purpose of the proposed association was to distribute 
shares of the available trade, especially in the supply of coal to the railways. 
We should not overlook the fact that bunker business with the 
Union Castle Line or any other Line, is becoming less each 
year, largely on account of the rapid introduction of oil burning 
ships. We have already suffered much loss of business from 
this cause, and are likely to suffer more in future. It, therefore, 
seems to me that we oUght to support any genuine movement 
to make the best of the trade which is left, and which is 
available. 58 . 
It appears that De Beers was reluctant to commit itself to such an association but as 
Steart pointed out, it could still obtain coal for its own use at any price it chose. 
The association was formed as the Natal Associated Collieries (Pty) Ltd. from 
1 January 1931, indicating the level of urgency wrought by the crisis. The 
participating collieries were allocated shares of the existing inland trade. while the 
57. De Beers' Archives (Kimberley) (hereafter DBA), S4/NC 1, F Steart to Secretary De Beers 
Consolidated Mines, 16 June 1930. 
58. Ibid. 
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prices charged for coal were regulated to prevent undercutting.59 According to J 
Townley Williams, Chairman of NCOS, the new company would show some 
immediate benefits to the collieries but as many of them were committed to long-
term contracts, the full benefit would only accrue when these terminated.60 
Williams later wrote: 
The effect of this [the formation of the company] was to 
eliminate the ruinous effect of competition and to fix prices on 
a more satisfactory basis. Prices are now better stabifised and 
financial results have improved, but not to any great extent as 
owing to the times it would appear that only moderate 
incre~ls in the price of coal for Union customers have been 
made. 
It is surely a measure of the magnitude of the economic crisis that such a company 
was formed in a market that had previously seen cut-throat competition in what was 
perceived as a struggle for survival. The creation of a price-fixing cartel also flew in 
the face of laissez faire capitalism, but there is no evidence to suggest that it 
engendered any disapproval.62 
It was also in this year that the "token system" was called into question. In his 
evidence to the NEC, Major Peachey, lately Magistrate and Native Commissioner 
for Vryheid, had condemned the practice of issuing trading discs to Mricans by 
storekeepers on the mines, " ... by which they were induced to spend all their wages at 
the stores, so that they had no money left when they went home".63 Archdeacon A 
W Lee also raised this issue in his evidence when he stated that Mricans who went 
to the coal-mines sent almost .nothing home " ... owing to the system of tied stores 
obtaining on the coal-mines".64 It 'appears that little notice was taken at this stage, 
59. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek", p.4. See also TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minute 1930. 
60. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minute, 1930. 
61. J Townley Williams, "Coal", in The Garden Colony, National Publicity Corporation, Durban, 
1932 (no pagination). 
62. The practice was wen established in the Transvaal with the Transvaal Coal Owners' 
Association, so was unlikely to elicit much criticism. . 
63. Reported in TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 24 September 1930. 
64. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Archdeacon A W Lee, Dundee, 17 September 1930, 
p.I449. 
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but the issue was subsequently to resurface with greater prominence as the 
depression deepened, especially in the rural areas.65 
By 1931, the Natal mines were firmly in the grip of the depression and with sales 
constantly falling, production was further reduced. Production fell by a further 
massive 952 512 tons, or by 21 per cent. As the general economy of the Union 
slumped, there was less need for rail transport and consequently, the SAR reduced 
its consumption to 663 941 short tons.66 Not only did inland sales fall, but the sales 
in the shipment trade (exports and bunkering) declined by a massive 605 749 short 
tons, or by 28 per cent.67 This had very serious consequences for some mines: 
Owing to the large fall-away in shipment trade, due to the 
abnormal world conditions and the consequent reduction in the 
requirements of the SAR Administration, who is our largest 
individual customer, the output for the year was 127 850 tons 
less than that of th~revious financial year. This average loss 
of upwards of 10 ucg' tons per month has had a very serious 
effect upon profits. 
So serious was this effect that no dividend was paid by the company on the paltry 
profit of £5 534.69 The precarious position of the Natal mines was further 
aggravated when Great Britain left the gold standard in September 1931. Many 
British dominions and territories (and even those countries which were outside the 
Commonwealth but which had strong trading ties with Great Britain) were forced, 
or chose, to follow suit.70 The Union of South Africa did not. This had the effect of 
making all South African products, including coal, more expensive on the world 
market. The result was a fall ~ the sales of shipment coal. 
The Union government responded by allowing a 10 per cent subsidy on coal exports. 
65. See below, pp. 98ff. 
66. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Report, 1932. 
67. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek", Appendix B. 
68. TM, VNRCIC, 23rd Annual Report of the Directors, 1931, p.14. The effects of the gold 
standard will be described in detail below. 
69. TM, VNRCIC, 23rd Annual Report of the Directors, 1931, p. 14. 
70. Latham, Depression, pp. 57 • 60. 
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Railway rates on the transport of coal had already been reduced prior to the sterling 
CrISlS; rates having been cut by 5s per short ton. The mines also reduced their 
pithead prices by 1s 2d per short ton, in an effort to boost sales.71 The government 
subsidy, although welcome, was, in the opinion of Mr Steart " ... an insufficient offset 
to the adverse exchange rate ... ,,72 In reporting a loss of £28 9s Od for December, 
Steart attributed this to the decline in the shipping business. He went on to say: 
The subsidy of 10 per cent on export coal is totally inadequate 
and as a result this class of business is rapidly *coming 
impossible on account of competition from overseas. 
Northfield Colliery had only worked for 18 days in December and Steart had 
decided to work the mine for only 3 days per week the following month. As much 
labour as possible was being retrenched.74 A further negative result of the 
exchange rate emerged the following February: 
... the further serious handicap of the exchange rate has added 
to the burden and has no doubt further curtailed the number of 
ships calling in Natal ... The 10 per cent subsidy has been proven 
to be totally inadequate to meet the exchange handicap and in 
order to compete on the eastern markets, coal must be sold at 
such a ridiculously low pit head price asf? involve the collieries 
committed by contracts to heavy losses. , 
No evidence can be found of the exact amount lost through mines having entered 
long-term contracts prior to the devaluation of sterling but as this was fairly common 
practice, it is more than likely that a considerable number of mines would have been 
forced to sustain losses in this manner. This is borne out by the fact that the matter 
was raised at the Natal Coal ' Owners' Society, during a debate on whether the 
society should lend its support to an anti-gold-standard movement. Interestingly, the 
matter had been raised by Mr Otto Siedle, a well-known Durban businessman 
connected to the Dundee Coal Company, who was serving on an anti-gold-standard 
71. DBA, S4/NC3, Weekly Reports of General Manager, Northfield Colliery, October 1931. See 
also TM, NVRCIC, 23rd Annual Report of the Directors, 1931, at p. 14. 
72. DBA, S4/NC3, Report of the General Manager, Northfield Colliery, October 1931. 
73. DBA, S4jNC3, Report of the General Manager, Northfield Colliery, December 1931. 
74. Ibid. 
75. DBA, Unsorted Box, FA Steart to Secretary of De Beers, 15 February 1932. 
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committee established by the Mayor of Durban.76 Siedle appears to have been 
attempting to solicit a financial commitment to this committee from the society but 
this was turned down. The society, at the urging of the chairman, J Townley 
Williams, did not pass any resolution against the gold standard77 but adopted the 
stance that: 
... the government should be kept fully informed as to the 
export coal position and the losses falling on the Collieries, 
otherwis; it might be thought that they acquiesced in the 
position. 8 
This is not to suggest that J Townley Williams was in favour of the maintenance of 
the gold standard. In an article published in 1932 he wrote: 
Like all other industries dependent mostly on eXp'0rts for its 
sustenance, the Natal coal industry has fallen on evil days. The 
crisis is, however, world wide, and it will be difficult, if not 
impossible to secure real and extended adjustment without a 
change of policy or the co-operation of many countries. 
Whatever the unseen advantages of the gold stand~ may be, 
there is nothing but misfortune in it, so far, for coal. 
The effect on the collieries of Natal was spelt out: the adverse exchange rate 
. . 
resulted in a loss of 3s per long ton, while the subsidy only amounted to Is 1 V2d per 
long ton. It was concluded that: 
.. .it was impossible to continue exporting other than to carry 
out existing long contracts, and on these the Collieries were 
faced with a hea~ 10ss.~O . 
76. Siedle was a partner in the Durban branch of the shipping line Bullard King and Company and 
from 1915 was the managing director of the Dundee Coal Company, becoming its deputy 
chairman in 1932. It was largely on Siedle's initiative that the Natal Coal Owners' Society had 
been formed in 1909. Siedle was also a founder member (and later president) of the Natal 
Chamber of Industries. He was an extremely weD-known and influential personality in the 
Natal regional economy. See Guest, "Fmancing an Infant Coal Industry", p. 47. 
77. Edgecombe (in a personal communication) has pointed out that the Natal Navigation Group 
kept considerable reserves in London and this may have been a factor in the stance taken by 
Williams. 
78. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 28 December 1931. 
79. J Townley Williams, "Coal". 
80, Ibid. 
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Not all the mining companies were equally affected by the exchange crisis. Some, 
like the Natal Navigation Group (including the VNRCIC), which were registered in 
London, were having some receipts for coal exports remitted to London in sterling. 
The Union government, however, refused to pay any subsidy on coal exports unless 
the proceeds of.such sales were remitted to the local company.81 The VNRCIC had 
extensive holdings in London, amounting to some £39 374 at the end of June 1932,82 
rising to £43344 in September of 1932, while at the same time, it was running an 
overdraft of some £9 610 with a local bank to cover production costs.83 Its parent 
company (Natal Navigation Group) maintained a policy of keeping substantial cash 
reserves in sterling in London, selling coal and delaying the repatriation of the 
proceeds until such time as the exchange rate should have improved. These 
companies appear to have been attempting to shield themselves from the negative 
effects of the exchange rate and were also hoping to turn an increased profit when 
the Union was finally forced to leave the gold standard, as the money could then 
have been repatriated at a profit.84 However, losses on exports eventually forced 
the VNRIC to repatriate some of this money and receive subsidy on it.85 
Attempts by NCOS to have the subsidy on coal raised were met by government 
refusal. The Minister of Agriculture responded on behalf of the Minister of 
Finance, stating that an increased subsidy was not possible " ... due to the financial 
depression".86 
In the face of the crisis, attempts were also made to reorganise the Natal Coal 
9wners' Association (which had been formed in 1913 to control the bunker trade) in 
order to expand its membership and allow other mines, which were not members 
and therefore did not share the benefits of the bunker trade, to join.S7 Some 
81. TM, VNRCIC, Minutes of a Directors' Meeting, 30 March 1932. 
82. TM, VNRCIC, Minutes of a Directors' Meeting, 1 July 1932. 
83. TM, VNRCIC, Minutes of a Directors' Meeting, 21 October 1932. 
84. Had ~e Natal Navigation Group not been able to pursue this policy, a profit or £19412 on 
sales m London at the end of June 1932, would have had to be converted into £l) 079 in South 
African currency. (Personal communication, Ruth Edgecombe.) 
85. TM, VNRCIC, Minutes of Directors' Meeting, 6 April 1933. 
86. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 1 March 1932. 
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collieries with vested interests, like the Durban Navigation Collieries which was 
owned by the Union Castle Company, were reluctant to give up any share of the 
market. Durban Navigation not only demanded that it should be allowed to supply 
the needs of its own company, but wanted a further share of the bunker trade in 
addition.88 By holding out and refusing to compromise, Durban Navigation was 
offered exclusive bunkering rights to six of the most important shipping lines calling 
at the port of Durban but was still reluctant to share the trade.89 The Association 
was eventually re-formed, with Durban Navigation getting not only the exclusive 
rights to the six shipping lines previously offered, but a further 13 per cent of the 
remaining trade, up to a total of 272 000 tons.90 The adverse exchange rate and the 
general decline in shipping, however, resulted in declining demand for bunkers and 
so the reorganisation did not really ameliorate the situation. 
Faced with losses incurred on exports and with reports of the SAR favouring 
Transvaal mines over Natal mines in supply contracts for coal,91 all the Natal mines 
could do was to economise and hope to ride the crisis out, as indeed they had 
already been doing. Employee numbers had been reduced and continued to be 
reduced92 and further prospecting had already been suspended. In the case of the 
Natal Navigation Group this was " ... deferred pending a more favourable cash 
position and a better development of the position of the Natal coal trade and of the 
Natal Navigation Group".93 
Yet the difficulties of 1931 were not over, for in November the whole issue of the 
token system was revived by a letter from the Director of Native Labour, Major 
~ Cooke, enclosing a letter received by him from the delegates of the United 
Transkeian Territories General Council, · who had visited the mines of Northern 
87. DBA, S4/NC2, F Steart to Sir Robert KOlle, 22 October 1931. 
88. DBA, S4/NC2, F Steart to Secretary De Beers, 20 November 1931. 
89. DBA, S4jNC2, Steart to Secretary De Beers 25 November 1931. 
90. DBA, S4/NC2, F Steart to Secretary De Beers, 17 December 1931. 
91. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 28 March 1931. 
92. See TM, VNRCIC, Minutes of Directors' Meeting, 8 June 1931. 
93. TM, VNRCIC, Minutes of Directors' Meeting, 8 June 1931. 
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Natal. The delegates were "greatly concerned" that mine stores on the collieries 
were granting credit to African miners by issuing tokens or celluloid discs called 
skilivanas, which were then exchanged for goods and, more importantly, beer. This 
was termed "a most pernicious system of credit" and resulted in "many of the 
labourers wasting all their earnings to the detriment of their families". The credit 
was redeemed on pay-day as storekeepers were allowed to sit in the pay office and 
collect monies due to them from the labourers.94 
It may well have been a strategy by which the mines ,tied employees to them for 
extended periods of service, as argued by Edgecombe95 and also by Guest.96 
Edgecombe made a forceful case when she wrote: 
When a new recruit arrived at the mine he was already in debt 
for cash advances and his rail fare. He immediately needed to 
purchase a blanket, billycan, and boots. The mine storekeeper 
Issued him with tokens to pay for the goods. These were 
known as skilivanas ("trash money"). The tokens came in 
denominations of 3 pence, 6 pence and 1 shilling (with no 
intermediate values), and would be used by the new recruit to 
purchase his requirements. The recruit also had to use tokens 
to purchase his other needs: bread and meat from the store, 
items such as soap, matches and tobacco, and beer from the 
beerhall. The supply of tokens was unlimited. The 
storekeeper recovered these advances on payday, when the 
recruit had completed his ticket of thirty shifts. Typically, little 
or nothin$ was left of his pay by this stage. To see him through 
the next ticket of his contract of six or nine months, he had to 
acquire more tokens. Recruits thus stepped onto a treadmill of 
debt. They had little or no money to remit home, or to buy a 
beast for lobola (bride wealth). They had no funds for their 
rail fare. home, or t.o ptQ.vide food for the journey, and tended 
to remam on the nuneY7 
Certainly, this view was borne out by evidence of black miners themselves and by 
the Inspector of Native Labour for Dundee, who cited one case in which a miner 
94. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 19 November 1931. 
95. 0 R Edgecombe, "Labour Organisation, Accommodation and Resistance on the Natal Coal 
Mines, 1889 - 1989" in K Tenfelde (ed.), Towards a Social History of Mining in the 19th and 
20th Centuries, C H Beck, Munich, 1992, p. 772. 
96. B Guest, "Post-Union Natal Coal Industry", pp. 87 - 88. 
97. R Edgecombe, "The Role of Alcohol in Labor Acquisition and Control on the Natal Coal 
~es, ~911-1938" in J C~ and C Ambler (eds), Liquor and Labor in Southern Africa, 
UmverSlty of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1992, pp. 190 - 191. 
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had not been able to send money home once in eleven years.98 Archdeacon Lee 
also confirmed this in his evidence to the NEC: " ... those who go to the coal mines 
send almost nothing, owing to the system of tied stores obtaining on the coal-
mines.,,99 
One serious effect of the token system was to deprive those desperate households 
from whence the workers had come of a sorely needed lifeline in the heightened 
economic crisis they were experiencing. Farmers and storekeepers other than those 
on the mines were also seriously affected by this system. The system was decidedly 
to the advantage of the mine managements, for it retained skilled miners and 
improved efficiency. It can also be argued that the token 'system was intimidatory, 
forcing workers into docility and preventing agitation, as there was the closest co-
operation between the mine managements and the storekeepers. lOO 
The initial response of the mine owners was one of dismissal; they argued that beer 
halls on the mine property were necessary " ... because of illicit drinking outside of 
mine properties and resultant failure to report for work on Mondays". It was also 
suggested that tokens or "good-fors" were in any case, illegal. lOl The matter was 
then referred to the Mine Managers' Association, which reported back stating that 
the report of the delegates was inaccurate and that conditions on the mines had been 
"greatly exaggerated". Beer was seen as food and Africans did not "dissipate" their 
entire earnings on beer. Whether skilivQnas were or were not illegal, the mine 
managers argued that credit arrangements were made by all storekeepers and the 
managers were unanimous that " ... such procedures should not be disturbed". They 
~ere, however, prepared to withdraw skilivQnas if necessary.102 This 
recommendation was accepted by the miile owners at their next meeting, where it 
was decided that skilivQnas would be withdrawn with almost immediate effect. The 
98. Ibid., pp. 191, 193. 
99. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Archdeacon A W Lee at Vryheid, 18 September 1930, at 
p.I449. 
100. Edgecombe, "Alcohol", pp. 192 • 193. 
101. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 19 November 1931. 
102. TM, NCOS, Minutes of the Mine Managers' Association, 3 December 1931. 
rationale was given as follows: 
Members generally expressed the opinion that the system of 
allowing the mine stores to issue these skilivanas was open to 
many abuses and it was not in the interest of the Collieries to 
encourage it, it being pointed out among other considerations 
that it tended towards a monopoly by the mine stores and 
higher prices for the requirements of the natives, m~&3them 
ultimately dissatisfied WIth the conditions at the mines. 
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Workers were definitely being exploited as prices at mine stores using tokens were 
considerably inflated. 104 If, as Edgecombe and Guest argue, the skilivana was a 
strategy for tying workers to the mines, then it can only be suggested that the 
depression with its twin effects of pressurising the rural communities and of making 
labour more abundant, allowed or necessitated the decision to abolish them. It 
appears clear that the government was desirous of mine workers remitting part of 
their pay home in order to alleviate the crisis in the rural areas. Workers had been 
hesitant to criticise the token system for fear of victimisation or dismissal, but 
storekeepers in the districts of the mines were much less hesitant and protested 
against the monopoly enjoyed by the mine stores at a time when the economic 
downturn had severely affected the.ir trade. lOS In the event, the mine storekeepers 
won a stay of execution until the end of March 1932.106 The government banned 
the use of tokens and coupons in 1934.107 
Labour on the mines was obviously one of the biggest expenses to mine owners and 
the weak demand which had led to a significant fall in coal production also 
necessitated a further reduction of workers on the mines. Reductions were made 
across the racial divide, the workforce being reduced by 20 per cent from 13 479 to 
103. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 28 December 1931. 
104. Edgecombe, "Alcohol", p. 192. 
105. Ibid., p. 196. 
106. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 27 January 1932. 
107. Union of South Africa, Government Gazette No. 1087, dated 3 August 1934. The battle over 
skilivanas raged on as the notice in the Government Gazette was subsequently declared ultra 
vires after it was challenged in court by Mine Stores (Natal) Ltd, but the government 
eventually had its way and tokens and all other forms of credit to employees on mines and 
works were prohibited from 1 March 1938. See Guest, "Introduction to the Post-Union Natal 
CoaJ Industry", p. 88. 
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10 747 in the course of 1931. Interestingly, there was no favouring of white workers 
as might have been expected with the government's emphasis on "civilised labour". 
Indeed, a higher percentage of white workers (21 per cent) was retrenched, 
compared to only 20 per cent of African and 17 per cent of Asian workers. Overall, 
the Natal coal industry had shed some 6 915 jobs since the heady days of 1927, a 
decline of 39 per cent.108 
In an effort to further trim expenses for the forthcoming year, the Mine Managers' 
Association was mandated by the mine owners to investigate a general reduction in 
the wages of African workers. A reduction of 15s per month was mooted, seeing 
that the sugar industry, Natal's other major industry, was reputed to have already 
reduced wages by that amount. Some collieries had already reduced the wages of 
those workers (mainly white) who earned more than £3 per month.109 Wage 
reductions had resulted in a "wildcat" strike by 600 African miners at the Natal 
Navigation Collieries near Dundee in August 1931.110 The issue was resolved 
promptly and the miners returned to work the very next day, but perhaps this 
incident coloured the outlook of the mine managers, for they appeared to be very 
cautious in their reply. The mine managers pointed out that there existed no 
uniformity of wages between the mines and that most managers had already 
reduced wages of "natives and coloureds" and were still in the process of doing so. 
They added that Africans " ... earned their wages", and that any further reduction 
would see their best employees leave for the gold mines. Furthermore, they pointed 
out, the wages of those Africans employed under contract could not be interfered 
with. They therefore felt that no general wage cut should be implemented, but that 
~his matter should be left to the individual mine managers.111 
Production in 1932 was further reduced and only 2 811170 short tons of coal were 
produced, a decline of 691 164 short tons, or 19,7 per cent over the previous year. 
The shipping trade declined by a significant 27 per cent, from 1 591495 short tons in 
1931 to only 1165 163 short tons in 1932.112 This was mainly due to a decline of 
108. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Report, 1932. 
109. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 27 January 1932. 
110. Natal Mercury, 18 August 1931. 
111. TM, NCOS, Minutes of the Mine Managers' Association, 4 February 1932. 
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some 33 per cent in exports, brought about by the poor rate of exchange and 
increasing competition on world markets as producing countries desperately tried to 
sell coal for whatever could be had for it. l13 Increasing quantities of coal, mainly 
from Japan, flowed onto the eastern market, depressing prices to an unprofitable 
level. Natal mines continued to export coal, some of them at a loss, in the hope of 
retaining markets until conditions should improve.114 On the inland market, the 
SAR once again reduced its consumption to 580 572 short tons, helping the inland 
market to absorb 13 per cent less Natal coal. 115 Mining was far from profitable, the 
Natal mines only declaring a combined total of £35 355 in dividends, or 3,02d per 
short ton,116 a far cry from the £205718 or 11,4d per ton declared in 1927.117 
Labour was further reduced in response to the adverse conditions, the total labour 
force falling from 10747 in 1931 to 8 259, a decline of 2 488, or 23 per cent. In these 
retrenchments, unlike those of 1931, only 11,5 per cent of white workers were 
retrenched, 20 per cent of Asians and 24 per cent of African workers.118 It may 
very well have been that the "civilised labour" policy had come to the mines but 
there is no explicit evidence to substantiate this. It seems more likely that the lower 
number of skilled white workers retrench~d could mean that the lowest level on 
which mines could operate with skilled manpower had been more or less attained. 
Some mine authorities showed genuine human compassion about retrenching 
workers. Sir Robert Kotze of De Beers wrote as follows to Steart: 
.. .I trust that you have not had to dismiss too many employees. 
It's the most distressing feature of declining business and one 
s~udders at the.. thought of men without work and families 
WIthout men. It y 
112. Adapted from Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Net", Appendix B. 
113. DBA, S4/NC3, Report of the General Manager, Northfield Colliery, February 1932. 
114. Edgecombe and Guest, "The Natal Coal Industry", p. 53. 
115. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Report, 1933. 
116. Ibid. 
117. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minute, 1932. 
118. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minute, 1933. 
119. DBA, Unsorted Box, Sir Robert Kotze to F Steart,22 February 1932. Exactly what Sir 
Robert meant by the flnal phrase is unclear, but he might have been referring to migrant 
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Sir Robert wrote again early the following month, expressing his desire to help 
alleviate the distress of a discharged white worker.120 Sir Robert appears to have 
lobbied the De Beers board for some sort of charitable relief for the Northfield 
community, for Steart was given permission to dispense £100 for charitable work at 
the colliery.121 This must be seen against the fact that the mine was losing money; 
the Northfield Colliery had lost £4819s Od since November 1931.122 
In early January 1932 information was received that the Magistrate of Vryheid, 
acting on the instructions of the Director of Native Labour, had withheld a labour 
agent's recruiting licence for the recruiting, in certain areas of Zululand, of labour 
for the coal-mines. This action was prompted by the desire to prevent the spread of 
malaria. The Native Recruiting Corporation, which supplied some of the labour 
needs of the gold mines was fighting this restriction.123 The Mine Managers' 
Association also reacted negatively, noting that " ... boys from the districts mentioned 
had been employed on the Natal Coalfield for the last thirty-five years, without 
harmful consequences to themselves or others". They were further of the opinion 
that this attempt was "high-handed" and oUght to be resisted, or future labour 
supplies from Zululand might be adversely affected.124 In discussing the report of 
the mine managers it was noted by the owners that "large numbers of boys" were 
leaving Zululand to seek work on the gold mines and while the current situation was 
that there was a surplus of labour for the coal-mines, this would not always be so. 
As a result, the mine owners were against any restriction on the recruitment of 
labour. 125 
The spectre of African workers being siphoned off to the gold mines was a very real 
one indeed. Van der Horst has shown that the number of Africans from Natal and 
labourers. 
120. DBA, Unsorted Box, Sir Robert Kotze to Steart, 5 March 1932. 
121. DBA, Unsorted Box, Secretary of De Beers to F Steart, 23 March 1932. 
122. DBA, S4/NC3, Reports of the General Manager, Northfield Colliery, December 1931 to 
February 1932. 
123. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 27 January 1932. 
124. TM, NCOS, Minutes of the Mine Managers' Association, 4 February 1932. 
125. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 1 March 1932. 
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Zululand employed on Witwatersrand mines was increasing rapidly during the 
depression years. In 1928, 5005 African labourers from Natal and Zululand were 
employed on those mines but by 1934, there were 12 289,126 an increase of 7 284, 
or 146 per cent. Van der Horst attributes the steep rise to the prevailing drought in 
Northern Natal and Zululand.127 This is indeed a significant finding, for as Smith 
pointed out, mine work was not popular with Natal Africans128 and the situation 
must have attained serious proportions to make mine work attractive. However, it 
remains to be explained why the Witwatersrand was preferred to Natal. The most 
likely explanation for the efflux to the Witwatersrand lies in the fact that work on 
the coal-mines of Natal was both difficult to come by at this time because of the 
depressed conditions in this industry (as opposed to the vibrancy of the gold mines) 
and further, that the work was not as well remunerated as work on the gold mines. 
General working conditions on Natal coal-mines were also far less favourable. 129 
The latter factor was a source of concern and may help to explain why the mine 
managers and owners appeared to be prepared to abolish the skiIivana. 
As the depression deepened, the mine owners became more and more insistent that 
the Union government should fully understand the effect the adverse exchange rate 
was having on their industry. In January 1932 a letter was written to the Minister of 
Finance, N C Havenga, illustrating their claims with an example: 
The effect of the exchange would be readily seen from the 
following figures. On a selling price, say, of 12/- per ton of 
22401bs. F.O.B. Durban, the exchange at 30% comes to 3/7d 
per ton. In the amount of 12/- is included (in the case of the 
Northern Natal Navigation Collieries, near Paulpietersbur~ 
which have depended for years almost entireTy on therr 
shipment trade for their existence) an amount of 6/5d for 
railage, and there is 1/3d to cover the cost of shipment at the 
Port of Durban. These three items (3/7d, plus 6/5d, plus 1/3d) 
total II/3d, which leaves only 9d per ton to the Colliery for 
their coal. To this add 1/- per 2000 lbs. (say 1/IY2d per 2 240 
126. Van der Horst, Native Labour, pp. 216 - 217. 
127. Ibid., p. 213. 
128. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 320. 
129. Guest, "Post-Union Coal Industry", pp. 87ff. 
lbs.) the rebate on export coal trade, and the colliery gets a 
total of 1/10l/2d, which is several shillings below actual out of 
pocket cash costs. The Northern Natal Navigation COlli1IJo is furthest away from the Port of any of the Natal Collieries. 
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Nor was the situation for those mines closer to Durban any different, for what they 
saved on railage had to be expended on working costs, as the mines of Dundee (the 
closest) had thin coal seams and were more difficult to work.131 The effect of the 
exchange rate had been to reduce the sale of coal for export and the mine owners' 
letter claimed that many collieries had ceased exporting coal, while others which 
were committed to long-term contracts were incurring great losses. The letter 
concluded on a grim note: 
If no relief is given at an early date the export of coal from 
Natal in cargoes oversea [sicJ will, in all probability, cease 
altogether - that is, as soon as the cash resources a{§ixhausted 
of Collieries still continuing to sell coal for export. 
As already shown, the government did not accede to the mine owners' request for 
the subsidy on coal to be increased to at least 25 per cent. 133 Despite the obviously 
serious position the mines were in, their protests were strangely muted and there is 
no evidence to suggest that the mine owners became more militant in their demands. 
Nor is there any evidence to suggest that NCOS placed any political pressure on the 
government or on the M.P.s that represented coal-mining districts to ameliorate the 
position of the coal-mines.134 The Natal Devolution League,135 however, wrote a 
pointed letter to the Prime Minister which stated: 
It may be news.to you, Sir, to learn that we reared a large 
bunkering trade at the Port of Durban owing to the fact that we 
130. TM, NCOS, Appendix to Minutes of Meeting, 1 March 1932. 
131. Ibid. 
132. Ibid. 
133. See above p. fTI. 
134. Wby mine-owners did not adopt a more militant stance has yet to be satisfactorily explained. 
It may be postulated that the weakness of Natal coal in the international marketplace may 
have been a contributing factor. The paucity of evidence does not allow any fmal explanation. 
Professor Ruth Edgecombe, one of the acknowledged experts on coal-mining in Natal, was 
also unable to shed any light on this. Personal communication, Ruth Edgecombe. 
135. See below pp. 326ff. 
supplied the cheapest coal in the world, coupled with the 
knowledge that its quality was the finest in the Southern 
Hemisphere. This ~as a trade peculiar to . Natal a~ the bulk of 
this coal was supplied to steamers who did not discharge any 
cargo in South African ports. Everyone of these vessels left 
behind considerable sums of money for repairs, store~, etc. in 
addition to the value of the coal they bought. .. We agam repeat 
that your persistence in maintaining high railway rates plus the 
gold standard has effectively ruined the expo~gf coal to other 
countries and incidentally the whole industry. 
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The depression claimed another victim as the Wallsend Colliery was closed down, 
unable to survive the trying economic conditions.137 
So deep was the psychological state of depression in the industry that even the 
departure of the Union from the gold standard at the end of December 1932, 
although it improved the likelihood of an increase in the shipping trade, was not 
expected to bring about an immediate recovery.138 In actual fact, the depression 
had begun to lift from November 1932, and the departure of the Union from the 
gold standard did indeed improve matters. A further reduction of 5d per ton in the 
price of bunker coal at Durban was also helpful in recapturing some, though not all, 
of the bunker trade.139 The total production of the Natal mines increased in 1933 
from 2811 170 tons to 3 116708 tons, an increase of 305538 tons, or 10,9 per cent. 
Even the shipment trade showed an increase of 156 856 tons, or 13,5 per cent, to a 
total of 1 322019 tons.140 The recovery was not evident in the consumption of the 
SAR, which only consumed 497 547 short tons of Natal coal in 1933, a further 
decrease of 14 per cent over the previous year.141 The general improvement in 
production was accompanied by a 9 per cent increase in the number of labourers 
employed on the mines, the totall~bour force rising to 9 006 in 1933.142 
136. CAD, A32 (Hertzog Papers), F99, Colonel E M Greene (Natal Devolulion League) to 
Hertzog, 7 October 1932. 
137. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting. 31 March 1932. 
138. DBA, S4/NC3, General Manager's Report, December 1932. 
139. DBA, S4/NC3, General Manager's Report, January 1933. 
140. Adapted from Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek", Appendix B. 
141. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minute, 1933. 
142. Ibid. 
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Although coal production and profits rose,143 the Natal coal industry had not yet 
fully recovered from the depression and hard times still prevailed. Most mines were 
still not working full time. Operations at the Makatee's Kop mine had been 
suspended; those at New Tendega Collieries were greatly curtailed. The Tshoba 
mine had stopped producing shipment coal and De Beers had cut their losses and 
sold the Northfield Colliery to the Natal Navigation Group for a bargain £50 000.144 
The Hattingspruit mine had also been closed.145 
Although the worst of the depression was over, it was not until 1944, when the 
unusual demands of the Second World War greatly boosted production, that the 
Natal coal industry was able to produce as much as had been produced in 1929.146 
Competition on the export market remained fierce during the rest of the 1930s. The 
fortunes of one company serve to illustrate this. The VNRCIC produced 148196 
tons or 40,9 per cent more coal in the financial year ended 30 June 1934 than it had 
done in the previous financial year, but the profits accruing to the company had 
risen by an insignificant 4,6 per cent to only £37747 from £36 081 the previous 
financial year. The reason given was that prices for export coal had had to be cut for 
the sake of competitiveness on the internati.onal market.147 
Indeed, the competition in the bunker trade had been severe throughout the 
depression years. At times, when cargoes were small, some European vessels 
carried enough coal to make the round trip to the Union and back, to avoid paying 
what was considered to be the exorbitant charges levied for Natal's bunker coal. 148 
More worrying to those in the bunker trade was the rapid increase in the number of 
~i1-burning vessels calling at 'Durban. The number of these vessels increased 
143. The Natal mines paid a combined dividend of £55 609, or 4,28d per ton in 1933. TM, NCOS, 
Cbairman's Minute, 1933. 
144. TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minute, 1933. 
145. TM, VNRCIC, 25th Annual Report of the Directors, June 1933, at p. 13. Edgecombe (in a 
personal communication) avers that this took place because of the exhausted reserves of the 
mine, rather than as a consequence of the depression. 
146. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek", Appendix B. 
147. TM, VNRCIC, 25th and 26th Annual Reports of the Directors, 1933 and 1934. 
148. Edgecombe and Guest, "The Natal Coal Industry", p. 53. 
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dramatically, as Table 4.3 illustrates: 
Table 4.3 












Source: TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minutes for relevant years. 
Taking the depression years of 1929-1933 alone, the increase in the number of oil-
burning vessels is significant, some 135 per cent. And this increase must be viewed 
against the background of the shrinkage in world trade and the consequent 
reduction in the number of vessels of all types calling at the port of Durban. 149 
Thus not only were fewer ships (fewer potential customers) calling each year, but an 
increasing proportion of those which did call, were no longer potential customers for 
bunker coal. This helps to explain why the bunker trade was steadily declining and 
also why it failed to recover in the years after the depression. 150 
The precarious position of the Natal coal industry becomes clear when the 
profitability of the mines during the depression years is examined. Allusions have 
already been made to this, but table 4.4 sets the position out in detail: 
Table 4.4 






























It is clear from table 4.4 that coal-mining in Natal was barely profitable during the 
worst of the depression years and that profit margins had shrunk due to the 
economic crisis. What must be noted is that these"figures reflect only the dividends 
paid by coal-mining companies; they do not take into account companies which 
failed to declare dividends during the depression years. It is also worth noting that 
the onset of the crisis in the coal-mining industry was only reflected in dividend 
payments from 1931 to 1933 and that recovery was very noticeable in 1934. 
The depression in the coal-mining industry of Natal had resulted in a large reduction 
of the labour force d~ng the worst of the economic crisis, as table 4.5 illustrates: 
Table 4.5 
Labour force on Natal Coal-Mines, 1929-1933 






Source: TM, NCOS, Chairman's Minutes for relevant years. 
It is interesting that during this period of stress, very little labour unrest was 
experienced on coal-mines in Natal, despite adverse conditions such as reductions in 
wages, the introduction of shot:t time, retrenchments and gross exploitation through 
the token system.151 Part of the explanation of this may lie in the very depressed 
149. Union of South Africa, Year book No. 16, 1933/34, p. 687. See also A Lumby and I Mclean, 
"The Pon of Durban" in Guest and Sellers, Receded Tides of Empire, p. 39. 
150. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek", Appendix B. The bunker trade did improve 
considerably during the Second World War, when coal-burning vessels were pressed into 
service to meet war-time requirements, but even this revival was shortlived. 
151. According to Edgecombe (in a personal communication) this was a feature of the coal-mines 
in Natal throughout their long history and so it should not be seen as remarkable. It 
nevertheless remains interesting that despite the severe deterioration of working conditions 
during the depression years, miners remained docile when all sons of pressures were operating 
on them. 
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conditions pertaining in the country, and in the reserves in particular, and in the 
intimidatory nature of the token system. Part of it, however, may also lie in the fact 
that the mine owners had been absorbed into an alliance which included sugar 
barons and other vested commercial farming interests in rural Natal. 
This may be seen in the contribution made by the mine owners to the Native Affairs 
Organisation Fund, set up by the Revd John Dube, to cultivate a favourable 
employment climate in those areas from which the mines (together with other 
commercial concerns) drew their main supply of African workers. EVidently Dube 
had been approached by the sugar industry (which had contributed £750) " ... to 
counteract adverse influences on the native labour supply, especially that of the 
ICU". The mine owners agreed to advance the fund an amount of £250, of which 
£125 was to be paid immediately,152 In reporting back in November 1932, the 
Chairman of NCOS, J Townley Williams, said the following: 
The Rev. J. Dube had done a good deal of effective work in the 
desired direction through his newspaper and by interviewing 
Native Chiefs in Natal and Zululand, and part of the fund had 
been expended in buying him a new printin$ press and a cheap 
motor car to go round the country interviewmg the Chiefs,l5j 
Exactly how effective Dube actually was is difficult to ascertain, but it is known that 
he was a very influential figure in Zulu society, with strong connections to the Zulu 
royal family. 154 This scheme of Dube's appears to have been the culmination of a 
long association between influential Zulu nationalists, connected to the formation of 
the first Inkatha, and an alli~ce of Natal sugar barons and other commercial 
farmers. The object of the "alliance" w.as to suborn the Zulu royal family and 
Inkatha into acting in their best interests as far as labour supply and the control of 
"agitators" were concerned.15S It appears that the coal-mines were drawn into this 
alliance by the late 1920s and early 1930s, although little direct evidence can be 
152. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 10 June 1929. 
153. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 23 November 1932. 
154. Cope, To Bind the Nation, pp. 177ff. 
155. Ibid., pp. 206ff. See also Edgecombe, "Protest", p. 780 and La Hausse, "Ethnicity and 
History", p. 2137. 
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found. It is worth noting, however, that the mine owners had previously promised to 
contribute the sum of £50 to Dube's Ohlange Institute. 
The Chairman said he thought the institution was a very useful 
one and worthy of support, Mr Dube hyggelf being quite a good 
man from the Collieries' point of view. 
This donation was called for in a letter dated 10 March 1934, accompanied by a list 
of donors. The list included representatives of sugar interests and local influential 
businessmen, as well as the Native Recruiting Corporation.157 There appears to 
have been a widespread belief in Dube's and the Zulu nationalists' abilities to 
maintain a regular supply of docile black labourers. 158 
Perhaps more significant in the question of a stable workforce is the role played by 
married African workers permanently resident on mine properties. Most collieries 
in Natal had been established on farms bought or leased for mining purposes and 
the original black inhabitants continued to live there and work on the mines. 
Furthermore, the coal-mining areas of Northern Natal contained the largest 
concentrations of privately owned black land in the province.159 The importance of 
this may be inferred from the reaction of the mine owners when a dispute arose 
between the collieries and the Director of Native Labour, Major Cooke, over the 
numbers of married Africans residing permanently on mine properties in the 
Vryheid and Dundee areas. Major Cooke pointed out that this large scale 
settlement was a contravention of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act.160 Some 2 516 
African males (and presumably, their families) resided in the married quarters of 25 
collieries in these two districts in ~931.161 As the dispute dragged on: the mine 
owners attempted to involve the Minister of Native Affairs, Mr E G Jansen, 
156. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 2 September 1929. (My emphasis added.) Exactly what was 
meant is unclear, but the import is clear. 
157. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 29 March 1934. 
158. Edgecombe and Guest, "lDobaoe", pp. 217 - 218. 
159. Edgecombe, "The Role of Alcohol", p. 189. 
160. TM, NCOS, Appendix A (Cooke to NCOS, 21 April 1931) to Minutes of Mecling 28 May 
1931. 
161. TM, NCOS, Appendix A to Minutes of Meeting, 28 May 1931. These were rcrorts of the 
Inspectors of Native Labour, Messers C Eager and C Cope of the Vryhcid and Dundee 
districts respectively. 
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informally. Jansen had evidently told one of the managers, Mr W T Heslop of the 
Utrecht Colliery, that " ... what was objected to was drunkenness and immorality in 
these locations and unauthorised natives being harboured there".162 The mine 
owners were confident that they could deal with these problems but suspected that 
the major objection of the Department was to detribalisation.163 The mine 
managers were willing to make some accommodation in order to arrive at a modus 
vivendi with Major Cooke, but they reaffirmed their belief that married Africans 
were an essential component of the workforce: 
There are a lar~e number of experienced native labourers on 
the Natal Coalfield who live with their wives in mine married 
quarters, and the mine managers submit that such a drastic step 
as clearing these boys off the properties, would be against the 
best interests of the collieries ... With the intermittent working 
which is taking place at present on the coalfield, married boys 
are preferable to single, as the latter are mostly contracted to 
serve a certain number of shifts, and idle days become more 
irksome to them, and lead to no end of mischief. The 
conditions in Natal cannot be judged by those on the 
Witwatersrand, as they are so dlSsimilar .. .lt was felt that 
economic conditions being as they were, the DepartmeY640f 
Native Labour should not unduly harass the Natal mines ... 
The managers therefore suggested that the married African miner was more stable 
and less volatile during trying economic times. Another factor was highlighted by 
Mr R Campbell, general manager of the Hlobane Colliery: 
All work performed by coloured labourers in and about a 
Colliery cannot be looked on as unskilled work. There is a 
large number of natives employed on skilled work as Boss 
boys, coal cutte·r drivers, timber boys, rail boys and rope 
splicers, while on the surface there are responsible jobs in the 
compound, native hospital, in and around the screening plant 
and in the workshops. Native labourers cannot become 
proficient in any class of work if they are to be in employment 
for a few months only, after which they are encourased to 
return to their homes for a time .... With the falling off m the 
number of Indians employed it is now essential to develop a 
class of labour to take the place of the Indians, and this can 
162. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 30 July 1931. 
163. Ibid. 
164. TM, NCOS, Minutes of the Mine Managers' Association, 3 September 1931. 
only be done by having at least twe~t~ per cent of the lab(:)U~ on 
the coalfield permanently resldmg at the collienes. 
Underground efficiency is perhaps more ~ependent on the 
experienced native than on the European mmer. It would be 
nothing short of a calamity if the coalfield is to be deprived of 
the very efficient class of labour that is resident in th~ ~ative 
Married Quarters. There should therefore be no restnctlon on 
the number of married native employees on any colliery. 
Efficiency can only be obtained by properly trained workmen, 
and the necessary skil~§annot be acquired unless a man is in 
regular employment. 
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Far from wanting to implement "civilised labour" policies, Campbell was arguing 
that the skilled African worker, permanently resident on the colliery, was more 
necessary for purposes of efficiency than a European miner. Married African 
miners, therefore, were an asset that the mine managers and owners were reluctant 
to see disappear. The local farmers, however, were most unhappy about the large 
numbers of Africans resident on mine property or on lands leased by the mines, as 
these areas attracted Africans who would otherwise have been working on 
farms. 166 
The reduction 10 the number of Africans working on the mines during the 
depression might also have had the effect of reducing militancy: 
At two of the Collieries between 3 000 and 4 000 Natives were 
discharged and some of the Collieries have been closed down. 
Many of the Collieries' Natives with bad records were 
recruited in Johannesburg and other large urban centres. They 
were frequenters of the Colliery beer canteens and most 
serious cnme w~ committed by Natives of this type. No doubt 
the Colliery Companies in reducing the number of Native 
labourers have retained the more law-abiding hence the 
reduced number of criminal cases from the Collieries.I07 
The Natal coal-mines were fortunate in not having labour disputes to compound 
their other difficulties during the depression. Due to the economic crisis, there 
appears to have been a spirit of co-operation between the mine managements and 
the mineworkers, to the extent that even some of the racial barriers which had been 
165. TM, NCOS, Minutes of Meeting, 19 November 1931. 
166. Edgecombe and Guest, "Wessel's Nek", pp. 17 - 18. 
167. NAD, 3fVry, F474, Magistrate of Vryheid's Report for 1931. 
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erected over time began to crumble. One example of this was the way in which 
African, Indian and "coloured" miners were trained as rescue workers on the mines. 
NCOS operated a rescue station outside Dundee,168 where miners were specially 
trained for rendering assistance (mainly in the rescuing of trapped miners) during 
mine disasters. The station had always been manned by white miners, who were 
paid extra for their training period, and whilst on duty. From 1931, miners other 
than white were trained as rescue workers, 169 without any complaint being made by 
the white Mine Workers' Union. The fact that NCOS saved approximately £290 p.a. 
by doing this was certainly a factor in this decision.170 
Viewed in totality, the depression years were indeed difficult years for the Natal 
coal-mines. Faced with an economic slump that most people concerned with the 
industry could neither understand nor have predicted, the industry found itself on 
shaky financial ground as the markets they had come to rely on, namely the export 
and bunkering markets, began to decline. Desperate attempts to improve sales 
came to nothing, as the world-wide recession had depressed global trade and the 
government's policy of remaining on the gold standard simply further aggravated the 
already dire situation. The Natal coal ,industry was particularly hard hit, as prices 
obtained for Natal coal fell by 12,4 per cent between 1928 and 1932, largely as a 
result of the falling prices in the shipment trade, while prices for Transvaal coal fell 
by only 2,3 per cent in the same period.I71 
The few concessions made by the government, in reducing rail tariffs and by paying 
a 10 per cent export subsidy, were totally inadequate and ineffectual in meeting the 
crisis facing the coal-mines. Attempts to make the government aware of the plight 
of the coal-mines of Natal also met with very limited success, forcing the mines to 
implement measures to cut costs and to share what little trade existed. It should not 
be seen as surprising, therefore, that the depression years saw the formation of Natal 
168. It had been established in 1924. Personal communication, Ruth Edgecombe. 
169. Edgecombe does draw a distinction though. She points out that the task of black mine workers 
involved in rescue work was largely confmed to post-disaster clearing up work, while white 
miners still did the initial, dangerous rescue work. Personal communication, Ruth Edgecombe. 
170. TM, NCOS, Minutes of the Mine Managers' Association, 16 April 1931. 
171. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 21. 
116 
Associated Collieries to control and distribute the trade available on the inland 
market, or that the Natal Coal Owners' Association, which controlled the bunker 
trade, should have been broadened to include more collieries. The price-fixing 
cartels created by these measures were a significant consequence of the depression 
years. 
Mines were forced to cut costs wherever possible and few mines functioned at full 
capacity during the depression years, most working only 3 or 4 days per week. All 
prospecting was halted and maintenance was kept to a minimum. The largest cost-
saving measures adopted were to be seen in the retrenchment of miners, many 
thousands being laid off during the economic crisis.172 This obviously had 
consequences for unemployment figures, although some of those discharged did 
move to the gold mines. Mining towns in Northern Natal suffered greatly, especially 
when the crisis deepened and some of the mines were shut down. 
Once the government went off the gold standard, the situation did begin to improve 
and sales and wage levels recovered somewhat, but it would be a long time before 
the coal industry in Natal and all those associated with it, could forget the years of 
struggle occasioned by the Great Depression. 
172. See Table 4.5 above. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AGRICULTURE IN THE DOLDRUMS 
There can be little doubt that, of all the areas of economic activity in Natal, 
agriculture was amongst the most severely affected by the Great Depression. It is 
also clear, however, that the economic position of most fanners in Natal, like that of 
farmers throughout the Union and indeed, the western world, had been steadily 
declining for some time before 1929. Furthermore, the unfortunate situation of 
many farmers in Natal at this time was greatly aggravated by natural disasters in the 
shape of a severe drought and the resurgence of various agricultural pests and 
diseases. As if this were not a heavy enough burden, fanners also had to cope with 
the effects of the Hertzog government's manipulation of the currency. 
This chapter will investigate the situation that prevailed in the major components of 
agriculture in the province outside of the so-called "native reserves" or "locations." 
This division is somewhat artificial, but since the Land Act of 1913 brought into 
being (or otherwise enforced) two separate spheres of agricultural activity - one 
market and export-orientated, largely practised by whites, and one which was almost 
exclusively geared to subsistence production conducted by Africans 1 - it has been 
decided to keep this division for the sake of convenience. As Nattrass wrote: 
The two sections of South African agriculture are so different 
from one another that when one moves from a White-owned 
modem capital Using. farming sector to a Black subsistence 
orientated and tribally organised farming area, it is almost like 
stepping throll$h a time warp. Because these sectors are so 
very distinct it IS essential to consider both the characteristics 
and the extent and nature of the contribution that these two 
sectors ha2e made to South African economic development separately. 
The situation in the reserves will be investigated in the following chapter. For 
convenience, and following the format of Hurwitz3 and Minnaar,4 this study 
1. Hobart Houghton, South African Economy, p. 45. 
2. Nattrass, The South African Economy, pp. 99 - 100. 
3. Hurwitz, Agriculture. 
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examines agriculture in its component sectors (often referred to as "industries") 
rather than adopting a geographical approach. 
To avoid a counterproductive plethora of detail, only those sectors of primary 
importance, in terms of either their financial or political connections, have been 
investigated. For example, the plight of cotton- and tea-farmers, although they were 
severely affected by the depression, has been largely ignored as few farmers were 
involved and the industries themselves were of relatively little importance, either 
financially or politically. For the purposes of this thesis, a broad view of the effects 
of the depression on agriculture was more important than a minutely detailed study. 
Natal's agricultural potential is limited. Although the region contains 40 per cent of 
South Africa's usable water, the topography of the province, with its steep rise from 
the sea to the towering peaks of the Drakensberg, punctuated by hilly, broken 
terrain, is such that only 22 per cent of the land is actually arable. Of that, 37 per 
cent has been described as having "high" potential, 28 per cent "medium" potential 
and the rest is "marginal".5 From its very beginnings, organised white agriculture 
has had a strong orientation to the production of export staples and has been fairly 
diversified in nature. In the twentieth century, the coastal regions have seen a rapid 
growth of sugar farming, virtually to the exclusion of all else; while the Midlands 
region, the so-called "mist-belt" became more diversified, with wattle, wool, maize 
and dairying being the chief agricultural activities. In the northern districts, still 
more diversification existed, with cattle ranching, sheep farming, maize and fodder 
production being the norm. The domestic market for Natal's produce has always 
been relatively small, as the ·vast. majority of the population were themselves 
subsistence farmers.6 
Sugar 
Natal's major agricultural activity was sugar farming} From its very beginning in 
the 1840s, the sugar industry had enjoyed mixed fortunes, with periods of prosperity 
4. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture". 
5. B Guest, "The Natal Regional Economy 1910-1960, in Historical Perspective", South African 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 5, No. 12, 1990, p. 23. 
6. Ibid., pp. 23 • 24. 
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alternating with periods of economic crisis with an almost monotonous regularity. 
Shortage of capital, high interest rates, crop disease, competition from low-cost 
sugar imported from Mauritius and fluctuating prices obtainable overseas, all 
contributed to make the early years of the industry very precarious indeed.8 The 
situation improved somewhat in the decade before Union, when large blocks of 
fertile land in the higher rainfall areas of Zululand were opened up to white 
settlement. By the 1920s and 1930s, canefields covered most of the coastal plain, 
inland to the 1500- to 2 OOO-foot contour line.9 The importance of this development 
is that the spread of cane discouraged continued experiments with other crops such 
as coffee, tea and cotton, which had been unsuccessful in the nineteenth century. By 
the 1930s, very little else was grown by white farmers in areas that were suitable for 
sugar-cane. 10 
This led to a monoculture in many of these regions, 11 the produce of which, once 
most of the needs of the domestic market had been met, was forced to compete on 
international markets.12 Being subject to laws of supply and demand, prices 
fluctuated. Unlike wattle, where Natal enjoyed a virtual monopoly, sugar was 
produced in large quantities by many countries, both developing and developed. In 
addition, cane-sugar had to compete with sugar manufactured from sugar-beet, an 
important crop in many European countries.!3 During the First World War, the 
production of sugar-beet declined markedly, thus stimulating the production of 
7. I R Behrmann, "A Study of the Economics of Sugar-Cane Production in Natal", Ph.D. (Agric. 
Econ.) thesis, University of Natal (Pietennaritzburg), 1959, p. 23. 
8. Hurwitz, Agriculture, pp. 38 ·- 43. Memorandum of the South African Cane Growers' 
Association to the Board 0/ Trade and Industries, (hereafter Memorandum), 1934. p. 12. 
9. Hurwitz, Agriculture, pp. 41 - 43. 
10. Ibid., p. 38. 
11. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 129, Note 202. See also Behrmann, "Economics 
of Sugar-Cane Production, " p. 8. 
12. R Barnett, "The Natal Sugar Industry: its development since Union (1910) and its Economic 
Importance to South Africa," M. Econ. thesis, UNISA, 1938, p. 156. 
13. M Tracy, Government and Agriculture in Western Europe: 1880-1988, (3rd cd .) Harvester, 
New York, 1989, p. 149. Tracy argued that in the case of Britain a government subsidy to 
sugar-beet farmers greatly promoted the industry. In 1924 there were 22000 am: planted to 
sugar-beet, but by 1934 there were 396 000 acres so planted. 
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cane-sugar in the world outside Europe.14 The high prices obtainable for sugar 
greatly stimulated the industry; 15 international prices rose from £10 2s 6d per ton in 
1914 to £90 per ton in August 1920. After this, however, the prices fell precipitously 
to £13 per ton in January 1922, recovering to £26 lOs in 1924. Then the downward 
trend resumed as production and consumption recovered, the price reaching £9 per 
ton in 1928.16 
Such prices were far below the ruling price in the Union and brought about the 
reappearance17 of the objectionable practice of "dumping." "Dumping" was defined 
as selling surplus produce on the international market at prices far below those 
current in the producing nation. While in the short term such measures benefited 
the consumer in the importing nation, it obviously had an extremely deleterious 
effect on the industry of that country. Consequently, all over the world, countries 
began to erect tariff barriers to keep unwanted quantities of such products, including 
sugar, out of their domestic markets. The Union of South Africa was no exception. 
It was essential for the Natal growers and producers that they should retain control 
of the local or domestic market and so prevent the uncontrolled importation of 
"foreign" sugar. Appeals to government ~gan soon after Union and, by the end of 
1929, government protective measures had resulted in a protective tariff of £12 lOs 
per ton18 on sugar imported from the United States of America (which had been 
refining Cuban sugar), Canada (after Cuban sugar had been re-routed there), 
14. Prior to the war 9Y2 million tons of cane-sugar were produced and 9 million tons of beet-sugar. 
The latter fell to only 3 million tons in 1919/1920, while the production of cane-sugar 
increased from 13 million tons in 1920/1921 to 20 million tons in 1927/1m. The production 
of beet-sugar gradually recovered ~d in 1927/1m, had reached nearly 10 million tons. 
Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 120. 
15. This is also true of the Natal industry, but to a much lesser extent. While it forced producers to 
produce sufficient quantities to meet local requirements, they did not reap the benefits of 
greatly increased prices as the industry had engaged in voluntary price fixing at £17 lOs per ton 
to prevent the actions of "profiteers". Barnett, "The Natal Sugar Industry", p. 34. 
16. M"mnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 120. 
17. This was not a new phenomenon in the Union; "dumping" had been known even even prior to 
1910, when German beet-sugar was so disposed of. Barnett, "The Natal Sugar Industry", 
p.155. 
18. Ibid. , ~. 152. Barnett cites the Customs Tariff Amendment Act (No. 32 of 1930). Minnaar puts 
the tar~ff at 711. lOs per ton .. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 123. It appears 
that Minnaar s figures do not mclude the £1 excise duty, whilst Barnett's do. 
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Czechoslovakia and Germany. 19 
Further measures worth noting had also been taken. These included price control, 
embodied in the Sugar Prices Control Act of 1926, which fixed wholesale and retail 
prices and the so-called "Fahey Agreement" of 1926.20 The latter is of importance, 
because inter alia it enforced co-operation between millers and growers, whose 
interests had often conflicted in the past.21 Growers would henceforth be paid 
according to the sucrose content of their cane, not its mass. Both growers and 
millers would share· the risks involved in exporting sugar into the volatile world 
market, through a quota system. This was essential as an increasing proportion of 
the sugar crop was having to be exported to avoid the creation of a large local 
surplus and thus an increasing demand for a price cut.22 
At the onset of the depression, therefore, the Natal sugar industry was already 
accustomed to hardship and privation, having survived many vicissitudes, often, 
admittedly, with a great deal of government assistance. So much so, that by the late 
1920s it could be argued that the industry had come to rely on cordial relations with 
the Nationalist government, whose policies of protectionism had greatly advanced 
the fortunes of the industry.23 It should come as no surprise then, that even 
amongst the "sugarocracy" who were traditionally supporters of the South African 
party,24 some prominent figures, including George Hulett,25 W Seals-Wood,26 W 
19. Barnett, "The Natal Sugar Industry", pp. 161 - 162; Minnaar, "South African White 
Agriculture", pp. 122 -123. 
20. Named after the Chairman of the investigation, Mr F J Fahey, who later became the President 
of the Board of Trade. 
21. See A G Hammond, The South African Cane Growers' Association: The First Fifty Years, 
19Z7 - 1977, South African Cane Growers' Association, Durban, 1977, pp. 13 - 65. The 
Agreement could not withstand the various pressures occasioned by the falling prices, the 
depression and drought, and was more honoured in the breach than in the observance by both 
parties. 
22. In the twentieth century, sugar was rust exported on a large scale in 1918/1919; by 1930 more 
than a third of the total sugar crop had to be exported. Barnett, "The Natal Sugar Ind~try", 
p. 156; Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 122. 
23. The acreage under cane increased by 50 per cent between 1924 and 1932, because of the 
protectionist policies of the Hertzog government. Behrmann, "Economics", p. 34. 
24. M D Lincoln, "The Culture of the South African Sugarmill: The Impress of the Sugarocracy" 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1985, p. 127. ' 
25. Hulett had written two letters to Hertzog in August 1929, informing the leader of the National 
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A Campbell,27 C J Rapson, and Leon Renaud, declared themselves to be National 
Party supporters.28 This also helps to explain, in some measure, the increased 
assistance afforded the industry as the depression deepened, and the vehement 
opposition to any suggestions of secession made by the devolutionists.29 
Party of his intention to start a local branch of the party and calling for the support of cabinet 
ministers. Hulett also wanted an assurance "for propaganda purposes" that the National Party 
government was not seeking to sever links with the British Commonwealth. CAD, A32 
(Hertzog Papers), F96, G N Hulett to Hertzog, 14 August 1929 and 28 August 1929. Hulett 
also mentioned in his letter of 14 August 1929 that Mr Edwards, Managing Director of Hulett 
and Company's Refmeries • ... is heart and soul with us· . The Prime Minister replied 
congratulating Hulett and affirming that " ... the National Party has never stood for secession 
and most decidedly after the 1926 declaration by the Imperial Conference, never will". CAD, 
A32, (Hertzog Papers) F96, Hertzog to Hulett, 31 August 1929. 
26. Seals-Wood was Managing Director of Lever Brothers SA, and a part-time sugar farmer. He 
wrote the foUowing to Hertzog: "During a visit to my sugar farm in Zululand a few weeks ago, 
I took the opportunity of addressing a meeting of planters, upon which occasion I said that 
from my knowledge of the Government, I felt certain that the best interests of the planters 
would be protected. At the same time I hinted in a jocular way that it seemed somewhat 
curious that so many planters who had received such protection from the Government would 
hold political aUegiance elsewhere. I found that quite a number of individual planters were 
strong supporters of the Government, and I feel that possibly a visit by a responsible Minister 
through the sugar belt in Natal and Zululand would do good ... " CAD, A32 (Hertzog Papers), 
F94, W Seals-Wood to Hertzog, 19 November 1929. 
27. CampbeU's name was mentioned by Seals-Wood in his letter to Hertzog: ·My friend William 
CampbeU (Managing Director of Natal Estates Ltd.), feels precisely as I do on the subject. 
Indeed, he has been out-spoken [sic] in saying that the honourable thing to do is to support the 
Government that has done so much for the Sugar Industry .. ." Seals-Wood went on to relate 
how CampbeU had succeeded in bringing pressure to bear on the Natal Mercury (CampbeU 
was one of the largest shareholders in the newspaper) to ameliorate the paper's attitude to the 
Government. CAD, A32 (Hertzog Papers), F94, Seals-Wood to Hertzog, 19 November 1929. 
28. A branch of the National Party was formed at Mount Edgecombe on 13th of December 1929. 
At the founding meeting C r Rapson said: "The Nationalist Government is a protectionist 
Government. . .and it is for this reason that I am standing for nomination. When I was last in 
Capetown [sic] saw General Smuts, who admitted that the Sugar Industry needed protection, 
but a number of members of his Party were against it. Not only does the Nationalist 
Government support the Sugar Industry, but also the steel and diamond cutting industries, as 
weU as many others. The fact that the Nationalist Government offer support to these industries 
influenced me in changing my policy." South African Sugar Journal (hereafter SASJ), 
December 1929, p.815. George Hulett had earlier formed another branch of the National 
Party on 24 August 1929. SASJ, August 1929, p. 469. 
29. The devolution movement will be discussed in Chapter Nine below. The Devolutionists were 
antagonistic towards the industry because of this lack of support and consequently opposed the 
government subsidy scheme: ·It gives us no great measure of satisfaction to see a few 
individuals wax rich at our expense." CAD, A32 (Hertzog Papers), F99, Colonel E M Greene 
(Natal Devolution League) to Hertzog, 7 October 1932. 
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Furthermore, the storm of protest that was unleashed following the Hertzog 
government's decision to remain on the gold standard blew much less forcefully 
among sugar interests than it did in other agricultural sectors, even though the 
policies of the government caused losses of several hundreds of thousands of 
pounds. 
Table 5.1 















Source: Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 48. 








Table 5.1 shows quite clearly that apart from the slight decline in the 1931/32 
season, occasioned by a variety of natural factors, the acreage of cane harvested 
continued to increase at a rapid rate, being in 1933/34 some 50 704 acres or 39 per 
cent more than in 1928/29. It follows then that the planting and maturing of cane 
continued throughout the depression years, despite the precarious nature of the 
industry and falling prices. Actual production of sugar also increased markedly in 
the early years of the depression but, as the drought struck, the industry suffered a 
setback as the sucrose content of the cane declined, resulting in lower yields. 
Table 5.2 
Sugar Production, Exports and Export prices, 1928-1934 
Year Production Exports Ex~rtPrice 
Tons Tons £ erTon 
1928-29 295934 96681 12.19 
1929-30 298635 123 590 7.75 
1930-31 393205 210632 7.71 
1931-32 325933 146977 7.12 
1932-33 358905 185451 5.71 
1933-34 391173 190 811 7.43 
Sources: Hurwitz, A~riculture, 
Agriculture , p. 130. 
p. 48 and Minnaar, "South African White 
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What is clear from Table 5.2 is that while the proportion of South African sugar 
produced and exported showed a steady rise from 33 per cevt in 1928/29 to a peak 
of 54 per cent"in 1930/31, before dropping to between 45 per cent and 50 per cent, 
the prices obtainable on the overseas market showed a dramatic decline, falling by 
more than 53 per cent between 1928/29 and 1932/33. Thus, although more was 
exported, a great deal less money was realised, substantially increasing the pressure 
on the growers and millers. One of the largest and most well-established companies, 
J L Hulett and Sons, did not pay dividends in 1931/32 or in 1932/33.30 
The Company's records show that up to two years ago, in the 
course of its lifetime it only once faired to pay dividends on its 
shares and that was in 1907, when East Coast Fever and Horse-
sickness decimated the live stock of this country. With the 
world's conditions as they now are, and su1!ar at such a low ebb 
abroad, dividends are out of the question.:J1 
The fluctuations in the world price of sugar, caused by overproduction, brought 
about an international agreement, known as the Chadbourne Agreement, to limit 
production in the principal producing nations.32 The Union was not a signatory to 
this agreement, as Natal sugar already enjoyed an imperial preference in Great 
Britain and Canada, in common with other Commonwealth states. However, the 
immediate effect of this agreement was temporarily to stabilise the international 
market, which was to the advantage of all producers. Cuba, however, could not 
afford to restrict her production and soon resumed the "dumping" of sugar on the 
world market, necessitating another rise in the protective tariffs operative in the 
Union, as Cuban sugar refined in the United States of America could then be landed 
in Durban at £2 5s cheaper than the"local selling price}3 The tariff was accordingly 
raised in March 1932, but the government demanded a quid pro quo from the 
industry, in the shape of a reduction in the local price, which had been fixed by the 
30. SASJ, January 1932, p. 5 and January 1933, p. 3. 
31. SASJ, January 1933, p. 3. 
32. This Agreement was operative (rom May 1931 to September 1935, but was also more 
honoured in the breach than in the observance, especially by Cuba. Barnett, 'The Natal Sugar 
Industry", pp. 157 - 158. 
33. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 124. 
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Sugar Prices Act of 1926.34 The reduction was made largely in response to a steady 
stream of propagand~ allegedly emanating from the Rand.35 The arguments 
advanced held that the South African domestic consumer was being exploited and 
that cheaper Cuban sugar should be imported.36 
As if all these tribulations occasioned by the fluctuations in price and dumping were 
insufficient, Natal sugar farmers also had to contend with the forces of nature, in the 
shape of a crippling drought and an invasion of locusts. In 1930 and 1931, rainfall in 
Zululand was considerably below average, resulting in a significant loss of 
production. The loss amounted to some 327 000 tons of cane (or 30 000 tons of 
sugar), which was only partially offset by the increased production resulting from 
new areas, namely the Ntambanana and Nkwaleni Valley areas. Many of the farms 
established by the government in Zululand were small, being on average 428 
hectares in extent, the objectives having been to provide opportunities for as many 
farmers as possible, and to exclude the large companies. This meant that such 
farmers were very hard hit by this natural disaster, as they had not diversified, nor 
was it possible for them to do so in so short a period of time.37 Many of them had 
34. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p.46 and Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 125. These 
measures were embodied in the Customs Tariffs (Amendment) Act, No. 25 of 1932. Also laid 
down in the act were prohibitive dumping duties against aU countries which exported sugar to 
the Union at prices lower than the domestic value of sugar in the producing nation. 
Unscrupulous importers in the Union were able to get round this provision by routing sugar 
through The Netherlands and other non-producing countries, against whom no barriers had 
been erected. 
35. This was not anything new. In April 1929 George Heaton Nicholls, M.P. for Zululand had 
warned: "In the past our Sugar Industry has failed in regard to propaganda. You cannot 
relieve your mind of the fact that the Industry is not popular in South Africa, and it is not 
popular because of the weight of prejudice which has come down from other days. After aU, 
we are supposed to be the introducer of the Asiatic, and we are also being charged with being 
a people who have bled this country white." SASJ, April 1929, p. 204. 
36. See "Rand Magnates Distort the Sugar Position" in SASJ, October 1930, p. 689 and an 
interview with Mr D M Eadie, in the same journal, March 1930, pp.161 - 163. Such 
propaganda continued weU into 1933. See Editorial, SASJ, April 1933, p. 173 which 
commented at length on remarks made by a planter, Major Anderson, who deplored the 
unsavoury image of the sugar industry and argued that positive counter-propaganda was 
necessary. 
37. Some farmers who had planted exotic trees in order to assist in the drying of their lands, were 
able to survive by selling timber, but this strategy was limited to those who were fortunate 
enough to have harvestable plantations by the onset of the crisis. For more detail on this 
aspect, see A de V Minnaar, uShukela: A History 0/ the Growth and Development 0/ the Sugar 
Industry in Zululand: 1905 to the Present, HSRC, Pretoria, 1992, pp. 141ff. 
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sunk all their capital and had borrowed heavily to establish their farms, leaving them 
exceedingly vulnerable and unable to withstand any setback.38 To further 
complicate matters, cane growers in ZuJuJand did not have clear title to their land, 
the allotments having been allocated on a 99-year leasehold system, which rendered 
them ineligible for assistance from the Land Bank. This naturally upset the 
farmers.39 
Yet worse was to come for during 1933 the rainfall pattern was severely disrupted 
and very little rain fell during critical times for the cane farmers. Much of the cane 
planted in ZuJuJand died, or was so low in sucrose content that it was deemed 
unmillable. Many farmers cut their cane down to save the roots, leaving the debris 
to act as a muJch, so preventing further moisture loss.40 Mills in ZuJuJand agreed to 
make token payments to growers, to assist in the crisis.41 The government declared 
most of ZuJuJand a drought area, paving the way for rail concessions, but this 
assistance was insufficient to enable many farmers to remain on the land.42 
In August 1933, after an absence of some twenty-five years, the red locust once 
more made an appearance in ZuJuJand, spreading later to Natal. At first, damage 
was rather limited, but · concern was expressed that this invasion was merely the 
beginning of a serious problem, as indeed, it proved to be. The first swarm moved 
quite rapidly down the coastal plain, somewhat hampered by the fact that there were 
few open, sandy places where egg-laying couJd take place. The only open spaces 
were along roads and railway lines, bordering cane-fields. Damage was inflicted 
especially on young cane, south of Durban.43 The extent of the damage was 
~creased to some extent by · the . incompetence of Department of Agriculture 
officials, who advised farmers not to destroy hoppers when they hatched, but to wait 
38. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 125. 
39. For more detail on this controversy, see Minnaar, uShukeia, pp. 68 - 70. 
40. SASJ, August 1933, p. 449. 
41. Ibid. 
42. SASJ, May 1933, p. 245. The journal put the number of farmers who had had to give up their 
farms in Zululand as • ... Not far short of fifty .. : 
43. SASJ, August 1933, pp. 407 - 409. 
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until they congregated in mass formation. However, the hoppers, on hatching, 
simply moved into the cane, which made spraying difficult. In their anger and 
frustration, some farmers even blamed their Indian fellow cane growers: 
Indian planters are reported to be responsible for a great deal 
of the damage which has occurred recently in the upper 
districts of the North Coast, where several acres of crop have 
been turned white by the locusts. Many of these Indians will 
do nothin~ to help themselves. With true Oriental 
characteristtcs they prefer to sit down and squabble amongst 
themselves over some tri~ities, while the locusts are every 
day growing more serious. 
To complicate matters, the poison supplied by the Department killed the cane and 
many farmers refused to use it. Short of burning the cane, then, there was no 
effective way to deal with the menace.45 Damage in 1934 was far greater, especially 
in Zululand, as good rains made for hatchings of hoppers allover Zululand, 
especially in areas where control measures had not been taken.46 The Zululand 
Chamber of Commerce estimated that the cost to the industry in Zululand for 1934 
alone, amounted to £1 000 000.47 It was claimed that in the 1933/1934 season 
damage to crops had amounted to 26 per cent in Zululand and 14 per cent on the 
South Coast of Natal.48 
Outbreaks of malaria also caused major problems for the sugar industry during the 
depression years.49 Even before the onset of the depression, there was much 
debate about government plans to restrict Zululand farmers to the use of indigenous 
labour. Not surprisingly, these, plans were met with vehement opposition from all 
connected with the sugar industry. ' While it was thought that the labour recruited 
44. SASJ, March 1934, p. 127. 
45. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", pp. 126 - 127. Burning mature cane was common 
practice in some areas, so this would not have resulted in hardship, but the locusts preferred 
immature cane. 
46. ,For a full discussion of the locust menance, see Minnaar, uShukela, pp. 72 - 74. 
47. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 127. 
48. Memorandum, p. 32. 
49. For a full discussion of the malaria problem during the depression years, see Minnaar, 
uShukela, pp. 80 - 86 and J B Brain, "'But only we Black men die': the 1929-1933 malaria 
epidemics in Natal and Zulu1and", Contree, No. 27, April 1990. 
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from Zululand was, to an extent, resistant to malaria and should be used in the 
malarial zone, great difficulty was being experienced in meeting all the labour 
requirements from Zululand alone. 50 Speaking at a meeting of the Zululand 
Farmers' Association, Mr George Heaton Nicholls M.P. put the matter thus: 
We live in a malarial country, and the recruited labour consists 
largely of mine rejects, who are particularly susceptible to 
malaria. Commonsense demands ... that we should ~et that type 
of labour which does not contract malaria readIly, which is 
largely immune, from the coastal districts of Portuguese East, 
[Africa - Mozambique] instead of looking to Pondoland. 
Everybody would be beyrr off, and the malarial position 
would be mfinitely better. 
Minnaar pointed out that the moves to acquire more labour from Zululand had 
come from within the ranks of the sugar farmers themselves, and that their 
complaint was that many workers who, in their view, ought to have been working in 
the cane-fields, were being siphoned off to the gold mines. This, they claimed, 
necessitated the use of other sources of labour.52 It appears that the political clout 
wielded by Heaton Nicholls was sufficient to scotch any government plans to restrict 
sugar farmers to Zulu labour alone;53 the quid pro quo appears to have been that 
sugar farmers would not oppose continued recruiting for the gold mines. Minnaar 
points out that key districts in Zululand only became "closed" to outside recruiting in 
1935.54 
The spread of malaria posed a major health hazard for everyone connected with the 
industry, and attempts had to be made to eradicate the disease or minimise its 
SO. Jeeves argued that this attempt was partially aimed at providing work (or the unemployed o( 
Zululand, but that the lobbying o( Heaton Nicholls to retain the status quo i.e. the employment 
o( Pondo and Basotho workers, was so effective that these plans aU came to nothing. A Jeeves, 
"Sugar and Gold in the making o( the South African Labour System: the Crisis o( Supply on 
the Zululand Sugar Estates, 1906 - 1939", South African Journal of Economic History, 1992, 
Vol. 7, No.2. 
51. SASJ, December 1931, pp. 769 - 771. 
52. A Minnaar, "Labour Supply Problems o( the Zululand Sugar Planters, 1905 - 1939", Journal of 
Natal and Zulu History, Vol. 12, 1989, pp. 64 - 71. 
53. See discussion below, pp. 264 - 265. 
54. Minnaar, "Labour Supply", p. 67. 
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effects on production.55 Mr C W Dent highlighted this in his evidence to the Native 
Economic Commission: 
In parts of the Reserves, whole families have been struck 
down, and the mortality has been severe. Apart from the 
health point of view of the natives concerned, its affects [sic] 
on the labour supply is most serious. Labourers are unable to 
turn out to work, or else not able to perform their tasks 
efficiently 5 This in turn raises the costs of labour to the 
employer. 6 
Campaigns were launched to eradicate the threat, but the lack of resources and the 
many breeding waters open to mosquito infestation, made this a well-nigh 
impossible task. The situation with regard to malaria became very serious in 1932 
and 1933, when reports were received of thousands of Africans dying of the disease 
in Zululand.57 The situation was somewhat alleviated by the drought, which dried 
up breeding places and so inhibited the spread of the disease-carrying mosquitoes.58 
Farmers bore the expenses of the anti-malarial campaign, which included spraying 
and the clearing of surface water.59 Farmers came to resent the fact that little was 
done in the reserves, which formed their labour reservoir, and that this negated their 
efforts.60 . 
While struggling to contend with all these natural impediments to profitable 
agriculture, sugar farmers also had to contend with the effects of the Hertzog 
government's decision to remain on the gold standard. As the sugar industry had 
55. R G T Watson, Tongaati: An African Experiment, Hutchinson, London, 1960, pp. 151·153. 
56. CAD, NEC,I<26, F4, Evidence of Cecil William Dent, Empangeni, 26 September 1930, 
p.1816. 
57. SASJ, April 1932, p.201. Mention was made here of widespread cases in Umvoti and the 
Tugela region. The epidemic in the Empangeni area was described as .... the worst ever· . At a 
meeting of the Zululand Farmers' ~tion, the President, Mr C W Dent, put the death toU 
as high as 7 000, although he admitted that the real total would never be knOWD. SASJ, August 
1932,p.469. . 
58. Report of the Empangeni Planters' Association Annual General Meeting, SAS}, August 1933, 
p.449. 
59. The costs were estimated to run into • ... tens of thousands of pounds .. .",Memorandum,I934, 
p.32. 
60. SASJ, July 1933, p. 389. 
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become more and more dependent on the international market to sell its surplus 
sugar, any alteration for the worse in exchange rates between the Union and Great 
Britain and her other dominions was bound to have an effect on the material well-
being of the entire sugar industry. As early as October 1931, only a month after 
Great Britain left the gold standard, Heaton Nicholls61 was warning of the effects 
on the sugar industry: 
Dealing with the Sugar Industry before Great Britain left the 
gold standard ... cargo sugar was realising £7 16s on the wharf in 
Durban. To-day, on the existing basis, we are getting only £6 6s 
8d., a drop of £19s 10d. a ton. This is a vgpr serious position 
indeed for all engaged in sugar production. 
As the crisis dragged on, the position of the sugar industry on the international 
market worsened. This was especially so as many countries which had strong trading 
ties with Great Britain, including Canada, had followed Britain off gold. In a 
strongly worded editorial, the SASJ had this to say: 
The strongest evidence in favour of South Africa going off gold 
is affordeo by the example of New Zealand, a country that has 
built an exceptional prosperi~ spread over a large number of 
years, solely upon her f.riniary products, particularly dairy 
produce, meat and woo, which she has supplied to Great 
Britain. There is no doubt that she has gone off the Gold 
Standard entirely with the object of retaining and safeguarding 
these markets for her produce. In spite of our position in South 
Africa and all our attempts to cut away from Great Britain, and 
our German treaties, and our Ministers plenipotentiary in 
certain countries of the world, even the backveld Dutchman 
has come to admit that Great Britain is by far our best 
customer, and she is also our best friend, inasmuch as we owe 
her four hundred millions of money loaned to us to develop 
our country. By remaining on the Gold Standard we may 
preserve that egg-shell of economic independence so dear to 
the heart of the man nursing the wounds he received in the 
Boer War, a matter of thirty years ago, but if persevered in it 
will result in the people of this country taking m one another's 
washing in order to make a livin~. Everybody, from the clerk in 
the city office to the backveld Iruelie ~ower and the man in the 
counting house is perfectly satisfied, after four months' 
experience, that the state of the country through clinging to 
61. Minnaar suggests that NichoUs was behind much of the agitation against the Gold Standard 
among sugar planters. See Minnaar, "The Farmers and the Gold Standard Crisis·, p. 138. 
62. SASJ, October 1931, p. 675. 
gold must become catastrophic. Most of the primary producers 
who cannot sell their products, are already on the verge of 
starvation, while there is hardly a man in the whole country 
who has not suffered more or less deeply, and this after only 
four months' experience. The len~h to which the government 
has gone with its ingenious legislation to bolster up the position 
and throw dust in the eyes of the people of the cog~try would 
be pitiable if it were not so tragic in its conclusions. 
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The "ingenious legislation" to which this editorial referred was the Export Subsidies 
Act, whereby the government imposed a surcharge of 5 per cent on all imports, using 
the proceeds (and additional monies voted by Parliament) to pay exporters a 10 per 
cent bounty on the value of their products, in an attempt to reduce the effect of the 
disparity between the South African pound and sterling. Such bounties were not 
paid in respect of gold, diamonds and strangely, sugar.64 Possibly the government 
considered that the sugar industry was already in receipt of sufficient government 
assistance, in the form of protective tariffs, but perhaps it is worth considering that 
such editorials might have had the effect of hardening'attitudes in Pretoria.65 
The ultimate cost to the industry of the government's gold standard policy was put at 
£540 000, but declin~g prices made this assessment appear conservative.66 
However, upon review, the cost to the industry was estimated at £481000, of which 
the members of the Cane Growers' Association had to bear £123 245.67 These 
losses need to be put into perspective. What must be realised is that many of the 
farmers engaged in the growing of cane could be termed "small producers" as the 
following table illustrates: 
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With the price of cane at the mills being in the region of 13s per ton, it is obvious 
that some farmers must have been growing cane as a sideline, for the returns they 
were receiving, once production costs had been deducted, were insufficient to make 
any kind of a living. Secondly, it must also be obvious that many farmers whose sole 
source of income was the growing of cane, were perilously close to the bread-line, if 
not under it. 68 
... the growing of cane is certainly not an economic proposition 
for the small planter, the marginal grower having to harvest at 
least 5 000 tons of cane per annum to cover his overhead 
expenses. On this basis it is clear that there are many small 
farmers who, failig~ a marked improvement in returns, are 
bound to go under. 
This made the position of most Indian and African planters even more precarious, as 
their average output was well below the figure quoted by Barnett. Yet the numbers 
of Indians and Africans engaged in the planting of cane showed an upward tendency 
throughout the depression years. 
Table 5.4 
Output of Indian and African Cane Growers, 
1928-29 to 1933-34 
Indians Africans 
Year No. Tons Average No. Tons Average 
1928-29 505 143956 285 583 41038 71 
1929-30 530 169886 320 585 33014 56 
1930-31 625 222839 356 711 52858 74 
1931-32 635 183370 . 289 806 52073 64 
1932-33 694 218079 314 710 46411 65 
1933-34 677 223 055 329 878 52623 60 
Source: Memorandum, p. 52. 
63. SASJ, January 1932, pp. 3 - 5. 
64. Ibid, p. 5; Barnett, "Natal Sugar Industry", p. 77. 
65. There is no direct evidence one way or the other, but it is worth noting that by October 1932, 
the. Journal was singing a different tune, pointing out that while the sugar industry was indeed 
losmg heavily, the local cost of living had gone down. "We have come to the conclusion that 
there is no definite right and wrong about the gold standard: Editorial, SASJ, October 1932, 
p.539. 
66. Annual Report of Sir J L Hulett and Sons, reprinted in the SASJ, January 1933, p. 39. 
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Interestingly, while the number of Africans engaged in growing cane increased, their 
output remained largely static. The growing of cane by Indians and Africans, 
although their combined output was only approximately 9 per cent of the total cane 
crushed each year,70 was resisted by white growers and millers.?1 
Another feature of the depression years was the growth in the miller-cum-planter 
estates. This situation arose chiefly because of a shortage of capital on the part of 
small growers. When the depression and the drought struck, many small planters 
who had insufficient capital to tide them over, turned to financial institutions for 
assistance. The Land Bank found itself inundated with requests from farmers 
throughout the Union and could not hope to supply all their needs with its limited 
capital. The following table indicates that commercial farmers in Natal were heavily 
in debt and used Land Bank credit to pay these debts during the depression years. 
Table 5.5 
Land Bank Credit: Purposes of Loans granted, 1928 - 1934 
(in percentages) 
Year Purchase Improve- Payment Purchase Total 
of stock ments of debt of land 
1928 7,6 4,8 38,9 48,7 168570 
1929 7,6 12,0 40,4 40,0 129840 
1930 9,5 11,4 47,6 31,4 152085 
1931 3,8 5,6 77,9 12,5 262525 
1932 0,5 2,0 85,9 11,5 212420 
1933 0,6 0,8 78,7 19,8 160335 
1934 1,1 2,1 86,0 10,4 362410 
Source: Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 1 i9. 
67. South African Sugar Year Book and Directory, 1934, p. 102. 
68. Memorandum, p.46 and p. 82. 
69. Barnett, "Natal Sugar Industry", p. 35. 
70. Memorandum, p. 52. 
71. SASJ, January 1929, p. 9. There were reports of "Native Cane" being rejected at several mills 
throughout Natal and Zululand. This will be dealt with in greater detail in the foUowing 
chapter. 
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Due to a host of factors, the Land Bank decided to limit its involvement in the sugar 
industry.72 Other financial institutions followed this lead and so for many small 
planters the only possible source of additional capital was to borrow money from 
millers, with whom they had, or were to have, a close working arrangement. In some 
cases, loans were made by millers to farmers planting cane for the first time. In the 
face of all the factors which militated against successful cane farming at this time, 
many planters found themselves in the unhappy position of having to surrender their 
farms to the millers.73 There were only nineteen mills operating in Natal and 
Zululand, " ... controlling between them all the resources of the entire industry".74 
Nowhere is this growth in the miller-cum· planter sector more clearly illustrated than 
in the following table: 
Table 5.6 
Comparison of Cane tonnages produced: Planters and Millers-cum-planters, 


























Source: Adapted from Memorandum, p. 48. 
72. See Barnett, "The Natal Sugar Industry", p. 102. 
73. Ibid., pp. 142 • 144. 













During the worst period of the depression years, while the production of the planters 
fluctuated before resuming its upward trend, that of the millers-cum-planters 
continued to grow at a fairly rapid pace.75 However, it must be borne in mind that 
the more sugar was produced, the more had to be exported, often at a loss, which 
naturally affected the profit margins of the millers-cum-planters. 
The movement of white farmers off the land was a cause of concern for the 
Government, for it created further unemployment. The introduction of a quota 
system in 1935 and the Sugar Act, No. 28 of 1936, were partially aimed at halting this 
attrition, for it would be pointless for companies to acquire additional lands when 
their quota had been met.76 Pressure was exerted on the whole industry to retain as 
many whites in full employment as possible, or to provide employment for whites.?7 
The factory side of the Industry has also responded to the 
requests of Ministers made of recent years, to increase the 
scope of European labour. One mill has, since 1931, increased 
its white labour staff by 51. Another, during the period 1932-34 
employed a further 60 Europeans. Whatever extra expense this 
has involved has been regarded as a contribution to the 
solution of the problem of European unemployment. Other 
mills have done their best 'in this regard. Since 1925 the 
Europeans employed on the industrial side have increased by 
56 per cent., althT some of this increase is no doubt due to 
increased output. 
Doornkop Sugar Estate, having been loaned a vast sum of taxpayer's money,79 
began to employ whites as cane-cutters in May 1932. In addressing a meeting of the 
unemployed in Durban, Mr Rosenberg, the Managing Director said: 
... the whole of the cane in Australia is cut by Europeans, who 
do on an average from five to six times as much work per day 
as our average Native, there is no reason why the experiment 
75. Behrmann argues that millers-cum-planters were in a far stronger fmanciaJ position than the 
planters, as they controUed the prices paid to planters and were advantaging themselves at the 
expense of the planters. Behrmann, "Economics", p. 34 and p. 69. See also Lincoln, "Culture", 
p.75. 
76. Barnett, "The Natal Sugar Industry", pp. 144 -145 and Behrmann, "Economics", p. 35. 
77. Watson, Tongaati, p. 159. 
78. Memorandum, p. 60. 
79. SASJ, February 1929, p. 77. The total sum involved was in the region of £160 000. 
should not be a success and bring relief to many of t~n young 
strong men who cannot find employment in the towns. 
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It has already been shown that growers of cane increased their output during the 
depression in an effort to boost their incomes. Another measure adopted by the 
growers was to attempt to cut their production costs, chief of which was labour. It 
was obvious that such a reduction of wages could not be made by individual 
planters, for labour would simply move to higher-paying farms in the district. 
Through the Farmers' Associations, representing organised white agriculture, 
decisions were taken to reduce wages of field workers. Citing the " ... present parlous . 
state of the Sugar Industry and how it reacted on them as Cane Growers ... ", the 
wages of field workers were ~educed to 30s per 3D-shift ticket, with rations, while 
togt labour was to receive 10d per day without rations.81 Whether farmers were 
sincere or not in their protestations of not " ... having a hit at the underdog ... ", it is 
clear that the depressed economy was having a serious effect on the African 
population. It was said that " ... Natives were begging for work at any rate of pay in 
order to get food". It was claimed that African labour had been consulted and had 
agreed to the reduction, as an alternative to being retrenched.82 Wages were 
reduced throughout the . sugar growing region, although the availability of labour 
often determined the extent of such reductions.83 
It is clear that the major agricultural pursuit among white farmers, sugar farming, 
did indeed suffer greatly during the depression years. However, it is also clear that 
the reverses the industry suffered could have been a great deal worse, had not the 
Union government protected the industry's access to local markets. Neither is there 
any doubt that the depression had a long-tenn beneficial effect in that it forced the 
80. SASJ, May 1932, p. 277. 
81. SASJ, October 1931, p. 653. At the meeting of the Victoria County Farmers' Association held 
at Umhlali on 19 October 1931, George Hulett had suggested 25s per 3O-ticket shift with 
rations, with IOd without rations for togt labour. The former was considered to be too drastic 
and was amended to the ftgure given in the text. 
82. SASJ, October 1931, .p. 653. Minnaar, uShukela, p. 97, fn 401, incorrectly cites SASJ for 1920, 
1922, 1923 and 1925 m support of the reduction of wages, apparently overlooking this correct 
reference. 
83. See SASJ; June 1931, pp. 359 - 361 and SASJ, September 1932, p. 483. See also KCAL, KCM 
33684, Minutes of the Dumisa and District Farmers' Association, 4 December 1931 and 9 May 
1932; KCAL, KCM 30626, Minutes of the Emoyeni Planters' Association, 8 December 1932. 
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adoption of a stricter quota system, which restricted production and did much to 
stabilise the industry in later years. The new quota system, which came into effect as 
a result of the Sugar Act of 1936, limited production and put small growers in a far 
more advantageous position.84 
Wattle 
Since its importation from Australia in the nineteenth century, the cultivation of 
wattle, mainly the black wattle, Acacia moilissima,85 rapidly assumed a position of 
importance in Natal's agricultural activity. To such an extent that, in the period 1922 
to 1928, the export of wattle products (bark and extract) contributed more to the 
Union's export trade than did sugar.86 For best results, wattle requires altitudes of 
between 2 000 and 4 000 feet, which makes it eminently suitable for cultivation in 
the Midlands, specifically in the districts of Kranskop, Umvoti, New Hanover, 
Pietermaritzburg, Lion's River, Richmond and Camperdown. It was in these 
districts that wattle was first planted and, in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, more than half of all the wattle plantations were to be found in them. 
However, as wattle was such a lucrative crop, plantations were also established in 
the southern Midlands around Ixopo, Alfred and Port Shepstone; in Zululand; and 
near Paulpietersburg and Vryheid. Indeed, by 1930, plantations had also been 
established elsewhere in the Union, but 72,9 per cent of acreage under wattle was 
still to be found in Natal.87 
Natal farmers in the areas most suited to wattle cultivation were relatively quick to 
supplement their farming incomes by planting wattle on areas of their farms which 
were unsuitable for other crops or livestock. The relatively high prices obtained for 
bark, and the seemingly assured nature of the overseas demand for wattle products, 
84. See Barnett, "Sugar Industry", pp. 110 -134. 
85. Experiments were also made with the green wattle, Acacia decurrens or Acacia normalis and 
with the silver wattle, Acacia deolbota, but these did not prove as successful. See W E Watt 
and Dr A J Beyleveld, "Development of the Wattle Bark Industry in South Africa: Market 
Prospects for the Future", Forming in South A/rico, Vol. 8, February 1933, p. 83. 
86. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 59. 
87. Ibid., p. 54 - 56. 
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made even relatively small areas of wattle appear like profitable ventures. At worst, 
wattle would serve to supplement the declining incomes of many farmers engaged in 
mixed farming.88 
Wattle is grown specifically for the bark of the tree, which is rich in tannin, used in 
the tanning process of leather. As late as 1957, when Hurwitz was writing, it was still 
possible to state: 
The bulk of wattle bark and extract entering international 
markets is produced in South Africa, with Natal as the most 
important area. Cultivation of wattles has been extended to 
Kenya, Rhodesia, and Tanganyika, with Kenya ranking next in 
importance to South Africa. Elsewhere, AustralA~ and 
Madagascar also export small quantities of wattle bark. 
The Union was thus the world's largest supplier of wattle bark and extract for use in 
the global tanning industry. This i~ significant as there was little internal market for 
bark or extract. A quantity of timber was sold for use as mine props, but the major 
portion of the industry's products was exported. This made the industry extremely 
vulnerable to the fluctuations in price and demand of the international trade cycle. 
As the economic situation in the major importing countries such as Great Britain, 
Japan, Germany and the United States of America deteriorated, so the demand for 
wattle products began to fall and consequently; prices began to decline. From a 
peak of £9 5s 7d per ton of bark in 1928, prices fell to a low of £3 19s 10d in 1934. 
The price of extract fell just as precipitously, but at a later date. The average price 
per ton of extract peaked in 1930, when £17 9s 8d was realised, but this fell 
~ontinuously to as low as £10 IS 2d in 1935.90 
Wattle takes between six and eight years to mature, depending on soil and weather 
conditions. Only at maturity is the bark sufficiently high in tannin to make 
88. H. Win, "The Development of the Timber Industry in Natal, 1910-1960: A Socia-
environmental Study." Paper presented at the Seventh Biennial Conference of the Economic 
History Society of Southern Africa, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, July 1992. 
89. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 52. 
90. ~ar, "South ~rican White Agriculture", p. 119. Minnaar provides a full table showing 
pnces for the penod 1928-1935, abstracted from Union of South Africa, Year Books of the 
relevant years. 
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harvesting worthwhile.91 The relatively high prices which had reigned on the 
international market during the mid-1920s had encouraged some Natal farmers to 
undertake further plantings of trees which were to mature at a time when 
international prices were falling in the 1930s.92 Obviously they could not have 
predicted this trend and the resulting over-production was, to an extent, offset by a 
dramatic increase in the export of extract. To obtain extract, the bark had to be 
boiled and then concentrated. The machinery required was expensive and it was not 
until 1916 that the Natal Tanning Extract Company was formed for this purpose.93 
However, as a ton of extract realised a great deal more, mass for mass, than bark, a 
steady increase in the quantity of extract exported was noticeable for most of the 
depression years.94 This increase in quantity was not matched by any significant 
rise in returns, as Table 5.7 illustrates: 
Table 5.7 
Wattle Exports: 1928 - 1934 
Year Quantity in tons Export Value £ Average £ per ton 
Bark Extract Bark Extract Bark Extract 
1928 85508 10654 793990 181079 £9/05/07 £16/19/11 
1929 73328 14023 513 542 241695 £7/00/00 £17/04/08 
1930 81809 17601 554095 307799 £6/15/05 £17/09/08 
1931 69150 17392 399887 264132 £5/15/07 £15/03/08 
1932 63573 20939 227378 215482 £4/07/03 £10/05/09 
1933 75620 18901 330404 195465 £4/07/04 £10/06/09 
1934 73747 25708 294534 261022 £3/19/10 £10/03/00 
1935 93340 38509 380102 387530 £4/01/04 £10/01/02 
Source: Union of South Mrica, Year Books for relevant years. 
Even declining prices did not stop some farmers from continuing to plant wattle in 
the early years of the depression.95 This should not be seen as surprising, as it was 
often a "knee-jerk" reaction of farmers to try and counteract the effects of declining 
91. Dr I J Craib, "Wattle Production in the Union", in Farming in South A/rica, Vol. X. November 
1933, p. 426. 
92. Watt and Beyleveld, "Development of the Wattle Bark Industry", p. 83. 
93. H Shaw, "The Wattle Industry", in Agriculture in Natal: Recent Developments. being Vol. 13 
of the Natal Regional Survey, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1957, pp. 67 . Mi. 
94. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 119. 
95. The Farmer, 24 October 1930, p. 42. 
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income by boosting production, either through better cultivation of existing lands, or 
by putting more land under the plough. Even the mouthpiece of the Department of 
Agriculture gave this sort of advice to farmers.96 
The consequence of this drive by farmers to increase their yields often meant that 
pressure was applied to the lands of African workers on the farms. Many farms, 
especially in the northern districts of Natal, still operated on the basis of labour 
tenancy arrangements, whereby African workers were allotted small portions of the 
white farmer's land on which to establish their kraals, run their livestock and grow 
their crops, in return for a specified period of labour service during the year.97 
Often small cash payments, or wages in kind supplemented the incomes of the 
workers. To many wattle farmers, land was too valuable in terms of possible future 
income to allow its continued occupation by workers and their families, who were 
simply "wasting" it.98 Many tenants were therefore turned off.99 The numbers of 
other workers were also reduced, to cut costs. The measures adopted were fairly 
universal throughout the farming community of the province during the depression 
years and will be discussed in detail below. 
96, Message from Mr C H Olivier, President of the South African Agricultural Union, Farming in 
South A/rica, Vol. 5, May 1930, p. 49: "Prices for all our products are low; therefore we should 
endeavour to reduce the cost of production by increasing the production per morgen or per 
animaL." It is worth noting that in the same journal some months later, a totally different 
approach was advocated by Mr Naude and Dr Beyleveld: "The farmer is often advised that in 
order to maintain his income in these days of depression as neat as possible to what it was 
before such depression set in, he should increase his production ... this is fallacious reasoning, 
and would, if acted upon, land the farmers in a worse plight than they were before." J S P 
Naude and A J Beyleveld, "AgricultUre and the Depression", Farming in South A/rica, Vol. 5, 
August 1930, p. 197. . 
97. Further detailed discussion of this system and the way in which white farmers were able to 
manipulate it will be given below. See also Lacey, Boroko, pp. 120 - 181. 
98. Bradford, Struggle, p. 281. 
99. Ibid., p. 170. The Natal Tanning Extract Company bought in the region of 30 000 acres and 
turned all existing tenants off the land. See also as examples the following evidence led before 
the Native Economic Commission of 1930/32: CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Headman 
Lugubu Mbata, Pietermaritzburg, 8 April 1931, p.6531; CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of 
Colonel F E Foxon and Mr F Pope-Ellis, Pietermaritzburg, 9 April 1931, p. 6620; CAD, NEC, 
K26, F4, Evidence of Mr Frederick Rodseth (Superintendent of Native Reserves and Inspector 
of Na~ve Labourers for S. Zulu1and), Eshowe, 30 September 1930, p. 1945; CAD, NEC, K26, 
F4, EVIdence of Chief Josiah Mqwebu, Stanger, 2 October 1930, p. 2039; CAD, NEC, K26, 
F4, Evidence of Richard Ngidi, Bulwer, 10 October 1930, p. 2256. 
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The Hertzog government was made aware of the negative effects on the wattle 
industry of its decision to remain on the gold standard when Britain left it in 
1931.100 This awareness, coupled with the failing fortunes of the industry, 
prompted the government to respond with an export subsidy. The industry was 
almost wholly dependent on overseas markets and, because the export of wattle 
products earned the Union valuable foreign exchange, the export of both wattle 
bark and extract was subsidised under the Export Subsidies Act of 1931, at a rate of 
10 per cent, this later being increased to 25 per cent.101 A sum of £68 380 was thus 
paid in 1932, £52994 in 1933 and £75207 in 1934.102 This served to assist farmers 
in surviving the depression and offset, to some extent, the fluctuation in returns 
occasioned by the disparity between the South African pound and sterling. Yet even . 
the measure of relief this afforded wattle growers was considered either 
inadequate 103 or foolish. 104 Generally, however, the wattle growers did not suffer 
nearly as badly as other agricultural sectors in the province, their plantations not 
being as affected by the drought or by insect pests and diseases. 
Maize 
In both volume ~d value, maize was without question the Union's most important 
agricultural crop. 105 It was also the staple food of a large section of the population, 
making it the most important commodity on the internal market. Furthermore, after 
the mid-1920s the Union generally produced far more maize than was required, the 
100. The effects of the gold standard issue will be discussed below. 
101. NAU, Minutes of the Executive Meeting of 28 April 1932. 
102. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 59. 
103. KCAL, KCM 30035, Annual Resolutions passed at Natal Agricultural Union Congresses, 
No. 16 of 26/27 April 1932. "That in the opinion of this Congress the subsidy on Wattle Bark 
should be increased from 10 per cent to 25 per cent owing to the present extremely low price 
of bark." 
104. See letters to the editor from "The Stroller" and "Sucrose" in The Farmer, 13 November 1931, 
p. 30. In the latter, the writer alleged that it was a case of "Robbing Peter to pay Paul". See 
also an editorial in the same journal, 15 January 1932, p. 15, where export subsidies are 
termed " .. Imancial jugglery for which it is hard to fmd justification". 
105. G Gianino, "An Analysis of Farm Supply Response with special reference to Maize Production 
in South Africa," M.Sc. (Agric. Econ.) thesis, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), 1979, p. 
1. The production of maize far exceeded the production of all other cereal crops combined. A 
R Saunders, Maize in South Africa, CNA, Johannesburg, 1930, p. 28. 
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balance being exported onto a volatile world market. It was from Natal that the first 
significant quantity of maize was exported to Great Britain in 1906/07. Shortages 
of maize and other grains after the First World War greatly stimulated production in 
the Union. Production in the other provinces soon far outstripped that of Natal. It 
must be stressed that this increased production elsewhere in the Union was almost 
entirely with a view to export, as the internal market remained rather static.106 A 
wave of propaganda suggesting that the Union could become a great maize-
producing nation also greatly stimulated planting, 107 particularly in certain districts 
of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, which concentrated on producing maize as 
a "cash crop" with no attempt at diversification. By the 1920s and 1930s, this area, 
known as the "maize triangle", produced 82,3 per cent of all the maize grown 
annually on white farms in the Union. By comparison, production of maize on white 
farms in Natal was very small, accounting for only 12,2 per cent of the total Union 
production.108 However, maize was Natal's most important field crop, after sugar 
and wattle, accounting for 82,5 per cent of all other crops planted in the 
province.109 In 1930,214000 morgen were planted to maize in Natal.110 
Table 5.8 
Maize Yields, Natal and the Union, 1927 -1934 
(In 200 lb. bags) 
Year Union Natal Natal as per cent 
1927 13 976000 1928000 15,2 
1928 15075000 1389000 9,2 
1929 13876000 1545000 11,1 
1930 17261000 1669000 9,7 
1931 12654000 989000 7,8 
1932 15320000 1123 000 7,3 
1933 5980000 . 906000 15,2 
1934 18547000 1631000 8,8 
Source: Handbook, p. 52. 
106. W J Lamont, A Review of the Maize Situation, Department of Agriculture, Economic series 
No. 15, Bulletin No. 101, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1931, p. 6. 
107. P W Vorster, "The Maize Industry", Farming in South Africa, Vol. 27, March 1952, p. 173. 
Vorster points out that this aU came to naught. 
108. Lamont, Maize Situation, p. 5. 
109. I J Smuts,."Field c~op Production", in Agriculture in Natal: Recent Developments, p. 96 and 
p. 102. MaIZe occupies almost twice the area occupied by aU other crops excluding sugar-cane. 
110. Union of South Africa, Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, Handbook of 
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Maize in Natal is grown largely in the Midlands and in the northern districts, where 
the climate and soil types are suitable for its cultivation. While much of the coastal 
region is also suitable, the crop gradually became less and less important in this 
region because of competition from sugar-cane and because of the incidence of 
stre~ a virulent viral disease which thrives in high humidity. Some maize was 
grown in the coastal region by Indian market-gardeners in the 1920s and 1930s, but 
the quantities were insignificant. 1 1 1 
The most important maize-growing districts in . Natal in the early decades of this 
century were: Estcourt, Klip River, Vryheid, Utrecht, Ixopo, New Hanover, Msinga, 
Newcastle and Dundee, which between them produced 63 per cent of all the maize 
grown in the province. Generally maize was the only crop grown in these areas, 
although not the only agricultural activity, as the growing of maize usually went 
together with animal husbandry, chiefly cattle farming.1l2 Maize was used to 
supplement the diet of cattle, to increase yields of both meat and milk. Despite the 
fact that maize farms in Natal were generally smaller than elsewhere in the 
Union, 113 the average yield per morgen was almost double that of the rest of the 
Union, largely due to suitable climatic conditions. 1 14 Yet there were many areas in 
which maize was planted simply for the lack of an alternative food crop, sometimes 
with disastrous results: 
Much of the land which is to-day planted to maize in Natal had 
perhaps more profitably been left unworked or put down to 
permanent pasture, for erosion is a problem of the w.:eatest 
seriousness. Erosion by water is an almost universal difficulty 
throughout Natal, but in the northi.Ol. parts a great deal of 
damage is also done by wind erosion . . 1' 
Agricultural Statistics, 1904 - 1950, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1960/61, Table 36, p. 52. 
Hereafter referred to as Handbook. 
111. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 65. 
112. Ibid., p. 66; see also D J R McWhirter, "Agriculture in Natal : An Outline based largely on the 
Census", Agric. Economics m Long Essay, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), 1951, p. 55. 
113. Saunders, Maize, p. 40. 
114. Ibid., p. 31. 
115. Ibid. , p. 41. 
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Much of the maize grown on Natal farms was actually retained on the producing 
farms. In 1933, 42,7 per cent (or 697000 bags of 200 lb.) of maize produced on 
Natal farms never left those farms, and figures for the years following show an even 
greater retention factor. 116 Maize grown in Natal that was sold, was generally sold 
locally, much of it to Africans in the reserves of Natal and Zululand. This may seem 
strange, as maize had become a very important crop among African subsistence 
farmers, but the overcrowded conditions in some of the reserves, coupled with poor 
farming techniques, soil erosion and exhaustion, drought and a growing population, 
meant that Africans often had to buy maize to survive.117 Very little maize grown 
in Natal left the province; most was consumed locally, as food for labour or for 
cattle.118 It should also be noted that Africans on white farms produced 
considerable quantities of maize for their own consumption. As part of their labour 
tenancy agreements, many Africans were allocated a portion of land on which to 
grow crops to sustain themselves. The produce was almost entirely consumed on the 
farm. 
Table 5.9 
Maize Produced by Mricans on White Farms, 1927 - 1934. 




















Viewed collectively, all these factors distinguished maize-growing in Natal from 
maize-growing elsewhere in the Union, and made Natal's maize farmers far less 
116. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 67 and McWhirter, "Agriculture", p.60. Unfortunately, no rigures are 
available prior to this year. 
117. The Farmer, 2 August 1929, p. 31. 
118. NAU, Minutes of Executive Meeting, 28 September 1928. 
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vulnerable to the vicissitudes of falling prices and fluctuations in production 
overseas. Yet Natal's maize farmers could not entirely escape the effects of the 
depression and drought, as maize prices on the local market were naturally 
responsive to conditions both elsewhere in the Union and abroad. As the price on 
the Union market declined, largely in response to export-related factors, so the 
prices in Natal also plummeted. 
The Union was one of the smaller maize-exporting countries; production in 
Argentina, the United States of America, the Danubian states and Russia far 
outstripped that of the Union and the international market price obviously 
depended on the production of these countries. The biggest international consumers 
of maize were Great Britain, Italy, France, Brazil, India, Egypt and the Dutch East 
Indies. Their levels of consumption also greatly influenced the prices on the 
international market.119 Until 1929, the world price of maize was s~ch that maize 
farming for export was relatively remunerative. As suggested above, the export of 
maize was encouraged by the Union government, as it brought in valuable foreign 
exchange.120 In 1930 the Union's maize surplus had risen to approximately 12,5 
million 200 lb. bags, which forced prices down from 13s 7d per bag in 1929 to 6s 5d 
in June 1930.121 Vorster described the situ~tion in the following terms: 
When in 1930 the world depression set in, the maize industry 
was largely dependent upon the export market and when prices 
slumped overseas, the maize fanners were very hard hit. 
There was a similar drop in local prices - so much so that the 
maize producers were faced with financial ruin. For thousands 
of fanners maize constituted the most important source of 
income. They CQuld not fall back on the cultivation of other 
crops. Using maize as animal feed brought no solution either, 
because the prices of animal products were just as low and 
exportation resulted in a loss. Moreover, radical change cannot 
be effected in any farming system overni~t. The then 
Government was obliged to take direct action m order to save 
thousands of fanners from ruin.12Z-
119. Lamont, Maize Situation, p. 9. . 
120. Vorster, "Maize", p. 175. For more on the "alliance between gold and maize", see D O'Meara, 
Volkskapitalis~: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Develop~nt of Afrikaner Nationalism, 
1934-1948, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. . 
121. Farming in South Africa, March 1930, p. 602; November 1930, pp. 366, 371. 
122. Vorster, "Maize", p. 175. 
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This deteriorating situation had prompted a mass meeting of maize farmers in the 
Transvaal to demand government assistance, which was not forthcoming in the form 
demanded, the government being unwilling to directly subsidise farmers. However, 
the situation deteriorated even further dwing the rest of 1930 and by early 1931, 
with world production again at record levels, the situati<?n of the Union's maize 
farmers was becoming very parlous indeed as the export price of maize had fallen to 
only 3s 6d per bag.123 
Finally forced into action, the government passed the Mealie Control Act, No. 39 of 
1931 (later amended by Act No. 23 of 1932), which brought some relief in the form 
of guaranteed payments to maize co-operatives, effectively subsidising the local 
price indirectly to a level higher than the export price.124 It also endeavoured to 
force every maize dealer to set aside some portion of maize for export, thus 
spreading the losses. By removing the surplus, the government was able to force the 
local price up, but hard times in the industry forced some dealers to unload their 
hoarded stocks, greatly depressing prices. By 1932, the price had fallen to 5s 9d per 
bag on the local market, while only 2s 9d per bag could be obtained on the export 
market. 125 
The drought of 1932/33 exacerbated farmers' financial problems, but it did 
somewhat alleviate the problem of exporting at a loss. In fact, the internal price 
rose significantly, as the government bought up some of the surplus, selling it at cost 
to farmers in the drought-ravaged areas of the country.126 Maize was also 
subsidized under the Export Subsid.es Act and this offset the negative effects of the 
exchange disparity between the Union and Great Britain. This, and other 
government measures like the writing off of £526 666 of debt incurred by maize co-
operatives, meant that maize exporters and the South African taxpayer suffered 
123. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 87. 
124. Ibid., p. 89. Similar legislation was also passed in the then Southern Rhodesia. See C F 
Keyter, Maize Control in Southern Rhodesia 1931·1941: The African Contribution to White 
Survival, The Central African Historical Association, Local Series No. 34, Salisbury (Harare) 
1978. ' 
125. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 91. 
126. Ibid. 
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severe losses during the depression period.127 
The significance of the above for maize farmers in Natal lies in the fact that at a 
time when agricultural prices for most commodities were declining, they were not 
able to supplement their incomes to any significant extent by producing maize; the 
production costs of maize, estimated at 7s per bag, were often far higher than the 
prices obtainable on the local or export markets.128 Furthermore, because of the 
nature of maize farming in Natal, farmers did not directly benefit from the 
assistance granted to agricultural co-operatives elsewhere in the country.129 It 
follows that even those farmers who were growing maize to feed either their labour 
or their livestock, were doing so at a loss during the depression period. Even the 
weather turned against the farmers in Natal. In 1931 a devastating drought in the 
Vryheid district, and the rest of Northern Natal, drastically reduced maize 
production. The Vryheid district normally produced over a million bags a year. As 
a result of the drought, the estimated harvest was only 30 000 bags.130 The only 
way in which maize could be turned to real profit was to hoard it until it was scarce 
and then sell it at high prices to Africans desperate for food. This appears to have 
been uncommon, though not unknown, especially in areas bordering the 
reserves. 131 
Natal maize farmers, like their counterparts in other areas of farming, also sought to 
relieve themselves of the burden of the depression by reducing their labour costs. 
Wages were reduced without, it appears, causing too much disruption to production. 
Wages in the Umlaas Road area, for example, were reduced from 1s to 9d per day 
~or "mielie pickers", but it was reported that despite this " ... a good supply of labour" 
127. A Minnaar, "The South African Maize Industry's Response to the Great Depression and the 
Beginnings of Large-scale State Intervention, 1929-1934", South African Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 4, No.1, 1989, p. 75. 
128. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 93. It must be admitted that some farmers 
could achieve higher prices by selling their crop to Africans in the reserves but generally, the 
storekeepers made the exorbitant profits, not the farmers. See Chapter Six. 
129. Lamont, Maize Situation, p. 13. 
130. The Farmer, 5 June 1931, p. 32. 
131. CAD, NEC, K.26, F14, Written statement of evidence submitted by the Revd Dr John Dube, 
Durban, 30 March 1931, p.6. 
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was obtained. 132 
Market-Gardening 
Intensive market-gardening was carried out in the urban and peri-urban areas of the 
major centres, largely by Indian farmers. 133 Having few other outlets for their 
accumulated capital, as Indian penetration into the commercial sphere was heavily 
resisted, those Indians invested heavily in land, largely for the purpose of market-
gardening.134 Limited suitable land drove prices upwards and some white farmers 
sold off subdivisions of their farms at a considerable profit.135 The less fortunate 
Indians leased their land on a monthly or annual basis. This was the most common 
form of land tenure.136 
Ever-rising land costs made market-gardening less and less profitable in the 
twentieth century, and the precarious position of Indian market-gardeners was 
aggravated by a prevalent anti-ASiatic feeling.137 White farmers resisted Indian 
penetration into the agricultural sphere with as much vehemence as the white 
business community resisted their acquisition of businesses in the major urban 
centres. Just two examples illustrate this well: 
That the action of the Executive of the Natal Agricultural 
Union in adopting the following resolution be confirmed by 
this Congress: 'That in the the opinion of this meeting of 
representatives of the Richmond, Byrne, Rosebank, 
Beaumont-Eston, Mid-Illovo, Camperdown and Umvoti 
Associations, the Indians in Natal receive perfectly fair 
treatment; that they have taken advantage of what is know[ n] 
as the "Gentleman's Agreement" between the Government of 
the Union and India, which agreement has worked 
disadvantageously for Natal; that it would be against the 
132. The Farmer, 25 July 1930, p. 77. 
133. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 81. 
134. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 254. 
135. S D Ie Roux, "Indian Agriculture on the North Coast of Natal: Social Aspects", 
M. Agric.(Agric. Extension) thesis, University of Pretoria, 1971, p. 53. 
136. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 253. 
137. Singh, "Effects", p. 112. 
interests of white civilization in the Union to make any further 
concessions to Indians in regard to residence or tradmg. The 
Meeting stron~y urges the Union Government to re-intr~duce 
a fair and defmite measure of segregation for both resIdence 
and trading; further, in the interests of peace and security, the 
meeting stron2!y urges the Union Government to allow no 
concessions whatever to Indians in regard to residence or 
trading in Zululand and other Native territories, and also to 
impose by legislaygg definite restrictions of land purchases by 
Indians in Natal.' 
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The following year, a similar resolution was passed by the Natal Agricultural Union 
(NAU), in response to further complaints from member associations: 
That in the opinion of this Congress, Indians in this Province 
should be placed on the same footing as Natives with regard to 
purchasing or hiring of land. That no Indian hire or purchase 
land in a white area in any Magisterial Division, unless 
permission is granted by the existing landowners and Farmers' 
Associations in that particular Division, such permission to be 
expressed at a Meeting of LandoWllers convened by the 
Resident Magistrate of the Division.13~ 
It should not be seen as coincidental that this feeling surfaced with such vehemence 
during the depression years. The Union government was unwilling, at this stage, to 
take action and a simple ''Duly Noted" reply was all that was received in response to 
this resolution.140 
The land on which market-gardening was carried out was largely alluvial and was 
cultivated by the family. The produce was then either hawked around the town by 
means of trucks, or taken to market, where it was sold.141 The chief crops were 
vegetables of all types, and sub-tropical fruit, particularly bananas and paw-paws, 
but some flowers were also grown.142 
138. KCAL, KCM 30035, NAU, Resolution No.4, passed at Annual Congress of NAU, 26 and 27 
April 1932. 
139. KCAL, KCM 30035, NAU, Resolution No.7, passed at Annual Congress of NAU, 26 and 27 
April 1933. 
140. NAU Records, Minutes of an Executive Meeting, 27 June 1933. 
141. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 253. 
142. H R Burrows, Studies of Indian Employment in Notal, being Vol. 11 of the Nalal Regional 
Survey, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1961, pp. 25 - 26. 
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During the depression, as prices for vegetables fell and Natal faced droughts and 
invasions of locusts, many Indians, particularly those farming very marginal lands, 
were forced to give up their land. 143 This trend was particularly noticeable in 
northern Natal and along the coast north of Durban. 144 Indian farmers did not 
receive any assistance from the Union government or from the Land Bank,145 and 
when profitability declined, many had no alternative but to give up their land and 
move to the towns. However, the drought did have the effect of making vegetables 
and fruit scarcer, driving prices upwards, granting those farmers who had managed 
to remain on the land, something of a respite. 146 These more fortunate farmers 
were, however, few in number. The vast majority were very unsophisticated, largely 
illiterate, and maintained a very low standard of living. They were quite unable to 
cope with the challenges which the depression and the weather brought.147 Leaving 
the land for the towns did not materially improve their lives as unemployment was 
rife and they had few marketable skills. 
In many ways, the depression simply hastened a migratory pattern that pre-dated the 
depression. Indians throughout the Union had been becoming rapidly urbanised 
since early in the century; the numbers engaged in agriculture in Natal showed a 
marked declfue, falling from 48 per cent in 1911, to 26 per cent in 1921 and to only 
18 per cent in 1936.148 By 1936,66,9 per cent of all Indians in Natal lived in urban 
areas, whereas only 55,8 per cent had been so categorised in 1921.149 
143. Singh, "Effects", p. 112. 
144. Ibid., p. 113. 
145. The Land Bank was restricted by law to providing loans only to white farmers. Farmers of 
colour were not eligible for assistance in terms of the existing legislation. 
146. Ibid. 
147. Smith, "Labour Resources·, p. 254. 
148. H R Burrows, Indian Lile and Labour in Natal, South African Institute of Race Relations, 
Johannesburg, 11943, p: 7. This picture is clouded by the fact that Indian workers on the sugar 
farms of Natal were bemg replaced by Africans during this period, but the general trend holds 
good. 
149. Union Statistics lor Filty Years, p. A·10. 
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Wool 
For the Union of South Africa in the early decades of this century, wool was the 
most important of all agricultural export commodities; 150 it contributed between 45 
and 50 per cent of the total value of farm produce exported, even during the 
depression years. 151 The industry played a vital role in the economic life of the 
Union, earning valuable foreign exchange for the country. The cardinal role that 
wool played was recognised by the Minister of Agriculture, General H Kemp, when 
he said in February 1930 that the prosperity of both the largest section of the 
farming community and the bulk of trade in the Union, depended on the prices of 
wool.152 The international -price of wool was therefore of vital significance to 
farmers in the Union and it is worthwhile examining the situation prior to the 
depression. 
Immediately after the First World War, international wool prices escalated 
significantly, reaching 84d per lb., before falling back to more realistic levels of 24d 
per lb., where they remained for much of the rest of the decade.153 These relatively 
favourable prices had a stimulatory effect on the wool industry in the Union, as the 
number of woolled sheep increased from 22 303 000 in 1920, to 43 927 000 in 1930, 
or by 97 per cent and the quantity of wool exported also rose accordingly from 
164 406 000 lb. to 295 428 000 lb. or by 80 per cent in those same years. 154 It follows 
that farmers in the Union saw wool farming as a profitable venture at this time and 
land prices in sheep-rearing regions throughout the Union rose accordingly; many 
farmers borrowed heavily, not only to buy land, but to purchase suitable breeding 
stock with which to improve their flOCks. The indebtedness of wool farmers was to 
be the downfall of many, as the mortgages and loans so acquired had to be serviced, 
even in the worst of times. 155 
150. A Minnaar, "The South African Wool Industry and the Great Depression (1929-1934)", Kleio, 
Vol. 22, 1990, p. 38. 
151. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 43. 
152. Farmers' Weekly, 19 February 1930. Quoted by Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", 
p.43. 
153. South African Merino Breeders' Journal, Apri11945. 
154. Union Statistics, 1-26 and 1-5. 
155. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", pp. 44 - 46. 
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In 1928 and 1929, a steep downward trend began and wool prices began to fall 
sharply on the international market, driving the local price down to only 3,5d in 
November 1932, considerably less than half of the estimated cost of production. 156 
This trend continued despite the efforts of South African wool dealers to enter into 
agreements with Australia to withhold wool from the international market until the 
price increased in February 1930, and also despite attempts at withholding wool on 
the domestic market in January and February 1931. When Australia left the gold 
standard in early 1931, the position of South African wool on . the international 
market declined still further, as the Australian currency had been devalued by 25 per 
cent against sterling, and buyers from the United States, Japan and Europe bought 
cheaper Australian wool.157 Even the departure of the Union from the gold 
standard in late 1932, which slightly increased the competitiveness of South African 
wool on the British market,158 failed to bring about an increase in price and it was 
not until 1934 that a rise in prices initiated a slow recovery of the South African 
wool industry. Only as late as 1948 did the value of wool exported from the Union 
surpass the value of wool exported in 1930.159 
The Union government was well aware of the plight of the wool farmers and did 
endeavour to assist through export subsidies of 10 per cent and later of 25 per cent. 
However, the formula for the subsidy was complicated and actually did not go far 
enough to redress the plight of the wool farmers. l60 Farmers also withheld wool 
from the internal markets in the hope that prices would rise and at the same time 
increased their production, measures which were often self-defeating.161 
from its origins in the mid-nineteenth century, the production of wool played a 
significant role in the agricultural activities of Natal. The importation of the hardy 
merino sheep, with its relatively high yield of wool, did much to place the industry in 
Natal on a firm footing. Markets for Natal wool were soon found in Great Britain 
and the industry became a valuable earner of foreign exchange for the colony. 
156. Farming in South Africa, January 1933, p. 5. 
157. Minnaar, "Wool Industry", pp. 62 ·64. 
158. Ibid:, p. 65 .. By N~ven;tber 1931, the Australian doUar had depreciated by 45 per cent against 
sterling, while sterling Itself had depreciated by 20 per cent against the South African pound. 
159. Union Statistics, p. 1·26. 
160. Minnnar, "Wool Industry", p. 65. 
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However, foreign competition on the international market, even in the very early 
years of the industry, had caused wool farmers in Natal great distress as the 
downward fluctuations in price often brought hardship in their wake.162 This 
situation was only to grow worse during the first few decades of the twentieth 
century. 
Natal was not unaffected by the great "wool boom" of the 1920s; the number of 
woolled sheep in the province rose from 7 191 000 in 1925/26 to 11 920000 in 
1929/30, an increase of 66 per cent.163 They also faced the same problems as their 
counterparts in the rest of the Union and, although Natal was the smallest of all the 
wool-producing provinces in terms of actual production, Natal wool was highly 
prized: 
Die Middeldistrikte het wat fyn-skoonwol betref in die ou dae 
groot naam verwerf. Selfs vandag nog word wol v~ hierdie 
distrikte deur die wolkoper as iets besonders beskou. 
The expansion of the dairy and wattle industries in the Natal Midlands confined the 
expansion of sheep farming to the northern districts, chiefly around Newcastle, 
Utrecht, Klip River and Vryheid; these districts containing almost 80 per cent of all 
woolled sheep in the province.165 Studies also demonstrated that merino sheep did 
not do as well in the Midlands as they did in the northern districts.166 However, 
wherever sheep were to be found in Natal, the farmers had to contend with various 
diseases and parasites, which caused considerable damage to flocks. 167 
Falling wool prices caused Natal farmers to respond in a similar fashion to their 
161. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 50. 
162. Hurwitz, Agriculture, pp. 99 - 100. 
163. C T van Rensburg, Skaapboerdery in Suid-A/rika, Nasionale Pers, Bloemfontein, 1948, p. 11. 
164. Ibid., p. 19. 
165. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 100. 
166. van Rensburg, Skaapboerdery, p. 19. 
167. Ibid. Van Rensburg argues that these problems were greater in Natal than elsewhere in the 
Union, largely because of the moister conditions. 
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counterparts elsewhere in the Union. As early as August 1929, Natal farmers were 
lamenting the slump in wool prices.168 ·By October, the wool price had dropped by 
30 per cent,169 a trend which had the effect of drastically reducing the income of 
farmers. In a report from the Umvoti Farmers' Association in February 1930, it was 
stated that the income of farmers in the district had declined by 50 per cent. Umvoti 
produced about 133 tons of wool annually, which had brought in approximately 
£16727, at a price of 15d per lb. By February 1930, the average price received had 
declined to only lOd per lb., while other costs had remained steady or had even 
increased.170 Some still remained optimistic: 
As far as the present depression was concerned, we in the 
Union are financially better off than any of the other 
dominions. The one reason is that we can produce wool 
cheaper than in Australia and of good quality if not better. Not 
including a few outstanding clips of Australia, the Union is 
getting the same average per lb. for her wool. Australia is 
today s~lling woolfflow the cost of production, owing to her 
expenSIve labour. 
As already pointed out, this optimism was misplaced. As the situation of Natal wool 
farmers deteriorated still further, some were thrown into despondency and despair: 
Sheepfarming is a dead loss at present prices, and were it not 
for the sales of the natural increase of the flocks, and sidelines 
such as wattle, poultry and maize, no ~heepfarmer would be 
able to survive the present depression.l!2~ 
There is some evidence that farmers were indeed selling off some of their sheep to 
~aise ready cash to meet their debts. The Mooi River Farmers' Association monthly 
auctions saw a significant increase in the number of sheep offered for sale, but 
prices had naturally fallen. In 1929, 11838 sheep had realised £13 737, while 13521 
sheep had only realised £12 204 in September 1930.173 
168. The Farmer, 23 August 1929, p. 20. 
169. The Farmer, 25 October 1930, p. 37. 
170. The Farmer, 14 February 1930, p. 36. 
171. The Farmer,21 March 1930, p. 17. 
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In addition, Natal farmers who had been sending wool to auction at other Union 
ports, appeared to prefer to ship wool from Durban, probably to save transport costs 
and iri an effort to obtain the best price.174 It was the issue of the gold standard, 
however, which really disturbed Natal wool farmers. Just a few days after Great 
Britain had abandoned the gold standard, the wool farmers of East Griqualand were 
urging the government also to abandon gold.175 Some had expected the price of 
wool to rise to compensate for the loss on the rate of exchange, but this had not 
materialised.176 By December 1931, the Natal Agricultural Union (NAU) had 
approached the Minister of Finance about the situation of all primary producers, but 
had received a negative reply to suggestions of abandonment. Farmers' 
Associations across Natal began to hold meetings to discuss the gold standard.177 
The NAU abandoned its apolitical stance on the issue, saying that it was " ... nowa 
national problem", for the government's policy was having a "crippling effect" on 
farming.178 This summation was echoed in a letter to the editor of The Farmer 
from Mr C K Aveling, Chairman of the Upper Klip River Wool Growers' 
Association: 
The people are ~etting desperate, and it will be no use to 
anyone if civilisation breaks down. While there is yet time the 
state should save the ship, for it is today a case of swim or 
sink,[sic] particularly with regard to debt recovery, which will 
174. This becomes apparent from an examination of the data provided in Union of South Nrica, 
Department of Agriculture, Division of Economics and Marketing, Statistical Wool and 
Mohair Bulletin, Bulletin No. 139, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1935. 
175. Report of a meeting of the East Griqualand Wool Growers' Association, The Farmer, 
16 October 1931, p.1. The Farmer did much to try and point out that the journal was "not 
political", but as will be demonstrated, the issue became so pressing that many reports of anti-
gold-standard meetings were published. 
176. The Farmer, 30 October 1930, p. 34. 
177. See the foUowing for just a few examples: KCAL, KCM 30990, Minutes of the Cedarville and 
Mveyane Farmers' Association Meeting held on 5 February 1932; KCAL, KCM 33680, 
Minutes of the Executive Meeting of the Besters Farmers' Association, 15 January 1932; 
KCAL, KCM 33684 Minutes of Meetings of the Dumisa and District Farmers' Association, 
4 December 1931 and 8 January 1932; KCAL, KCM 33647, Minutes of a Meeting of the 
Richmond ~armers' Association, 5 May 1931 and Annual General Meeting, 12 January 1932. 
See also Minnaar, "The Farmers and the Gold Standard Crisis", pp. 117 - 126. 
178. The Farmer, 1 January 1932, p. 30. 
sweep the white man off the land. Failing this, civilisation will 
be wrecked in South Africa beyond all likelihood of 
recovery ... Unrest and disgust with the existing financial system 
under which men are groaning, is spreading everyw~ere and 
the positioP7qlUst be carefully handled or there wIll be an 
upheaval ... 
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Equally strident was the resolution of the Hammarsdale and District Farmers' 
Association conveyed by the secretary, Mr W P Purdon, to the Prime Minister: 
That for the sake of the prosperity, nay the very life of the 
farming community of the Union of South Africa, the 
Government be called upon to go off the l~Oold Standard 
without further delay and link up WIth sterling. 
Some Natal wool farmers had even pressurised their Members of Parliament to 
become involved. J S Marwick wrote to Hertzog at the behest of the Polela Wool 
Growers' Association urging the government to abandon the gold standard in order 
to allow the farmers to compete with their Australian counterparts. 181 It was at this 
juncture, with open dissent rising, that the government announced that the subsidy 
on wool would rise fro~ 10 per cent to 25 per cent.182 This move gained a little 
support from some Natal sheep farmers. A resolution was passed by the Dundee 
Farmers' Association stating: 
179. Ibid. 
That this meeting of farmers of the electorate [sic] district of 
Dundee wishes to express its gratitude to the Government for 
increasing the subsidy from 10 per cent to 25 per cent and 
therefore declares itself fully in favour of the Government's 
decision to remain on, the Gold Standard. 
That this meeting of farmers respectfully requests the 
Government to asSISt those farmers who are unable to meet 
their obligations either by stopping impendiniLorosecutions or 
by coming to their assistance some other way.l~j 
180. CAD, A32, (Hertzog Papers), F155, W P Purdon to Hertzog, 19 January 1932. 
181. CAD, A32, (Hertzog Papers) F155, Marwick to Hertzog, 11 December 1931. 
182. The Farmer, 22 January 1932, p. 14. 
183. CAD, A32, (Hertzog Papers), F155, F R McKenzie (Secretary, Dundee Farmers' Association) 
to Hertzog, 23 February 1932. 
Some farmers were more grateful: 
Hierdie vergadering ondersteun die Regerin~ heelhartig en 
laat die hand hawing van die Goudstandaard 1D sy hande en 
spreek sy waardering uit tenoor die Regering vir die verdere 
tegemoetkoming deur die verhoging van die subsidie aan die 
Boere.l84 
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In reality, the subsidy made little difference to Natal sheep farmers, as the following 
case shows: A farmer in the Midlands received £200 for his wool and £50 as an 
export subsidy; but the South African pound had appreciated by 31 V2 per cent, so the 
farmer felt he should have received £292. He claimed to have lost £42 on his clip.185 
Another wool farmer who signed himself "Agricola" was even more vehement: 
I recently read in one of their agricultural papers how things 
with sheep farmers were booming in Australia, where they are 
getting just double the price that the South African farmer gets 
for his wool. How many farmers realise what this Gold 
Standard folly is costing them? Taking wool as an example, 
South Africa produces 300 000 000 lbs. and if we take 31Ad. per 
lb. as the average price, it would realise £4375000. Add 25% 
subsidy £1 095 000; total £5 470 000. Whereas if we were 
linked with Sterling the farmer would get at least 6d. (average) 
per lb., totalling £ 7 500 000. Consequently, on wool alone, the 
farmer has been diddled of £2 000 000, which has been lost to 
the country; and besides, the whole community has been 
specially taxed to find the subsidy ... so that the total financial 
loss is a colossal figure for South Africa ... Verily, those 
responsible hav~ttuch to answer for to the people of this 
ruined country. 1 
The announcement of the abandonment of the gold standard did nothing to abate 
the fury of farmers. In an editorial, The Farmer had this to say: 
And what good has it all done? To what purpose has been the 
ordeal of the last year? Is there anything to show for the 
desperate adherence to the Gold Standard? Nothing but a 
184. CAD, A32 (Hertzog Papers), F 155, C D Ferreira (Sekretaris van die NP Mannetak, 
Newcastle) to Hertzog, 23 November 1932. 
185. Letter from "Let Down", Nottingham Road, The Farmer, 12 August 1932, p. 24. 
186. The Farmer, 9 December 1932, p. 24. 
picture of the wreckage of once prosperous farms, of ruined 
families, a record of forced sales, of thousands thrown off the 
land they love so well, to swell the ranks of tflf7 unemployed, or 
earn a pIttance with a pick-and-shovel gang. 
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No estimates of the cost to Natal wool farmers of the government's gold standard 
policy can be found, but judging from the foregoing, the loss to farmers must have 
been considerable. It is clear that the experience of the depression left a lasting 
impression on sheep farmers in Natal, for the post-depression period saw a great 
diminution in the numbers of woolled sheep in the province and many sheep 
farmers began to produce mutton rather than wool. 188 
Cattle and Dairy Farming 
Cattle have always been part of the lives of the inhabitants of Natal, be they the 
Zulu or the Voortrekkers and British settlers. In the nineteenth century, cattle were 
fairly well distributed across the whole region, with the exception of some of the 
furthermost regions of Zululand, where the tsetse fly carried nagana. As intensive 
farming spread, so cattle farming was gradually forced inland, away from the coastal 
belt. The topography of the entire region, with its broken territory and hilly terrain, 
made much of the land area of the entire region only suitable for livestock, as the 
land could not successfully be put to the plough. Well into the twentieth century, 
67 per cent of all land in Natal was still being described as "veld," and was largely 
being utilised as grazing. 189 
White-owned cattle were kept ~ainly either for beef or for dairying purposes, with 
the sale of hides and skins being a sideline. During the years prior to the'depression, 
a marked trend towards dairying and away from beef and trek-oxen production was 
noted, a tendency which continued during the depression. l90 Dairying was at first 
concentrated around the major urban centres, as farmers had to deliver their 
product to the distributors as speedily as possible, but the growth of 
187. The Farmer, 6 January 1933, p. 12. 
188. Hurwitz, Agriculture, p. 100. 
189. J M Erskine, Agriculture in Natal/KwaZulu: Development Potential, Institute of Natural 
Resources, Research Monograph No.1, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. 1982, pp. 4 - 5. 
190. J Fisher, "Looking into Natal's Future", Farming in South Africa, Vol 6, May 1931, p. 61. 
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communications, specifically railways, made it possible for this area to be expanded 
considerably. Intensive dairying was concentrated in pockets along the railway line, 
including areas around Pinetown, Camperdown, Pietermaritzburg, Lions River, 
Estcourt, Bergville, Richmond and Ixopo.191 Most farmers in these districts 
produced fresh milk. Farmers in outlying districts tended to produce milk for 
industrial purposes; the manufacture of cheese, butter and condensed milk was and 
still is, concentrated in these areas, of which Dundee, Newcastle, Klip River and the 
southern regions of the province were the most important.192 
The number of cattle in Natal (including the reserves) in 1930 was 2 485000, or 
24 per cent of the total Union cattle population of 10574000.193 While it is obvious 
that not all the animals in Natal were milk-producers, the 20 million gallons of milk 
that were produced constituted 22 per cent of all the milk produced in the Union in 
1929/1930.194 The Midlands produced 48,7 per cent, the northern districts 27,6 per 
cent and the coastal region only 5,4 per cent of all dairy products in that season. 195 
As the urban areas grew, the increased demand for whole-milk (fresh milk) 
increased and, encouraged by relatively high prices, farmers responded by greatly 
increasing production. In 1904, only 3,8 million gallons had been produced; by 1925 
7,8 million gallons were being produced. It is obvious then that dairy farming in 
Natal, as elsewhere in the Union, was in the midst of a great boom in the early 
decades of this century. 196 As this boom continued, so surpluses began to build up, 
especially of cheese and butter, and the manufacturers of cheese and butter began to 
look increasingly to the export market to reduce the surplus, or the local price would 
have been forced downwards. This impetus towards export was hastened by the 
onset of the depression, which . brought about a decline in domestic milk 
consumption throughout the Union.197 
191. McWhirter, "Agriculture", p. 55. 
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Table 5.10 
Exports of Butter and Cheese from the Union, 1928-1934 
Year Butter Cheese 
Quantity Value Quantitr Value 
(1000lbs) £ (1000lbs £ 
1928 393 34300 298 19700 
1929 2337 67000 304 22300 
1930 2904 179100 1954 77100 
1931 4521 233000 2186 81600 
1932 4328 223 700 2364 101900 
1933 2508 123 600 1238 50500 
1934 2855 172800 396 19900 
Source: Handbook, Table 112, p. 125. 
The increase in the amount of butter and cheese exported continued until 1933, 
when the drought adversely affected the production of milk and a greater 
proportion was retained to meet local requirements. 
The manufacturers of cheese had attempted, with government assistance, to stabilise 
prices and to pay producers a bounty on all cheese exported. This scheme was fairly 
successful and the 45 cheese factories in Natal were able to keep prices paid to 
producers at reasonable levels until 1931.198 The government decided that the 
dairy industry was in need of regulation, and in September 1930 a Dairy Control 
Board was established as a result of the Dairy Industry Control Act (No. 35 of 1930). 
The Board imposed a levy on all cheese and butter either made in or imported into 
the Union. With the proceeds ~f this levy, export bounties were paid to producers. 
Restrictions on the importation of dairy products were also imposed, guaranteeing 
farmers and producers virtually unfettered access to local markets.199 Natal 
farmers were still unhappy with this, forecasting lower prices in 1931: 
The prices (of dairy products) Overseas were declining and 
there was no saying what the prices would be after the Summer 
Months. ' Probably they would go lower still. The bonus 
scheme would not assist to the extent of maintaining prices at 
pas2Javels for, in spite of the drought, production was going 
up. 
198. Ibid. , p. SO. 
199. Ibid., p. 81. 
161 
Had the farmers been able to forecast the adverse effects of the exchange rate on 
their returns, once Britain had departed from the gold standard, their cries would 
have been more strident - and indeed they were, just short of a year later.201 
Farmers also looked enviously at the prices for milk realised in the urban areas, 
when compared to the producer's prices. In 1931, milk was selling in Durban for 4d 
per pint, but the farmers were only getting 6d to lOd per gallon (eight pints).202 
Little could be done to remedy this, beyond withholding supplies of milk from 
industry, which was attempted in 1931, without markedly improving matters. The 
great drought which began to make itself felt in late 1932 and 1933 had the effect of 
drastically cutting milk production in most areas of the Union. Natal was not as 
severely affected, except in the northern districts and Zululand. Drought caused 
farmers to reduce the size of their herds at a time when domestic meat prices were 
falling.203 
Viewed in totality, the effects of the depression and drought on dairy farmers would 
have been far worse had the Dairy Board not acted to force the export of surplus. 
Despite the cost to the ·producers, the reduction of the local milk surplus ensured 
that prices remained at levels that were not ruinous. Even though prices for cheese 
and butter on the international market had shown a marked decline for most of the 
depression years, as Table S.11 shows, the benefits of export were to be seen in the 
reduction of the domestic surplus. 
Table 5.11 

























Source: Adapted from Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 83. 
200. NAU, Minutes of the Executive Commiuee, 11 December 1930. 
As the Report of the Secretary for Agriculture pointed out in 1933: 
The dairy industry has also p~sed through a difficult time, an~ 
oversea prices were, at one time, at such a low level that had It 
not been for the bonus and Government subsidy the net price 
per lb. to the exporter would only have been 6d. and 2Y2d. for 
butter and cheese respectively. Incidentally these oversea 
prices d~ot cover production costs in spite of the bonus and 
subsidy. 
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The production of beef was also fraught with uncertainties as prices in the major 
domestic centres fell with declining demand. Apart from contracts to supply the 
Italian and Belgian armies with frozen beef, the Union was not a significant exporter 
of beef. Pilot schemes were instituted, with considerable government assistance (the 
subsidy on exported meat was 35 per cent), to export South African frozen or chilled 
beef to London on an experimental basis. The prices realised, however, even with 
the subsidy, were not found to be adequate. South African beef producers, including 
those in Natal, were therefore largely dependent on the local market to dispose of 
their meat. Prices declined markedly during the depression years. On average, the 
farmer was receiving £3 per beast less in July 1932, than he had been in 1929.205 A 
surplus of beef on the market in Durban, caused by a large oversupply of cattle, 
depressed prices to levels lower than those which prevailed in the other major 
centres of the Union.206 The price of beef in Durban was 3s to 4s below that 
obtainable in Johannesburg,207 adding to the woes of the Natal farmer. 
201. NAU, Minutes of the Executive Committee, 3 December 1931. 
202. The Farmer, 2 October 1931, p. 15. 
203. Report of the Secretary for Agriculture, . reprinted in Farming in South Africa, Vol. 8, 
December 1933, p. 447. 
204. Report of the Secretary for Agriculture, reprinted in Farming in South Africa, Vol. 8, 
December 1933, p. 450. 
205. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 74. 
206. In a letter to the Prime Minister, the Underberg Farmers' Association blamed the 
" ... disastrously low prices being received for fat stock ... " on the lack of credit caused by the 
government's adherence to the gold standard", and reaffirmed their resolution of 10 October 
1931, calling on the government to go of( gold. CAD, A32, (Hertzog Papers), F155, 
Underberg Farmers' Association to Hertzog, 7 July 1932. 
207. Report of the Secretary for Agriculture reprinted in Farming in South Africa, Vol. 8, 
December 1933, pp. 449 • 450. 
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Nor could Natal cattle farmers realise much from the sale of hides and skins from 
their slaughtered stock. This once-profitable sideline depended almost entirely on 
the export market and, as demand for leather dropped, so the prices began to fall. 
The fall . had begun even before the depression itself, as a result of increased 
competition from leather substitutes and the failure of a number of hide-importing 
houses. So precipitous was the decline that by the onset of the depression in 1929, 
prices were lower than they had been in 1921, the nadir of the post-war depression 
in Europe. This situation was to continue worsening until the Union left the gold 
standard at the end of 1932,208 when a slight recovery in prices made it possible to 
dispose of the surplus that had built up in the Union.209 Yet another source of 
income for hard-pressed farmers had dried up. 
Farmers of all types had very few avenues which held any hope of regaining 
profitability during the depression years. Natal's agriculture, apart from the coastal 
districts where sugar predominated, was far more diversified than in any other 
region of the country. Even this did not, however, completely shield farmers from 
the depression, for commercial farming operations in Natal were largely geared to 
the export market and thus were exposed to the vicissitudes of oversupply and 
falling prices. Faced with declining profitability, farmers tried to increase 
production, which was largely self-defeating. Yet there was one area in which 
savings could be made, and profitability increased, and that was the area of labour. 
Agriculture in Natal in the early decades of this century was not highly mechanised; 
?n the contrary, it was labour ·intensive. Some 132546 persons worked on 10414 
farms in Natal in 1930. The vast majority, some 106 352 persons, were Africans.210 
Conditions of employment varied from district to district and from industry to 
industry. The sugar and wattle industries generally made use of recruited labour to 
208. Ravenscroft gives June 1932 as the month in which the lowest price, namely 2.75d per lb., was 
realised on the Port Elizabeth market, which was the largest market serving this trade. Prices 
had fallen 82,9 per cent since April 1928. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 9. 
209. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 77. Minnaar quoted the average price received 
per l~. for hides and skins as 12,3d in 1928, falling to only 3d in 1932, before recovering to 
5,2d m 1933. 
210. Handbook, pp. 3,11. These figures include owners. 
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supplement the local supply, while in the northern districts, where maize, dairying 
and wool predominated, extensive use was made of labour tenants. In fact, 70 per 
cent of all African agricultural labourers in the province were labour tenants.211 
Whatever the industry or district, labour came under great pressure from employers 
during the depression as farmers struggled to make ends meet. Many workers were 
simply ejected from white farms:212 
The only . complaint is that Natives are bein~ turned off farms 
and that they have nowhere to go. This IS due to a certain 
extent to the precarious position of the European farmers, who 
find themselves unabli10 employ or give grazing to as many 
Natives as formerly ... 
This left many Africans in a desperate state: 
Many Natives, with their families, have recently been turned 
off European owned farms, ther are unable to make fresh 
contracts, in some cases [they are too old or otherwise 
unsuitable for mine labour, there is no room for them in the 
Maguswana Location and the Department of Lands will not 
allow them. to ~iv~ o~ C2~f1 Lands. Such cases are not 
uncommon ill this dIstnct ... 
Wages were reduced, conditions of employment revised to benefit employers, and 
even the legal machinery of the state was employed to gain greater control over 
labour in a time of economic stress. It is not mere coincidence that the Native 
Service Contract Act (No. 24 of 1932) should have found its way onto the statute 
books during the depression years.215 The effect of this act was to give farmers 
211. J Streak, "Perceptions and Conflict: White Farmers, Labour Shortages, Tenancy and Labour 
Control in Northern and Mid-Natal during the late 19305", B A(Hons.) long essay, University 
of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), 1990, p. 11. 
212. Bradford, A Taste of Freedom, pp. 55 - 59. 
213. NAD, CNC, Vol. 95A, Ftle 68/1 (Part ill), Native Commissioner, Newcastle to Chief Native 
Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 21 September 1933. 
214. NAD, CNC, Vol. 95A, Ftle 68/1 (Part m), Native Commissioner, Underberg to Chief Native 
Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 21 September 1933. 
215. W H Hutt, "The Economic Position of the Bantu in South Africa" in I Schapera (cd .), Western 
Civilization and the Natives of South Africa, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967, p.198. 
Hutt claims that government fears of a rising "black proletariat" consequent upon the demise of 
the labour tenancy system also prompted government action. 
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greater control over their labour and to render tenants more exploitable.216 
As discussed in chapter two, one of the causes of the Great Depression was a world-
wide overproduction in primary products leading to a fall in agricultural prices on 
world markets. Natal's white commercial farmers were severely affected by this 
crisis, particularly those who were attempting to export sugar and wool. The decision 
of the South African government to remain on the gold standard further 
exacerbated the situation and subsidisation did little to alleviate it. 
Internally, the farmers were also faced with serious difficulties. Natural disasters, 
accepted as a hazard in agriculture, followed each other during these years in a 
sequence which left unprecedented devastation in its wake. Given that these 
disasters occurred during a time of falling prices, it may be considered something of 
a minor triumph for farmers that so few of them were forced into bankruptcy 
courts.217 
Farmers had few options to consider in trying to shield themselves from the effects 
of the depression: more efficient farming apd better utilisation of resources simply 
added to the overproduction and further depressed prices. Diversification was 
attempted to some extent, notably in the planting of wattle in the midlands, but as 
prices were falling across the board this brought little relief. The situation did lead 
to a greater acceptance among Natal farmers of government control through 
marketing boards. 
~ will be discussed in more detail.in the following chapter, the plight of the white 
farmers had severe repercussions on the 'the black labourers and tenants on their 
farms. In trying to boost production, self-defeating as it may have been, white 
farmers reduced the land available to black tenants and in many cases turned them 
216. There is increasing interest in agricultural labour during this period. Some recent works include 
Lacey, &roko; V Harris, "Land, Labour and Ideology: Government Land Policy and the 
Relations between Africans and Whites on the land in Northern Natal, 1910-1936; M.A. 
thesis, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), 1984 and J Streak, "Perceptions and Conflict" 
previously cited. 
217. Annual Reports of the Durban Chamber of Commerce for relevant years. These Reports give 
the number of farmers declaring bankruptcy as 151 for the years 1929/1933. 
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off their farms. Labourers whom they could no longer afford to pay even the meagre 
average wage were also dismissed. The displaced people were forced to migrate to 
the already overcrowded reserves or to enter the urban areas. The circumstances of 
those who chose the latter option will be examined in chapters seven and eight. 
The hardships suffered by farmers left an indelible impression on the collective 
consciousness and obviously had political repercussions. Their stance on the gold 
standard question united Natal farmers as nothing ever had before, and forced 
organised agricultur~ to become politicised, a state of affairs which had previously 
been regarded as unacceptable. The political alignment of white farmers with 
established and newly formed parties during the depression years will be discussed 
in greater detail in chapter nine. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RESERVE ECONOMY UNDER STRESS 
Assessment of the situation of Africans during the depression necessitates a detailed 
study of the rural areas set aside for their exclusive occupation - the so-called 
native reserves or locations. 1 However, since space does not permit the separate 
investigation of every area, generalisations, with all their attendant dangers for the 
historian, are inevitable.2 Equally frustrating is the lack of adequate and detailed 
statistical information. Nevertheless, despite these disclaimers, it is possible to show 
how the lives of the inhabitants of the reserves were influenced by the economic 
changes that took place as a result of the depression and drought. It will be shown 
that even those Africans living in remote areas of the reserves could not remain 
unaffected by the twin calamities of the early 1930s. 
Briefly sketched, the history of the reserves, goes back as far as 1841, when the 
Volksraad of the Republic of Natalia were making plans for the setting up of a 
separate area to house all those Africans, resident in Natal, who were not working 
on white farms. These plans did not come to fruition and it became the task of 
successive British governors and their able administrators, most notably Theophilus 
Shepstone, to arrive at suitable policies and to allocate land for this purpose.3 The 
result of these early policies was the so-called Shepstone System, under which 
Africans were allocated land under the control of their own chiefs, thus perpetuating 
the tribal system. Apparently, i't had been Shepstone's intention to grant each "tribe" 
settled in a reserve full title to their land, but this was never ratified. Instead, 
1. In the twentieth century, the term "location" came to refer more to those areas occupied by 
Africans in urban or peri-urban areas. Earlier, however, the terms were often used completely 
interchangeably and this practice has been continued. See MacMillan's explanation in 
Complex South Africa, p. 135 and Davenport, "Urban Segregation", p. 1. 
2. I have not drawn any special distinctions between reserves in the different areas of the 
province, nor between mission reserves and "ordinary" reserves. This is not because conditions 
in all the reserves were identical, for they were obviously not. While there is a considerable 
body of literature on the mission reserves covering the nineteenth century, very little of 
substance could be found for the twentieth century, despite exhaustive research. 
3. E H Brookes and N Hurwitz, The Native Reserves of Natal, being Vol. 7 of The Natal 
Regional Survey, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1957, pp. 1 - 11. 
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control was vested in the Natal Native Trust, before passing to the Governor-in-
Executive-Council until Union in 1910, after which it was given into the hands of the 
Governor-General-in-Executive-Council. The latter also took control of the 
Zululand Trust.4 The Native Land Act of 1913 demarcated areas which were set 
aside exclusively for occupation by Africans. In Natal, this law did not meaningfully 
alter the borders of the existing reserves, which remained as they were until 1936. 
Thus in 1926, according to Lacey, there were approximately 3 633210 morgen set 
aside as "native reserves" or "locations"; a further 146 168 morgen of African-
occupied "mission lands and reserves"; and 807 133 morgen of Crown Land occupied 
by Africans in Natal, making a total of 4586503 morgen. On this land, lived some 
1 149 980 Africans. 5 These figures, like all figures relating to the extent and 
population density of reserves in Natal, must be treated cautiously, as Smith pointed 
out.6 Smith put the total number of Africans residing in Natal reserves at 910000, 
with a further 670 000 residing on ~rown and Mission reserves, but his figures are 
based on the 1936 census and cannot be regarded as accurate for the period 1929 to 
1933. MacMillan gives the total extent of the scheduled areas (reserves) as 3 772 
square miles and the population as " ... a round million of Natives"} Whatever the 
vagaries of the statisticians, it is important to note that the population density of the 
reserves in Natal, based on the 1921 census figures, was such that these areas were 
amongst the most densely populated of all areas in the Union. It stands to reason 
that population density figures varied considerably within this; Zululand was 
relatively thinly populated at 24,66 persons per square mile, while districts close to 
Durban were far more crowded. Inanda, for example, had a population density of 
~50,65 persons per square mile:8 
An examination of the topography and other natural features reveals that despite 
4. Ibid., pp. 11 - 12. 
5. Lacey, Boroko, p. 388. 
6. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 126. Smith pointed out that even as late as 1938, discrepancies 
between the ftgures acquired from the Native Affairs Department, the 1936 Census, and 
Survey Maps were considerable. 
7. MacMillan, Complex South Africa, p. 135. 
8. Ibid., p. 127. 
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the "generous" allocation of land to Africans in Natal,9 much of this land was not 
suitable for cultivation, being very broken and hilly in nature - typical "monkey 
country". 10 In an article in Jlanga lase Natal, J Mapumulo quoted an unnamed 
"Scottish writer" who wrote of the Native locations of Natal: 
The Native Locations are generally the most barren, wild and 
broken parts of the country. Only small portions here and 
there are adapted for cultivation, and much of the land is not 
fitted even for Rrfturage but only the habitation of the eagle 
and the baboon. 1 





35 per cent 
40 per cent 
34 per cent 
11 per cent. 12 
The Zululand coastal region, preferable in terms of its warm climate and adequate 
rainfall, was infested with malaria and nagana, which took their toll of both man and 
beast. Scarcity of water at crucial times of the year also contributed to the very low 
population density in this region. The interior of Zululand is very hilly, and the soils 
are shallow and unproductive, making it suitable only for cattle rearing. Its many 
river valleys, however, contained dense settlement rising to 100 persons per square 
mile, and intensive farming was practised. This area had seen great population 
growth in the 19205; Co~ claimed that the population had increased by a 
significant 43 per cent between 1916 and 1936.13 The Magistrate and Native 
Commissioner for Melmoth, Mr E, N Braatvedt,14 said of the congested areas of 
Tanbene near Redhill and Nqwehqwe: 
9. Lacey, Boroko, p. 29. There were many whites, especially farmers, who considered that too 
much land had been allocated to Africans. 
10. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 141; MacMillan, Complex South Africa, p. 135. 
11. /langa lase Natal, 31 October 1930. 
12. J H Moolman, "Die Geografie van die Bantoegebiede", The South African (jeographical 
Journal, Vol. 37, December 1955, p. 7. (My translation.) 
13. Cope, "Zulu Royal family", p. 235. 
14. Sometimes also spelt "Braadvedt". 
We have a large area there. The Native Reserve is in the 
vicinity of 190 000 acres, on paper, but out of that, an area of 
50 000 acres itsminhabitable, on account of nagana, fever and 
lack of water. 
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In the Thukela Valley, the great variety of soils and terrain made it possible for 
some areas to support a very dense population of over 200 persons per square mile. 
The situation in the reserves of Natal proper was even more serious. Taking the 
coastal region first, the humid sub-tropical climate and high rainfall permitted 
intensive farming, both within and outside the reserves. The land was densely 
occupied, especially within a 30-mile radius of Durban. Population densities ranged 
from 120 persons per square mile in these coastal reserves to 298 persons per square 
mile on mission reserves. The Natal Midlands were equally densely populated, 
although the climate and soil types were little better than the coastal regions. The 
foothills of the Drakensberg were also overcrowded by man and beast, the grazing 
permitting large cattle populations in most areas. Population densities varied, but 
rose as high as over 200 persoDS per square mile in some districts.16 
Much of the evidence presented to the Native Economic Commission (NEC) 
supported the popular perception that the reserves of Natal were overpopulated, 
while those of Zululand were less crowded. A few examples of such evidence will 
suffice to illustrate this point: 
Die lokasies, soos U weet, is gepak met kaffers ... En geloo [sic] 
my, ODS moet elke dag ho~ applikasies afslaan van naturelle 
wat by oDS wil ko'm [woon]:l1 
'n Ander ding wat ek wil se is dit: om te denk dat die kaffer 
wegtrek van die boer se grond omdat hy so ellendig behandel 
word - daar bestaan Die so 'n ding Die; die lokasies is propvol 
van die ene end na die ander en daar is Die 'n kaffer wat van 
die baas se grond sal weggaan om in die lokasies te gaan bly.HS 
15. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Eilert Nils Braatvedt, Melmoth, 29 September 1930, 
p. 1872. Braatvedt also said that the population of the area had grown substantially due to the 
eviction of Africans from white farms as the area under cultivation increased. 
16. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, pp. 45 - 53. 
17. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of J J Kemp and 0 J Uys (Helpmekaar District), Dundee, 
17 September 1930, p. 1325. 
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In his evidence, Archdeacon Lee stated that there was a great deal of migration 
from the reserves of Natal into Zululand as " ... Zululand is not congested. Its Native 
areas are adequate." He claimed that if all the land were properly surveyed and 
allocated equitably there would be " ... plenty of land for the Natives, even excess". 
But even he was doubtful if the inhabitants could survive: " ... they would never be 
able to keep themselves and there would always be a surplus to go out to work".19 
Some Africans, however, had different perceptions: 
Question: But from our evidence Zululand is not overcrowded. 
Why do they go there? 
Answer: I know of cases where natives have gone to reserves 
and they have had to come back. They cannot get any place 
there. 
Question: Why cannot th~t~ 
Ans~er: .They say that ~tf places are overcrowded. I could 
mention mstances to you. 
The Revd Oscroft also directed the Commission's attention to the fact that some 
areas of Zululand were overcrowded: 
It is my opinion that the native reserves are showing signs of 
congestion, for instance parts of Nkandhla and Nqutu districts. 
These parts are sfpously congested at present and have been 
for several years. 
In this assertion he was supported by Gilbert Robinson of the Zululand Farmers' 
Association who gave evidence that overstocking and overtilling had denuded the 
~and in the Ntongeneni Valley. ' 
18. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of D J Uys, Helpmekaar District, Dundee, 17 September 1930, 
p.133O. 
19. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Archdeacon A W Lee, Vryheid,18 September 1930, 
pp. 1404 - 1434. 
20. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of William Washington Ndhlovu, Vryheid, 20 September 1930, 
p.1559. 
21. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of the Revd Oscroft, Nongoma, 22 September 1930, p. 1638. 
This evidence was corroborated by that of the Revd W Hallowes. CAD NEe K26 F4 
t , " 
Evidence of the Revd W HaUowes, Eshowe, 30 September 1930, p. 1966. 
I really want to bring this to the notice of the Commission, to 
show how a number of ~ese reserves in Zululand are 
overstocked and overtilled.2 
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Mr Rodseth, the Superintendent of Reserves, who was present at the time, agreed, 
explaining that because the region right up to the Urnfolozi was a nagana-infested 
area,23 all the cattle in that reserve were "congregated" in the southern portion.24 
However, the general perception of the white farmers of Zululand was different. 
Judging from the evidence of C W Dent, they appear to have been convinced that 
the relative prosperity of the reserves of Zululand lay at the root of their labour 
problems: 
Natives are better off in the Reserves of Zululand than 
elsewhere in the Union and better off than they were 15 years 
ago. Wages have risen 100 per cent in that period ... at the same 
time there appears to be a large n~~r of adult natives in the 
Reserves who are not seeking work. 
The apparent conflict of evidence between Robinson and Dent may be partially 
explained by the desire on the part of the former to show that Africans were poor 
farmers who degraded the land, thus justifying greater white ownership of land. 
The significance of population density figures lies in the fact that the land allocated 
was intended, to a greater or lesser extent, to support the families that resided on it. 
This was the basis on which the entire migrant labour system rested. The reserves 
were to act as reservoirs of labour for both farmers and urban employers. Yet it was 
intended that while the labour of some family members was required outside, the 
rest of the family would be seif-supporting on the land allocated in the reserve.26 
22. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Gilbert Robinson, Empangeni, 26 September 1930 p. 1842. 
23. For more information on nagana in Zululand, see A de V Minnaar, "Nagana, Big-game Drives 
and the Zululand Game Reserves", Contree, Vol. 25,1989 and S Brookes, "Playing the Game: 
The Struggle for Wildlife Protection in Zululand, 1910-1930", MA thesis, Queen's University, 
Kingston, Canada, 1990. 
24. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Mr Rodseth, Empangeni, 26 September 1930, p. 1844. 
25. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of C W Dent et al., representing the Zululand Farmers' 
Association, Empangeni, 26 September 1930, pp. 1817 - 1818. 
26. For a fuller discussion of this·question see M Wilson and L Thompson (eds.), The Oxford 
History of South Africa, Vol. 2, Oxford, 1971, pp. 65fr. 
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By the time of the depression, this system was clearly becoming less and less tenable 
in most of the reserve areas. 
Another aspect which deserves consideration is the fact that the Natal reserves had 
been allocated with little spare capacity to allow for population growth; there was 
scant room for sons to set up their own homesteads upon marriage. Nor was any 
provision made for the African system of primogeniture, whereby the eldest son 
inherited all the land held by his father on the latter's demise. Other sons were thus 
left landless. The lack of land meant a lack of cattle for lobola and was thus a strong 
incentive for the young men to go in search of paid employment beyond the borders 
of the reserves. For those who needed further encouragement to enter the white 
cash economy, this was provided in the form of taxation.27 Even relatively 
unpopular employers, like the coal-mines of Natal, were flooded with labour when 
taxes fell due: 
I think that this taxation has a wonderfully good effect on the 
labour supply. When the time comes for tax collecting comes 
round here, you find that as soon as the time is due for them to 
pay their taxes you cannot cope with the amount of labour 
offering for the mines [sic]. That is the only time a Native will 
voluntarily go out to work whether he feels like it or not. That 
is the only time the mines have plenty of labour. If they were 
not compelled to pay t~tax'about 50 per cent of them would 
never turn out for work.28 
Collections of tax outside of the reserves provide a fairly good indication of the 
degree of outside employment,. as do masculinity rates, but no figures can be found 
which directly cover the period under study. The Revd Oscroft of Nongoma, who 
acted as Census Officer for the district, stated that up to 40 per cent of males of 
working age were away from home for between three and six months of the year.29 
The full decennial census due in 1931 was restricted (as an economy measure) to the 
27. J M Tinley, The Native Labour Problem of South Africa, University of North Carolina Press 
Chapel Hill, 1942, p. 19. ' 
28. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of I W de Jager, representing the Collieries, Dundee, 
17 September 1930, p. 1351. 
29. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of the Revd Oscroft, Nongoma, 22 September 1930, p. 1659. 
Oscroft does not make explicit whether this was the general rule (most likely), or only applied 
to the census year; nor did he specify to which census year he was referring. 
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gathering of information concerning the white population alone. However, as a 
guide, Smith claimed that at the time of the census in 1936, 12,5 per cent of all 
Africans from the reserves of Natal and Zululand were working away from home; 
the 12,5 per cent included almost a quarter of the total male population of working 
age.30 Professor Frankel, in his evidence to the NEC, suggested that by the 1930s 
Africans were streaming into the white cash economy and that taxation was by that 
stage superfluous, as sheer starvation was forcing many Africans into wage labour. 
Frankel put it thus: 
There can be no doubt that the historical cause of the present 
general Native tax of £1 (and probably also of pass fees) is to 
be found in the desire to force Natives to work. In my 
opinion ... the Natives are today being driven by a far stronger 
force than taxation, to find work on almost an~~rms that will 
give them and their dependants a livelihood. .! lif force is the 
threat of starvation in the overcrowded reserves. 
Migrant labour played a significant role.in undermining agricultural advancement in 
the reserves, for the absence of many of the most able men during crucial periods of 
the year helped to perpetuate the old tribal custom in which women were the main 
agricultural workers.32 Despite the fact that men were generally less active in 
agriculture than women, they did have important and clearly defined roles, including 
ploughing. Smith even suggested that when the migrants returned to their homes, 
they showed little enthusiasm for, knowledge of, or skill in agricultural pursuits.33 
The NEC found that prejudice, emanating from tribal elders and neighbours, also 
prevented Africans who had acquired more sophisticated farming skills, during their 
periods of outside employment on white farms, from utilising such skills: 
H a man became too rich this was ascribed to witchcraft, 
against which 'smelling out' proved to be an effective 
remedy ... This probably largely explains the circumstance, 
noticed by us throughout the Reserves that Natives who have 
30. Smith, "Labour Resources", pp. 158 -160. 
31. Written submission of Professor S Frankel to NEC, quoted in Lacey, Boroko, p. 166. 
32. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Albertus Steenkamp, Dundee, 17 September 1930, p. 1317. 
"But most of the owners are away and women and children do the work, which makes it very 
hopeless." 
33. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 166. 
learnt up-to-date methods on the European farms, seldom 
practise them in their own area.34 
Often their efforts did more harm than good: 
... the Native areas are almost all in previously unwanted parts 
of the country ... mainly in mountainous districts. Through the 
resultant denudation and erosion, over-stocking is ravaging 
large tracts of land, and it is a hard physical fact that, at an 
accelerating pace, the locations are becoming less and less able 
to support their populations. It is particularly unfortunate that 
the Natives, with their primitive agricultural methods, plus the 
steel plough, should have been relegated to the hilly country 
where, ~th high gradient ploughing, they can do most 
damage. 
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The reserves were meant only to sustain a subsistence economy. It was not intended 
that Africans residing in the reserves should become competitors of the white 
farmers; Africans were neither expected nor encouraged to grow marketable cash 
crops. Small amounts of sugar-cane, tobacco, cotton and vegetables were cultivated 
for sale more as an exception than the rule; most areas were planted to food crops 
for domestic consumption. 
Maize 
By far the most important food crop was maize, which was the staple food of 
Africans throughout the reserves. Millet, the original indigenous crop, had declined 
in importance, which was unfortunate because it grew better in the more arid parts. 
~ere conditions permitted, beans.and root crops were also grown.36 The amount 
of land under crops varied with the population density and the topography, ranging 
from intensive cultivation in the south, to only 3 to 15 per cent north of the Thukela. 
34. Union of South Africa, Report of the Native Economic Commission, UG 22/1932 (hereafter 
Report of NEC), p. 5, para. 26; See also CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Captain Frank 
Ferguson (representing the Izingolweni Farmers' Association), Harding, 8 October 1930, 
p.2161. 
35. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 141. 
36. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, pp. 101 · 102. Maize and millet together constituted 
approximately 86 per cent of all crops grOWD. 
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Due to the absence of crop-rotation and the lack of adequate fertilization, maize 
yields in the reserves were considerably below those on white farms in Natal.37 
Even coastal regions which had high rainfall and reasonably good soils could not 
produce enough to sustain life and maize had to be imported from other districts.38 
Rheinallt Jones puts the average production in the Natal reserves at two 200lb. bags 
per acre.39 A figure of 2,1 bags per acre in a "normal season" was also given by the 
Director of Native Agriculture, R W Thomton,40 in his evidence to the NEC.41 
However, Table 6.1 illustrates that although maize production during the late 1920s 
and early 1930s fluctuated tremendously, there was a general upward trend in 
production. 
Table 6.1 
Maize Production in African Reserves in Natal, 1926-1935. 
(in 200lb. bags) 












Source: Handbook, Table 36, .p. 53.42 












38. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of the Revd Martin Leisegang at Stanger on 2 October 1930, 
p.2032. 
39. J D Rheinallt Jones, '1'he Urban Native" in I Schapera (ed.), Western Civilization and the 
Natives of South Africa, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, (reprint) 1967, p. 168. 
40. Tho~ton was appointed to this position in 1929. See South African Outlook, 1 July 1929. His 
appomtment was later welcomed by llanga lase Natal as a " .. lascinating Christmas box for 
Natives". /langa lase Natal, 27 December 1929. It is difficult to ascertain whether the 
~ppointme.nt result~ in any significant improvement in agricultural methods among Africans 
m the Umon, but It may be seen as part of a growing realisation in official circles that 
agricultural conditions in the reserves would have to be improved if the rapid urbanisation of 
the African population was to be halted. 
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The drought which struck Natal and Zululand in 1931/32 had a far more serious 
effect than that of 1933, as far as maize production in the reserves was concerned. 
Thornton said production in the Zululand region for the season 1930/31 was "below 
50 per cent".43 Yet the overall trend was upwards. Despite this increase in 
production, Natal reserves remained net maize-importing areas. Smith argued that: 
Nevertheless, the salient feature of the Natal agricultural 
economy as a whole, and of the reserve economy, in particular, 
is the shortfall in the staple grain crops. The reserves are all 
maize' importing areas. For the purchase of maize, monel4is 
required. To secure money, wage employment is necessary. 
And indeed, it was. This becomes clear from the following: a family of five would 
need to produce nearly fourteen bags of maize just to sustain life for a year. To do 
this seven acres would have to be cultivated. This does not take into account the 
amount of maize which would have to be sold to raise enough money to pay taxes, a 
bag of maize selling for approximately 10s.45 The production and sale of surplus 
maize to make a living (including provision for tax) was clearly not an option for 
most reserve Africans.46 In Zululand, ~he average cultivated area was only two and 
a half to three acres per family of five, as opposed to the Transkei average of eight 
acres.47 However, the sale of maize, initially grown to sustain life, in order to 
obtain money was widespread in many parts of the reserves. This self-defeating 
practice was exacerbated by the depression. 
41. CAD, NEC, K26 FIS, Evidence of R W Thornton at Pretoria on 3 June 1931, p. 8395. 
42. Smith was very disparaging of dfficia1 statistics during this period, alleging that those for crop 
yields might err by between 50 and 60 per cent, as no proper census was taken and the flgUl'es 
are at best estimates. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 168. Merle Lipton in her contribution 
entitled "South Africa, Two Agricultures?" in F Wilson, A Kooy and D Hendrie (eds) Farm 
Labour in South Africa, David Philip, Cape Town, lCJ77, pp. 72 - 85, argued that all 
agricultural statistics pertaining to the reserves should be treated with due caution, as they 
appear far too conservative. 
43. CAD, NEC, K26, FlS, Evidence of R W Thornton at Pretoria on 3 June 1931, p. 8394. 
44. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 171. 
45. This price varied considerably, as will be shown. 
46. RheinaUt Jones, "The Urban Native", p. 168. 
47. CAD, NEC, K26, F15, Evidence of R W Thornton at Pretoria on 3 June 1931 p. 8403. 
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Country storekeepers bought maize from Africans who needed money in the early 
part of the harvesting season, only to sell it back at a profit to the same clientele at a 
later date. This opportunism, and other "sharp" practices, were soundly condemned 
by W J Wentzel, a missionary: 
En die tweede beswaar wat hulle het - hulle het nie mark nie; 
dit ~ag snaaks klink, maar .in Utrecht as 'n na~el. 20 s.ak~e 
miehes het, en hy kom by dIe handelaar en hy wll dIe mlelies 
vir die handelaar verkoop, dan krY. hy nie kontant geld nie, hy 
kry net aIleen handelsware in mil Vlr sy produkte ... Dit is die 
groot skande: die winkelier ~§eld maak uit die moeilikheid 
en uit die nood van die naturel. 
The storekeepers acted as storage depots, besides providing Africans with the cash 
required to purchase other necessities.49 Often, as illustrated above, no cash 
changed hands and maize was simply bartered for other goods, only to be bought 
back later, at a higher price.50 These iniquitous practices, which all too often 
resulted in Africans being exploited through unfair exchange, were later 
outlawed.51 But this did not stop storekeepers from advancing Africans credit, 
often against wages to be earned or against the security of their cattle. The Revd 
John Dube was emphatic in his condemnation of this: 
The unscrupulous country storekeepers are wolves in sheep 
skins. By many artifices e.g. overdue accounts in some cases 
their existence highly doubtful, are sucking the blood of Bantu 
people in back parts of our country. By certain tricks and also 
1D times of scarcity of food, large numbers of cattle are taken 
away. The law against profiteering was not evidently enacted 
against this type of storekeepers [sicl. He does not hesitate to 
take advantage of the depression. He takes advantage of the 
Native's need of food in a bad season to advance him money or 
sell him goods at exorbitant rates and he becomes so involved 
that he loses all freedom of bargaining, both as producer and 
buyer, being bound to deal with the one store only.,:l 
48. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of W J Wentzel at Newcastle on 16 September 1930, pp. 1238 
·1240. 
49. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 145. 
SO. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 102. 
51. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 145. 
52. CAD, NEC, 106, F7, Statement of Evidence submitted by the Revd John Dube Durban 
2 April 1931. ' , 
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Thus indebtedness often forced Africans into wage employment outside the 
reserves, a phenomenon which increased in frequency under the economic pressure 
of the depression.53 In rare cases, the property of Africans was sold by order of the 
court to pay debts. As Simon Majozi told the NEe: 
Question: In the last year, have there been many cases of your 
Natives who have had their property sold under order of the 
court, to pay their debts? 
Answer: Taking my people as a whole, there have not been 
many cases of that kind; but now, in view of the depression, I 
am apprehensive; I suspect that there will be more than even in 
the past, not only in respect52f such matters, but also even in 
respect of government dues. 
Generally, Africans in the Natal reserves made use of the most primitive grain 
storage methods; galvanised iron tanks (employed by African and white farmers in 
the absence of silos) were uncommon, as they were expensive and difficult to 
transport. Other methods of storage, like earthen pits, often resulted in severe 
losses due to weather and pests, leading to near starvation at times.55 This was 
aggravated by the irregular yields, as Table 6.1 illustrated, while the fact that maize 
was consumed as a staple on a year-round basis meant that efficient planning and 
rationing had to be carried out, for the maize had to last until the next harvest.56 If 
it did not, famine could result.57 It has been argued by Lipton that the eating of 
"green mielies" by Africans in the early part of the season when stocks of dried 
maize were low, might very well account for the discrepancy in statistics between 
actual production and bagged ~ried maize.58 This certainly may help to explain the 
53. Rheinallt Jones, "The Urban Native", pp. 168 - 169. 
54. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Simon Gilbert Evans Majozi, PietermarilZburg, 9 April 
1931, p. 6721. 
55. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 145. 
56. Letter from "Observer" of Matubatuba [sic], The Farmer, 8 April 1932, p.23. He wrote: "The 
young mealies have come on well after the heavy rains and most of the nalives are eating 
green mealies, but one fears that as they have nothing else they will not have enough to keep 
them until next year's crops are ready: but even so matters cannot be worse than last year." 
57. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 103. 
58. Lipton, "South Africa: Two Agricultures?", p. 73. 
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apparently gross underestimates of maize production during the depression years. 
Yet it would appear that in certain areas there was a real shortage. 
Shortages of maize became acute in some areas, especially in 1931 and 1932, and 
maize had to be distributed by the state.59 These shortages were caused by a 
drought that affected most of the reserves in 1931. In a letter to The Farmer, 
"Observer" detailed some of the suffering: 
Forgetful though the human race is, it will be a very long time 
before the year 1931 is forgotten, especially by the natives. I 
have known some people who have said that the famine in 
Zululand was not as serious as they were led to believe, but 
obviously these people knew nothm~ of the conditions that 
then existed in the kraals. Many a SIck native was unable to 
recover because of the lack of food, and many a woman fainted 
at work, so weak had they become. I have known some natives 
leave their kraals for a month at a time in search of food. They 
were d,raid of going home to their starving families without 
food. 
It stands to reason that subsistence farmers of maize were even more vulnerable to 
the vagaries of weather, pests and other natural disasters than their counterparts 
who were market-orientated, for their very survival depe'nded on the food they 
produced on their land. Incorrect farming methods, especially when applied to 
marginal or even sub-marginal lands, often produced erratic yields and even led to 
soil erosion. The only way in which people could survive, if they did not diversify 
their crops, was to purchase maize from the country storekeeper, often on credit. 
The exact extent of these credit purchases is not known, but they were reputed to be 
considerable.61 In one reserv~ district alone, the debts of Africans amounted to 
some £2 000.62 Mabel Palmer, in her evidence to the NEC, termed money-lending 
by storekeepers in the reserves a "terribly serious position".63 The Revd Hallowes 
corroborated this evidence when he said that Africans " ... very often get seriously 
into debt over getting their food".64 
59. See Chapter Eight, pp. 257 • 264. 
60. Letter from "Observer" of Matubatuba [sic] to The Farmer, 8 April 1932, p. 23. 
61. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 102. 
62. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Magistrate and Native Commissioner of Port Shepstone, 
Mr R D Lyle at Port Shepstone on 7 October 1930, p. 2106. 
181 
The cost of most items sold in the rural areas during the depression years was 
generally higher than in the urban areas, as the Revd Oscroft pointed out: 
The Native is really interested in the essentials of life; flour, 
sugar, etc., and there is a tremendous difference in the price 
which he has to pay in the country as compared with that which 
he has to pay in town. Take the price of mealies in the 
Nongoma District. I do not think that he could buy a bag of 
mealies in Non~oma for anything less than IS/-or 16/-; as a 
matter of fact, It is usually round about a pound, and yet the 
same bag can be bought in Durban for 9/-. That is merely an 
illustration, but the same thing holds good for flour and such 
things. It costs the natives more to live in the country at the 
present moment if he wants to live a civilised lif~ and if he 
wants to live on civilised lines than it does in town. 
Perhaps, to be charitable to the storekeepers, the prices were higher because goods 
had often to be transported considerable distances. However, no charitable 
interpretation can be put upon evidence of gross profiteering by storekeepers who 
paid exceptionally low prices to African producers - often between 40 and 50 per 
cent below the ruling market price.66 And to make matters worse the price of 
maize was falling, as the 'following table indicates: 
Table 6.2 












Source: Adapted from Handbook, Table 153, p. 183. 
63. CAD, NEC, K26, F7, Evidence of Mabel Palmer at Durban on 7 April 1931, p. 6406. 
64. Quoted by Lucas in his Addendum to the Report of the NEC, p. 184, para. 78. 
65. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of the Revd Oscroft at Nongoma, 22 September 1930, 
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As the price of maize declined, it made even less sense for Africans to sell maize in 
order to meet their cash requirements. In addition, it is obvious that the falling 
producers' prices were not always passed on to the consumers. The chain of supply 
from wholesaler to retail outlet was often longer, the country storekeepers making 
use of agents who all added their costs. The lack of competition among country 
storekeepers also drove prices up; in most cases there was no other store within a 
reasonable distance.67 All these costs were borne by the African purchasers. 
When, in times of famine, maize was distributed by local magistrates or Native 
Commissioners, the country storekeepers objected, as their custom was obviously 
affected. In fact, in 1931, the famine in certain parts of Zululand was greatly 
exacerbated by the very late arrival of the promised government maize. The 
storekeepers, on receipt of intelligence that this distribution was to be made, failed 
to replenish their stocks of maize and there was none available in certain parts of 
Zululand, even when the government maize failed to materialise. When the 
government maize did arrive, it was " ... just sufficient to keep the natives alive, and in 
fact, a lot of natives could not get any".68 Farmers in nearby districts who were 
worried about the supply of labour also resented this distribution of maize: 
... the giving out of mielies for famine relief is encouraging the 
natives to stay at home instead of going out to work and it is 
suggested that relief work on roads lVould be a better means of 
meeting the needs of the indigent. bY 
In this letter is contained the nub of the argument for the underdevelopment of the 
reserves: the idea that, as conditions in the reserves declined due to burgeoning 
pp. 1648 -1649. 
66. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of W J Wentzel, at Newcastle on 16 September 1930, p. 1239. 
At Ixopo stores, Africans were paid 6s per bag for maize. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of 
Paulus Coneo at Ixopo on 9 October 1930, p. 2248. 
67. CAD, NEC, 106, n, Evidence of John Allen Erlandson at Durban, 1 Apri11931 p. 628O. 
Erlandson said that there were few European stores in Zululand which had "a monopoly of the 
trade" and that these stores "charge the unfortunate Native whatever they like" because there 
was no competition. 
68. Letter from "Observer" of Matubatuba [sic] to The Farmer, 8 Apri11932, p. 23. 
69. The Farmer, 8 January 1932, p. 27. 
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population growth and consequent overpopulation by man and beast, more potential 
workers would be squeezed onto the labour market, thus preserving the migrant 
labour system and maintaining the supply of cheap black labour on white farms, on 
the mines and in industry.70 Smith stated: 
It is probably true that the progressive deterioration of the 
reserves makes the Natives more dependent on outside 
employment and therefore increases the flow of labour. But 
this is essentially a short-run phenomenon. The ruin of the 
land must inevitably be followed by a weakening of the 
physical health of the population, and, in due course, by actual 
numerical decline, so that the lab9ur supply will suffer first in 
quality and ultimately in quantity. It IS therefore a grave 
fallacy to deduce from the fact that a poor harvest increases 
the immediate sUP.flY of labour, that a policy of ne~ect of the 
Native ~as wtl solve the problem of 'NatIve labour 
shortage."I 
This was the case, for in the more eroded and underdeveloped parts of Zululand, 
very few Africans actually went to work; their absentee-rate was amongst the lowest 
in the Union and it was certainly not because they were able to make an adequate 
living off the land.72 
Millet 
Millet was (and still is) grown in most areas of the reserves, but does best in the 
more arid parts. It was precisely this ability to withstand dry conditions that had 
made millet so valuable a cereal crop. This quality was to stand African subsistence 
farmers in good stead during the dry years that coincided with the depression. The 
resilience of subsistence farmers, and their adaptability to changing environmental 
circumstances, are factors often overlooked by researchers. Subsistence farmers 
could not passively sit by during drought; their very survival depended on the 
harvesting of some sort of food crop. When, because of drought, maize yields were 
70. Smith, "Labour Resources", pp. 140 - 141. These were the standard arguments that had been 
used ever since Shepstone began the reserve system. 
71. Ibid., pp. 147 - 148. 
72. Ibid., p. 181. 
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lowered, the more enterprising subsistence farmers must have had recourse to the 
planting of the drought-resistant indigenous millet to sustain themselves. It is 
otherwise difficult to explain the vast differences in the yields from year to year, 
given that millet is a hardy and well-adapted cereal. Table 6.3 shows these 
fluctuations: 
Table 6.3 
Production of Millet (Kaffircom) in the Reserves 





















Source: Handbook, Table 38, p. 55. 
As has been suggested, African subsistence farmers were able to respond to drought 
conditions by planting more drought-resistant millet in place of the more susceptible 
maize. It cannot be coincidental that in the worst drought years of 1931 and 1933, 
the production of millet should have risen so significantly. Almost no millet was 
ever sold, as it formed one of the main ingredients of the beer made by Africans, 
and it was therefore unaffected by price fluctuations. However, fluctuations in 
production could be detrimental to the diet of Africans as the beer was very 
nutritious.73 
Sugar 
African cultivation of sugar-cane began in the nineteenth century and was initially 
largely confined to mission reserves. By the twentieth century it had spread on a 
small scale to other reserves, bringing in much-needed cash.74 There was increasing 
73. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 106. 
74. R F Bates, "Aspects of Sugar Cane Production in Natal and KwaZulu", M.Sc. (Agric. Econ.) 
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opposition, however, from less progressive chiefs who saw the cane-fields 
encroaching on grazing lands,75 and from white farmers who resented the 
competition at a time of crisis in the industry.76 The NEC did report that the 
Commission had encountered " ... one Native of exceptional ability," who owned 80 
acres of cane " .. .from which he appeared to be making a good living".?7 This 
example was more the exception than the rule, however, as the majority of African 
cane-growers farmed much smaller acreages. 
Despite the opposition from white farmers, less scrupulous millers were exploiting 
land in some of the reserves through African "fronts", and at the same time 
circumventing the Land Act. Mr Frederick Rodseth, the Superintendent of 
Reserves and Inspector of Native Labour for Southern Zululand, explained how this 
was possible: 
There is no lease - no legal form of lease, but the way the 
mills have got in is this, and undoubtedly the mills were quite in 
earnest when they started; they lent the Africans money; the 
Natives failed to work their fields properly, and when the time 
comes to cut their case [cane] the natives say 'I have not the 
money to pay for labour,' and that sort of thing, and gradually 
the position has arisen where the miller simply walks in, 
ploughs the land, plants it, and cultivates it, cuts It, loads it and 
brings it in, and leaves the native out of it altogether. He 
employs recruited labour, pa'y~ 2/9 or 2/6 a day for the labour, 
and charges the native anything from 12% to 60%, 1 believe, 
for the money which he has advanced - he wor~the field for 
the native and pays out any balance there may be. 8 
The production of sugar-cane by Africans was insignificant when seen against the 
vast production of white farmers, but must have been regarded as an attractive 
option by the more "progressive" African farmers in the reserves, for the number of 
thesis, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), 1979, p. 5Off. 
75. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of George Hulett at Stanger, 2 October 1930, p. 2009. 
76. Hulett himself was one of these. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of George Hulett at Stanger 
on 2 October 1930 p. 2008. 
77. Report of the NEC, p. 43, para. 299. 
78. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Frederick Rodseth, Eshowe, 30 September 1930, p. 1947. 
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Africans engaged in the growing of cane was increasing steadily throughout the 
depression years, as table 6.4 shows. 
Table 6.4 
Production of Sugar-Cane by Africans, 1926/27 -1933/34. 
Year Number Tons Average tonnage 
1926/27 584 44660 76 
1927/28 675 42952 64 
1928/29 583 41038 71 
1929/30 585 33014 56 
1930/31 711 52858 74 
1931/32 806 52073 64 
1932/33 710 46411 65 
1933/34 878 52623 60 
Source: Memorandum, p. 52. 
Interestingly, although the number of Africans involved in sugar production 
increased, their total output remained rather static.79 The source quoted above 
does not distinguish between Africans who were independent producers and those 
who were indebted to millers, as outlined previously. It is possible that the millers 
were under pressure from white farmers to limit their involvement in the reserves, 
given the surplus of sugar being exported at a loss.80 This would perhaps help to 
explain the difficulties that some African producers had in getting their cane 
milled.81 Rodseth spelt this out in his evidence to the NEe. After having said that 
some Africans grew cane along the South Coast, he explained their difficulties: 
Some Farmers' 'Associations have objected to the Natives 
sending cane to the mills, and some pressure has certainly been 
brought to bear on the mills not to accept it. 
Mr Lucas:(Commissioner) Has the pressure succeeded? 
Mr Rodseth: Yes, to some extent; it succeeds to this extent, that 
the natives are put up until the end of the season, and then of 
course the mills just accept the cane or not, if it suits them. 
79. See comments in previous Chapter, pp. 132 - 133. 
80. See previous chapter, p. 124. 
81. A similar situation prevailed among African commercial maize and tobacco farmers in 
Southern Rhodesia during the depression years. Whites simply boycotted African-produced 
goods. See 0 Hulec, "Some Aspects of the 1930s Depression in Rhodesia", Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 7, No.1, 1969, p. 103. 
Mr Lucas: Does it affect the value of the cane, having to wait 
like that? 
Mr Rodseth: During the end of the season the sl;lcrose goes 
down, making it less valuable and furthermore, It becomes 
rather awkward, because they suddenly calIon a number of 
small native settlers for their cane, and perhaps they only have 
three or four waggons between them, and 8~ey have great 
difficulty in getting all their cane off at once ... 
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This could also conceivably be seen as a strategy employed by the less scrupulous 
millers to undermine the financial position of some independent African producers 
and ultimately force such producers into a subordinate relationship in which their 
land in the reserves could be exploited at little cost,83 thus boosting the profitability 
of the mills during the economic crisis.84 
The Native Affairs Department of the Union (NAD) attempted to revive a scheme 
whereby Afncans would be encouraged to grow cane in the reserves. The Director 
of Native Agriculture estimated that there were 100000 acres that could be made 
available in the reserves of Zululand for the growing of cane and that " .. .in his 
opinion, 10 acres of cane is sufficient to provide a Native with a good living".85 The 
Department gazetted regulations in the Government Gazette86 whereby reserve 
land would be set aside for Africans to grow cane. The holdings were to be limited 
to between 10 and 15 acres, and cattle holdings were also to be limited. The 
Department would grant the land rent-free for the first year, but thereafter an 
annual rent of £1 per holding was to be paid. Africans who had already planted cane 
82. CAD, NEC, K26 F14, Evidence of Frederick Rodseth, Eshowe, 30 September 1930, pp. 1945-
1946. . 
83. This was certainly the perception of Chief Josiah Mqwebu. In a petition presented to the 
visiting Chief Native Commissioner, Mr J M Young, Mqwebu (through Charles Goodenough 
Nxaba) complained of the activities of the Melville Sugar Company in the following terms: 
"We humbly plead for your intervention, Sir, because the said Millers surely get the upper 
hand of us, leaving us practically indigent despite our large cane fields: [[anga lase Natal, 
15 July 1932. The CNC appears to have been swayed by representations of this sort, for 
opening the lnanda Agricultural Show, he said that Native farmers were "overwhelmed in 
debt" and that some millers "had taken advantage of their lack of capital". /langa lase Natal, 22 
July 1932. 
84. At this stage this is only a hypothesis. Much more work will have to be done, especially with 
company records, to give concrete substance to this suggestion. 
85. Report of NEe, p. 43, para. 301. 
86. Union of South Africa, Government Gazette, 30 January 1931, Proclamation 42/1931. 
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in the newly demarcated areas were to be allowed to continue for their lifetimes, 
subject to a levy of 6d per ton of cane crushed.87 Cash advances not exceeding 
£20 p.a. would also be provided for Africans to acquire the necessary tools and 
seed.88 The SASJ outlined similar attempts in the past, pointing out that " ... they 
have all resulted in a complete failure".89 Previous schemes, initiated at a time 
when prices were high, had been expected to give African growers on similar 
acreages of land an annual income of between £50 and £60 per annum.90 In the 
prevailing conditions of the early 1930s, with prices falling, the new scheme was 
greeted with considerable scepticism:91 
Although the Natives have lived and worked amongst cane for 
scores of years, and have sufficient experience and training to 
do the necessary work, yet very few of them have planted cane 
to any extent. The mind of the average Native does not 
progress far beyond superintending the cultivating of a patch of 
mielies or kaffrr com ... With the present overproduction under 
serious consideration, and the restricting of planting, this 
proposal from the NNC [Natal Native Commissioner] comes, 
m any case, at an inopportune time. But apart from that, a 
Native would be very fortunate under present day conditions, if 
he could get a I?rofit of £20 p.a. from his holding, which would 
not be a suffiCient inducement for any Native to en2age in 
sugar growing, even if that were the only consideration. 'JZ 
It is obvious that white growers did not wish to see further cane coming onto an 
already satiated market; the fact that the cane was to be grown by Africans was an 
aggravating factor. Most white growers did not want Africans as competitors, only 
as labourers.93 However, despite the protestations of the Sugar Journal, even 
£20 p.a., while it might not have been an attractive incentive for white fanners, 
would have been very attractive to African producers in the reserves, who had few 
87. Ibid. 
88. SASJ, February 1931, p. 77. 
89. Ibid. 
90. Ibid., p. 79. 
91. Ibid., pp. 89 - 91. This was termed " ... an old abandoned dream". 
92. Ibid., pp. 77 - 79. 
93. CAD, NEC, K26 F14, Evidence of George Herbert Hulett, (Chairman of the Victoria County 
Planters' Association), Stanger, 2 October 1930, p. 2006. 
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other means of generating cash from agriculture. Furthermore, their initial 
production costs would be partially or entirely met. Some 7 293 acres in the 
reserves were proclaimed.94 Nevertheless, as the harvesting of cane would only 
take place some years after the initial clearing, and planting of the ratoons, this 
scheme could not do anything meaningful to relieve the plight of Africans in the 
reserves during the depression years, and its progress has therefore not been 
described in detail. It is known that a number of African producers were granted 
quotas under the Sugar Act of 1936, but sugar-cane cultivation did not enjoy 
widespread popularity, especially after 1936, when restrictions on production were 
introduced. As late as 1944, there were only 13 283 acres under cane in the 
reserves.95 
What is quite clear is that during the depression, even though the price obtainable 
for cane fluctuated tremendously, and the entire industry suffered through 
overproduction and the government's manipulation of the gold standard, some 
Africans in the reserves had identified the potential of sugar-cane as a cash-
generating crop and continued to plant and harvest cane, despite obstacles placed in 
their way by their white counterparts. What must be borne in mind, however, is that 
areas planted to cane did reduce the amount of land available for cattle and indeed, 
for life-sustaining crops. Africans who planted cane, therefore, must have had 
alternative sources of income, or more land under cultivation than was planted to 
cane. The only alternative conclusion is that collusion with millers-cum-planters was 
lucrative enough to sustain the African inhabitants of the reserves engaged in the 
cultivation of sugar-cane. 
Livestock 
Whatever importance was attached by the African people of Natal to food crops was 
largely overshadowed by the central role which livestock, particularly cattle, played 
in their lives.96 Cattle formed the basis of many cultural and religious ceremonies 
94. Report of NEC, p. 43, para. 301. 
95. Brookes and Hurwitz, Natives Reserves, pp. 108 - 109. 
96. See Report of the NEC, p. 6, para. 33, where the Commission details evidence in this regard. 
Mrs Hoernle is quoted as having said: "The cattle are a trust to the present generation from the 
past generation: they are a medium between the people who are here and those who are no 
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in traditional society and were inextricably bound up in rituals and practices 
associated with marriage.97 Cattle were more than wealth, De Kiewiet asserted: 
To sell them or to eat them was a step away from the ways of 
their fathers against which the spirit of the tribe continued to 
struggle. They were a cult. Some of the serious economic 
c.onsequences of 'cow worship' amongst the Hindus of British 
India could, therefore, also be observed amongst the Bantu. 
The ban upon killing cattle for food was much less severe in 
South Afnc~ but the cattle cult had the same result of 
permitting many thousands of wretched and useless beasts to 
batten upon the slender resources of the land. Cattle were 
hoarded like money. They became more a measure of their 
owner's dignity than a source of income or profit. .. Thus their 
two principal assets, their cattle and their land, continued to 
stand in an unproductive and damaging relationship to each 
other.'J~ 
Cope likewise stressed the importance of cattle: 
In the hands of the overwhelming majority of the Zulu, money 
was only useful as a medium of exchange - cattle produced 
valuable by-products (milk, hide, dung for fertilizer), and could 
be used for ploughing, and . could be slaughtered for food. 
Moreover, cattle could reproduce themselves and thus they 
were a potentially generative form of wealth. Money, to the 
Zulu, was not: caJ)jtalist enterprise was extraneous to Zulu 
cultural traditions.9'l 
The economic value of cattle has been highlighted by Lent~ who accurately pointed 
out that: 
The social sy'stem of the African community is bound up in the 
closest poSSible manner with livestock ownership. Livestock, 
and cattle in particular, fulfil certain functions which are 
probably even more important than the obvious economic ones 
of acting as a source of income and as a factor of production; 
livestock is regarded as a store of wealth and as a medium of 
longer here, as the Natives put it. .. They are heirlooms; emblems of the status of the family ... " 
en. See Cope, To Bind the Nation, pp.26 - 33, for a discussion on the changing role of cattle in 
Zulu society in the early twentieth century. 
98. De Kiewiet, History, p. 198 - 199. 
99. Cope, To Bind the Nation, p. 27. 
exchange. Acquisition of livestock is probably the most 
important form of investment in the homeland.s of South 
Africa and is the customary method of amassmg wealth. 
Precluded from buying land and often unable to canalize their 
savings into industrial or commercial enterprises, Africans 
indulge in excessive investment in stock, often preferring 
number to quality; the possession of livestock in itself gives 
weight and dignity to the owner. TheOBroductive capacity of 
the stock is often of little significance. t 
191 
Cattle of the Sanga variety had long been part of Zulu life but, by the time of the 
depression, most herds in the reserves consisted of cross-breeds, the offspring of 
these cattle and "nondescript" European cattle. The only cattle which appear to 
have been carefully bred were the pure-white type associated with royalty and the 
type known as the Black Nguni, which was very hardy and a good producer of both 
milk and beef. lOt The huge herds which had grazed the lands of the Zulu in the 
nineteenth century had been decimated by plunder and disease, causing widespread 
disruption of the social system.102 By the second decade of the twentieth century, 
however, the numbers had begun to recover somewhat,103 largely as a result of a 
compulsory dipping programme instituted by the Union government to combat east 
coast fever (a tick-borne disease), and restrictions upon the movement of stock to 
curtail the spread of nagana (a disease spread by the tsetse fly). As the NEe 
reported: 
The ruthless efficiency of the white veterinarians increased the 
numbers of the Native cattle and quarantine resruations 
limited access to the market, eV~ll.in the small degree m which 
the Native was prepared to sell. lU4 
100. G Lenta, Development or Stagnation? Agriculture in KwaZulu, University of Natal, Durban, 
Department of Economics, Occasional Paper No.7, 1CJ78, p. 17. 
101. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 112. 
102. See Cope, To Bind the Nation, pp. 27· 30, where Cope discusses changes wrought to the 
lobola system as a result of cattle shortages, and the social dislocation that followed the 
increased rate of migrancy associated with this shortage. 
103. Cope, "Zulu Royal Family", p.235. Cope argues that the livestock population growth far 
outstripped that of humans in Zululand in the period 1916·1936. Furthermore on white farms 
just outside the reserves, cattle numbers were increasing at the rate of 11 per' cent per annum 
during the mid·1920s. 
104. Report of the NEC, p. 10, para. 67. 
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This "ruthless efficiency" had not been accompanied by any measures "to teach the 
Natives to husband their grazing" 105 and the resultant overstocking had led, almost 
inevitably, to over-grazing and the creation of "near desert conditions" in some 
areas. 106 
Cattle were found in all the reserves of Natal and Zululand, despite the large 
differences in climate, veld and potential endemic diseases. l07 Only in the far-flung 
reaches of Zululand, where the tsetse fly made nagana almost endemic, were cattle 
numbers small. 108 The higher ground in Zululand, particularly in the savannah and 
thornveld areas, was eminently suitable for cattle, and supported large herds. In the 
reserves of Natal proper, the population densities of humans and cattle showed a 
remarkable correlation.109 In the reserves of southern Natal, there were areas 
which were described as having grass " ... so bad that not even the goats will eat it". 
Thornton said this area extended from Mid-lliovo right down to Port Shepstone and 
there was hardly any grazing left due to overstocking. 1 10 In most reserves in Natal, 
there were between 30 and 40 head of cattle per morgen, but there were areas in 
which this figure rose to more than 50.111 This was partly as a result of the fact that 
there were few other investment opportunities open to Africans in the reserves; 
cattle formed the basis of their savings. 1 12 
Significantly, cattle holdings were not evenly distributed amongst the population of 
the reserves. Many impoverished Africans owned no cattle at all, while in some 
areas individuals owned large herds - sometimes as large as three or four hundred 
head. These owners used their influence to obtain more land for their cattle, at the 
105. Ibid., para. 68. 
106. Ibid., p. 11, para. 73. 
107. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 112. 
108. Ibid., p. 114, where a map is provided to show tsetse Oy infestations. 
109. Ibid., p. 112. 
110. CAD, NEC, 106, F15, Evidence of R W Thornton, Pretoria, 3 June 1931, p. 8432. 
111. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves., p. 112 - 113. Brookes and Hurwitz assert that the 
numbers of cattle in the reserves remained largely unchanged between 1930 and 1950 so 
although their study is largely of a later period, their statistics, in the absence of others, ~ve 
been employed. 
112. Lipton, "South Africa: Two Agricultures?", pp. 76 - 77. 
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expense of others. Chiefs were able to reserve the best land for their own use 
because they controlled access to land. 1 13 
Thornton stated that the reserves in the Union were carrying four times the stock 
they ought to have done,114 a very conservative estimate that obviously took no 
account of the terrain, the carrying capacity of the veld, and endemic diseases. 
Brookes and Hurwitz argue that the "generally accepted" true carrying capacity of 
the veld was one beast on every ten morgen, which then greatly increases the 
overstocking factor. 1 15 Even some of the reserves in Zululand, which carried small 
numbers of cattle, were also overstocked, if the quality of the veld was taken into 
account.116 Generally, the quality of the veld and the other factors related to the 
carrying capacity of the reserves do not appear to have been considered either by 
the NEC, or by many who gave evidence before it, for the Commission decided that 
although the reserves of Natal were overstocked and denuded, those of Zululand 
were not.117 This is obviously a generalisation, but one which may have had 
applicability as the Commission reported that some whites had been taking 
advantage of the situation by grazing their herds on reserve land in Zululand at this 
time. 
These cattle were known as sisa'd stock after an old African custom of "loaning" 
stock among clan members. White farmers would approach Africans for grazing 
and, in return for the milk and a portion of the natural increase, the Africans would 
tend the herds running on their reserve land. It was, the Secretary of Native Affairs 
averred, most profitable: 
This is the most profitable form of farming for the European, 
especially in parts of Zululand where the pasture is not 
overstocked. He can run hundreds of head of cattle at 
practically no cost, as neither rent on land nor labour costs 
have to be met, at the same time the custom may benefit 
113. Cope, "Zulu Royal Family", pp. 239·241. 
114. CAD, NEe, 106, F15, Evidence of R W Thornton at Pretoria on 3 June 1931. p. X427. 
115. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 112. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Report of the NEC, p. 44, para. 306. 
impoverished Native families, rnr is one to which the Natives 
themselves are much attached. 
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The extent of this could not be determined, as both parties to such agreements 
would simply disclaim ownership, but at the time the Secretary of Native Affairs 
claimed that the practice was not widespread, as: 
Generally speaking Native Locations are so congested and 
overrun with scrub cattle, that there is no inducement for the 
European {Fer or stockowner to place his cattle in the 
locatlOns.1 . 
It is strange that the Department of Native Affairs, which laid down tight restrictions 
on the numbers of stock that other Europeans (traders and missionaries) were 
allowed to keep in the reserves, should allow this situation to continue at all. One 
possibility may lie in the explanation offered: that the practice was assisting destitute 
African families and was simply subtly altering the patron-client relationship which 
had traditionally existed in Zulu society. In any event, the NEC recommended that 
this practice be stopped.120 Mr G Kirby, Superintendent of Native Reserves, 
Nongoma, wrote that the practice was en~ing anyway as " ... during the last four or 
five years from three thousand to four thouSand head of European-owned cattle 
have been removed from Native areas in this District".121 But the files of the Chief 
Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, show that although there was indeed a 
diminution of the practice, there were still thousands of head of European-owned 
cattle in the reserves. Instructions were given that all such cattle be removed from 
the reserves as soon as possible. 122 There is no evidence that sisa was in any way 
influenced by the depression, but the practice was definitely taking place on land 
that could have been used by the many thousands who were desperately seeking 
land. Mr J S Marwick MP had also made use of this system to graze his cattle 
without cost to himself and, despite being ordered to remove his cattle, managed to 
keep over 400 head in the No. 12 Reserve at Nongoma until 1933.123 
118. Ibid., Annexure 12, p. 267. 
119. Ibid., p. 268. 
120. Ibid., p. 19, para. 123. 
121. NAD, CNC, Vol. 42A, Fde 39/3 (Part I), G Kirby (Superintendent, Native Reserves, 
Nongoma), to Native Commissioner, Nongoma, 10 August 1932. 
122. See NAD, CNC, Vol. 42A, Fde 39/3 (Part I). 
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The following table reflects the number of African-owned cattle in the reserves. 
Unfortunately, despite compulsory dipping (which was recorded) no figures could 
be found for the years 1931-1933. 
Table 6.5 








1935/36 1188 177 
Source: Adapted from Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 119. 
The decline between 1929/30 and 1933/34 can largely be ascribed to losses suffered 
during the droughts of 1931 and 1933. Despite the fact that the Zulu were 
accustomed to losing large numbers of cattle through drought and disease,124 the 
situation in Zululand was so desperate in the former year that the Minister of Native 
Affairs, Mr E G Jansen, (M.P. for Vryheid) informed Parliament that 203 326 Zulu 
cattle had died in the period from June to November 1931 alone.125 This left the 
Africans not only impoverished, but starving, and the NAD was forced to declare 
the inland reserves of Zululand famine areas and . to distribute maize against 
promissory notes, in what Cope termed "an unprecedented move".126 
123. NAD, CNC, Vol. 42A, Ftle CNC 39/3, Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA) to CNC, 
15 November 1933. 
124. Handbook, Table 23, p. 37. The average annual loss of cattle in aU the reserves of Natal and 
Zululand between 1926 and 1930 was in the order of 50 000 head. See also CAD, 106, F4, 
Evidence of Charles Wheelwright, former Native Commissioner for Zululand, Mtubatuba, 
25 September 1930, p. 1738, where he states that thousands of head of stock died annuaUy 
from nagana in the Umfolozi, H1uh1uwe and Umkooi areas. 
125. Debates of the House of Assembly, (hereafter Hansard), Col. 5106, 23 May 1932. 
126. Cope, To Bind the Nation, p. 262. These efforts will be described in detail in Chapter Eight. 
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The decline in cattle numbers cannot be ascribed to any large-scale sell-off of stock 
during the economic crisis. While the cattle auctions organised by the NAD and 
cattle traders at Eshowe, Vryheid and Nongoma were "popular",127 these had 
hardly any impact on the herds. There appears to have been a very well-entrenched 
white view that attempts to get Africans to sell their surplus stock, through organised 
auctions, had met with little success.128 As the NEC put it, "It is difficult for a 
Native to sell cattle in cold blood.,,129 Even in the most trying of economic 
circumstances, Africans simply refused to sell their stock, or sold only the most 
emaciated and unhealthy specimens: 
At that time, [1931] although the natives were short of food, 
they would not sell their cattle for a reasonable price. When 
the speculators left off buying, the magistrates were 
approached by the natives with a request to find buyers for 
their stock. The outcome was that It was decided to hold 
auction sales at various places. Somehow the word got round 
that the Government was buying their cattle and that any kind 
would do. The result was that a general cullin~ was carried out 
and the very worst of cattle, with a few exceptions, were sent to 
the market. I know one native who sent a cow that was..s.o 
weak that he could not drive it back after he failed to sell it. 13u 
Some of the poor prices obtained in the auction described by "Observer" were also a 
cause of concern for Africans. He reported the following sentiments being 
expressed: 
'They have just come to grab our cattle'; 'The Government is 
trying to take all our cattle because they say we have too many, 
and that is why .we won't work'; 'I'll take my cow and kill it 
rather than take £2 for her
t3 
Why! a sheep is £1; and do they 
think our cattle are sheep?' 1 
The overstocking of most of the reserves, and the general reluctance of Africans to 
sell their cattle, even in the direst circumstances, was a source of continuing 
127. Cope, '7he Zulu Royal Family", p. 236. 
128. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of F J Carless (Mooi River Farmers' Association) Mooi 
River, at Estcourt, 13 October 1930, p. 2306. ' 
129. Report of the NEC, p. 16, para. 106. 
130. Letter from "Observer" of Matubatuba [sic) to The Farmer, 8 Apri11932, p. 23. 
131. Ibid. 
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frustration to those in authority and, in fact, to all those interested in the land. 132 
However, while most of the Zulu could not be brought to part with their cattle in 
return for cash, they were prepared to part with them as tribute to their king, 
Solomon. 
Cope stated that "tens of thousands of cattle" were collected as tribute between 1931 
and early 1933. These were then sold by white cattle-dealers to pay Solomon's 
debts.133 Even those who had wanted to make use of the auction sales organised by 
magistrates and the NAD, were persuaded by agents of Solomon not to sell there, 
but to entrust cattle to them as they would sell directly to the market in Durban and 
the owners would receive better returns. In the event, however, only the agents and, 
to a much lesser degree, Solomon, benefited from these sales.134 These demands, 
at a time of crisis for most Zulus, cost Solomon support from even his most loyal 
subjects.135 The government, through the NAD, was understandably outraged, for 
even as they were distributing famine relief and writing off thousands of pounds in 
arrear taxes,136 not only were Solomon's agents collecting cattle, but the king 
132. As late as 1935 the NAD reported: "It cannot be claimed that either the propaganda of the 
Department or the fostering of cattle sales bad yet bad any appreciable affect on the 
overstocking of the Native areas of Natal and Zululand. Even the more enlightened Natives 
nearly all keep as many cattle as will keep alive on the common grazing regardless of their 
condition." Quoted in Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 115. 
133. Cope, To Bind the Nation, pp. 263 - 264. Cope appears to bave overlooked the evidence in 
NAO, CNC PMB, Vol. 92A, Ftle 64/7, relating to the Zulu National Deputation Fund. This 
me contains the docket prepared by the South African Police who were asked to investigate 
the whole matter of cattle collections to ascertain whether these were being obtained 
fraudulently. The investigating officer, Detective Sergeant CJaysmith, came to the conclusion 
that between 2 000 and 3 000 cattl~ bad been given to Solomon and that although Solomon 
bad denied that the cattle collectors were acting on his behalf, the persons concerned bad 
signed permission from Solomon to do so. See the docket forwarded to the Divisional 
Criminal Investigation Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 6 September 1932. However, it is indeed 
quite likely that many more cattle were collected than could be traced by the Investigating 
Officer, which makes Cope's assertion quite probable. The same conclusion is reached by La 
Hausse. See La Hausse, "Ethnicity and History", pp. 325 - 331. La Hausse does make use of 
the me in question. I bad uncovered and made use of the me independently. 
134. The extact extent of the tribute paid to Solomon in the form of cattle and the extent of the 
appropriation by "agents" acting on his behalf during this period shall probably never be 
known; there is simply not sufficient data (in any form) existant to reach a definitive 
conclusion. 
135. Cope, To Bind the Nation, p. 265. 
136. The exact sum involved in this action cannot be ascertained, but the action itseH should be 
seen as a measure of the seriousness of the situation. 
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himself continued to spend liberally, even buying an expensive new car - all the 
time getting himself deeper and deeper into debt. 137 
Other cattle trends Were also serious. The birth-rate among cows was falling; the 
average number of calves borne per cow had fallen from between 15 and 20 to only 
7 or 8, as a consequence of their poor condition and the lack of grazing. 138 Milk 
production, always dependent on the weather and the quality of grazing, was 
negatively affected by the poor environment. This had serious consequences for 
many children who were largely reared on a diet of milk.139 Even the market for 
skins and hides, which had often provided African families with a small but steady 
cash income, ceased to provide the customary returns as a result of the depression. 
This had serious consequences, for even in the worst of times when cattle had died 
of drought or disease, the sale of the hide of a dead beast provided an income. 
Often this was the only income that could be obtained from such an animal. 
Another source of money for the hard-pressed subsistence farmers had virtually 
dried up.140 
Overall, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the depression years, 
accompanied as they were by severe droughts, had a very negative impact on the 
cattle holdings of the Zulu people and, therefore, on the daily lives of the 
inhabitants of the reserves. Most of the reserves were overstocked, and the grazing 
under severe pressure. It is not surprising, therefore, that the losses of cattle through 
drought and disease were considerable. Dube put it thus: 
The wheel has now turned the other way about. Locations and 
reserves are congested. Dn~ught, don~as, wasteful methods of 
cultivation, destruction of vegetatIon thus reducing the 
moisture-absorbing power of the pasture, are now common. 
Added to this, outbreaks of stock diseases, hitherto unknown, 
137. Ibid., pp. 266 - 267. 
138. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Frederick Rodseth at Eshowe on 30 September 1930, 
p.1954. 
139. Report of the NEC, p. 14, para. 92. 
140. For discussion of the effects of the depression on the market for hides and skin~. ~ Chapter 
Five. 
have caused our people financial embarrassment. . .It [livestock] 
has now so increased that there is not enou~h I?asture. Large 
numbers are dying off, and people are becorrung Impoverished. 
Even those who hav{ stock now derive no income during this 
time of depression. 1 1 
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Such losses brought great hardship, suffering and social upheaval in their wake, and 
were exacerbated by the predations of the Zulu king and his agents. However, one 
must not paint too bleak a picture, for once the rains came and the veld regenerated, 
so did the herds. Indeed, as Brookes and Hurwitz noted: 
... a precarious equilibrium has been reached between cattle 
numbers and the carrying capacity of the veld. This balance is 
easily upset and many cattle are lost from disease and drought. 
The balance is, however, quickly re'lPed in favourable years 
by natural increase and by purchase. 
The drought also had a significant effect on African holdings of sheep. Although 
few areas of the reserves were really suitable for woolled sheep, relatively good 
prices during the 1920s (even for poor-quality wool) had encouraged a steady rise in 
holdings of woolled sheep; holdings of non-woolled sheep, (kept largely for mutton) 
also increased. During the drought, however, large numbers of the former perished 
and declining prices for wool forced a changeover to the more hardy mutton sheep. 
Table 6.6 
African Holdings of WooDed and Non-WooDed Sheep in the 


































141. CAD, NEC, K26, F7, Statement of Evidence submitted by the Revd J L Dube Durban 
2 April 1931, pp. 6 - 7. ' , 
142. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 115. 
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In concert with their white counterparts, African wool farmers in the reserves 
continued to produce wool during the depression years and, even though the prices 
fell,143 production was more or less maintained. Unfortunately, because of the 
stopping of agricultural censuses, no figures are available for the crucial years 1931-
1933, nor was any distinction drawn between the production of Africans in the 
reserves and the production of Africans on white farms: 
Table 6.7 









Source: Handbook, Table 32, p. 48. 








The overall trend in the numbers of sheep was an upward one, reflecting the 
declining ability of the veld to support cattle. While holdings of woolled sheep on 
white farms decreased in the twenty years from 1930 to 1950, those of Africans 
continued to increase. In 1930, African holdings constituted 3,4 per cent of the total 
provincial holding; by 1950, this had risen to 10,3 per cent. l44 More significant than 
the holdings of sheep of both kinds was the pattern of the ownership of goats. 
Both sheep and goats, because of their grazing patterns, effect greater damage to 
pasture than cattle. But apart from their destructive feeding habits, their possession 
is most often a sign of poverty, as Brookes and Hurwitz argued: 
There are more ~oats than any other livestock in the Reserves. 
They are of httle economic value, but are slaughtered 
sometimes for food and sometimes for ritual purposes. Their 
presence can often be regarded as an indication of poverty in 
143. See previous chapter for price fluctuations. 
144. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 117. 
the families that own l~~m, for to own goats is often to be 
unable to afford cattle. 
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There existed a strong correlation between the population density of goats and soil 
erosion. As goats were able to subsist on very poor grazing, the heaviest 
concentrations of these animals were to be found in those areas which were the most 
eroded and poverty-stricken in the reserves.146 
Table 6.8 
African Holdings of Goats other than Angora, 


















The drought and the rising tide of poverty in the reserves had a very negative effect 
on the numbers of goats; many died of disease or in the drought.147 Many others 
must have met their fate under the butcher's knife, as goats were often eaten as a 
source of protein during desperate times. The NAD was also actively promoting the 
reduction of the goat population, although with relatively little success.148 
High prices for mohair during the 1920s had occasioned a significant rise in the 
number of angora goats in the reserves during the late 1920s, and the sale of mohair 
by Africans rose as a consequence. In 1926/27 there were some 1 300 angora goats 
in the reserves; by 1929/30, this had increased to 2 761, an increase of 112 per cent. 
Some 2 713lbs of mohair were sold in 1928/29.149 However, the onset of the 
145. Ibid. 
146. Ibid. 
147. Handbook, Table 26, p. 39. 98 000 sheep and goats were lost in 1930 alone. 
148. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, pp. 117 - 118. By 1950 numbers bad fallen to 702 888. 
149. Ibid., p. 118·119. 
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depression and the subsequent collapse of the mohair market ended the interest of 
African farmers in this activity and the numbers of such goats declined to almost 
nothing. 150 
The period of the depression, coinciding as it did with two severe droughts, 
encompassed years of hardship for most African families resident in the reserves of 
Natal. Overstocking and overpopulation had reduced some areas to near-desert; 
even some fifty years later, Ndeshini kaMnyaiza still recalled that in the aftermath 
of the drought in the Nongoma and Mahlatini areas, a snake could be seen moving 
across the other side of the valley, for there was no grass left at all.151 When the 
predations of locusts and the sporadic outbreaks of various livestock diseases are 
added and the serious outbreaks of malaria 152 are also included in the picture, there 
can be no doubt that for many of the inhabitants of the reserves, the early years of 
the 1930s were years of privation and hardship. 
This makes it easier to take issue with the analysis of reserve production produced 
by Simkins.153 Simkins, in analysing reserve production argued that in 1927, some 
reserves in Zululand were almost self-sufficient in food production, while some of 
the reserves of Natal proper produced less thari 25 per cent of their required 
food. 154 However, in referring to Zululand, Cope pointed out the flaw in Simkins's 
analysis: 
... the relative prosperity of many Zulu in the reserves masks 
the fact that very many more were becoming acutely 
impoverished. Simkins' conclusions are based on statistics 
150. Handbook, Table 17, p. 31. The figures supplied in the Handbook do not coincide with those 
of Brookes and Hurwitz. The former suggests that there were 4000 angora goats in 1928; 
2000 in 1929 and 3 000 in 1933. Thereafter the numbers decline to below 1 000. Although 
the f.gures do not agree, the overall trend is the same; another example of the vagaries of the 
statisticians. 
151. Cope, "Zulu Royal Family", p. 235. 
152. For a fuller discussion of this see J B Brain, "But Only the Black Men Die: The 1929·33 
Malaria Epidemics in Natal and Zululand", Paper presented at Workshop on Natal History, 
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1988. 
153. C Simkins, "Agricultural Production in the African Reserves of South Africa, 1918-1969", 
Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 7,1981, pp. 256 ·283. 
154. Ibid., p. 266. 
arrived at by dividing the value of agricultural produyggn in 
the Zululand reserves as a whole by population figures. 
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Furthermore, the evidence suggests that at least for the period 1929 to 1934, the 
reserves of Zululand were less able to support their populations than simple 
statistical computations would have one believe. This does not detract from 
Simkins's overall conclusions, but again highlights the fact that statistical studies 
over long periods of time might not always give an accurate reflection of the 
situation that prevailed in particular component years. Simkins himself admits that 
the fragile maintenance of a productive base in the reserves was assisted by the 
migration of a significant number of their inhabitants, which alleviated some of the 
problems of overcrowding and partly relieved the pressure on limited resources. 
According to Brookes and Hurwitz, the situation had not improved by the 1950s, at 
which time there were only a few areas (in Zululand) that could support a normal 
subsistence population, while there were other areas (mainly in the Natal reserves) 
which carried populations more than 20 times greater than the normal subsistence 
population. 156 
There is abundant evidence to confirm that, during the depression years, poor 
economic conditions encouraged white farmers in Natal to evict Atrican tenants and 
labourers from their farms in order to boost productivity and profitability.157 
Bradford described the situation in the following terms: 
Countrywide between 1926 and 1936, the number of Africans 
on white-owned farms rose more slowly than the general 
population 'increase, while the reverse was true of black -owned 
farms and towns: The most striking shifts occurred in Natal. 
Here the proportion of Africans on holdin~ owned or 
occupied by non-Africans remained almost static in absolute 
terms, and fell dramatically from 41 to 26 per cent of the 
province's total African population. Simultaneously, numbers 
m the reserves increased by almost one-quarter; on African-
owned holdings they doubled; and in towns they more than 
trebledI~8 
155. Cope, "Zulu Royal Family", p. 239. 
156. Brookes and Hurwitz, Native Reserves, p. 127, FtgW'e 25. 
157. See Chapter Five and La Hausse, "Ethnicity and History", pp. 280·281 and p, ,\21 ; Bradford, 
A Taste 0/ Freedom, pp. 34·62. 
158. Bradford, A Taste 0/ Freedom, p. 59. 
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Bradford intimated the areas in which such displaced Africans did eventually find 
homes, but the picture is not as simple as might appear from a survey over ten years. 
In the short term, such displaced Africans had to find somewhere to live and some 
means of staying alive. Most white farmers were not hiring or acquiring new labour 
tenants, even under conditions of labour that can only be described as being akin to 
slavery.159 Alternative employment on white farms was therefore scarce and 
unrewarding. So desperate were many that they sought work in the sugar industry. 
This avenue of employment was generally very unpopular with the Zulu, but the 
industry reported that during the depression their perennial labour shortages were 
somewhat alleviated. 160 
The operation of the "civilised labour" policy and the general economic downturn in 
the urban areas of Natal also resulted in large-scale African unemployment and 
consequently, in a forced movement of Africans from the urban to the rural 
areas.161 It seemed after all, as John Dube put it: 
... that you want our labour, but as soon as you have finished 
with us you want us removed 'so far away from you that you do 
not wantto see us until certain hours when you again want our 
labour.1u2 
The depression had adversely affected the position of the urban African.163 Dube 
had said previously: 
[Urban Africans) should have land to flee to in case of 
whatever troubles they may have in the urban areas. At the 
159. /langa lase Natal, 12 February 1932. 
160. CAD, NEC, 106, F7, Evidence of Douglas Saunders, Acting Chairman of the Natal Millers' 
Association, Durban, 2 April 1931, p. 6220. 
161. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Shiyabanye Mncwango, Nongoma, 22 September 1930, 
p. 1696, where he said: "We have several things to represent in regard to native labour- certain 
conditions which have been brought about by the authorities lately have come down' heavily 
upon us; I refer to the natives who have lost the work which they had on the railways. There 
were many natives deprived of their living that way on the railways, and it seems to us that the 
Government, instead of helping their subjects to make a living, are creating poor blacks ... " 
162. CAD, NEC, 106, F1, Evidence of the Revd J L Dube, Durban, 2 April 1931, p. 6263. 
163. See above, Chapter Three. 
present time, you want to send away Natives to Native areas, 
but the Native areas are congested. You do not want Natives 
in the ur~~ areas; and when you have not got land, where can 
they go? 
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This must have been the question that faced thousands of displaced Africans during 
the depression period. It appears that many did attempt to find their way back to 
the reserves, but in most cases, the congestion, and the generally desperate 
conditions pertaining in many of the reserves, made it economically impossible for 
them to return to their own land, or that of their families, to eke out a living. The 
reserves simply could not sustain such an influx; conditions within them were, in 
fact, obliging many resident Africans to leave the reserves in search of paid 
employment to sustain themselves and their families during the crisis. Africans in 
the reserves often resented the intrusion of others from outside, knowing that the 
land could not support more people.165 Many were forced back to the urban areas 
where they lived illegally, often at the mercy of Indian slumlords.166 The influx to 
the towns could not be stopped merely by the passing of acts of parliament. 167 
The depression and the resultant hardship reported by the NEe can be taken as one 
of the factors that moti~ated the Hertzog government to allocate additional land to 
the reserves in 1936.168 Plans for the development of the reserves were also 
mooted, but these came too late to assist the many thousands of destitute Africans 
who bore the full brunt of the depression. Harried from pillar to post, from urban 
areas and white farms to the desolate backwaters of the reserves, exploited by 
storekeepers and even their king, the African population felt the fullest effects of 
the depression and the resultant impoverishment. 
164. CAD, NEC, 106, F7, Evidence of the Revd J L Dube, Durban, 2 April 1931, p. 6230. 
165. CAD, NEC, 106, F7, Evidence of H C Lugg, Durban, 1 April 1931, pp. 6150, 6175. 
166. CAD, NEC, 106, F7, Evidence of H C Lugg, Durban, 1 April 1931, p. 6176. 
167. Lacey, Boroko, p. 274. 
168. Ibid., p. 289. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN NATAL 
No man has hired us 
With pocketed hands 
and covered faces 
We stand about in open places 
and shiver in unlit rooms. 
Only the wind moves 
Over empty fields, untilled 
Where the plough rests, at an angle to the furrow. 
In this land 
There shall be one cigarette to two men, 
To two women one half pint of bitter ale. 
In this land 
No man has hired us 
Our life is unwelcome, our death 
Unmentioned in "The Times". 
T S Eliot, The Rock, 1934. 
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Unemployment was perhaps the most noticeable result of the great depression 
throughout the western world. Hardly any nation was unaffected by this 
phenomenon, but the populous industrialised nations of Europe and the United 
States of America suffered more severely from this dislocation of the normal order, 
as millions of workers were rendered jobless and thronged the streets vainly 
attempting to secure any form of employment which would restore their pride and 
self-confidence. Unemployment of such magnitude in these countries was 
unprecedented: the modem economic system had never before failed on such a 
massive scale. In Europe the ' worst affected country was undoubtedly Germany, 
~here the jobless numbered 7 000 000 by the end of 1932,1 in Great Britain, some 
2745000 were likewise unemployed in the same year,2 while in the United States of 
America, 12830 000 or 24,7 per cent of the workforce were unemployed in 1933.3 
In France, which had managed to resist the depression until much later, some 
1300 000 workers were unemployed by 1933.4 While not experiencing the same 
1. Heaton, Economic History of Europe, p. 708. 
2. M Beloff, Wars and Welfare: Britain 1914 - 1945, Edward Arnold, London, 1984, p. 195. 
3. Robertson and Walton, History of the American Economy, p. 486. 
4. A Cobban, A History of Modern France, Vol. 3: 1871- 1962, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1965, 
p.138. 
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degree of joblessness amongst its population, the province of Natal in the Union of 
South Africa did nevertheless suffer some measure of this great social and economic 
dislocation. 
Before attempting to assess the situation in Natal, it is perhaps prudent to grapple 
with the problem of defining the term "unemployment". A basic definition was 
provided by the Holloway Commission, which stated that: 
Unemployment is the non-fulfilment of the desire to be 
employed. Wh~e this desire does not exist, there can be no 
unemployment. . 
This basic definition has been followed by other writers such as Pigou6 and Casson.? 
But as Robertson and Walton point out, there is always a certain measure of 
unemployment present in capitalist society: 
People are said to be 'involuntarily unemployed' when they are 
willing and able to work but cannot find a job for which they 
are trained. Some kinds of involuntary unemployment, often 
referred to as "frictional unemployment," are unavoidable in a 
free economy ... Some businesses have seasonal ups and downs 
in employment. Technological unemployment occurs as 
innovations throw people out of work .... And there are always 
marginal workers who, due to approaching old age or mental or 
physical disabilities, find themselves continually moving into 
and out of the workforce. Frictional unemployment cannot be 
lightly dismissed, but it is not an economic malfunction. 
Serious unemployment is the mass unemployment that results 
from sudden, drastic declines in economic activity.M 
~uch a "drastic decline" is indeed the stuff of this study. This type of unemployment 
is referred to as cyclical unemployment and was the main type of unemployment 
occasioned by the Great Depression of 1929-1933. The situation in the Union of 
South Africa was, however, more complex, for in addition to all the other types of 
unemployment considered above, the Union also experienced structural 
5. Report of the NEC, para. 700. 
6. A C Pigou. Lapses from Full Employment, MacMillan, London, 1945, p. 1. 
7. M Casson, Youth Unemployment, MacMillan, London, 1979, p. 2. 
8. Robertson and Walton, History of the American Economy, p. 485. 
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unemployment. 
Structural unemployment is unemployment that is built into the economic 
framework of a country. This was, in essence, the cornerstone of the migrant labour 
system in the Union, for the system was predicated upon the fact that there should 
always be a reservoir of unemployed African labour in the reserves, which could be 
tapped when needed. As supply would always exceed demand, wage levels would 
be kept as low as possible. In other words, there would always be fewer vacancies in 
the formal sector of the economy than there were potential workers.9 This 
complicates any study of unemployment in Natal during the depression years, as 
such structural unemployment is impossible to quantify. In the populous African 
reserves of Natal and Zululand, and on the outskirts of some of the major urban 
centres, there were many people of working age who did not wish to work in the 
formal sector of the economy and therefore cannot be classed as "unemployed". 
When circumstances altered drastically, however, many of them were forced to seek 
employment and only then, when they were unable to secure such employment, 
could they possibly be classified as "unemployed". 
In addition, there were many thousands of Africans who were migrant labourers, 
moving between either agricultural employment and the towns, or between their 
rural homes and their urban employment. When the depression struck, many of 
these people could not find employment in the urban areas to supplement their 
incomes. The question then arises whether such persons could be termed 
"unemployed". This issue was neatly resolved by the Hertzog government, in that it 
simply chose to ignore the plight Qf the African unemployed in the urban areas. 
Some largely ineffectual attempts were made, by the Native Affairs Department, to 
quantify the problem of unemployment in the reserves. The government. however, 
contented itself with attempting to banish the problem of African unemployment to 
the rural areas and tightening legislation to make the entry of Africans into urban 
areas more difficult during the depression years. to 
9. See F Wilson, Migrant Labour in South Africa, SACC and SPRO-CAS, Jobannc~burg, 1972, 
pp. 155 - 185 and C Simkins and D Clarke, Structural Unemployment in South Africa, 
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1978. 
10. Two legislative measures serve to illustrate this; the Natives (Urban Areas) Amt:ndment Act 
of 1930 and the Native Service Contract Act of 1932. 
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An examination of the economic history of the Union of South Africa will show that, 
in a normal rhythmic pattern, periods of growth and expansion (boom periods) 
alternated with periods of decline and stagnation (depressions). The period 1929 to 
1933 was an example of the latter, while the years 1933 to 1936, provide an example 
of the former. 11 Cyclical fluctuations often have a sudden, devastating impact on 
the economy and thus affect employment severely, as one of the traditional 
responses to such a fluctuation would be the retrenchment of all or part of the 
workforce, consequent upon a structural re-organisation of an affected enterprise.12 
Although some measure of unemployment had been present throughout the history 
of the Union, unemployment on a large scale was a new . phenomenon and the 
government appointed a Committee to investigate. The Committee found that: 
Unemployment is no respector of race or class, more especially 
in a period of severe and prolonged depression. It affects the 
White, the Coloured person, the Indian and also the Native. 
The intensity and extensiveness is not to be myrured by the 
colour of the worker's skin, but by other factors. 
Despite the common concern implied in these lofty sentiments, the government 
retained its old priorities and focused almost entirely on the unemployment problem 
as it related to white adult males. When the depression struck, therefore, existing 
mechanisms, catering largely to white needs, were marshalled to cope with the crisis. 
These mechanisms operated through the local offices of the Department of Labour 
in the major urban centres, and the Post Office Exchanges in the rural areas. These 
~cted as labour bureaux, attempting to match prospective workers with employers. 
They simply registered unemployed white males over the age of 18 years, recorded 
their previous occupations (if any) and attempted to place such unemployed persons 
in suitable employment. Although registration of white women took place, no relief 
works were ever contemplated for them. In fact, scant attention was paid to the 
11. Schumann, Structural Changes and Business Cycles, p. 248. 
12. See A J V Rorich, "Statistical Analysis of Seasonal Variations in the Economic Life of South 
Africa", M.Comm. thesis, University of SteUenbosch, 1940. 
13. Union of South Africa, Report 0/ the Unemployment Investigation Committee, U.G. 30/1932, 
p.6. 
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plight of the unemployed of the other gender or other races. Even for white males 
registration was not compulsory, as the Union had no unemployment insurance 
administered by the state until 1937,14 which meant that the government had no 
accurate idea of the number of unemployed. 
This was the case even for the group which concerned the government most, adult 
white males. When there seemed to be little likelihood of there being employment 
in the offing, either on relief works or in the private sector, such unemployed men 
simply did not bother to register as unemployed, or to renew their monthly 
registrations.15 Not only did officials at the local level have an inaccurate picture of 
the unemployment situation, but such inaccuracies multiplied when statistics were 
collected centrally. Colonel F H P Cresswell, Minister of Labour, admitted as much 
when he said that the official figures of registered unemployed did not reflect the 
true situation, which was twice as bad.16 This contention was disputed by Mr H P 
Borlase, a Durban Member of Parliament (MP), who suggested that the government 
should take the dependants of such unemployed white males into account. The 
"Borlase formula" multiplied the registered unemployed by five, to account for such 
dependants, which would have meant that more than a quarter of the white 
population of Durban ' was subsisting on charity.17 This "formula" was itself 
inaccurate, as the number of dependants was inflated.18 The evidence presented 
shows quite clearly that official figures did not reflect the true situation. The 
government had no real idea of the magnitude of the most serious consequence of 
the depression, nor did it take adequate steps to quantify this problem.19 
14. Davies, Capital, p. 90 (note 27) and pp. 316 - 317. 
15. See above, p. 30. 
16. Natal Mercury, 29 September 1931. 
17. Natal Mercury, 14 March 1932. 
18. The Durban Benevolent Society which was the largest charitable organisation in Durban stated 
that the average number of dependants per case assisted had grown from 1,770 in 1928 to only 
2,468 in 1932. Natal Mercury, 15 September 1932. 
19. It is difficult to explain why this should be so, but it appears that the prevailing parsimony in 
government may have been partly responsible for the lack of measures taken to collect 
accurate statistics. Most forms of census-taking were halted during the depression years as an 
economy measure. Furthermore, although the Hertzog government could in no way be 
described as one which subscribed to the principles of laissez-taire, there was a distinct 
reluctance to commit the state to any long-term solution to the problem of unemployment, 
over and above the measures already in operation. It is equally true that most of the 
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The lack of any other trustworthy statistical evidence means that despite the obvious 
shortcomings of the official statistics, they remain the only source for the historian. 
These statistics reveal that at the onset of the depression in 1929, there were already 
approximately 3 800 white men registered as unemployed in the Union.20 
Registrations increased steadily as the depression worsened and the Employment 
Index fell almost continuously, reaching its nadir in October 1933, when 39 309 
white men were unemployed.21 In fact, only 13 703 were actually unemployed at 
that point, the balance being employed on government-subsidised relief works.22 
Relief works were seen as a method of disguising unemployment, for they were not 
considered a substitute for real long-term employment in the formal sector of the 
economy. Relief work was thus regarded as inferior and was performed at a 
reduced rate of wages.23 If this argument is accepted, figures of those men 
employed on relief works must be included in any assessment of the unemployment 
situation. 
The various categories of employment in the Union were also affected differently 
by the depression; taking white males alone, the overwhelming majority of those 
who registered as unemployed were unskilled, as table 7.1 shows: 
Table 7.1 
Percentage Distribution of Unemployed by 













32,4 · 27,9 
6,0 8,9 
60,7 63,2 
Source: Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 47. 
1932 1933 
Mar Sept Mar Sept 
27,7 28,1 20,1 13,3 
8,5 7,3 4,5 3,4 
63,8 64,6 75,4 83,4 
government were totally inexperienced in fmance and fmandal management and might thus 
have been caught unawares by the magnitude of the problem. 
20. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 46. 
21. Davies, Capital, p. 247. Recent research by Minnaar put the figure far higher. He stated that 
in September 1933 approximately 22 per cent of all white and coloured males in the labour 
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The urban and rural areas of the Union (and indeed of Natal) were also affected 
differently by the depression and the accompanying drought; the unemployment 
situation in the urban areas of the Union was worst in September/October 1932, 
while the rural areas experienced their highest level of unemployment only in 
September 1933, as a result of the drought, locust infestations and an outbreak of 
foot-and-mouth disease.24 The unemployed in the rural areas then drifted to the 
towns, thus aggravating the situation there. The drift to the towns was certainly a 
factor in Natal's unemployment situation, as will be shown below. The process of 
urbanisation was indeed greatly accelerated by the depression, the influx into the 
towns being explained by Mr Tobias, the Divisional Inspector of the Department of 
Labour for Natal, as follows: 
The psycholo&ical 'herd instinct' in times of stress may be 
partly responsible, as it has been made repeatedly clear allover 
the country that nothing but
2
.nllsery and starvation awaits 
unemployed men in the towns. ~ 
Smith was more sanguine in his reasoning: 
... charity and relief are better organised in the towns, so that 
there is a minimum standard of life (however low) below which 
urban families rarely sink. This in itself, is
6
an attraction to the 
depressed classes of the rural community.'l1 
Durban appears to have had great attractive powers for the unemployed of the 
province and indeed, of the Union. As early as 1930, statistics showed that up to 
20 per cent of the unemployed in the town had arrived in the province within the 
force, some 188 000 men, were officially registered as unemployed. Minnaar does not give a 
racial breakdown, but the ftgUres seem far higher than have been generally accepted. See 
Minnaar, "Unemployment", p.46. 
22. See Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 47 and Union of South Africa, Annual Report of the 
Department of Labour, U.G. 37 of 1933, p. 5. Again, Minnaar's recent research disputes this 
figure. See Minnaar, "Unemployment", pp. 56 - 60. 
23. See above p. 33. 
24. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 46. 
25. Natal Mercury, 14 October 1932. 
26. R H Smith, Labour Resources of Natal, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1950, p. 25. 
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previous twelve months, while 30 per cent had been previously resident elsewhere in 
Natal for a period of three years, and only 50 per cent had been resident in Natal 
(most in Durban) for a period longer than three years.27 There were constant 
references in the Durban press to the influx of "outsiders" coming into Durban 
expecting assistance not only from the Department of Labour but also from the 
Town Council and charitable organisations. By October 1932, it was reported that 
70 unemployed men with families were arriving in Durban every month.28 In 
presenting his budget proposals for the following financial year, Councillor George 
Reyburn claimed that the unemployed present in Durban as at 31 October 1932 
represented 86 per cent of all the unemployed of the province of Natal, while this 
percentage constituted 21 per cent of all the registered unemployed of the entire 
Union at that point.29 
The idea that the major urban areas of Natal (and particularly Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg) were fast becoming the "mecca" of the unemployed of the Union 
led to measures aimed at making such unemployed persons distinctly unwelcome in 
these towns; residential qualifications were applied to the provision of assistance in 
any form. The Natal Provincial Administration (NPA) imposed a residential 
qualification of two years for employment on its relief works and further 
discriminated in favour of married men.30 The Town Council of Durban and the 
City Council of Pietermaritzburg both imposed similar residential qualifications; in 
Durban not only did the applicant for employment on the relief works have to have 
been a resident for at least three years, but he had to have had at least a year's 
steady employment prior to being retrenched.31 In Pietermaritzburg the 
9ualification was also three years.3~ 
As the depression deepened and the plight of the unemployed grew. so public 
opinion grew more vociferous about the influx of "foreign" unemployed into the 
towns, as the letter from "Hors de Combat" illustrates: 
27. Natal Mercury, 31 October 1930. 
28. Natal Mercury, 14 October 1932. 
29. Natal Mercury, 15 November 1932. Reyburn was obviously only referring ttl unemployed 
adult white males. 
30. Natal Mercury, 16 January 1930. 
31. Natal Mercury, 4 November 1930. 
.. .1 say keep the Free Stater and Transvaler to his. own ~'3untry 
and let we [sic] Natalians get jobs in our own Provmce ... 
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The Department of Labour did little to halt this influx; Tobias merely reiterated that 
there was "nothing sinister" in the influx of unemployed men from other parts, as 
"distance lends enchantment" and that the influx "must be seen as inevitable".34 
Some attempts to place men in employment on relief works even resulted in more 
men arriving in Durban: 
It is regretted that men have been induced to journey to 
Durban from various parts of the Province and U mon to seek 
employment upon the Provincial roads scheme through the 
local Inspector of Labour, many of whom were rejected to 
swell the numbers of unemployed in Durban, while others who 
were sent to Port Shepstone, Greytown and elsewhere, have 
left their work and returned to Durban, finding it impossible to 
live on the average net wage result of 3/3 per man per day, and 
upon which ~~y of the men are expected to keep their wives 
and families. 
Not only were unemployed whites flocking to the urban areas, but the unemployed 
of other racial groups were also arriving. The small "coloured" community of 
Durban, for example, had its unemployment problem exacerbated by the arrival of 
"coloureds and mixed races" from elsewhere in the Union, " ... which naturally has 
added to the difficulty of employment for local semi-skilled persons".36 Africans 
were also coming into the major urban centres in increasing numbers, as the 
situation in the rural areas deteriorated. It is not possible to give an accurate 
estimate of the numbers of unemployed African workseekers, but the situation was 
regarded as so serious that even Mabel Palmer, a staunch opponent of segregation, 
advocated halting the flood. She declared that steps would have to be taken in the 
rural areas to stem the tide: 
32. Natal Witness, 12 March 1931. 
33. Natal Mercury, 14 October 1932. 
34. Natal Mercury, 14 May 1930. 
35. Natal Mercury, 15 February 1930. 
36. Natal Mercury, 14 March 1931. 
You could improve conditions in the country; you could 
disseminate informati~~ through the magistrates often as to the 
conditions in Durban. 
When asked to elaborate further on what measures she advocated she said: 
Send one of their own men around to explain to them3~hat was 
likely to happen to an unemployed Native in Durban. 
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Similar evidence was given in Pietermaritzburg by Robert Dunlop, the chairman of 
the Joint Council and the Native Welfare Society. Dunlop further recommended 
that Africans be returned to their home districts at provincial expense.39 
Taking the main urban centre of the province first, it is possible to trace the 
deepening depression through the ever-increasing number of unemployed white 
males in Durban. As early as December 1929 there were between 600 and 700 
unemployed men in Durban. Included in this number were those too sick to work, 
habitually unemployed men (often referre,d to as "stiffs") and temporarily 
unemployed skilled workers. The situation was described as being "in no way 
acute".40 The situation continued thus with minor fluctuations occasioned by men 
failing to register or to renew their registrations until June 1930, when a steep rise in 
the number of unemployed was noted, so that by October 1930 the number of 
unemployed had risen to a total of 2 100.41 The deepening depression and the gold 
standard crisis appear to have exacerbated the unemployment situation in Durban 
and by December 1931, there were 2 561 registered unemployed in the town.42 This 
number increased, with minor fluctuations, until it reached a peak of 3 472 
registered unemployed at the end of October 1932.43 
37. CAD, NEe, K26, F7, Evidence of Mabel Palmer, Durban, 7 April 1931, p. 6346. 
38. CAD, NEC, K26, F7, Evidence of Mabel Palmer, Durban, 7 April 1931, p. 6363. 
39. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Robert Dunlop, Pietermaritzburg, 10 April 1931, p. 6814. 
40. Natal Mercury,10 December 1929. The records of the Department of Labour relating to 
unemployment have not yet been sorted and catalogued, and are thus not yet available to 
researchers. The press were, however, kept abreast of the situation through monthly briefings, 
which remain the only source of statistics for this period. 
41. Natal Mercury, 25 October 1930. 
42. Natal Mercury, 5 February 1932. 
43. Natal Mercury, 1 November 1932. 
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Thereafter, the situation began to improve. The return of business confidence, after 
the Union's departure from the gold standard at the end of 1932, resulted in a 
gradual improvement and the unemployment rate declined markedly until March 
1933, when there were only 1 035 registered unemployed.44 The great drought 
gripping the province and the Union at this time did result in a further surge in 
unemployment until June 1933, when there were again 2 000 registered 
unemployed.45 After June, however, the situation began to improve steadily, 
signalling the end of the depression. From December 1929 to October 1932, there 
was thus an increase of 479 per cent in the rate of unemployed white males in 
Durban. 
Some of the unemployed whites were able to find employment on relief works in the 
town, but these were always inadequate and the average number never exceeded the 
maximum of 1 024 employed in 1933.46 
As far as the unemployment of white women was concerned, very little was done. 
The prevailing condescending attitude, that work for white married women was an 
indulgence rather than a necessity, hardened into resentment that such women were 
keeping male breadwinners out of the positions which they occupied. Little 
attention was paid to the plight of unemployed women who were single mothers 
with children to support, or to situations where women became breadwinners 
through force of circumstance. .Women were accused of working for "pin-money" 
and of worsening the situation for men. Such sentiments were regularly voiced at 
~eetings of the unemployed47 · and.in the press.48 
Registrations of female white unemployed were only initiated by the local office of 
the Department of Labour in July 1931 after considerable pressure had been applied 
44. Natal Mercury, 29 April 1933. 
45. Natal Mercury, 20 June 1933. 
46. Mayor's Minute 1933, p. xxiv. 
47. Natal Mercury, 2 July 1931. 
48. Natal Mercury, 12 June 1930. 
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for something to be done. It was then found that there were 500 women prepared to 
register, even though there was little likelihood of any employment being found for 
them. This number fluctuated downwards to 450 in August 1931,49 and to 362 in 
September 1931,50 before increasing to a peak of 696 in October 1932.51 
Thereafter, the situation improved steadily. Most unemployed white women were 
forced to subsist on charity or by finding someone to maintain them, for no relief 
works were ever contemplated for women. Women did find it easier to gain 
seasonal employment as the numbers of shop assistants always increased over busy 
periods, especially the Christmas season.52 Opposition to the employment of white 
women drew criticism from Councillor Mrs Edith Benson,53 and from others, who 
believed that efforts to exclude white women from employment were misdirected. 
An extract from a letter to the Natal Mercury, signed "Sympathiser", commenting on 
plans by some trade unions to displace white women illustrates this: 
If the Unions concentrated their efforts and threatened 
demonstrations upon those firms and industrialists who employ 
large percentages of Coloured and Asian labour, they would 
achiev~ far more, and have the sympathy of the public with 
them.~~ 
Such racist responses were also evident when the problem of unemployment among 
white juveniles was raised. The unemployed in this category registered with the 
local Juvenile Affairs Board, which performed similar functions to the Department 
of Labour. There was a generally held perception among whites in Natal that white 
youths could not obtain employment because Africans and Indians had been 
employed in their stead.55 This was certainly the stance adopted by "Delville Wood" 
when he wrote: 
49. Natal Mercury, 31 July 1931. 
50. Natal Mercury, 19 September 1931. 
51. Natal Mercury, 14 October 1932. 
52. Natal Mercury, 3 December 1932. 
53. Natal Mercury, 2 July 1931. 
54. Natal Mercury, 9 July 1931. 
55. See for example, Natal Mercury, 18 October 1932; letter signed "White Man" in the Natal 
Mercury 22 March 1932 and letter from "Anxious Mother", Natal Mercury, 25 May 1931. 
Indians from the age of 12 upwards are employed and given 
employment at the present time while white boys and girls are 
trampmg around looking for work ... Here, I say, is the solution, 
let all employ whites and the others must make way for them. I 
know quite a few of the same boys and girls lost their fathers in 
the late War. Would these men have gone so willingly and 
sacrificed their lives had they known how D~tF would carry 
out its promise to look after their dependants? 
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The juvenile unemployment situation in Natal was aggravated by the fact that Natal 
had the lowest school-leaving age in the Union. A child could leave school in Natal 
if he or she had passed standard six or attained the age of fifteen years. Many 
children left school as soon as they had passed standard six, even if they were only 
thirteen years of age, and were sent to work to supplement the income of their 
families. 57 Mr B M Narbeth, Principal of the local Technical College and 
Chairman of the Juvenile Affairs Board, indicated that the law made provision for 
children to be withdrawn from school at an even earlier age, if their family was " .. .in 
indigent circumstances and needed the wages earned by children".58 This was, in 
fact, not unique to Natal and was a common response to the depression all over the 
world.59 Such provisions gave indifferent or desperate parents the right to remove 
children before they had even acquired a reasonable proficiency in language and 
arithmetic, which greatly reduced their employability.60 Not all juvenile 
unemployment could be blamed on lack of education, for some unemployed 
juveniles were said to lack enterprise, energy, persistence and keenness, and to have 
unprepossessing appearances.61 
Durban also acted as a magnet to such unemployed juveniles from elsewhere, 
aggravating the situation in the town: 
This influx has an important bearing on both adult and juvenile 
unemployment in Durban. The drift to the towns IS a big 
56. Natal Mercury, 12 September 1930. 
57. Natal Mercury, 10 April 1930. 
58. Natal Mercury, 10 April 1930. 
59. J Robinson, Essays in the Theory of Employment, MacMillan, London, 1937. p. 12. 
60. Natal Mercury, 10 April 1930. 
61. Natal Mercury, 27 February 1930. 
question which affects the whole .of South Africa and ~annot be 
adequately discussed here. It IS unfo~~ate th~t It sh0u!d 
occur when it is more than unusually difficult to fmd work. 10 
Durban. These juveniles are fr~quently ~adapted to to~n. life 
and backward educationally, this COWltutlOg the most difficult 
part of our unemployment problem. 
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Given the above it is not surprising that Durban, as the major urban centre of Natal, 
should have had the highest unemployment rate among white juveniles in the entire 
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This unsatisfactory situation in Durban had improved only marginally to 7,3 per 
thousand by October 1933, while the situation in the other major urban centres of 
Johannesburg and Cape Town had shown more marked improvement.63 
The juvenile unemployment figure.s were swollen each year by school-Ieavers. It 
appears that few school-Ieavers sought employment in December, when term closed, 
but deferred their registrations to January and February the following year. In 
December 1929, there were 138 registered unemployed white juveniles,64 rising to 
386 in February 1930.65 In December 1930 only 197 were registered,66 while there 
62. Natal Mercury, 25 May 1931. 
63. Natal Mercury, 18 October 1933. 
64. Natal Mercury, 10 January 1933. 
65. Natal Mercury, 27 April 1931. 
66. Natal Mercury, 10 January 1933. 
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were 511 in February 1931.67 In December of that year, 513 were registered,68 but 
this figure rose to 750 in February 193269 and to 868 in March 1932,70 which point 
represented the peak of juvenile unemployment in the town. Little can be found by 
way of statistics for the remainder of the depression, but in December 1932 there 
were 533 registered,71 and 808 in July 1933.72 
It is clear that juvenile white unemployment experienced a more precipitous rise 
than that of white adult males, being 629 per cent higher in March 1932 than it had 
been in December 1929. It is also clear that the return of business confidence and 
the upswing in the economy did not significantly improve the situation in 1933, and 
white juvenile unemployment remained a cause for great concern, as J R Kingston-
Russell, the renowned editor of the Natal Mercury, pointed out: 
Signs of commercial and industrial stability and prosperity are 
illusory if the economic scheme of our development arbitrarily 
decrees that after every school term an ever increasing number 
of ea~er youths are to be turned into the barren wilderness 
occupied by the workless. There can be no future for a 
ommunity when the only lesson it can offer its European 
youngsters is the daily demonstration that they are less fitted to 
earn a decent livelihood than Indians and Natives.73 
Most white South Africans appear to have supported the Hertzog government's 
"civilised labour" policy and to have believed that they had a right to employment. It 
mattered little to them that workers of other racial groups would have to face the 
unpleasant consequences of displacement. It is perhaps as a result of this type of 
reasoning, mirrored ' so clearly in the columns of the Natal Mercury, that scant 
~ttention was paid to the unemployment problems of other racial groups in Durban. 
The first expressions of concern about unemployment among Indians in the town 
were only reported after an investigation by the Indian Agent-General, Sir Kurma 
67. Natal Mercury, 27 Apri11931. 
68. Natal Mercury, 10 January 1933. 
69. Natal Mercury, 5 February 1932. 
70. Natal Mercury, 18 March 1932. 
71. Natal Mercury, 10 January 1933. 
72. Natal Mercury, 7 August 1933. 
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Reddi, in 1 gust 1931. In response to Reddi's investigation, the Natal Indian 
Congress (NfC) began compiling a special register to ascertain the exact extent of 
unemploym nt among the Indian community. In publicising a meeting of the 
unemployed to initiate this exercise, Indian Opinion carried the following: 
This step has been taken owing to the impression prevalent 
among the Europeans in general and responsible men among 
them in particular that there is no unemployment among 
Indians. The object of the meeting is to prove to them that the 
unemployment among Indians lS as acute as it is among 
Europeans and that their condition is even more distressing in 
consequence of the fact that the unemployed among their 
ranks are not privileged to take advanlf.fe of the relief 
measures as are the European unemployed. 
Approximat ly a thousand Indians registered as unemployed in a matter of a few 
days.75 POj lical rivalry among competing Indian organisations, however, had 
prevented s Ime from registering. The leader of the Natal Indian Vigilance 
Association, J L Roberts, accused the NIC of political opportunism: 
The Natal Indian Congress does not represent the poorer 
classes who do not want equal Jights, but merely fair play and 
segregation from the Natives}<> 
This internecine rivalry flared once more when the NIC organised a demonstration 
march of unbmployed Indians in Mayville.77 In a letter signed "Unemployed 
Indian", the + ter alleged that the NIC was merely seeking to make political capital 
out of the plight of the unemployed and consequently the meeting of the previous 






hardly 10 per cent of the whole assembly were unemployed 
Indians. The other 90 per cent were friends of the so-called 
Indian Congress, which has not even 5 per cent of sane Indian 
public opinion behind it. .. some three years ago the Indian 
Natal Me cury, 1 August 1933. 
Indian 0 inion, 18 September 1931. 
Natal Mj Cury, 23 September 1931. 
Natal Me,\cury, 21 September 1931. 
Natal Mercury, 24 September 1931. 
unemployment situation began to cause concern among 
responsible Indians in Durban, but during this long period, the 
Congress, well knowing the parlous position of many Durban 
Indians, did not even bother about an ordinary 
investigation ... Today the rank and file of the Indian 
unemployed army number some 2 000, but with the exception 
of long-winded, meaningless resolutions and a solidarity 
meeting, nothing tangible has been accomplished to aid the 
starving Indians, who are being exploite~J>Y wealthy Indian 
landlords and unscrupulous Indian traders. 
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The agitation about Indian unemployment led to the formation of an investigatory 
committee by the Joint Indo-European Council. This committee, headed by Mabel 
Palmer, found that Indian unemployment was not as serious as had been suspected. 
Another finding was that, while some retrenchments had resulted from the 
introduction of technology in the printing industry and at the Lion Match factory, 
unemployment was mainly of a cyclical nature. The seasonal unemployment usually 
found in the hotel trade did not, in fact, exist.79 Indian employment in secondary 
industry in Durban did not decline markedly during the depression. Katzen shows 
that the Indian workforce actually increased by 352 between 1929 and 1930, to a 
total of 4 474. In 1933, this number had declined by only 9,7 per cent to 4 040.80 
More severe unemployment must have been present in other areas of the economy, 
however, for it cannot be merely coincidental that large numbers of Indians chose to 
be repatriated to India. In terms of the Cape Town Agreement of 1927, those 
Indians wishing to return to India were to be given free passage and a £25 bonus.81 
The numbers of Indians making use of this scheme increased dramatically during the 
depression; in 1930 slightly more than 1 000 were repatriated but in 1932, 3 000 
emigrated.82 . 
78. Natal Mercury, 25 September 1931. There appears to be some substance to this latter charge 
for an Indian employer, one Morarjee Bhikbabhai Naik, was f1DOO the sum of £100 for grossly 
exploiting underage Indian labour, making them work for more than 48 hours per week for 
only ISs. See Natal Mercury, 3 April 1931. 
79. Natal Mercury, 9 December 1931. 
SO. Katzen, J ndustry, p. 163. 
81. Natal Mercury, 29 October 1931. 
82. Burrows, J ndian Life and Labour, p. 3. 
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As Smith pointed out, the majority of these Indians were previously domiciled in 
Natal: 
Migration losses have . bee~ heavie~ in Natal than in the c;>ther 
provinces, a fact which IS explamed partly by the hIgher 
lDtensity of intra-Indian competition for limited employment 
opportunities in the most heavily Indian populated Province 
than elsewhere. In consequence of this, depression has been 
more likely to suggest repatriation to the Indian in Natal than 
in other less Indlanised areas, which, ~ it happens, are even 
further away from the mother country. 
Naturally, not all those who chose to leave were unemployed, but there was a 
general perception, shared by the Director of Indian Immigration, Mr H Robinson, 
that many of the Indians of Natal had indeed chosen to return to India in the face of 
continuing unemployment. 84 Thus the unemployment situation was alleviated 
through the simple process of removing the unemployed.85 Freund goes much 
further by suggesting that Indians were actually encouraged to leave. He wrote of 
the situation in Durban: 
... establishment views fantasised a city without Indians and 
hoped many would be induced to emigrate to India. The 
Indians were a kind of 'surplus' and the 'Indian question' often 
was seen as one of unemployment and redundant population. 
With the onset of the Depression and under the inspiration of 
the ra~ governm~nt, ..authority saw the answer in firmg Indians 
to give Jobs to whites.~o 
The government's "civilised labour" policy, and the high incidence of anti-Asiatic 
feeling prevalent in Natal, mi~t also have contributed to the decision to leave the 
Union. Such racist feeling in Natalreached fever pitch during the depression years, 
as whites saw the displacement of Indians as one way of guaranteeing themselves 
employment. A grass-roots movement called the Anti-Asiatic Encroachment 
League was formed in Durban by one S M Oellermann. The League drew up a 
83. Smith, "Labour Resources", pp. 52 - 53. 
84. Ibid. Indian Opinion had a more sanguine view: "Whether any steps will be taken or not (to 
relieve unemployment) will remain to be seen. We can only appeal to their scn~ of justice. 
Their present mentality, however, of fmding ways and means to drive Indian!> out of the 
country makes one only a little pessimistic." Indian Opinion, 18 September 193 1. 
85. Robinson, Unemployment, p. 75. 
86. Freund, Insiders and Outsiders, p. 49. 
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petition beseeching the government to put an end to Indian competition for 
employment, and also in trade and commerce. Such were the hostile feelings 
towards Indians that 26 000 whites, (or approximately 42,6 per cent of the white 
population of Durban) allegedly appended their signatures to the petition.87 
The Palmer committee also found that there was a high rate of juvenile 
unemployment among the Indian population of Durban. The committee 
recommended that education of Indians be made compulsory and that the local 
Juvenile Affairs Board also take jurisdiction over Indian youths. These measures, it 
was thought, would go some way towards relieving the problem.88 
Despite agitation about the plight of unemployed Indians, it took until late 1932 for 
the Town Council to decide to implement relief works for Indians. It was initially 
envisaged that these would accommodate 600 Indian males89 but, in the event, only 
some 300 were so employed in June 1933,90 augmented by a further 40 in July 
1933.91 Residential and marriage qualifications were also imposed. Even in the 
process of assisting unemployed Indians through relief works, the authorities were 
led by prevailing racist attitudes to the de~ision that they should be paid less than 
their white counterparts. Indians on relief works received only 3s per man per day, 
as compared to 8s for whites.92 By 1934 only 270 Indians were still employed on 
relief works,93 indicating that although the unemployment .problem had eased 
somewhat, it was still not possible for all these men to return to normal employment. 
Although unemployment among Indians does not appear to have reached crisis 
proportions during the depression, .it must be remembered that most Indians were 
lowly paid workers and that any period of unemployment would have quickly 
87. Natal Mercury, 16 January 1932. 
88. Natal Mercury, 9 December 1931. 
89. Natal Mercury, 16 December 1932. 
90. Mayor's Minute 1933, p. xxiv. 
91. Natal Mercury, 14 July 1933. 
92. Mayor's Minute, 1934, p. xxv. 
93. Ibid. 
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consumed any reserves that may have been scraped together. Conversely, the 
extended family system prevalent in this community meant that the burden of 
unemployment was shared as resources were pooled amongst family members.94 It 
was written in Indian Opinion that: 
... the wants of Indians are meagre and their capacity to suffer is 
great. Hence they 'put up with the circumstances in which they 
find th~gtselves Without making a song of it or parading the 
streets. 
The small "coloured" community of Durban did suffer some measure of 
unemployment during the depression, despite the fact that employment of 
"coloureds" in secondary industry actually rose during the depression years.96 It 
appears that unemployed "coloureds" from elsewhere in the country made their way 
to Durban, thus aggravating the unemployment situation for others, especially in the 
building trade. No system of registration for "coloureds" was ever instituted, but the 
local Town Council did make relief works available to assist the unemployed of the 
"coloured" community, some 80 men being so employed in 1932.97 This number 
remained fairly stable, showing only a slight diminution to 72 men in 1933/34.98 
As indicated earlier, any attempt to deal with unemployment among Africans in 
Durban is fraught with difficulties, as there is a distinct lack of statistics. There was 
no registration of African unemployed, nor were any relief works ever instituted for 
them in the urban areas of Natal. However, Durban was a proclaimed area under 
the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923,99 which meant that legally, all Africans 
entering the town had to register their presence with the local Native Administration 
Department (NAD) and apply 'for permission to remain in the area.1OO 
Furthermore, contracts of employment between Africans and their employers in the 
94. Natal Mercury, 9 December 1931. 
95. Indian Opinion, 18 September 1931. 
96. Katzen, Industry, p. 163. 
Cf7. Mayor's Minute 1932, p. xx. 
98. Mayor's Minute 1934, p. xxv. 
99. Proclamation No. 10, 1928. 
100. CAD, NEC, K26, F7, Evidence of T J Chester (Acting Manager of the Native Administration 
Department), Durban, 7 April 1931, p. 6475. 
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borough had to be registered with the NAD and renewed monthly, thus providing 
some indication of the numbers actually in employment. Fees were charged for this 
service; Is for an initial registration and 6d for every monthly renewa1.101 From 









Number of Registered African Male Employees 
in Durban, 1928-1933 
Initial Reregistration Renewals 
14401 44866 336639 
14237 45784 338267 
14160 41295 314916 
10355 34829 299788 
11139 32072 295502 







Sources: CAD, NEC, K.26, F14, Memorandum of written evidence submitted 
by the Durban Town Council and Mayor's Minutes for relevant 
years. 
This complex table requires explanation. An initial registration was the registration 
of an African working in the town for the first time; a reregistration applied to those 
Africans who changed jobs; renewals were the monthly renewals of Africans still 
employed by the same employer. The total is arrived at by adding initial 
registrations and renewals and dividing by twelve to produce a monthly average. 
The decline in this figure over the period is significant. 
To complicate matters, the figures for 1933 included the newly incorporated areas, 
which were added to the borough in 1932. If one subtracts the figures emanating 
from these areas, the net decline is more obvious, for there were 4 177 initial 
registrations, 4 850 reregistrations and 38 768 renewals of registration, giving a net 
monthly average for 1933 of only 24 243 registered African workers in Durban.102 
This procedure was followed by Hemson,103 but this is based on flawed reasoning, 
101. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 327. 
102. Mayor's Minute 1933, p. 38. 
103. Hemson, "Dockworkers", p. 265. 
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for although it is obvious that not all Africans living in these areas worked in Durban 
prior to their incorporation, Smith estimated that ~pproximately 75 per cent of them 
did 104 and they therefore would have been obliged to have been registered as 
employees in Durban prior to 1933. In any case, the decline in the number of 
registered employees is obvious, indicating the effects of the depression and the 
"civilised labour" policy. 
These twin factors had a great impact on African employment in secondary industry 
in greater Durban during the depression, for the African component of the 
workforce declined by 37 per cent, from 8 559 in 1930 to only 5 415 in 1933.105 
Wage Board determinations were also blamed for unemployment among 
Africans.106 It appears that Indian workers gained employment at the expense of 
African workers, as the numbers of Indians in employment in secondary industry, 
for example, actually increased during the depression years.107 
As demonstrated in an earlier chapter, conditions in the reserves deteriorated at an 
accelerating pace during the depression years, forcing more and more of the 
inhabitants to move to the towns to seek employment in order to survive.108 
Similarly, conditions on white farms in Natal were also deteriorating and, as farmers 
tried to expand production, labour tenants and other workers were forced off the 
farms. Exploitative conditions had moreover prompted many of the younger 
Africans to desert to the towns. 109 Smith argued that there was a marked increase 
in the number of Africans over the age of 45 years who came to Durban looking for 
work for the first time during the depression years, an indication of the extent of 
rural poverty at this time. 
It would appear that there is a tendency at work widening the 
104. Smith, "Labour Resources", pp. 93 - fJ'l. 
105. Katzen, Industry, p. 163 and Van Der Horst, Native Labour, p. 263. 
106. CAD, NEC, K26, FI, Evidence of A Z Mazingi, Durban, 2 April 1931, pp.6338 - 6339. 
107. Katzen, Industry, p. 163. 
108. See Chapter Six. 
109. See Chapter Five. 
age span during which Natives come for th~ first time to w<?rk 
in Durban. This may be due to the gr~lOng pressure WhICh 
rural poverty is placing on Natal Natives. 1 
228 
Most jobs commenced by Africans during the depression period showed an 
abnormally high average duration, indicating that the need for remuneration was 
greater. 1 11 Smith wrote: 
His sojourn in Durban is dictated to a greater extent by the 
rural situation. H there is a need for a larFfftmount of cash, 
he is compelled to work for a longer period. 
This does not apply across the board, however, for in some areas of the economy, 
Africans were actually demanding shorter contracts. This was so especially in the 
building trades and was to the benefit of both employer and employee. The 
employer could dismiss unneeded employees more quickly once projects had been 
completed, and Africans could give shorter notice periods if a more lucrative form 
of employment could be found elsewhere in the economy.113 The building trade 
appears to have been the exception, for generally the average period of service was 
expanded as African wages fell during the depression years. This was a consequence 
of both the increased availability of labour and the need of employers to cut costs 
during the depression. In secondary industry in Durban, for example, African wages 
fell from an average of £43 per annum to £41 per annum between 1929 and 1933, in 
contrast to the rest of the Union, where wages actually rose from £45 to £46 in the 
same years.114 Some 60 per cent of all jobs were in the relatively low-wage bracket 
of less than l4s 5d per week, while 34 per cent were in the bracket between 14s 6d 
and 19s 5d per week. 1 15 
Surprisingly, the numbers of Africans applying for permits, either to visit relatives in 
110. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 381. 
111. Ibid., p. 413. 
112. Ibid., p. 349. 
113. CAD, NEe, K26, F7, Evidence of E B Scott (Town Treasurer of Durban). Durban, 7 April 
1931, pp. 6485 - 6487. 
114. Van der Horst, Native Labour, p. 263. 
115. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 410. 
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the town or to seek employment, do not reflect the expected increase in migrants, as 
table 7.4 illustrates: 
Table 7.4 
Six-day Permits issued in Durban, 1927/28 - 1932/33 
Categories 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32· 1932/33 
Male 
Visitors 5501 4478 1795 2322 1850 
Female 




44667 42299 25976 19528 23678 
Total 59615 49751 28299 22090 26043 
• No figures available for 1931/32. 
Source: CAD, NEC, K26, F14, Memorandum of written evidence submitted 
by the Durban Town Council and Mayor's Minutes for relevant 
years. 
The decline in the total number of permits issued from 1927/28 to 1930/31 is 
marked, being in the order of 63 per cent. The danger of relying on statistical 
evidence alone is again illustrated here, for judging solely on these statistics, one 
might justifiably form the opinion that there were in fact fewer Africans in the town 
who might be classed as unemployed. The real picture emerges when one studies 
the evidence presented to the NEC: both T J Chester (the Acting Manager of the 
91unicipal NAD) and Selby Ngcobo claimed that there was an avoidance of 
registrations. Chester said: 
I think that possibly conditions have been such that these 
Natives have not reported to us as regularly as they should 
have done, nor have we rigidly enforced our visiting permits. 
As you know, we have trouble at times, for the last 3 or 4 years, 
and, I think, quite a lot of them did not worry to observe these 
regulations. Although the position appears to be going back to 
normal now, there has been a time when there has been a 
certain amount of contempt for these things. 1 fo . 
116. CAD, NEe, K26, f7, Evidence of T J Chester, Durban, 7 Apri11931, p.6475. 
In a written submission to the NEC, Ngcobo wrote: 
There are a good many Natives in Durban looking f~r jobs w~o 
are in Durban without the knowledge of the Native Affarrs 
Department. These men do not take any special pass; at any 
rate not as frequently ar ftey should and do not sleep at the 
Men's Singles Quarters. 1 
230 
Whether the avoidance of registration, or the failure to obtain six-day permits, can 
entirely explain the decline in the figures is impossible to say. It is not unreasonable 
to suggest, however, that there were considerable numbers of African job-seekers in 
the greater Durban region. Ngcobo stated that African job-seekers were assisted by 
their fellows: 
They stay with their relatives and friends in town, eating the 
food they eat and usin~ their friend's room, and maybe, his 
spare blankets ... The Natives regard taking in an unemployed as 
h .. Ins a umarutanan act ... 
Apart from those Africans who actually resided in the town, there were a large 
number who took up .residence on the outskirts of the town, just beyond the 
jurisdiction of the corporation, where rentals were lower and the local state 
mechanisms less repressive.119 This was one of the major reasons for the 
incorporation of the additional areas into the borough in 1932. The local state was 
aware of a "large floating population" of between 60 000 and 70 000 people in 
Durban during the later 1920s, and claimed that this number had been reduced to 
some 20 ()()() during the depre~sion years.120 Given their inability to control the 
influx and efflux of Africans to and "from Durban, and the lack of accurate statistical 
knowledge concerning the African population of the town, this claim appears to 
have had little foundation.121 
117. CAD, NEC, K26, F14, Written submission of S Ngcobo, p. 2. 
118. Ibid., p. 1. 
119. CAD, NEC, K26, F7, Evidence of Dr GAP Ross (Assistant Medical Officer of Health), 
Durban, 1 April 1931, pp. 6077 - 6080. 
120. Mayor's Minute 1932, p. 6. 
121. Following the Beer Hall riots of 1929, the number of Africans in Durban became an important 
issue of concern to the Town Council and indeed to the government. This will be dealt with in 
Chapter Ten. It may be posited that the dissemination of information suggesting a diminution 
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The type of jobs sought by Africans during the depression period also underwent a 
marked change, with domestic service becoming increasingly popular, as workers 
usually received not only their wages, but also food and accommodation.122 Figures 
relating to the proportion of Africans working in various sectors in Durban were 
presented to the NEC and are given below: 
25% of Natives are males in Domestic Service 
3% of Natives were females in household employ 
1 % of the females are engaged in other services 
70% of the Native males take up Industrial and commercial 
service 
1 % of the Native Males follow c~ngs where they are not 
under service to an employer. 
Seen in totality, it is obvious that unemployment among Africans in Durban during 
the depression not only existed, but was aggravated by the "civilised labour" policy. 
It is, however, ~most impossible to quantify this. The prevailing blinkered view 
appears to have been that Africans arriving in Durban to seek work would have 
perceived the situation as hopeless and would have joined their fellows who had 
been retrenched in returning to the rural areas from whence they had come. Local 
officials had very little idea of conditions in the reserves, or they would have 
realised that this was a pipe-dream. Many Africans appear to have flouted 
regulations and to have remained either in or around the town, while looking for 
work or finding other avenues to eke out a living. 
In Pietermaritzburg, the second major urban centre of Natal and the provincial 
capital, the unemployment situation was .less serious in that the industrial base of 
the city was far smaller. However, the proximity of the city to farming and rural 
industries did mean that the city experienced an influx of unemployed from 
elsewhere, as evidence presented to the NEC shows: 
I know there is a proportion [of whites] coming in from the 
country because the country cannot support a certain number 
might weD have been a sop to the more concerned white citizens of the town. 
122. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 350. 
123. CAD, NEC, K26, F14, Written submission of the Durban Town Council, p. 13. 
and that class, of course, is a very poor one, they are very poor 
people who have been brought up on farms. That class is a 
very poor class, because of their want of education in the early 
stages. 124 
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Pietermaritzburg had long experienced problems relating to white unemployment. 
The Corporation Year Book for 1922 contained the statement that " .. .for a 
considerable time the matter of the city unemployed has been one of great 
anxiety".l25 Some 122 white men were registered as unemployed at this time. 126 
Throughout the 1920s, this number fluctuated, but remained a cause of concern, 
necessitating the continuation of relief works for the entire period.127 Owen has 
suggested that many of the whites thus assisted may very well have been 
"unemployed sojourners who had come up against hard times in other parts of the 
Union" as only a three-month residential qualification for assistance existed during 
this period. 128 This is borne out by the following description of the unemployed by 
officials of the Council: 
Most of the men do not know what a steady day's work means. 
They seem to be content to remain as they are without making 
any effo~ to impi~ye, and will therefore remain as long as they 
are pernutted to. :'J 
At the onset of the depression in the city in 1930, although there was still a degree of 
unemployment, the City Council was beginning to become concerned about creating 
conditions through the provision of relief works that would actually attract the 
unemployed and "all sorts of undesirables" from elsewhere to Pietermaritzburg.130 
There was a woeful lack of statistics concerning even white unemployment in the 
early years of the depression, a fact which was lamented by the unemployed 
themselves: 
124. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Canon Cyril Robinson, Pietermaritzburg, 10 April 1931, 
p.6729. 
125. City of Pietermaritzburg, Corporation Year Book, 1922, p. 23. 
126. Ibid. 
127. Owen, "White Unemployment", pp. 16·28. 
128. Ibid., p. 16. 
129. NAD, 3/pMB, Minutes of the Works Committee, 24 February 1925. 
130. Natal Witness, 15 January 1930. 
I noticed an article ... stating that unemployment was not so bad 
in Maritzburg as in other centres. It would enlighten some 
people if a consensus [sic] were taken of the out-of-works in 
the city. One cannot depend on a true estimate by taking into 
consideration how many are unemployed on the relief works or 
by the Benevolent Society's books. I am writing this as sY3yrai 
unemployed have asked me what I thought of this article. 
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The discontent of the unemployed led to the formation of the "Grousers", a group 
dedicated to the welfare of the poor and unemployed of the city. 132 The 
membership of the Grousers grew rapidly, and they were soon providing food and 
clothing and looking for jobs for several hundred people.133 Yet there were some 
who believed that the "Grousers" were greatly exaggerating the unemployment 
position for their own purposes.134 Indeed this appears to have been the case, for 
although the membership of the Grousers numbered some 1 000 in December, 135 
only 143 men turned up at a meeting of the unemployed of the city in January 
1931.136 The Grousers claimed at this meeting that 491 men had registered their 
names with the organisation as unemployed, but admitted that only 73 per cent were 
residents of Pietermaritzburg and 94 per cent were whites.137 There was, therefore, 
a total of 460 unemployed white men in the city.138 These claims had repercussions 
in that Mr S D Roberts, one of the regional representatives of the Department of 
Labour, came post-haste from Durban to investigate the unemployment situation in 
the city and met with the Grousers. 
131. Letter to the Editor, Natal Witness, 6 November 1930. 
132. Owen, "White Unemployment", p. 36. The Grousers will be discussed more fully in Chapter 
Nine. 
133. Ibid., pp. 38 - 41. 
134. See various articles in the Natal Witness, 6 January 1931. 
135. Natal Witness, 27 December 1930. 
136. Natal Witness, 14 January 1931. 
137. It is indeed interesting to note that the Grousers were able to attract the unemployed of other 
races to sign up, but were avowedly racist in advocating the implementation of the "civilised 
labour" policy. 
138. Natal Witness, 15 January 1931. 
Interviewed in the Natal Witness the following day, Roberts said: 
I have been deeply shocked at the state of the unemployment 
in Maritzburg as it has been revealed to me by the 
representatives of the city's unemployed [the Grousers] ... The 
statement that there are 400 unemployed in the city has 
impressed me profoundly ... as they [the figures] are not in any 
way comparable with the numbers registered on our boo\1 I 
am at a complete loss to understand the position in the city. ~ 
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One of the reasons that Roberts found this so shocking was the fact that, although 
there was a quota set aside for the unemployed of Pietermaritzburg on various relief 
works in the province, the department had been forced to fill this with unemployed 
from other centres; 140 the department was therefore under the impression that 
unemployment in Pietermaritzburg was less severe than elsewhere. The Grousers 
had explained that the unemployed men were reluctant to leave their families for 
extended periods, and Roberts promised that after proper investigation, the 
department would seek to provide increased relief in and around the city.141 
Sensing that the time was right to pressurise the authorities into doing something 
about the unemployment among whites in Pietermaritzburg, various protest 
meetings were called by the unemployed. Some 350 attended a meeting at which a 
speaker, Mr L H Greene, called upon the unemployed of the Union to organise 
themselves politically to give weight to their demands for an improvement in their 
conditions. This was the right of the people who had paid taxes; the government had 
to be "forced" to d~ something for the unemployed.142 
In disseminating information concerning the alleged high rate of unemployment in 
the city, the Grousers inadvertently brought about the ruination of their reputation 
and ultimately, the demise of their movement. When pressed for details by Roberts, 
the Grousers claimed that there were 169 genuine unemployed in the city, but 
Roberts could only find 39, many of whom had only recently become unemployed, 
139. Natal Witness, 22 January 1931. 
140. See NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of Relief Works Sub·Committee, 12 February 1930. 
141. Natal Witness, 22 January 1931. 
142. Natal Witness, 22 January 1931. 
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or had refused relief work for a variety of reasons. When he made twelve jobs 
available to the Grousers, only six men applied and then refused the employment 
offered.143 The leadership refused to make available their register of the 
unemployed of the city. The movement dissolved after details of financial 
mismanagement (the charges against them amounted to misappropriation of funds) 
became known, and when the leaders of the movement were convicted of 
assault.144 
The unemployment situation in the city among whites continued to worsen. Eighty-
seven were registered with the Department of Labour in February 1931, of whom 
only eight could be placed in employment.145 The City Council had only twenty-
eight men employed on relief works at this time and had imposed a three-year 
residence qualification on those seeking employment.146 Although the Grousers 
were no more, the agitation they had caused led to the intervention of the City 
Council which, through the agency of Councillor Major Way, began to take the lead 
in co-ordinating relief efforts. These began with a plan to manage the crisis being 
published in the press.147 A register of the unemployed was initiated and 195 men 
registered as unemployed, while it was also noted that 207 families were not 
receiving adequate feeding.148 The Pietermaritzburg corporation decided to 
retrench 20 per cent of their black labourers and made those positions available to 
the white unemployed as temporary relief works. 149 
As the situation continued to deteriorate, the unemployed and their champions 
became more vociferous and demanded the abolition of relief works which were 
~egarded as an unsatisfactory solution to the problem. They called for the 
gove~ent to " ... unlock the land; the unemployed do not want relief or charity". 150 
143. Natal Witness, 28 January 1931. 
144. Owen, "White Unemployment", pp. 48 - so. 
145. ' Natal Witness,2 February 1931. 
146. Natal Witness,6 February 1931. 
147. Natal Witness, 9 February 1931. 
148. Natal Witness, 17 February 1931. 
149. Natal Witness, 25 September 1931. 
ISO. Natal Witness, 24 February 1931. It seems strange that at a time when most of Natal's 
fanners were suffering considerable hardships the unemployed wanted to join the ranks of the 
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More interestingly, they also called upon the council to dismiss all pensioners and 
women whose husbands received good salaries. Some of their oratory displayed a 
distinctly revolutionary bent and this will be referred to in more detail below. 
There were constant suggestions that the situation in Pietermartitzburg was being 
exaggerated as, of the 132 registered unemployed in the city in February 1932, a 
large proportion were "passers-through", "won't-works" and black-listed men who 
had fallen foul of the authorities for unreliability. 15 1 Official statistics showed that 
Pietermaritzburg's unemployment situation was on a par with that in Cape Town 
and Bloemfontein, while the situation in Durban was the worst in the Union at this 
time. I52 The Benevolent Society did note with some degree of satisfaction that the 
influx of poor whites into the city had almost ceased and that they were assisting 
"respectable citizens of many years residence, who never imagined that they would 
be obliged to ask for charity".153 By May the number of unemployed had risen to 
185, of whom 110 were residents of more than 7 years' standing.154 By July 1932, 
the unemployed numbered 280155 but by November of that year, some 506 were 
unemployed; 300 were on the waiting list for relief work employment.156 
Thereafter the situation improved slowly and the unemployed were gradually re-
absorbed into employment, but there were still some 153 men on relief works as late 
as June 1934.157 
Very Little evidence relating to the unemployment of white females can be found for 
Pietermaritzburg and environs. There appears to have been a perception in some 
quarters that particular families were monopolising employment to the detriment of 
unemployed women: 
farmers. 
151. Notal Witness, 3 February 1932. 
152. Notal Witness,4 February 1932. 
153. Notal Witness,7 May 1932. 
154. Notal Witness, 17 May 1932. 
155. Notal Witness, 1 July 1932. 
156. Notal Witness, 2 November 1932. 
157. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Engineer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1934. 
It was also believed that there were men in the city who 
received substantial salaries, yet their wives and daughters 
worked, 'thus enabling the family I~Jive in luxury, while other 
women were unable to find work.' 
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The plight of unemployed juveniles is equally obscure; in September 1930 the Natal 
Witness reported that although 117 youths were unemployed, only 6 had been able 
to find employment.159 Even those with matriculation certificates found it difficult 
to find employment: 
The foundation of the belief that the matriculation certificate 
is the key to the 'golden gate' of higher grade employment has 
been rudely shaken throughout Natal within the past IgO' 
days .. .In the majority of cases ... the search has been in vain. 
As in Durban, the juvenile unemployment situation in Pietermaritzburg was 
aggravated by the annual exodus of school-Ieavers; in September 1932 it was 
reported that an estimated 200 school children would be looking for employment at 
the end of the year.161 Measures were adopted to create employment in the 
Council service for juveniles. 162 
Similarly, there is very little evidence to show how the employment of blacks in 
Pietermaritzburg was affected by the depression. According to the evidence 
presented to the NEC, there were some 12 000 Africans resident in and around the 
city,163 of whom some 4 300 were women.164 The actual number in the city was 
put at approximately 8 000 males.165 The implementation of the "civilised labour" 
policy had resulted in unemployment among Indians and Africans in the town, which 
had caused some concern: 
158. Owen, "White Unemployment", p. 29, quoting from the Notal Witness, 3 September 1930. 
159. Notal Witness, 3 September 1930. 
160. Notal Witness, 28 January 1931. 
161. Notal Witness, 13 September 1932. 
162. See below, Chapter Eight. 
163. C~, m::C, K26, F4, Evidence of Dr William Wood (Medical Officer of Health), 
Pietermantzburg, 10 April 1931, p. 6761. 
164. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Mr Robert Dunlop (Chairman of the Joint Council and 
Native Welfare Society), Pietermaritzburg, 10 April 1931, p. 6814. 
Commissioner: ... You say that the Poor Whites are taxed much 
less than the Natives and the Poor Whites receive enormous 
sums by way of government aid? 
Mr Dunlop: They do. 
Commissioner:What sort of figures had you in mind there? 
Mr Dunlop: Quite a number of them. They do not pay any 
special taxation for the education of their children. Jobs are 
found for them. They are paid enormous sums by Yfay of 
railway service, for which we know they do not gIve an 
adequate quid pro quo. 
Commissioner: You mean, large sums are given to employ 
them, although Natives would be cheaper? 
Mr Dunlop: Yes. We had 400 of them brought into this 
Community and, because of their influx, 400 Natives and 
Indians who were long employed && the Railway Department 
[sic] were put out of employment. 1 
This was also the perception of Africans: 
Another matter to which I want to refer is the matter of the 
employment of Natives. Today there are many Natives 
walking about the countryside who are quite unable to find 
work, although they wish to work. Some are being deprived of 
their work by their white employers and some by the 
government. That makes us wonder where these unemployed 
Natives will get money to p'ay their taxes and other 
Government dues. Moreover, if a Native, who cannot find 
employment, is found wandering about the countryside like 
that, he runs the risk of being arrestepf10r roaming around the 
countryside and being up to no good. v 
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There was, indeed, some distress among Africans, for several deputations of African 
togt workers were received by Council officials, with the result that free meals were 
given to a number of unemployed ·Africans.168 In April 1932, about ten Africans 
were found employment after a deputation of twenty unemployed had approached 
the council asking for work.169 The council was prepared to accept that it had a 
165. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Native Administration Committee, 2 March 193 1. 
166. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Robert Dunlop, Pietermaritzburg, 10 April 1 tJ3 1. pp. 6820 -
6821. 
167. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Chief Stephen Mini, Pietermaritzburg, 10 April 1931, 
p.6778. 
168. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Native Affairs Committee, 8 October 1931. 
169. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Native Affairs Committee, 4 April 1932. 
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measure of responsibility towards those Africans who resided permanently in the 
"Native Village", and who had previously been in employment in the city, although 
this did not extend to those Africans who had come to the city looking for work. The 
setting up of relief works for the former was contemplated, but nothing was done as 
no subsidy from the government was forthcoming. 170 
There were, however, indications that unemployment among the city's Indian and 
"coloured" communities was rife, as the City Council authorised street collections 
and instituted relief works for these unemployed, some 41 "coloured" men being 
employed by October 1932.171 There were still 100 "coloured" men employed on 
the relief works in February 1933,172 while arrangements were made for 50 Indians 
to be employed on relief works in April 1933.173 Very little other evidence 
pertaining to the unemployment of Indians and "coloureds" in Pietermaritzburg 
could be found. There were some 40 men employed on council relief works in 
1933,174 a number which had declined only marginally, to 37, by 1934.175 It is 
worth noting, however, that the City Council was opposed to the "civilised labour" 
policy and resisted suggestions that it displace black workers in its permanent 
employ for whites, even though the extra costs to the council would have been 
subsidised. The Department of Labour continually threatened to withdraw the 
existing subsidy for white relief workers,176 but it appears that the council refused 
to compromise as no evidence can be found that relief workers were ever employed 
in a permanent capacity. 
In the smaller towns of Natal, the unemployment situation varied with the fortunes 
of the chief economic activities of tlte surrounding region. Generally, however, the 
170. NAD, 3/PMB. Minutes of the Native Affairs Committee. 27 November 1933. 
171. NAD, 3/PMB. Minutes of the City Council-in-Committee, 25 October 1932. 
172. NAD, 3/pMB, Minutes of the City Council-in-Committee, 9 February 1933. 
173. NAD, 3/PMB. Report of the F'mance Committee to the City Council, included in City Council 
Minutes, 11 Apri11933. 
174. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Engineer's Report. Corporation Year Book. 1933. 
175. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Engineer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1934. 
176. N~, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Relief Works Sub-Committee. 27 May 1929 and NAD, 3/PMB, 
Minutes of the City Council, 5 November 1931. 
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numbers of the unemployed were small and as there was often little hope of 
employment, or even assistance from local authorities, the unemployed tended to 
drift to the major urban centres of the province, particularly Durban. Very little 
evidence can be found regarding the unemployment situation of any group other 
than white adult males. Small-town newspapers, where they existed, carried little 
information regarding the number of even white unemployed. Recourse was made 
to the minutes of the town councils, but unfortunately evidence relating to 
unemployment could often only be detected through figures relating to employment 
on local relief works, and the relief of distress. 
In Colenso, the Town Council made a stout effort to apply the "civilised labour" 
policy by dispensing with the services of an African Town Office messenger, and 
replacing him with a "suitable European youthtl)77 The Town Council also 
authorised door-to-door collections for certain poor white families in the town, but 
no relief works were ever begun, nor was any attention given to the distressed of 
other communities. 
In the coal-mining district, the town of Dundee was more severely affected and 
consequently greeted the proposed derating of government buildings with some 
apprehension: 
... this meeting of the Committee of the Property Owner's 
Association takes a serious view of the present economic 
position and views with apprehension the possibility of the 
proposed derating of government buildings, also the gradual 
10crease of murucipal expenditure, and the possibility of an 
increase in the rate.S of the Borough, which we consider the 
majority of Ratepayers are .-.ot in a position at the present time 
to meet. The majority of Property Owners are not getting a 
~air return on the .money outlying [sic] on their property and an 
10crease of rent IS beyond the power of the tennants [sic] to 
contribute, while many of those living in their own houses are 
~inding a difficulty in making ends meet. The business people 
10 town are also finding great difficulty in getting their 
bl!S~n.esses to com~ out on the ri2ht si.de. While not wishing"to 
cntlClse the pobcy of the Council in detail, we would 
respectfully urge upon them a general policy, during the 
present depressed time, of rigid economy. 10 order that there 
will be no 10crease of the present rates. IRS 
177. NAD, 3/COL, Minutes of the Town Council, 30 August 1932. 
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Some distress was definitely present in the district, for several people were arrested 
for vagrancy, a proceeding which had never before been necessary in the 
borough.179 The Council also applied the government's "civilised labour" policy by 
giving preference to a European over a "coloured" applicant for a lorry-driver's 
position. In debate, the wage attached to this position (£9 per month) was 
considered to be possibly too low to be offered to a white man, but 
as the applicant was desirous of gett~ the job it was felt that it 
would not be right to tum down a rMIopean for a Coloured 
man, particularly at the present time. 
The Council also received a petition from fifty-five residents of the town calling for 
the replacement of an "old and feeble Native" at the town cemetery by a white man 
"who can only receive a living salary".181 The council never began any relief 'works 
and did not engage any unemployed whites as additional workers in its service, 
preferring to increase its contribution to the local Benevolent Society to provide for 
the assistance of such people.182 In the Zululand town of Eshowe, the local Town 
Board resisted attempts by the unemployed to create billets for themselves in 
municipal employ,183 and even resisted attempts to replace Indian employees with 
whites. 184 
In the neighbouring town of Utrecht, the council found that it was not in a position 
to assist unemployed farmers in the area, 185 nor could it afford to assist the 
178. NAD, 3/DUN, Letter in Minu.tes of the Town Council, 24 April 1930. 
179. NAD, 3/DUN, Minutes of Town Council, 24 July 1930. The race group of the offenders was 
not specified. 
180. NAD, 3/DUN, Minutes of the Town Council, 23 September 1930. 
18l. NAD, 3/DUN, Minutes of the Town Council, 28 September 1933. 
182. This was done in the case of one C van Tonder, who had applied for a job "to enable him to 
support his family, he having been out of employment for some time." An extra £2 per month 
was contributed to the Benevolent Society to assist him. NAD, 3/DUN, Minutes of the Town 
Council,26 February 1931. 
183. NAD, 3/ESH, Minutes of the Local Town Board, 2 March 1931 and 16 March 1931. 
184. NAD, 3/ESH, Minutes of the Local Town Board, 23 July 1931. 
185. NAD, 3/UTR, Minutes of the Town Council, 17 September 1931. 
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unemployed resident in the town itself. 186 It did manage to find employment for 
one European youth, who replaced an African previously employed as a messenger 
and caretaker at the town hall, after which the council resolved to write to the 
Divisional Inspector for Labour to inform him that 
the Council has filled all available positions with EuroPlft~ 
labour and is unable to absorb any more unemployeds [sicJ. 
Also in northern Natal, the town of Vryheid had similar problems relating to distress 
among the surrounding farming community, for as early as March 1929, the local 
Child Welfare Society was asking for permission to hold a street collection. In 
supporting the application, Councillor Mr Botha said 
that there was a lar~e number of poor peol?le in the Borough 
and the number was mcreasing regularly owmg to these people 
flocking to the town, and the demand increasmg 
proportionally, so that the Association found it impossible to 
meet the appeals. lS8 
The council was mindful of the unemployment among whites in the town, and five 
whites were engaged to man the sentinel wagon, a job previously done by Africans. 
This was accepted as a form of relief works as the council obtained a subsidy from 
the Department of Labour.189 The severity of the situation in the town can be 
gauged from the fact that when the position of Storekeeper was advertised by the 
council, at a salary of £25 per month, no fewer than 165 applications were 
received. 190 
In Estcourt, the local town council had its proceedings disrupted by unemployed 
whites who attempted to force the council to take action on the unemployment 
situation in the town.191 Despite this, nothing was done until July 1932, when 
186. See NAD, 3/UTR, Minutes of Town Council 12 November 1931 and 23 June 1932. In the 
former case, one J Moolman was prepared to work as a caretaker for £2 per month, while in 
the latter case one J Coleslcy begged for employment "as he is practicaUy destitute". 
187. NAD, 3/UTR, Minutes of Town Council, 17 December 1931. 
188. NAD, 3/VRY, Minutes of the General Purposes Committee, 4 March 1929. 
189. NAD, 3jVRY, Minutes of the General Purposes Committee, 7 November 1929. 
190. NAD, 3/VRY, Minutes of the Works Committee, 13 November 1930. 
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several whites were engaged in relief works of a temporary nature.192 Further 
investigations, later in 1932, showed that there were 22 unemployed men in the 
borough, 16 Europeans and 6 "coloureds".193 The Council instituted relief works 
for these men, but this was seen as a temporary measure and they were discontinued 
in April 1933.194 Following representations and investigation, these were re-
instated because the level of distress was deemed to be acute. In one instance, 
seventeen destitute family members were said to be living in one house.195 
Unemployment in the town of Ladysmith was greatly exacerbated by an influx of 
poor whites from surrounding areas. 196 In a list of the unemployed submitted to the 
local town council in October 1931, of the 31 white men who registered as 
unemployed, 15 had not been resident in Ladysmith for three years. Their previous 
occupations also give some idea of the nature of the distress, as 11 had been farmers, 
while 9 had been "artisans".197 Instructions were given to the Borough Engineer to 
try to find employment for some of these men on works within the borough.198 The 
Borough Engineer reported that there were eight Indians employed who could 
possibly be replaced by white workers, but as these men had long been in the employ 
of the council, they appear not to have been replaced.199 Nothing significant was 
done to alleviate the distress in the borough and only two white men were employed 
on relief works in March 1932.200 After representations were made by the 
Ladysmith Benevolent Society on behalf of twelve men on the books of the society, 
the council offered to make relief works available in the form of stone breaking.201 
191. NAD, 3jEST, Minutes of the Town Council, 23 June 1931. 
192. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Town ,Council, 19 July 1932. 
193. NAD, 3jEST, Report of the Unemployment Relief Sub-Committee, 28 November 1932. 
194. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Unemployment Relief Sub-Committeee, 12 May 1933. 
195. See NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Unemployment Relief Sub-Committee, 12 May 1 <133. 
196. For a discussion of the position of "poor whites" in northern Natal, see Verne Harris. 'Time to 
Trek: Landless Whites and Poverty in the Northern Natal Countryside. 1902· 1939" in R 
Morrell (ed.), White but Poor, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1991, pp. 57 . 74. 
197. NAD, 3/LAD, List of unemployed submitted to the Fmance Committee, 22 October 1931. 
19.8. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the Fmance Committee, 22 October 1931. 
199. NAD, 3/LAD, Letter from Borough Engineer to Fmance Committee, 26 October 1431. 
200. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the Works, Health/ Waterworks/Lands/ Aballoir Committee, 
17 March 1932. 
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No evidence could be found to suggest that this offer was ever taken up, but it does 
serve as an indication of the level of unemployment within the borough. 
Unemployment among the Indian community of the town was also significant, as a 
letter from thirty-eight unemployed Indians connected to the Hindu Thirukutam 
Sabah showed: 
We, being ratepayers within the Borough of Ladysmith, beg to 
earnestly request that owing to the distress prevailing amongst 
us owing to unemployment, that your council may be pleased 
to grant us employment or to consider some means of relieving 
the distressed condition we are in. Further to see your way 
clear to grant us extensio2b~f time within which to pay the rates 
that become due shortly. 
The council offered relief work in the form of stone breaking, but refused an 
extension of time for the payment of rates.203 Again, there is no indication that the 
offer of relief works was ever taken up. 
Distress among Africans in Ladysmith has proved even more difficult to quantify, 
but a sum of £50 was withdrawn from the Native Revenue Fund to alleviate distress 
among Africans in the borough 
in view of the prevailing depression and the acute distress 
among the Natives at the present with little prospect of things 
improving in the immediate future.204-
In the African reserves of Na~al and Zululand, attempts were made by the Chief 
Native Commissioner to facilitate the employment of Africans "languishing" in the 
reserves. The distress in the reserves was becoming acute as a result of widespread 
drought and the discharge of Africans from normal employment in urban areas and 
on white farms. This situation greatly augmented the influx of Africans to the gold 
mines, to the extent that the mines of the Witwatersrand were swamped. The 
201. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of F'mance Committee, 28 September 1933. 
202. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the F'tnance Committee, 23 February 1933. 
203. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of F'mance Committee, 23 February 1933. 
204. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of Fmance Committee, 28 January 1932. 
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Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA) was moved to issue a departmental circular 
instructing that Af~icans be notified that there was no employment to be had on the 
gold mines. The circular noted that there were "several thousand" surplus African 
miners in compounds on the Reef, drawing rations while there was no work for 
them.205 In addition, there were some 4 000 Africans "fmitlessly searching for w k 
in Johannesburg", while in other Reef towns the position was similar: 
Owing to the depression and drought conditions the number of 
Natives leaving employment and returning to their homes is 
much below normal .. .It seems hardly necessary to emphasise 
that the plight of a workless Native on the WitwatYd~and is far 
worse than if he had remained in his home district. 
All Magistrates and Native Commissioners in Natal and Zululand were instructed to 
inform chiefs and to discourage Africans from going to the gold mines.207 
A similar situation arose on the coal-mines of Natal. The Native Commissioner of 
Vryheid informed the Chief Native Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg (CNC PMB) 
that between 3 000 and 4 000 Africans had been retrenched from mines in the 
district, but unemployed .Africans were still coming into the district, aggravating the 
unemployment amongst local Africans: 
Local Native farm labour tenants who are required to render 
service to the farmers for half the year often spend months 
tramping about the District in search of employment. In the 
murucipallocation, there are many Natives who are living from 
hand to mo.nth and for whom no work of a permanent nature is 
available.408 
A circular was issued by the CNC PMB to all Native Commissioners in Natal and 
Zululand, advising them to discourage Africans from seeking work on the coal-
mines of Natal.209 
205. South African Outlook, 1 April 1932, placed the number of unemployed "boys" who were 
being fed as high as 4 000, while there were reputed to be 10 000 unemployed "Natives" on the 
Rand. 
206. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. g]A, Flle 68/33, SNA Circular No. 2/1932, dated 25 January 1932. 
207. Ibid. 
208. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 97A, File 68/33, Native Commissioner (NC) Vryheid to Chief Native 
Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg (CNC PMB), 23 February 1932. 
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Attempts were made by the Native Affairs Department to increase the chances of 
employment for Africans from Natal and Zululand reserves by restricting the influx 
of African labourers from areas outside Natal. These, however, were thwarted by 
farmers, who wanted to maintain their traditional supplies of labour.210 It appears 
that, after representations from the SNA, the Chamber of Mines and the Native 
Recruiting Corporation (NRC) accepted the seriousness of the situation in the 
reserves of Natal and Zululand. At least they were prepared to assist by offering to 
employ such unemployed Africans from the reserves as they could accommodate 
and who might be willing to work on the mines. The NRC wished to gain some idea 
of the numbers which might be involved.211 All Native Commissioners and 
Magistrates were telegraphed to provide statistics relating to a) the number of 
unemployed male Africans in their Districts, and b) how many of these were 
physically fit for mine work and were prepared to work on the mines. The replies 
are illuminating, but space does not permit a full discussion of each district's returns. 
Most NC's and Magistrates were able to provide approximate numbers, but nearly 
all said that mine work, particularly un~erground work, was not popular. It was 
found that there were some 53 800 unemployed African males in the reserves of 
Natal and Zululand, but that only 15 120 of these were fit for and prepared to 
undertake work on the mines.212 
Magistrates and NC's in the reserves were asked to use their offices as employment 
bureaux to assist both local employers and unemployed Africans. This was not very 
successful, as few made use of. the service, and in any event officials, overworked 
~ith the distribution of relief to Africans, had little time to spare. The number of 
209. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. WA, File 68/33, CNC Circular No. 4/1932. 
210. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. WA, Fde 68/33, CNC PMB to SNA, 19 March 1932. These attempts 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
211. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. WA, Fde 68/33, Telegram from NATLAB (NRC) to CNC PMB, 
22 March 1937. 
212. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. WA, Fde 68/33, Telegram CNC PMB to NRC, 30 March 1932. Most 
of the ftgUres were estimates, while some NC's and Magistrates admitted they had no idea of 
either the total number unemployed or the number of those willing to work on the mines. The 
statistics must therefore be treated with extreme caution, but they do provide evidence of 
serious unemployment in the reserves. 
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unemployed who actually registered was so small that these figures in no way 
represent the true situation in the reserves.213 In other areas, farmers had a surfeit 
of labour: 
Farmers have as much labour as they require, and in many 
cases more than they can pay for, and I am informed that 
Natives frequently offer to "2~~ without wages, simply to 
obtain food and a place to live. 
It is impossible to determine the full extent of unemployment among Africans in the 
reserves of Natal and Zululand. It is possible, however, to suggest that the severe 
drought and the prevailing economic downturn severely disrupted the normal 
employment patterns of the African inhabitants of the reserves. As an editorial in 
Jlanga lase Natal put it: 
Were it possible to obtain authentic figures relating to 
unemployment among the Native population of the Union, we 
make bold to say that such figures would be positively 
alarming. It is beyond dispute that never in the history of 
South ~'? has there been such destitution among the Bantu 
people ... 
The circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that there were very many Africans 
who wished to work, but were unable to find gainful employment. They formed an 
unquantified, but nonetheless substantial, component of the unemployed masses. 
Despite all the difficulties in assessment, a fairly clear picture has emerged of the 
seriousness of the situation with regard to unemployment in Natal. The severity of 
the problem, outside of the reserves, was. greatest in the major urban centre of the 
province, Durban. This was largely due to the vulnerability of the economic basis on 
which the town was constructed; as international trade declined, commerce and 
industry, facing the resultant fall in demand for Natal's major products, sugar and 
coal, were forced to lay workers off, creating a massive problem for the local 
authorities. Yet the perception that Durban, and to a lesser extent, 
213. See correspondence in NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. CJ7A, Ftle 68/33. 
214. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. CJ7A, File 68/33, NC Newcastle to CNC PMB, 25 April 1932. 
215. llanga lase Natal, 18 August 1933. 
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Pietermaritzburg, were "greener pastures" continued to attract unemployed from 
elsewhere in Natal and indeed, in the Union, throughout the depression, thus 
exacerbating the situation. 
Elsewhere in the province, local authorities also faced the problem of 
unemployment, but most had limited resources and could provide little in the way of 
relief. The more enterprising among the unemployed made the journey to the major 
urban centres, while many of those who remained appear to have eked out a 
precarious existence even during the best of times. When the depression struck, 
their small-scale farming and other enterprises simply collapsed, leaving them 
stranded. 
The unemployed, unless they were enterprising enough to find alternative ways of 
earning a living, were forced to look to the state for assistance in their plight. The 
state, however, proved a poor provider, failing even to accurately quantify the 
problem ab initio. The major burden then fell on the ratepayers of the local 
authorities throughout the province. With the best will in the world, these local 
authorities (with few exceptions) felt obliged to assist only their burgesses, and then 
were limited by their individual capacities. Scant attention was paid to the 
unemployed of any group other than white adult males. 
It must be seen as symptomatic of the attitudes of the time that this should have 
been so; but it must also be admitted that under the stress of the depression the 
racism and sexism that characterised Natal society at this time was greatly inflamed. 
~ti-Asiatic sentiment was rife~ as· was the idee fixe that Africans only worked when 
they wanted to and could always return to their idyllic rural places of origin to laze 
in the SUD. This attitude was summed up by Mr Edward Holden of the 
Pietennaritzburg Chamber of Industries when he said: 
... if the economic circumstances are pressing hardly on the 
Natives as the evidence before this Commission would lead 
one to believe, then with regard to a very large proportion of 
the Native population, the remedy is 10 their own hands, 
because they can work for a longer period per year. I, 
person~ly, cannot - and I doubt whether any member of the 
Comnnsslon can - afford to have four to six months' holiday 
per year, which is the usual thing with the majority of rural 
Natives. Therefore, we say, if economic circumstances press 
heavily on the Native as reputed, he 2re alter things himself by 
working for a longer period per year. 
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The truth of the matter is that a substantial number of Africans were indeed seeking 
work for longer periods to tide themselves and their families over the depression 
and the devastating drought in the rural areas. However, government policies such 
as the "civilised labour" policy and the Wage Act, either prevented them finding 
employment or even led to their displacement by white workers when they were 
successful. 
Whites believed that in the natural order of things they should not be made to suffer 
this most visible of wounds caused by the depression, and that white employment 
should be safeguarded and expanded at the expense of other races. Taking this into 
account, it is significant that despite all the measures adopted, white unemployment 
in Natal still attained the proportions which it did. Conversely, although 
quantification is impossible, it is worth pondering that if white unemployment 
reached the levels it did with all the machinery of the state and the prevailing 
weltanschauung operating in favour of job creation for whites, how much worse the 
situation of other groups must have been, as they were the targets of this prejudice 
and discriminatory action. 
In conclusion, it is worth remembering exactly what unemployment meant to the 
average white person living at this time, brought up to believe that working was a 
divinely ordained activity; and the loss of employment some kind of divine 
visitation. The loss of employment'meant that families lost their financial mainstay 
and the decline into poverty was often a short fall for many of even the middle class. 
Faced with the inability to provide for their families, many men deserted them, 
rather than face the daily reproach in the eyes of those who had come to depend on 
them.217 Many of the unemployed experienced psychological problems; feelings of 
inadequacy, depression, despondency, lassitude and helplessness overcame them.218 
216. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Mr Edward Holden, Pietennaritzburg, 9 April 1931, 
pp. 6683 - 6684. 
217. Natal Mercury, 6 November 1929, 27 August 1931 and 5 November 1931. 
218. See letter from "Grudge against Society", Natal Mercury, 19 November 1931. 
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The unemployed felt trapped in a web of circumstance that they could neither 
understand nor escape.219 
John Dube saw the unemployment of whites from a different angle. In an article 
which related tales of whites begging from Africans, he wrote: 
I believe that one would have been shot down stone dead if ten 
years ago he would have predicted that Europeans would one 
day sink to a level of digging roads, pushing wheelbarrows 
loaded with dirty sand and wearing tom trousers and without 
shirts, working to earn their bread. When one sees these thin~s 
happening and the onesidedness of the Government m 
reserving employment only to Europeans ... one cannot fail to 
deduce that God moves very mysteriously to protect the 
downtrodden peoples against their oppressors. It is really 
miraculous that in the face of all open gateways to employment 
for Europeans, yet they should get no employment. And the 
Natives with no employment at all should spare a penny to give 
to. EU2~lrans who happen to cross their ways hunger-dying 
[SlC] ... 
It was to prevent the development of such a view of the white overlords that the 
government was to direct its efforts at relieving the distress caused by 
unemployment. Dube shows that these efforts were not entirely successful. Why 
this should have been so forms the basis of the following chapter. 
219. Rees, The Great Slump, p. 89. 
220. /langa lase Natal, 11 November 1932. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE DISTRESS AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
IN NATAL 
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As the depression deepened and unemployment grew, citizens of all the affected 
nations began to look to their respective governments for assistance. It was realised 
that the magnitude of the crisis was such that only government intervention could 
halt the plunge into chaos. Most people could not fully comprehend the complex 
causes of the depression, and turned to their elected representatives whom they 
believed, initially at least, had both the ability and the power to set matters to rights. 
Most governments in the western world did react sympathetically, although often 
their actions were hampered by their limited knowledge of economics and the 
conservative laissez faire principles to which many of them subscribed. As 
Robertson and Walton wrote of the situation in the United States: 
As Americans suffered through the first two years of the 
Depression, they analyzed the causes of their troubles in 
everyday language, and suggested cures. Some of these 
analyses were astonishingly accurate, and many of the 
remedies proposed, had they been tried, might well have 
prevented the precipitate declines in income and employment 
that charactenzed the late stages of the Depression. But 
remedies potent enough to be very effective required a 
radically different approach to public finance and a 
revolutionary concept of the role of the federal government in 
times of economic crisis. The administration of Herbert 
Hoover, who was elected to office on promises of a safe, 
conservative program, was" simply incapable of the radical, 
imaginative leadership that alone could have saved the day.l 
The failure of the Labour government in Britain to respond adequately in the early 
years of the depression has likewise been explained by Beloff: 
The Economic Policy Committee set up by MacDonald in 
January 1930 which also had Keynes as a member failed to 
make any impa~t upon gover~~ental thinking. But in the light 
of the orthodOXIes then prevailIng both at home and abroad, it 
1. Robertson and Walton, History 0/ the American Economy, p. 412. 
seems unreasonable to single out the MacDonald government 
as particularly ineffective and obtuse.2 
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South Africans too began to look to their government to assist them in this crisis. 
The Hertzog government, like most other conservative governments in the capitalist 
world that were affected by the depression, seemed reluctant to embark on any 
radical economic changes. Prior to the depression, the government had already 
established procedures for dealing with unemployment among whites both in the 
urban and rural areas and simply expanded these during much of the depression 
period. The government did, however, appear to believe that white employment 
was a government priority. It perceived a threat to the civil order in the influx of 
unemployed "poor whites" into the cities of the Union, which had begun in the 
1880s.3 It was partly for this reason that the Hertzog government had instituted the 
ticivilised labour" policy and had created a government ministry, the Department of 
Labour, to promote white employment in the urban areas. 
Unemployment in the Union was evident in both rural and urban areas. As has 
already been demonstrated, agriculture in the Union was experiencing a period of 
considerable tribulation. Low producer prices and various natural factors had 
forced many ill-educated, unskilled whites off their farms. Drifting to the major 
urban centres, they competed for the lowliest menial jobs with black workers. 
Similarly, many Africans in the rural areas of Natal and Zululand, hard hit by the 
depression and the crippling drought, also sought to survive by obtaining work in the 
urban areas. These urban centres had unemployment problems of their own, which 
were greatly aggravated by the arrival of outsiders. 
In an effort to stem the rising tide of unemployment, the government embarked on a 
multi-pronged strategy. Not only would the problem of urban unemployment have 
to be addressed, but attempts would have to be made to halt the drift to the towns; 
firstly by improving conditions on the land to keep white farmers on their farms, and 
secondly by providing assistance to the rural unemployed in their own areas and 
2. Beloff, Wars and Welfare, p. 168. 
3. See J Grobler, "Die Verskynsel van Verarmde Blankes in Suid-Afrika", UnpUblished paper 
presented at 8th Biennal Meeting of the South African Historical Society, Durban, 1981 and 
Morrell, White but Poor. 
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making them ineligible for assistance in the urban areas.4 Furthermore, legislative 
and administrative measures were to be taken to stem the influx of Africans into 
urban areas, to reduce the competition for work.5 
Turning to the rural areas of Natal first, it is worth noting that the government did 
comparatively little specifically for the rural white unemployed in this province6 
during the depression years, as the "poor white" problem was far greater elsewhere 
in the Union.? Furthermore, the Nationalist Party only enjoyed majority support 
amongst farmers in northern Natal, the rest of the farming community of the 
province being mainly composed of South African Party stalwarts. 
However, even if on a smaller scale, attempts to alleviate the distress in the rural 
areas of Natal did form part of the country-wide government initiative. As Minnaar 
wrote: 
The majority of these relief schemes were aimed specifically at 
alleviatmg the plight of the rural poor, many of whom were ex-
farmers forced off the land by the calamitous combination of 
economic depression, drought and natural disasters. This 
legislation favoured the rural and agricultural sector since it 
was this section of the populace (besides the blacks in the 
reserves) which had experienced the most distress and 
hardshil>, and because the government was also very sensitive 
to critiCIsms that they were neglecting the rural poor (i.e. the 
group known as Poor Whites). In parliament the awicultural 
lobby was powerful since the government was COjlSCIOUS that it 
receIved major political support from this sector.~ 
4. This strategy was outlined at an Unemployment Conference chaired by the Minister of 
Labour, Colonel F H P Cresswell, in September 1931. It was decided there that no man 
should be given relief work unless he had been resident in the relevant urban area for at least 
two years. Minnaar, "White Agriculture", p. 250; see also Minnaar, "Unemployment", pp. 54 -
55. 
5. These measures will "be discussed in Chapter Ten. 
6. This is obviously excluding the veritable plethora of measures taken by the government to 
assist agriculture throughout the Union. For a discussion of these see Minnaar, "South African 
White Agriculture", pp. 207 - 237. 
7. Harris makes the point that although the poor white problem definitely did exist in northern 
Natal at this time, it bas generally been neglected by most writers. See Harris, "Time to Trek", 
p.57. For general information, see Lewis, "Poor White Problem", passim; Minnaar has 
recently pointed out that the problems of rural unemployment and "Poor Whiteism" became 
blurred during the depression. See Minnaar, "Unemployment", p. 46. 
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Several schemes were in operation in Natal. The first, initiated in the 1920s, was the 
forestry project at Weza in southern NataL Farmers who had been forced off their 
land were engaged by the Uepartment of Forestry to conduct afforestation, and 
were allowed to farm small plots on their own account. Workers were employed on 
a permanent basis and were paid reasonably well. They were given free medical 
treatment and education for their children, while their accommodation cost only lOs 
per month. 'i 'his settlement, in common with others established elsewhere in the 
Union, expanded during the depression years, but no details of the exact number of 
persons so assisted in Natal can be foundY 
'i 'he second project, the Urakensberg Reclamation Scheme, was only launched in 
1934. it was aimed at replanting the slopes of the Urakensberg with suitable 
vegetation to prevent soil erosion and was expected to provide work for some 500 
unemployed men from Natal and the Orange Free State. lO The third project was 
undertaken by the South African Railways. it involved, amongst other things, the 
straightening of the railway-lines in northern Natal. The project was planned in 
1933/34,11 and by 193512 was providing work for 700 men on the Glencoe-
Volksrust line, while another 500 men were at work on the Natal main line at 
Hoscobello. No provision was made for the families of the "European labourers" 
employed on the former scheme, while a model village was built to accommodate 
the families on the Hoscobello scheme. In addition, by 1934/35, a further 104 white 
labourers had been found permanent employment on the Railways in Uurban.13 
These projects in Natal (and indeed, the many other such rural projects initiated 
elsewhere in the Union) may be likened to the work of the Civilian Conservation 
Corps in the United States of America, although the workers were never 
administered by a single authority in the Union as they were in America.14 
8. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p, 269. 
9. Ibid. , pp. 251·253; see also Minnaar, "Unemployment", pp. 65.66. 
10. Union of South Africa,Year Book, No 16, 1933/34, p. 195 and Minnaar, "Unemployment", p. 
69. 
11. Union of South Africa, Union Year Book No. 16,1933/34, p. 195. 
12. J Taylor, "Bulding Railways and 'Building Character': The Model Villages in Northern Natal 
c.1935-1939", Contree, Vol. 35, June 1994, p. 32. ' 
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The other major project aimed at relieving unemployment among rural communities 
in Natal was mounted by the Natal Provincial Administration (NPA). Even before 
the onset of the depression, Parliament had voted £1 000 000 for the creation of 
employment opportunities for whites on road-building schemes to be administered 
by the provinces. Natal was allocated some £200 000 for this purpose in 1929/30. 
Some 241 men were employed in Natal on road-building throughout the province at 
the end of June 1930.15 This number increased steadily to 537 in June 1931 and 
then to 660 in December of that year, before declining to 355 in June 1932. The 
decline in number was caused by a shortage of funds. When more money was made 
available, the number increased once more to 1 065 in December 1932, before 
falling again to 993 in June 1933 and then to 948 in December 1933. Some 480 were 
still so employed in June 1934.16 In total, the Natal Provincial Administration 
received some £15 641 in addition to the earlier grant of £200 000, considerably less 
than either the Transvaal or the Cape,17 where numbers employed on road works 
were far higher.18 This fact was seized upon by Natalian opponents of the 
govemment.19 Employment was largely confined to whites but, as will be shown 
later, the NPA also contributed to relief works on roads in the African reserves of 
Natal and Zululand. 
The Provincial Administration also made subsidies available to municipalities for 
the employment of semi-fit men on relief works in the urban areas. It was mainly 
white men who benefited, although a small number of "coloured" men were also 
subsidised. The sums expended are shown in table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 
Amounts expended by the Natal Provincial Administration in 
Subsidies to Municipalities in respect of tbe employment 
of semi-fit labourers on relief works, 
1930/31- 1934/35, in £ 
Year Amount Budgetted Amount Spent 
1930/31 2100/00/00 2101/05/09 
1931/32 4800/00/00 5294/12/05 
1932/33 6000/00/00 4286/18/08 
1933/34 4000/00/00 3177/12/02 
1934/35 3600/00/00 3700/00/00 
Source: Annual Reports of the Provincial Auditor for relevant years. 
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It must be understood that the NP A operated within severe financial constraints, as 
the central government kept very tight control of the purse strings. In fact, it 
appears that the central government wanted to abolish the Provincial Councils 
during the depression years, ostensibly as "an economy measure", and was thus 
attempting to demonstrate that the councils were not financially viable. Like the 
administration of the Orange Free State, the NP A was constantly having to go cap in 
hand to the central government for funds.20 Relief could only be afforded, 
therefore, within limits imposed by the central government. 
In the reserves of Natal, and especially in those of Zululand, a crippling drought 
began to make itself felt early in 1931.21 The depression was also beginning to have 
a serious affect on the employment of Africans but initially, the drought was a far 
more serious threat to the welfare of thousands of people. Reports were received of 
widespread shortages of food due to crop failures,22 while the price of maize was 
13. Union of South Africa, Union Year Book, No. 17, 1934/35, p. 210. 
14. For similar projects in the United States see L A Lacey, The Soil Soldiers: The Civilian 
Conservation Corps in the Great Depression, Chiltem, Radnor, 1976. 
15. Union of South Africa, Year Book, No. 12, 1929/30, p. 188. 
16. Union of South Africa, Year Book No. 13, 1930/31, p. 161 and No. 16, 1933/34, p. 196. 
17. Annual Reports of the Auditor-General for relevant years. 
18. Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 267. 
19. See below, pp. 327 - 328. 
20. For a discussion of this aspect ~ Thompson, Natations First, pp. 50 - 59. 
21. La Hausse claims that the drought began a$ early as 1929 in the Ubombo district. He claims 
that the crisis in ZuluJand in the early 1930s " ... compelled the state to initiate a widespread 
relief programme in 1934." La Hausse, "Ethnicity and History", p. 324. This date is obviously 
incorrect in the light of what follows. 
22. See as examples, correspondence in NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), of which 
the following is a selection: Native Commissioner (NC) ' Melmoth to Chief Native 
Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg (CNC PMB), 25 February 1931; Telegram from Bishop of 
ZuluJand to CNC PMB, 10 September 1931; NC Nongoma to CNC PMB, 17 September 1931; 
Ibid, 18 September 1931, reporting • ... serious shortage of food in the whole District..."; NC 
Ubombo to CNC PMB, 19 September 1931; Assistant NC Mhlabatini to CNC PMB 
~Se~~~lm. ' 
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rocketing accordingly.23 The Native Commissioner (NC) at Nongoma, Mr 
Braatvedt, composed a circular to storekeepers asking them to keep the price of 
maize down, or else the government would be forced to bring in maize and sell it to 
Africans more cheaply. This threat did bring about some reduction in price, as 
storekeepers were fearful that if it were carried out, their stocks would go unbought 
and they would suffer 10sses.24 The situation became so critical that Braatvedt was 
forced to telegraph the Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg (CNC PMB) 
asking for Nongoma and Mhlabatini to be declared drought disaster areas. 
"CA TI1...E DYING FAST NO RAIN NATIVES SHORT OF CASH AM 
INFORMED MANY ON BRINK OF ST ARV A TION".25 The NC of Eshowe had a 
similar tale to tell; reporting on the situation in the worst drought-affected area of 
Tugela Ferry, he wrote, "Scarcely any cattle left alive, donkeys and goats are now 
dying." Maize was being brought in but roads in the district were bad. He suggested 
that relief work on roads in the area would be a useful way of dealing with the 
situation.26 Nongoma, Mhlabatini and Hlabisa were declared drought-stricken 
areas, which enabled the importation of fodder and the transportation of cattle and 
maize at reduced rates.27 This did not meet with the approval of the NC Nongoma, 
who wanted maize to be imported into the area free of charge, or at much further 
reduced rates, so that the storekeepers could sell maize more cheaply.28 
It was then realised that maize would have to be made available in certain areas of 







NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), NC Ingwavuma to CNC PMB, 8 April 1931. 
Maize was being sold at 26s per bag, while some (unspecified) traders were selling at 50s per 
bag in the remoter areas. There were many other examples of increases in price, most 
averaging 2s per bag over the previous few months. This took place at a time when the maize 
price was falling elsewhere in the Union, so by obtaining maize from elsewhere in the Union, 
storekeepers could make handsome profits. For details of the maize price see Table 62 above. 
NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), NC Nongoma to CNC PMB, 17 September 
1931. 
NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), Telegram NC Nongoma to CNC PMB, 
24 September 1931. 
NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), NC Eshowe to CNC PMB,23 September 
1931. 
NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), Telegram Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA) 
to CNC PMB, 30 September 1931. 
NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), CNC PMB to SNA, 3 October 1931. 
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failed, but where cattle were still left alive, they were generally so emaciated and in 
such poor condition that storekeepers were unwilling to take them in exchange for 
maize. Though this assistance was aimed at keeping body and soul together, it did 
not operate to the long-term benefit of the impoverished people of the reserves. 
The maize was made available by the government on promissory notes, and records 
were kept of those recipients who had cattle and those who had not. Those with 
cattle would be obliged to repay the cost of the maize, including the cost of 
transport, while those without would be treated as paupers.29 Recipients had to 
undertake to repay the full costs, not only of the maize (approximately 9s per bag), 
but also of the costs of transportion, so that the final cost was somewhere in the 
region of 15s or 16s per bag.30 The 'beneficiaries" would inevitably have to go and 
work to earn this money. If there seemed little likelihood of the African being able 
to earn the money to meet the promissory note, maize was not given to him, and he 
had to depend on the charity of others.31 
The decision to begin supplying maize was lauded by llanga lase Natal which stated 
that the authorities had acted "with commendable promptitude and foresight".32 
The CNC PMB warned in a telegram that any efforts to bypass the storekeepers 
would result in problems: 
CONSIDER IT MOST IMPOLmC ENTER INTO 
COMPETITION WITH TRADERS IF THIS CAN BE 
A VOIDED ESPECIALLY AS PRESENT CONDmONS 
HAVE ALREADY HIT MOST OF THEM HARti.33 
Efforts were then made to secure co-operation from the traders in the affected areas 
but with little success, and the distribution of maize by magistrates and NCs began. 
The traders protested vehemently,34 and continued to do so well into 1932: 
29. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), SNA to CNC PMB, 7 October 1931. 
30. Hansard, Col. 1323,22 February 1932. 
31. Letter from "Observer", Matubatuba [sic], The Farmer, 8 April 1932, p. 23. 
32. /langa lase Natal, 20 November 1931. 
33. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Fde 68/1 (Part I), CNC PMB to SNA, 8 October 1931. 
34. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Fde 68/1 (Part I), CNC PMB to SNA, 14 October 1931. 
... no efforts are being made to ascer,tain whether the case a~e 
indigent or not [sic] and the result IS that 1~e storekeepers 10 
the vicinity are doing no mealie trade at all. 
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Initially, the SNA was unmoved, telegraphing that " ... medical and other reports on 
malnutrition outweigh all that traders may say ... "36 A storm of protest was 
unleashed from traders, newspapers and even members of parliarnent.37 Nor were 
these efforts appreciated by farmers, who complained to the Minister of Native 
Affairs. By 1932 the response was sympathetic: 
The Minister of Native Affairs has directed that officers 
charged with the distribution of mealies for the relief of 
distress among the Native population should keep in touch with 
the Farmers' Associations and consult them in regard to the 
labour requirements of their respective Districts. On no 
account must mealies be supplied or assistance given to Natives 
who refuse work available for them on farms. Please instruct 
all officers concerned in the at.ea under your control to give 
effect to the Minister's wishes.j~ 
Many believed that supplying Africans with food would diminish the labour supply: 
" ... the wholesale dishing out of mealies must inevitably lead to the supply of labour 
becoming frozen".39 The Witness was even more vehement in its criticism: 
Charity, where wisely used, is, without doubt a very good thing, 
yet there has arisen in Natal today a situation that is striking at 
the roots of white prestige and authority and inter-racial 
commerce. The Government has extended the open palm 
35. NAD, CNC, Vol. 95A, rtle 68/1 (Part 11), F P Bull (Secretary of Zululand Chamber of 
Commerce to CNC, Pietermarltzburg, 18 April 1932. 
36. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, rue 68/1 (Part I), SNA to CNC PMB, 15 October 1931. 
37. See the following selections from NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, rue 68/1 (Part I); 0 R Nel 
(Greytowo) to SNA, 11 October 1931; SNA to CNC PMB, 31 October 1931; SNA to CNC 
PMB,4 November 1931, relaying contents of telegram from Heaton Nicholls; C F Adams 
(representing Zululand traders) to CNC PMB, 7 November 1931; Natal Mercury, 
10 November 1931; G Heaton Nicholls to CNC PMB, 7 November 1931; W H Haupt (District 
Surgeon of Nongoma) to E G Jansen, Minister of Native Affairs (MNA), 25 November 1931; 
OR Nelto MNA, 9 December 1931; F H Bull (Secretary, Zululand Chamber of Commerce) 
to CNC PMB, 17 December 1931; Natal Mercury, 22 December 1931; Natal Witness, 
18 January 1931. 
38. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 95A, rue 68/1 (Part II), Secretary of Native Affairs to CNC, PMB, 19 
July 1932. 
39. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, rtle 68/1 (Part I), 0 R Nelto MNA, 9 December 1931. 
instead of the mailed fist. Procrastination is the greatest 
weakness of the Native and the Government has played right 
into the Natives' hands. How many Natives are to be seen 
today attempting to be self-supporting? ~actically n~ne. They 
have discovered that the Government wtl!dupply thelr greatest 
need - and their indolence grows apace. 
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However, both Archdeacon A W Lee (a noted expert on Zululand) and Mr S D 
Malcolm, Engineer with the Native Affairs Department and the official in charge of 
the distribution of relief, both argued that the situation was becoming worse by the 
day and that only half the normal planting had been undertaken.41 By January 
1932, 23 900 bags of maize had been issued to starving Africans in the reserves.42 
The drought situation was so bad in some areas that even the sugar planters had 
been forced to dismiss African workers, greatly aggravating the unemployment 
situation and raising the general level of distress considerably. Some Africans were 
so desperate that they were offering to work for four months for one bag of 
maize.43 
Nor was there any sign of matters improving: 
ESTABLISHED RELIEF RAPIDLY OUTGROWING 
EXISTING RESOURCES X NUMEROUS NEW 
DISTRIcrs DEMANDING IMMEDIATE REliEF WHICH 
CANNOT BE SUPPLIED EXCEPT AT EXPENSE OF 
ESTABLISHED AREAS.~ 
The worsening situation, and the barrage of criticism directed at the NAD's attempts 
to relieve distress through the distribution of maize, led to the CNC PMB, Mr J 
Mould Young and Mr S D Malcolm being summoned urgently to Cape Town for 
40. Natal Witness, 18 January 1932. 
41. See interview with A W Lee, Natal Mercury, 22 December 1931 and NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 
94A, File 68/1 (Part I), S 0 Malcolm to CNC PMB, 29 December 1931. This view was also 
shared by /langa Lase Natal, which wrote: "Between the White and the Black Imfolozi· [sic] 
there will be no harvest, and most of their [the Africans'] stock is dead which places the 
Natives in an intolerable state." /langa lase Natal, 12 February 1932. 
42. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, File 68/1, SNA to CNC PMB, 6 January 1932. 
43. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, File 68/1 (Part I), S 0 Malcolm to CNC PMB. ,:!I) December 
1931. 
44 NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, File 68/1 (Part I), CNC PMB to SNA, 8 January) lJ.\,:! . 
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discussions with the SNA, Major Herbst and the Minister of Native Affairs, Mr E G 
Jansen. It was decided that the existing system of relief in the reserves of Natal and 
Zulu land should be replaced by a system of relief works: 
It has been decided that the present system of establishing 
depots in every magistracy from which mealies are issued to 
distressed natives should be abandoned as soon as possible, and 
there will be substituted a scheme of relief works, and every 
effort made to absorb natives in connection with irrigation 
schemesa~oad work, and in any other sort of work which can be 
devised. 
The Treasury and the Cabinet were growing anxious at the funds being expended on 
relieving distress in Zululand, while the unemployment situation of whites was daily 
growing more serious. Instructions were issued that no Africans were to be assisted 
outside of the reserves and that maize should be issued sparlngly.46 llanga lase 
Natal was naturally very critical of the stance taken by those opposed to relief 
measures, especially the storekeepers. In an article entitled "The Zulus are 
Starving", the newspaper drew attention to the plight of the people in the affected 
reserves and praised the attempts of the authorities to alleviate distress. It added a 
note of warning to the storekeepers: 
But ~he storekeepers who derive good business from the 
Natives in normal times had complained that the Government 
is interfering with their business in giving the dole of mealies to 
starving Natives. Others in town and country seem to be glad 
to have Natives offer their services for 5s. a month, and in 
some cases work only for board and lodging as is the case in the 
Vryheid district. Relief works promised by the Government 
cannot absorb all Natives who are famine stricken; and the 
prejudice against Govemm~nt help shown by a certain class of 
white people, may alter the attitude of the Native towards the 
Government, and the day may com~ when the storekeepers 
may need the support of the Natives.41 
By February 1932, a staggering 38 300 bags of maize had been ordered for 
distribution,48 of which the following had actually been issued: 
45. Natal Mercury, 22 January 1932. 
46. CAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, File 68/1 (Part I), SNA telegram to CNC PMB, 26 January 1932. 
47. /langa lase Natal, 12 February 1932. 




























350 bags (Relief Works) 
60 bags (Relief Works) 
30 577 bags49 
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The seriousness of the situation was highlighted by a communication from the 
Senior Veterinary Officer for Natal, who informed the CNC PMB that cattle losses 
Between June and November, 1931 had been catastrophic: 
Native Areas of Natal On Crown Land 
and Zululand Occupied by Mricans 
June 13060 268 
July 15850 332 
August 19923 370 
September 32403 422 
October 42134 817 
November 39723 686 
Total 203326 2905 
Total cattle losses by Africans in re~erves and on crown land were thus 206 231.50 
The government, unmoved, decided that no further funds would be made available 
for the issue of maize to Africans, after 31 March 1932. Ten thousand bags of maize 
were bought to tide relief efforts over 1932/33.51 The SNA issued the following 
instructions: 
49. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, FIle 68/1 (Part I), CNC PMB to SNA, 4 February 1932. 
SO. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, FIle 68/1 (Part I), Senior Veterinary Officer to CNC PMB, 
8 February 1932. 
51. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, (Part I), SNA telegram to CNC PMB, 9 March 1932. 
Owing to the necessity for husbanding the limited funds 
available for the relief of distress in order that they may be 
utilized to the greatest advantage ... TI:te issuing o! mea.lie~ in 
bulk should be discontinued and that 10 future stnctly IInuted 
rations of mealies should be issued solely for the relief of 
specific cases of actual starvation ... The underlying principle is 
that the Department will in these cases ~rovide t~e bare ~eans 
of subsistence and the scale upon whictsfIealles are Issued 
should be similar to that of pauper rations. 
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In addition to the need to conserve resources, there were other considerations, as 
the SNA indicated: 
Care should be exercised that no relief is extended to Natives 
who refuse work. Many complaints have been received that 
work has been refused on the grounds that t~~ Government's 
relief measures have rendered It unnecessary. 
The purchase of 10 000 bags of maize was a mistake, as the CNC PMB pointed 
out,54 as much of the maize would undoubtedly be spoilt by infestations of weevils 
but the SNA telegraphed " ... FULLY REALISE DIFFICULTIES MENTIONED 
BUT NO MONEY WILL BE AVAILABLE NEXT YEAR ... REL YING ON YOUR 
CO·OPERATION IN MEETING DIFFICULT POSmON AND 
SAFEGUARDING NATIVE INfEREST.55 
The distribution of maize continued, albeit on a much smaller scale and as late as 
1937, maize was still being distributed in certain parts of Zululand.56 A total of 
some 50100 bags of maize had been purchased for distribution by April 1932.57 
52. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Fale 68/1 (Part I), SNA to CNC PMB, 23 February 1932. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Mould Young appears to have been determined to place his fears on record, for he sent two 
telegrams to the SNA warning of weevils. In the second (confidential) telegram he advised: 
" ... GREATLY FEAR THIS WILL LEAD TO SCANDAL AND MUST AGAIN GRAVELY 
URGE SUITABLE ACCOMMODATION SHOULD BE OBTAINED WHERE GRAIN IS 
HELD FOR DELIVERY". See NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Fale 68/1 (Part I), CNC PMB to 
SNA, 9 March 1932 and Ibid., 10 December 1932. 
55. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Ftle 68/1 (Part I), SNA telegram to CNC PMB, 9 March 1932. 
56. See NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 95A, 96A and CJ7A. 
57. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 95A, FHe 68/1 (Part II), SNA to CNC PMB, 19 April 1932. 
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The idea of beginning relief works was followed up by Malcolm, who devised plans 
to construct and repair roads, to build stock dams and irrigation works and a 
caUseway over the Umvoti River, at an estimated cost of £81 250.58 This figure was 
drastically reduced by the CNC PMB, for the plan he submitted to the SNA would 
cost only £20 625, of which £16 375 was included in departmental estimates for the 
year 1932/33.59 Most of the planned works involved road repair and road-building, 
although some stock dams were also to be built. It was proposed that, as in Eshowe 
and Nkandhla, Africans on relief wor~s were to be paid in maize, not cash. 
No evidence could be found regarding conditions on these relief works, nor on the 
numbers receiving assistance. Malcolm estimated that 600 Africans would be 
employed, but it is not known if this figure was achieved or exceeded. It appears 
that the scheme was put into operation, as the Natal Provincial Administration 
contributed £1 000 towards the costs, despite being committed to a ''White Labour 
Policy" on the road works it administered.60 It was reported in January 1933 that 
"great difficulty" was being experienced finding sufficient labour for the relief works 
in Zululand, which was seen as a sign that they were no longer necessary. 61 
The Native Affairs Department (NAD) spent £35 800 on famine relief in Natal and 
Zululand in 1931/32, some 81 per cent of its total expenditure for the Union in that 
year. It also wrote off some £30 000 of the taxes owed by Africans, which also 
helped Africans to some extent.62 
However, these were not the only measures adopted by the NAD to alleviate the 
~istress in the reserves. Already discussed in an earlier chapter was the 
department's attempt to involve the African population of the reserves in the 
growing of sugar-cane.63 Their efforts at liaising with the South African Sugar 
58. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Fde 68/1 (Part I), Undated plan by S D Malcolm forwarded to 
CNCPMB. 
59. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Fde 68/1 (Part I), CNC PMB to SNA, 29 March 1932. 
60. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 94A, Fde 68/1 (Part 1), CNC PMB to SNA, 31 March 1932. 
61. South African Outlook, 2 January 1933. No one asppears to have ascribed this lack of 
enthusiasm to the extremely exploitative conditions on these relief works. Relief workers were 
only paid in maize; no cash changed hands. 
62. Cope, To Bind the Nation, p. 262. 
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Association in this regard, however, were largely unsuccessful. In a confidential 
letter to the CNC PMB, the SNA wrote: "It does not look if you are going to get 
much help from the Sugar Association, it is just all talk as usual.,,64 
In January 1932, as a direct result of the chronic unemployment and the high level of 
distress prevalent in the reserves of Natal and Zululand, the CNC PMB decided to 
boost the employment of Africans from these areas, by refusing entry passes to 
those who were termed "extra-Natal Natives". A circular was issued to all 
' Magistrates and Native Commissioners throughout the province, advising them to 
refuse to issue such passes.65 The farmers of the province soon got wind of this, and 
a flood of complaints began to pour in. Many farmers, especially wattle and cane 
growers, used "extra-Natal" African labour from Basutoland, Transkei and 
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and actually preferred such labour to Zulu, 
for a variety of reasons.66 
Mould Young received support from Herbst, but also a warning: 
We oUght to prevent Portuguese Natives coming over your 
borders now but you will have to be very careful that the 
farmers do not get wind of any instructions you may give ~ we 
will get the reaction in the House [of Assembly] at once ... 
This warning was already too late, as the sugar farmers, led by Heaton Nicholls and 
Duncan Eadie, had already made it clear that this state of affairs was not acceptable 
to them. An attempt by the CNC to placate the sugar and wattle farmers by 
exempting those "extra-Natal" workers who were employed on a contract or semi-
permanent basis,68 was unsucc~ssful and Mould Young was forced' to telegraph for 
63. See Chapter Six. 
64. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. (J7A, Ftle 68/33, SNA to CNC PMB,2 March 1932. 
65. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. (J7A, Ftle 68/33, Circular No. 1/32,27 January 1932. 
66. There were many letters of complaint and the foUowing are merely a selection: NAD, CNC 
PMB, Vol. (J7A, Ftle 68/33, Underberg Farmer's Association to Magistrate Himeville, 
22 March 1932; CNC PMB to ° M Eadie (Secretary of the SA Sugar A~sociation), 
24 February 1932. 
67. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. (J7A, File 68/33, Confidential letter from SNA til CNC PMB, 
18 February 1932. 
68. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. (J7A, File 68/33, Circular 3/32 from CNC to all Magi~trates and 
Native Commissioners, 4 February 1932. 
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permission to revoke the ban entirely, and this was granted.69 In two subsequent 
communications, the CNC PMB blamed the withdrawal of the ban on the opposition 
from cane and wattle farmers.70 Fears of insufficiency and "unsuitability" in 
African labour therefore thwarted this attempt to raise the employment level of 
Africans from the reserves of Natal and Zululand. 
A further attempt to increase the employment of Africans from the reserves on the 
gold mines of the Witwatersrand, detailed in the previous chapter,?1 also appears to 
have come to naught, mainly due to the aversion many Zulu-speaking Africans had 
to working underground. Despite the relatively high levels of unemployment and 
considerable distress prevalent in the reserves, many Africans refused to volunteer 
for mine work.72 
There may indeed have been a tendency for Africans, even under the direst of 
domestic circumstances, to refuse to offer themselves for work. Some feared 
malaria: 
Although there are many young men now at their kraals, they 
are disinclined to go out to work. The general excuse is that 
they are afraid of contracting malarial feverJ5 
Other Africans simply refused to enter the wage-labour market.74 Fears were 
constantly expressed that Africans were "taking advantage of the Government" and 
that their "natural indolence" was being catered to by the distribution of relief maize. 
Farmers were especially brutal in their condemnation of the NAD's efforts to 
69. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. fJ7A, FIle 68/33, SNA to CNC, 18 March 1933. 
70. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. fJ7A, FIle 68/33, CNC PMB to SNA, 19 March 1932 and 5 April 1932. 
71. See Chapter Seven. 
72. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. fJ7A, FIle 68/33, CNC PMB to Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC), 
30 March 1932. 
73. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. fJ7A, FIle 68/33, Magistrate Nongoma to T Wilson (Farmer) 
Gingindhlovu, 13 April 1932. 
74. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 95A, File 68/1 (Part llI), NC Weenen to CNC PMB, 21 September 
1933. See also CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Gilbert Manning Robinson representing the 
Zululand Farmers' Union, Empangeni, 26 September 1930, p. 1818. 
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alleviate the distress caused by the drought and the depression. Ever-sensitive to the 
farmers' opinions, the government was forced to remind those involved in relief 
work that: 
The Minister of Native Affairs has directed that officers 
charged with the distrib~tion of ~ealies for the ~elief of 
distress amongst the Nat.lv~ population should ke~p 10 touch 
with the Farmers' AsSOCIation and consult them In regard to 
the labour requirements of their respective Districts. On no 
account must mealies be supplied or assistance given to Natives 
who refuse work available for them on farms. Please instruct 
all officers concerned in the aga under your control to give 
effect to the Minister's wishes. 
In conclusion, it is difficult to assess the success of the government's measures aimed 
at alleviating the distress caused to the African population of the reserves by the 
twins disasters of depression and drought. Many of the attempts of the NAD were 
thwarted by the vested interests of white farmers and storekeepers, of whom many 
expected to benefit from the tribulations of Africans. What is certain is that the 
Africans in the reserves did suffer a great deal of hardship, and that the government 
achieved considerably less than it might have in its attempts to alleviate the distress. 
In the urban areas, where Natal's major unemployment problem among whites lay, 
the chief government agency concerned with the relief of unemployment was the 
Department of Labour. The Department of Labour76 was intended to assist 
unemployed white males in a number of ways: firstly, it would keep records of the 
unemployed and act as a labour bureau, attempting to match employers who 
required labour with suitably qualified workers. Secondly, the Department would 
assist by subsidising, from its budge~ various job-creation projects and by 
recompensing employing authorities which replaced cheap black labour with more 
expensive white workers (in line with the "civilised labour" policy). This, in effect, 
was to be one of the chief instruments of the government in its attempts to relieve 
unemployment, for this policy applied equally to those authorities employing 
"civilised labour" on a permanent basis and to those that chose to employ such 
workers in a temporary capacity, as relief workers. Thirdly, it would co-ordinate 
75. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 95A, Ftle 68/1 (Part D), SNA to CNC PMB, 19 July 1932. 
76. The government also made use of the Post Office in the rural areas where the Department of 
Labour had no offices. 
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activities and ensure minimal overlapping of relief efforts. Beyond this, the 
government was reluctant to go.77 
This policy decision thrust most of the burden of relieving the distress caused by 
unemployment in the urban areas onto the local authorities, a role which most were 
reluctant to accept, as the following resolution illustrates: 
This Council holds that the problem of unemployment of 
whites as now below [sic] the level of Non-Europeans and the 
questions arising therefrom are national and should be met by 
the Government out of taxation of those citizens, with the 
ability to pay, and urges the Government, as representin~~he 
Union to shoulder its supreme obligations in this direction. 
The City Council of Pietermaritzburg expressed similar sentiments: 
The Corporation does not acknowledge any responsibility for 
the relief of unemployment 0~9distress, being of the opmion 
that these are national matters. 
Even llanga lase Natal concurred with such sentiments: 
We are not in a position to know the various causes that have 
made so many people, Europeans as well as Natives to be in 
need of employment, but this we know that it is the burden of 
the Government to bring to work all its machinery to ease the 
position of such as are unemolDyed if they are employable, 
whether Europeans or Natives:SU 
17. The government established a Committee to investigate the unemployment situation in the 
Union, which reported in 1932. The Committee made a number of recommendations, such as 
the establishment of a special £5 000 000 fund for the establishment of State relief works and 
the co-ordination and implementation of the normal Public Works programme (which the 
government had curtailed as an economy measure), neither of which was ever implemented. 
The government did, however, implement recommendations on the extension of existing relief 
works. See Union of South Africa, Report 01 tM Unemployment Investigation Committee, 
U.G. 30 of 1932. 
78. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Durban Town Council, 12 August 1932. 
79. NAD, 3/pMB, Report of the ' Sub-Committee appointed to interview the Provincial Executive 
on the Administration of Poor Relief, City Council Minutes, 8 December 1931. 
80. llanga lase Natal, '6 March 1931. 
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The Union government paid little heed to such articles and resolutions. No 
"alphabet soup" of government agencies was established to deal with the problem, as 
was done in the United States, nor did the government ever contemplate making 
cash payments to the unemployed. The Union did not institute an Unemployment 
Insurance or "dole" system until 1937, long after the depression had passed.81 The 
government clearly saw its role in the urban areas as being largely confined to the 
subsidisation by the Department of Labour of relief works begun by provincial 
administrations, municipalities, divisional councils and para-statal organisations like 
the South African Railways. 
In granting such subsidies account was taken of the extent to which the applying 
authority implemented the "civilised labour" policy, its financial resources and the 
level of unemployment prevalent in the area.82 The Department also distinguished, 
for subsidy purposes, between those workers employed in a permanent capacity and 
those employed on relief works, which were viewed as temporary. For white 
workers taken into full municipal employ the subsidy was granted for a period of 
three years; 50 per cent for the first year, 30 per cent for the second year and 20 per 
cent for the third year. These subsidies were intended to bridge the gap between the 
wages paid to unskilled blacks and a minimum wage of 6s per day for unskilled 
whites. This applied only to fit men. Where the municipalities chose to employ 
semi-fit men on a permanent basis, the subsidy was 20 per cent on a minimum wage 
of 5s per day.83 
In respect of those fit men employed on relief works, the subsidy was 50 per cent of 
the difference between black 'and "civilised labour" on a minimum daily wage of 
6s.84 In respect of semi-fit men employed on relief works, the subsidy would only 
amount to 25 per cent of the difference, provided that the relevant provincial 
administration also contributed 25 per cent. The municipality would therefore still 
have to contribute the major portion of the costs.85 The absorption of unemployed 
81. Davies, Capital, p. 90 (note 27) and pp. 316 - 317. 
82. Union of South Africa, Annual Report of the Department of lAbour, U.G. 37 of 1933, p. 7. 
83. Ravenscroft, "Depression", p. 49. Note: The 6s daily minimum wage applied only to the major 
urban centres. 
84. Ibid. 
85. Ibid., p. SO. 
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whites into full municipal service was not popular with municipalities, who were 
reluctant to commit themselves to the extra expense.86 There were, however, other 
considerations in Natal: 
That in regard to the question of the absorption of white 
unskilled labour into the Corporation servIce, the Town 
Council is of opinion that in the peculiar conditions of Durban 
where the Indian and Native population so greatly outnumbers 
the white population, the Town Council must study the 
interests of Indians and Natives as well as the European 
population. For that reason work carried out in the Durban 
area must be carried out on the economic basis, i.e. affording 
fair employment of Indian and Native labour. The Council is 
therefore of opinion that any work started to relieve the 
present abnormal conditions should be in the nature of 
temporary relief works and not designed for the permanent 
absorpti9n of white unskilled labour into Corporation 
Works.M 
As has been demonstrated, the government's conservative economic policy dictated 
that in times of depression when revenue accruing to the state declined, rigid 
economy should be practised and expenditure trimmed to the bone. A variety of 
economy measures were instituted to balance the budget. Unfortunately, one area 
in which expenditure was reduced was that which ought, by rights, to have received 
increased funding, the agency which was dispensing assistance to the urban 
unemployed, the Department of Labour. As the following table clearly illustrates, 
the government actually allocated a smaller proportion of the national budget to the 
Department of Labour during the depression years, when the calls upon it for 
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Source: Annual Reports of the Auditor-General for relevant years. 
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This situation may be explained partially by the conservative budgetary policies of 
the government, and partially by the very heavy calls which other government 
policies, aimed at keeping farmers on the land in a time of low producer prices and 
drought, made on the treasury. Government spending on export subsidies to 
primary producers also consumed millions of pounds.88 As illustrated above,89 the 
government had found it expedient to assist those who had brought it to power, a not 
impolitic move at a time when many elected governments were under considerable 
threat.90 Government assistance to the rural areas had clearly been made a 
priority.91 However, the Department of Labour itself did not make use of all the 
money it had been allocated, but in line with government fiscal policy, surrendered 
large surplusses during the depression years, as table 8.3 illustrates: 
Table 8.3 
Amounts Allocated and Expended by the Department of Labour, 









































Source: Annual Reports of t~e Auditor-General for relevant years. 
86. Union of South Africa, Report of the Department of LAbow 1933, p. 7. 
87. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Town Council, 21 September 1931. 
88. For a full discussion of the costs involved in the government's agricultural support programme, 
see Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", pp. 237 - 244. . 
89. See above p. 252 - 255. 
90. The depression appears to have been responsible for the creation of a number of coalition 
governments or "Best Man Ministries" around the world. Other governments were simply 
turned out by voters. This will be dealt with in Chapter N'me. 
91 . This view is shared by Minnaar, "South African White Agriculture", p. 269. 
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Those in management positions at the Department of Labour appear to have 
followed the lead of their parsimonious political masters, for in addition to not 
expending their full budget, the amount the Department actually spent on relieving 
unemployment was also substantially smaller during the years of the depression, as 












Expenditure by the Department of Labour on Unemployment 
Relief, showing percentages of the Total Budget in £, 
for the period 1926/27 -1934/35 
Total Unemployment Percentage 
Expenditure Expenditure 
252439/00/02 170981/00/00 67,73 
278545/11/10 196 163/00/00 70,42 
244 997/06/06 162391/00/00 66,28 
232469/07/01 148979/19/02 64,09 
193440/14/11 108875/08/05 56,28 
138 523/18/00 53306/14/05 38,48 
201 539/18/05 127590/05/04 63,31 
245 891/06/08 162699/14/06 66,17 
587359/11/07 497 138/15/07 84,64 
Source: Annual Reports of the Auditor-General for relevant years. 
Despite these budgetary constraints, the Department of Labour did make it possible 
for additional (mostly white) workers to be employed in the public sector by the 
granting of loans to employing authorities, which might otherwise not have been 
able to initiate or maintain relief works. Some £117506 was thus loaned in 1933, 
with £69 756 going to municipaiities~92 Even this was not as important, however, as 
the subsidisation of relief workers in the pay of a wide variety of employers, mostly 
in the public sector. 
Before discussing the operation of relief works, it is necessary to understand the 
official attitude towards them. Relief works were not seen as charity: 
We consider that public relief, being intended to relieve 
distress only among the able-bodied, should take the form of 
92. Union of South Africa, Annual Report of the Department of Labour, U.G. 37 of 1933, p. 7. 
relief works, conducted strictly on the principle that assistance 
is only given in return for work done. Relief works should not 
be a method of dispensing charity. They should simply be the 
means by which the Government enables a number of people 
to make a living by hard work, when owing to sudden 
circumstances, over which they have ~g control, they cannot 
get work and are in danger of starving. 
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Relief works were to be of a temporary nature; virtually no one wanted to create a 
class of workers forever dependent on the state: 
Conditions of employment on relief works should be distinctly 
less advantageous than those normally obtainable in ordinary 
unskilled employment. It is clearly undesirable that the State 
should be forced to maintain relief works longer than is really 
necessary, and workers on them shoulS
4
be encouraged to leave 
as soon as work can be got elsewhere. 
In both Durban95 and Pietermaritzburg,96 relief works had been in operation ever 
since the First World War. On the advent of the Great Depression, therefore, the 
existing works were simply extended and expanded. In Durban, the Corporation 
had already borne the greater part of the costs involved in maintaining relief works, 
which from 1921 to 1928/29 alone had cost f272 443, of which the council had been 
responsible for 79,67 per cent.97 The burden of payment ultimately fell upon the 
ratepayers. While wishing to assist distressed fellow citizens, the council was wary of 
overgenerosity in the provision of relief works, not only to spare the ratepayers, but 
also to avert the danger of attracting the unemployed from other areas.98 
It was primarily for this reason that very little was done to extend the existing relief 
works until the third quarter of 1931, when the number of men accommodated rose 
93. Union of South Africa, Report 0/ the Unemployment Investigation Committee, U.G.3O of 
1932, p. 17. As is stated in this Report, a distinction was drawn between Poor Relief - the 
charity in the form of food rations dispensed by magistrates to indigents - and relief works. 
94. Ibid. 
95. See Edley, "Population", pp. 68 - 69. 
96. Owen, "White Unemployment". 
1l7. Natal Mercury, 28 August 1931 and Edley, "Population", p. 69. 
98. Mayor's Minute 1928, p. 5. 
274 
from 140 to 490.99 Another reason, already alluded to, was the council's conviction 
that responsibility for dealing with the problem lay with the central government. lOO 
A further cause of delay was that the council was expecting the road works begun by 
the provincial council to absorb the majority of the unemployed of the town. At a 
meeting of the Council-in-Committee in early 1930: 
[Mr Tobias, the Divisional Inspector of Labour for Natal] 
intimated that road work would soon be offering in Natal, in 
the construction of roads (a) from Port Shepstone to Prince 
Alfred; (b) from Ladysmith to the National Park and (c) from 
Muden to Greytown .. .it was the wish of the Government to 
recruit these men as far as possible from the fit men on existing 
relief works ... He could not say definitely but it was to be 
inferred, that Government would not view sympathetically the 
granting of subsidies for thfofmployment on Municipal relief 
works of physically fit men. 
As a direct consequence of this meeting, it was decided not to increase the number 
of workers on the council's relief works " ... until such time as all the unemployed in 
Durban have been absorbed in the Government road works".102 
The government was apparently still unsure of its policy, but it was suggested that 
employment on relief works in the urban areas should be restricted to semi-fit 
men.103 This was rejected by the council, acting on the advice of the Borough 
Engineer, who stated that relief works would not be able to function with semi-fit 
men alone.104 Of the council's 140 relief workers, 100 were employed on a daily 
basis for road works, quarrying and land reclamation, and were paid a daily wage of 
8s per man. The remainder were older and semi-fit, 10 being employed on land 
reclamation at the Eastern Vlei, while another 30 were employed in the parks, 
gardens, cemeteries and on the beaches. These men received a daily wage of 6s per 
day. lOS 
99. Mayor's Minute 1931, p. 18. 
100. See above, p. 268. 
101. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 7 January 1930. 
102 Ibid. 
103. The interview with the council was followed by a letter from Tobias to the Council in which he 
expressed exactly these sentiments. NAD, 3jDBN, Letter from Tobias to Council, 
20 February 1930, included in Minutes of Council, 7 March 1930. 
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Meanwhile the unemployment situation in the town was growing worse and the 
council received a number of requests from the public, in the form of deputations 
and letters, for more to be done for the unemployed.106 At a meeting of the 
Unemployment Sub-Committee in October 1930, it was decided to create positions 
on the relief works for an additional 800 men in the following few months. t07 
When the full council met, however, this was deemed to be too ambitious and the 
number was reduced to 250, provided that a subsidy could be obtained from the 
Department of Labour. Even with the subsidy, this would cost the council an extra 
09594, if administration and costs of equipment were included.108 Despite the 
proposal being approved, it was not until February 1931 that the scheme came into 
operation. 109 
Unemployment among Durban's small "coloured" community resulted in the council 
instituting relief works for 30 of these men in June 1931. It is a measure of the 
seriousness of the situation that the Borough Engineer was authorised to engage the 
men even before the Department of Labqur had been approached for the requisite 
subsidy. The men were to be paid a daily wage of 4s 6d.110 
The total cost of relief works mounted by the council in 1930/31 amounted to some 
£30 666 16s lId, of which the council paid as 307 16s 5d, by far the largest portion 
of the costs. 111 
In July 1931, Councillor Mrs Edith Benson suggested that 100 white relief workers 
~ permanently employed by the. council in place of 200 African and Indian 
104. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 7 March 1930. 
105. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 5 April 1930. 
106. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 24 October 1930. 
107. Natal Mercury, 1 November 1930. 
108. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 6 November 1930. 
109. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 27 February 1931. 
110. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 5 June 1931. 
111. Mayor's Minute 1931, p. xx. 
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employees, who were then engaged in the construction of footpaths. Mrs Benson 
argued that this would involve extra expenditure of only 4s 6d per man per day, as 
the African and Indian workers were receiving 3s per man per day.112 This was 
adopted on an experimental basis, with 34 whites replacing Indians and Africans. l13 
The council was under constant pressure from the government to absorb more white 
relief workers into full municipal employ, and Mrs Benson's scheme marked the 
beginning of the breakdown of council resolve that this should not happen.114 In 
April 1932, a further 100 white relief workers were taken into full municipal 
service. lIS 
By November 1931, there were 600 men employed on relief works in the town.116 
However, as the ranks of the unemployed were growing daily, the Secretary of the 
Department of Labour, Mr Ivan Walker, visited the town to propose that new relief 
works be set up to employ an additional 600 men. The situation in Durban was 
considered to be so grave that the Union government was prepared, through the 
Department of Labour, to subsidise the scheme to the extent of 3s per man per day, 
on a daily wage of 6s per man, for a five-day working week.117 While accepting the 
dire necessity of the scheme, the council thOUght the wages proposed by the 
Department were too low and the Town Treasurer was asked to work out the extra 
costs involved in bringing the wage up to 7s 6d per man per day.l18 The issue was 
resolved by an agreement that the men would be paid on a staggered scale; 6s for 
the first two months, 7s for the following two months and, finally, 8s per ~an per 
day, following a further two months' satisfactory service. At the same time, the 
wages of "coloured" relief workers were also increased to 6s per man per day.l19 
112. NAD,3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 31 July 1931. There was obviously 
something wrong with the councillor's arithmetic. 
113. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 21 September 1931. It was decided that 
the African and Indian workers so displaced were not to be dismissed, but transferred. 
114. See above p. 269 - 272. 
115. Mayor's Minute 1932, p. xx. 
116. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 5 November 1931. 
117. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Town Council, 20 June 1932. 
118. Ibid. 
119. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Town Council, 8 July 1932. 
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Municipal relief works in Durban cost a total of £52642 8s 8d in the municipal year 
1931/32, of which the NP A and the government (through the Department of 
Labour) together contributed only £9 860 12s 2d, leaving the lion's share of 
£42 78116s 6d to be paid by the Durban Town Council. Appeals to the government 
to increase its contribution towards the costs involved in the maintenance of relief 
works were refused "on financial grounds". Instead, the Department of Labour 
suggested that an additional 200 semi-fit men be employed on relief works, for 
which the Department would be prepared to contribute 2s 6d of the proposed wage 
of 5s per man per day. This offer was accepted after the council had again debated 
the low wage offered.120 
After representations from the Indian community about the high level of 
unemployment and the effects of the discriminatory "civilised labour" policy, the 
Town Council agreed to begin relief works for Indians. Initially, a scheme which 
would have provided employment for only 100 men "in recognised Indian areas" was 
mooted but, after debate, it was decided to increase this number substantially, to 
300.121 The Department of Labour was prepared to contribute half the daily cost 
of 3s per man. 122 By the end of the municipal year 1932/33 therefore, there were 
1 400 relief workers in Durban: 
Old Section 
New Section - Whites 
New Section - Coloureds 
Semi-fit (Stone breakers) 
Permanent European.Labourers 









120. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Counci1-in-Committee, 15 September 1932. 
121. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Counci1-in-Committee, 12 January 1933. 
122. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Counci1-in·Committee, 24 January 1933. 
123 "Old Section". refer.s to those " workers ~mployed prior to June 1932 and those employed 
subsequently m thetr places. New Secbon" refers to those workers employed after 1 June 
1932, under the amended conditions. Mayor's Minute 1933, p. 4. 
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Relief works cost £117 205 in the municipal year 1932/33, to which the Town 
Council contributed £82 445, while the NPA and the government contributed the 
remaining £34760.124 
During the municipal year 1933/34, the number of men employed on relief works 
declined somewhat as conditions in the town began to improve. The situation had 
not yet improved to the extent that relief works could be abolished, but no new 
works were begun and workers were encouraged to seek alternative employment. 
In the case of Indian relief workers, this "encouragement" took the form of a 
reduction of their daily wage by 6d per day, leaving them with only 2s 6d per 
man.125 The number of workers employed was: 
Old Section 
New Section - Whites 
New Section - Coloureds 
Semi-fit (Stone breakers) 
Permanent European Labourers 









The total cost of relief works in the town for this municipal year was £102 
38614s 6d, of which sum the council contributed £73 699 7s 10d, while the NPA and 
the government paid in the remaining £28 687 6s 8d.127 
Overall, it is obvious that the ' Durban Town Council, through its ratepayers, had 
been obliged to bear the greater portion of the costs involved in initiating and 
maintaining relief works for the unemployed in the urban area. This analysis lends 
credence to the argument that the government left the major burden of the 
provision of unemployment relief in the urban areas to the local authorities. This 
involved the major urban centre of Natal in considerable expense, as the total 
124. Mayor's Minute 1933, p. xxiv. 
125. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 3 January 1934. 
126. Mayor's Minute 1934, p. xxv. 
127. Ibid. 
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contribution of the Durban Town Council in the period 1929/30 to 1933/34 was the 
astronomical sum of £236530 out of a total cost of £318755, or 74 per cent of the 
total cost, as table 8.5 illustrates: 
Table 8.5 
Costs of Relief Works in Durban, showing portion contributed 
by the Town Council in cash, to the nearest £ and expressed as a percentage, 
1929/30 to 1933/34 
Year Total Cost Cost to Council Percentage 
1929/30 15854 12297 78 
1930/31 30667 25308 83 
1931/32 52643 42782 81 
1932/33 117205 82445 70 
1933/34 102387 73698 72 
Total 318756 236530 74 
Source: Adapted from Edley, "Population", p. 78. 
This largely unforeseen expenditure plunged the Council into deficit at a time when 
the financial situation of the borough dictated moderation. In common with most 
local authorities, Durban was expecting a decline in revenue as the depression grew 
worse. Furthermore, the town was not willing to incur massive expenditure, as it 
already had substantial accumulated debts in the form of outstanding loans of some 
£394 947 as early as 1927.128 The situation, however, made it imperative that the 
burgesses of the town should be assisted through relief works as so little else was 
being done for the unemployed. The cost to the town was proportionately more 
than even the government was spending, as the following table illustrates: 
Table 8.6 
Annual Budget of Durban Town Council, Showing Income, 
Expenditure, Amount Spent on Relief Works and percentage of Total Budget 
spent on relief works, 1929/30-1933/34 
(to the nearest £) 
Year Income Expenditure . Balance Relief per cent 
Works 
1929/30 3326702 2881067 +445635 12297 0,43 
1930/31 2705778 2684 829 + 20949 25308 0,94 
1931/32 2529154 2542770 - 13 616 42782 1,68 
1932/33 2711910 2780035 - 68125 82445 2,97 
1933/34 2627173 2613 091 + 14082 73698 2,82 
Source: Natal Mercury, 28 August 1931 and Mayor's Minutes for relevant 
years. 
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The Town Council did, therefore, have a legitimate complaint against the 
government, for the council was spending proportionately more of its budget on the 
relief of unemployment than the government was spending on the Department of 
Labour, which was the chief dispensing agent of relief in the urban areas, for all 
years except 1929/30.129 It is little wonder then, that despite the high levels of 
unemployment prevalent in the town, the council was extremely reluctant to spend 
more than was absolutely necessary. Only legitimate residents of the town could be 
assisted and, consequently, a three-year residential qualification for employment on 
the relief works was imposed.130 
While relief works were instituted for white, "coloured" and Indian unemployed in 
the borough, no relief works were ever contemplated for the African unemployed of 
Durban. All that appears to have been done was to supply free accommodation and 
meals to starving Africans. In the period 24 October 1931 to 23 February 1932, this 
cost the council the comparatively paltry sum of £144 16s Od. In January 1932, it was 
decided that Africans who wished to make use of this scheme would be set to work 
weeding compound grounds, and would be given one meal for every bag of weeds 
collected. Despite objections from the Municipal Auditor, Mr A Graham-Cook, it 
was decided to continue this scheme.!31 Reports were published in the Natal 
Mercury132 and in the Natal Advertiser,133 that starving Africans in Durban were 
receiving assistance from the Natal Workers' Club, but when this was investigated, 
the reports were deemed to have been exaggerated: 
I am satisfied that although there is undoubtedly a great deal of 
unemployment amongst . Natives in Durban, there is 
comparatively very ~ttle actual starvation. This may be 
128. See Town Treasurer's Report in Mayor's Minute 1927, p. xiii. 
129. See Table 8.2 above. 
130. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Works Committee, 28 September 1931. 
131. Natal Mercury, 9 March 1932. 
132. Natal Mercury, 11 August 1932. 
133. Natal Advertiser, 11 August 1932. 
accounted for by the fact that it is seldom that any nati~e w~o 
is in a position ty~elp another will refuse to do so, especIally 10 
regards to food. 4 
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The council appears to have done almost nothing for unemployed women, but the 
high level of juvenile unemployment prevalent in the town did prompt the council to 
appoint a special sub-committee to investigate possible avenues of assistance. 135 
This sub-committee reported that it was possible for the council to absorb some 51 
white youths into municipal employ if 27 Indian workers were displaced.136 The 
full council approved the permanent employment of these youths, on condition that 
Indian workers be not dismissed but transferred. No juveniles were to be employed 
until such time as the Indian workers had been transferred satisfactorily.137 
In Pietermaritzburg, the City Council had also had to reach deep into its pockets to 
provide relief works for its citizens after the First World War, relief works having 
been initiated in May 1922. Relief provided by the City Council up to July 1923 had 
cost £5 600.138 By 1928, the council, through the Works Committee, was spending 
approximately £2 500 a year on employing approximately 35 white relief 
workers.139 In 1928 these 35 men were bei~g employed as follows: 
Race Course Ironstone Quarry 
Parks Department 
Road Patching Gang 









The costs to the council amounted to £1 158 8s 5d in this year.140 Even before the 
onset of the depression, the number of relief workers had been increased from 20 to 
134. NAD, CNC PMB, Vol. 13A, File N7/8/2, Native Commissioner, Durban to CNC, PMB, 8 
October 1932. The Native Commissioner in Durban further pointed out that the Natal 
Workers' Club was an ICU controlled body and when he had interviewed the Secretary, the 
latter had been quite unable to furnish particulars. 
135. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 30 October 1931. 
136. The other positions would be specially created. 
137. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 22 April 1932. 
138. City of Pietermaritzburg, Corporation Year Book, 1923, p. 19. 
139. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Fmance and General Purposes Committee, 27 September 1928. 
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35 men, although the government only subsidised the original 20. The state of 
unemployment in the city may be gauged from the fact that a total of 420 
applications for places on relief works had been made by 31 July 1929, but only 35 
men were employed, while 30 more were on the waiting list.141 The cost to the 
council in this municipal year was £1041 19s 7d.142 
Unemployment in Pietermaritzburg seemed almost to be part of the permanent 
state of affairs in the city. Owen remarked that: 
The problem of unemployment in Pietermaritzburg fluctuated, 
indeed, it was becommg something that the corporation had 
realised it had to live with; no sooner did it seem as thou~ the 
situation was on the decline than it worsened again. ThlS was 
possibly because tp(3 authorities were treating the symptoms 
and not the cause. 
Thus by the time the depression reached Pietermaritzburg, many on the council 
were becoming concerned that relief works were assuming a permanent character: 
The provision of relief works was merely the provision of 
temporary employment until the men could find something 
more substantial. It was never intended that the works become 
permanent or that the men became permanent employees of 
the council; yet, some had selUed down permanently and 
seemed to want nothing better. I' 
It seems that although relief for unemployed whites had begun before the "civilised 
labour" policy was promulgated, a change of attitude had come about by the time of 
~he depression. Some councillors no longer perceived the employment of whites on 
relief works as a form of assistance, but rather as an obligation to implement 
government policy. By accepting the government subsidy they were paying 
uneconomic wages to white labourers 
140. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Treasurer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1928, p. 26. 
141. See City of Pietermaritzburg, City Engineer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1929. 
142. City of Pietermaritzburg, Report of the City Treasurer, Corporation Year Book, 1929, p. 26. 
143. Owen, "White Unemployment", p. 24. 
144. Councillor Cross in an interview with the Natal Witness, 15 January 1930. 
... of from 7s 6d. a day in order to further the government's 
white labour policy. They were doing so because the 
government pald half! Otherwise they would do better to 
employ Native labour. 45 
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Like their counterparts in Durban, the City Council resisted attempts to force it to 
absorb more whites into corporation service in a permanent capacity. In May 1930 
there were only 31 relief workers in the city. At this stage the Department of 
Labour encouraged the council to open positions on relief works to semi-fit men, 
equal in number to the number of fit men employed, and indicated willingness to 
contribute 20 per cent of their wages, if the provincial council could be persuaded to 
do likewise.146 At the end of the municipal year, however, only 21 men were 
employed, while a further 39 were on the waiting list. Some 448 men had applied 
for places on the relief works in the course of the year.147 The cost of maintaining 
relief works was, however, rising. The works cost the council £1 552 17s 10d in the 
year ended 31 July 1930.148 
In the municipal year ended 31 July 1931, the state of unemployment in the city had 
clearly grown worse, as 506 men had applied for places on the relief works, but only 
44 could be accommodated, while 51 were on the waiting list. The council paid 
some £1 616 17s 1d towards the costs of maintaining the relief works.149 In 
December 1931, there were only 22 men employed on relief works in the city and 
their tenure was decidedly insecure, as the subsidy agreement between the City 
Council and the Department of Labour was due to terminate on 31 January 1932. 
There was little likelihood of the subsidy being renewed unless the council were 
prepared to employ " ... a certain number of Civilised workers in place of Uncivilised 
workers."150 The Relief Works Sub-Committee had earlier stated the council's 
position: 
145. Ibid. 
146. NAD, 3jPMB, Minutes of the Fmance Committee, 22 May 1930. 
147. City of Pietermaritzburg, Borough Engineer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1930. 
148. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Treasurer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1930, p. 26. 
149. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Treasurer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1931, p. 28. 
150. NAD, 3jPMB, Minutes of the Works Committee, 23 December 1931. 
... the Borough is doing everything in its power to ensure 
permanent employment, but if the subsidy IS withdrar~l the 
position would be reviewed and the works closed down. 
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This stance was maintained throughout the depression years and even at the height 
of the crisis in June 1932, a special sub-committee, appointed to consider an 
expansion of relief works, had as the first item of their recommendations: 
That the policy of not displacing local Native l~~ourers in 
providing work for civilised labourers be adopted. 
Reporting on the Unemployment Conference which the Minister of Labour had 
called in Pretoria, the Mayor reiterated the council's viewpoint: 
While the major recommendation of the Conference - viz., 
that Municipalities should absorb a proportion of unskilled 
White Labour in Municipal service under a reducing subsidy -
was not ~ccfy~able to this Council, other Municipalities have 
adopted It ... 
In presenting his budget estimates for 1933/34, Councillor Mr A E Harwin said: 
The question of unemployment has assumed formidable 
dimensions, and although its daily impact has been somewhat 
relieved by the altogether praiseworthy and useful scheme 
initiated and brought into operation through the efforts of His 
Worship the Mayor, there still remains unsettled the whole 
policy of the Council with regard to the permanent 
employment of white labour, and apart from our undoubted 
obligations to o.ur Non-European people, how it can be 
provided for within the limits of our modest resources.l~4 
The Pietermaritzburg council seems to have been more resolute on this position as 
no evidence can be found that any relief workers were appointed to the council's 
permanent employ during the depression years. 
151. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Relief Works Sub-Committee, 27 May 1929. 
152. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the f'mance Committee, 30 June 1932. 
153. City of Pielermaritzburg, Mayor's Minute, Corporation Year Book, 1932. 
154. NAO, 3/PMB, Minutes of the FInance Committee, 26 September 1933. 
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This stance was maintained even when the Secretary of Labour, Mr Walker, visited 
the city. The council did, however, decide to bring onto the relief works an extra 100 
men, who would work a five-day week and receive a daily wage of between 4s 6d 
and 6s, depending on their tasks. A sum of £10 000 was set aside for Relief Capital 
Works for the following year. A scheme was established whereby the council gave 
preferential treatment to applications for employment on relief works of men who 
were receiving assistance from the Pietermaritzburg Benevolent Society (PBS), thus 
affording such men the opportunity to earn up to 27s per week, instead of the 5s 
which the PBS was able to give each case. The council grant to the PBS was 
proportionately reduced. 155 At the end of July 1932, however, there were still only 
111 men on relief works in the city,156 while 635 men had applied for places on 
those works during the year.157 Relief works in the city cost the council some 
£1 725 15s 1d, while the government contributed £443 15s 4d and the NPA 
£329 5s 7d. In addition, £334 had been raised by selling ironstone which had been 
quarried and broken by relief workers. 158 
By 1933, the situation in the city was critical, and 187 men were employed on relief 
works at the end of July in that year. Representations regarding the high levels of 
unemployment prevalent among members of the Indian community had resulted in 
50 Indians being given places on the relief works. 159 The Department of Labour 
paid a subsidy of Is 6d per man per day in respect of these workers.160 A similar 
representation was made in regard to the position of "coloured" unemployed in the 
city. The Divisional Inspector of Labour, Mr Tobias, wrote to the council 
... stating that it bad been represented that the assistance at present 
afforded the Coloured unemployed in Pietermaritzburg by the 
Council was insufficient to -meet the increasing number of Coloured 
unemployed and consequent distress1b1 
155. NAD, 3jPMB, Minutes of the Fmance Committee, 26 April 1932. 
156. City of Pietermaritzburg, Mayor's Minute, Corporation Year Book, 1932. 
157. City of Pietermaritzburg, Report of the City Engineer, Corporation Year Book, 19,"\2. 
158. City of Pietermaritzburg, Report of the City Treasurer, Corporation Year Book. 11)32, p. 28. 
159. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Fmance Committee, 11 April 1933. 
160. City of Pietermaritzburg, Mayor's Minute, Corporation Year Book, 1933. 
161. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Works Committee, 7 February 1933. 
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Tobias offered a subsidy, which was accepted. The men employed on relief works 
were deployed as follows: 
Roadworks (Europeans) 
Roadworks (Coloureds) 
Ironstone Quarry (Europeans) 
Ironstone Quarry (Coloureds) 
Parks (Europeans) 
Electricity Dept (Europeans) 










Costs had also escalated dramatically and amounted to some £5 763 5s 7d, of which 
the council had to pay £3 364 18s 8d, the remaining £2 398 6s lId being contributed 
by the government and the NP A.162 The charitable organisation, Toc H, had 
approached the council with a request that something be done about the high level 
of juvenile unemployment in the city. The council had agreed to employ some 24 
youths at £2 per month, on condition that the council would pay only lOs to every £1 
raised by Toc H towards the youths' wages. 163 The council was perturbed at the 
number of unemployed in the city, and p~oposed that in order to distribute relief 
evenly, no man would be able to work on the relief works on a continuous basis. 
Relief workers were only allowed to work one week in the month, although this was 
extended to two weeks in the month in February 1933.164 
By 1934, the numbers employed on relief works had declined only marginally, to 
153, but the costs had escalated dramatically, to £8 586 7s lId, of which sum the 
council had contributed £5 550 16s 7d, the remainder coming from the government 
and NPA.165 In 1935, the courtcil was still running relief works for its burgesses and 
the number in employment had actually increased to 159 as at the end of July 
1935,166 but the total costs had decreased to only £6 5695s 4d, to which sum the 
council contributed £3 936 17s lOd.167 
162. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Treasurer's Report, Corporation Year Book 1933, p. 32. 
163. City of Pietermaritzburg, Mayor's Minute, Corporation Year Book, 1933. 
164. Natal Witness, 10 February 1933. 
165. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Treasurer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1934, p. 36. 
166. City of Pietermaritzburg, Mayor's Minute, Corporation Year Book, 1935. 
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In contrast to the situation in Durban, unemployment does not appear to have 
ceased with the general recovery in business confidence which followed the Union's 
departure from the gold standard at the end of 1932. Rather, it seems that the 
council had grown accustomed to providing relief work for its needy citizens and 
may have continued to do so because of the lack of alternative employment 
available to residents of Pietermaritzburg, even long after the depression had 
passed. 
Unfortunately, no figures relating to the contributions of the government and the 
NP A to relief works in the town are available for the early years of the depression, 
so no comparative study of these can be attempted. It is worth noting, however, that 
between 1927/28 and 1934/35, relief works in the city cost the council 
approximately £19 948, which, for a city the size of Pietermaritzburg, was 
considerable. 
In the town of Estcourt, the town council decided to institute relief works in 
December 1932,168 after representations had been received from the unemployed 
of the town. 169 The deCision came after the council had tried to provide temporary 
relief through engaging some white labourers to assist the Town Foreman in 
carrying out temporary works in July 1932. This assistance was limited to bona fide 
burgesses, or persons who had been resident in the town for at least eight 
months. 170 A decision was also taken to use only white labour in building 
operations in the local African location.171 These temporary measures had not 
~erved to alleviate the distress caused by the unemployment prevalent in this 
community and as a result, full relief works were instituted. 
167. City of Pietermaritzburg, City Treasurer's Report, Corporation Year Book, 1935, p. 36. 
168. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 29 November 1932. 
169. NAD,3/EST, Minutes of the Fmance Committee,19 July 1932. The proceedings of the 
council had twice been disrupted by the unemployed in June 1931, but the council had 
declined to act at that point. See NAD, 3/EST, 23 June 1931. 
170. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Fmance Committee, 19 July 1932. 
171. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Town Council, 20 September 1932. 
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A sub-committee, appointed to investigate the whole matter of relief works, 172 
reiterated the necessity for such works in the following terms: 
.. .investigation of the question of unemployment has shewn 
that there are an appreciable number of men, mostly with 
families dependent upon them, who have been out of 
employment for some time and for whom there appears no 
prospect whatever of any work being found for many a day to 
come. 173 
A sum of £100 was to be set aside to fund the relief works, which consisted of stone-
breaking in the municipal quarry. Some relief was also to be afforded to the small 
"coloured" community of the town, although at lower rates of pay: 
A further point which fell to be determined was whether 
Coloured persons ( of the type ordinarily regarded as 
ratepayers when residing in the Towns) should not also be 
accorded relief work .. .it was agreed that it would be a definite 
hardship to exclude this class, who are known to be in dire 
need, though it has been recognised that they must necessarily 
come in at a lower scale of relief pay so as to conform with the 
relative standard of living ordinarily subsisting between 
Euro~ans 7f1d Non-Europeans under normal working 
condItIons. 1 
A total of sixteen whites and six "coloureds" were regarded as eligible for these 
relief works, but by February 1933, the £100 voted for relief works was almost 
exhausted 175 and the town was forced to apply for a state subsidy to continue the 
project. Work was halted in April 1933,176 but the council was forced to resume 
operations in May 1933, after.it became clear that at least seven whites and five 
II coloureds" were still dependent on' relief works to keep body and soul together .177 
The council did pass a resolution 
172. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the rmance Committee, 22 November 1932. 
173. NAD,3/EST, Report of Sub-Committee on Unemployment Relief, included in Minutes of 
Counci1-in-Committee, 29 November 1932. 
174. Ibid. 
175. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 7 February 1933. 
176. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the rmance Committee, 18 April 1933. 
177. N~D, 3/EST, Report of the Unemployment Relief Committee, 12 May 1933, included in 
Minutes of Town Council, 16 May 1933. 
That no person who is not a rate-payer of Estcourt shall be 
eligible for such employment unless he shall have first 
deposited at the Town Office a certificate to show that he has 
been rejected f9§ employment on the Provincial Relief Road 
Party Scheme. 
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The council was attempting to limit its responsibilities in regard to the provision of 
relief to only those men who genuinely could not find alternative employment, and 
in fact refused to employ two men who did not supply such certificates.179 By 
October, only three whites were still employed on the relief works in the town.180 
The Borough of Estcourt was also reluctant to take unemployed whites into its 
permanent service, even when the sub-committee on unemployment relief 
recommended this.181 The exact costs to the town cannot be calculated, as stone 
broken by relief workers was both utilised by the council and sold to buyers at a 
profit. 182 
Another town in the province which was wrestling with unemployment was 
Ladysmith. In October 1931, the Ladysmith Benevolent Society approached the 
council with a list of the unemployed of the town and indicated that the men were 
prepared to work for 5s per man per day. During the subsequent investigation, the 
men requested permission to cut timber on council land which they could sell in the 
local market as firewood for £1 per load. 183 The council refused permission and 
instructed the Borough Engineer to attempt to find work for these men. l84 Nothing 
was done, however, because news was received that the provincial council was to 
employ at least ten men on road works. The town council resolved to approach the 
local member of the provincial council, Mr James Macaulay MEC, for assistance in 
this matter.185 Nothing appears to have been done in this regard until Mr S D 
178. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Town Council, 16 May 1933. 
179. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 30 May 1933. 
180. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the rmance Committee, 24 October 1933 
181. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Town Council, 16 May 1933. 
182. NAD,3/EST, Report of the Unemployment Relief Committee, 12 May 1933, included in 
Council Minutes, 16 May 1933. 
183. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the rmance Committee, 22 October 1931. 
184. NAD, 3/LAD, M"mutes of the rmance Committee, 22 October 1931. 
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Roberts, one of the Employment Officers with the Department of Labour in 
Durban, visited the town in January 1932. After this meeting, the Borough Engineer 
was instructed " ... to see what could be done to employ civilised labourers in 
unskilled work".186 Only two men were so employed in March 1932, but it is 
unclear whether they were employed in a permanent or temporary capacity.187 A 
subsidy from the Department of Labour was later obtained for these men.188 
Representations from unemployed Indians189 led to the council offering relief 
works in the form of stone-breaking, but no evidence could be found to suggest that 
this offer was ever taken up. In September 1933, the Ladysmith Benevolent Society 
again approached the council about starting relief works for the twelve men 
permanently on their books. 190 The council responded, as before, by agreeing to 
engage the men on stone-breaking at a local quarry, but again there is no evidence to 
suggest that this offer was ever taken up.191 The council was well aware of the 
unpopularity of the work they offered and may have used the stone-quarrying as a 
means of both salving their consciences and of deterring the unemployed from 
becoming a charge on the borough's revenues. 
Relief works in Natal have been discussed in some detail because they were the 
main conduit through which government at all levels channelled assistance to the 
unemployed. They were far more complex than a simple "dole" system would have 
been. Firstly, the programmes instituted were generally necessary public works 
which would probably have been undertaken anyway, if not during the depression, 
then certainly after it. Little of the work performed was useless. However, as the 
~elief of white unemployment was seen to be a priority, work which would normally 
have been done by Africans was given to whites, at a higher cost. Secondly, the 
185. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the Fmance Committee, 29 October 1931. 
186. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of Special Council Meeting, 22 January 1932. 
187. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the Works/HealthjWater Works/Lands/ Abbatoir Committee, 
17 March 1932. 
188. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the Works, etc. Committee, 16 March 1933. 
189. See above p. 244. 
190. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the Finance Committee, 28 September 1933. 
191. Ibid. 
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unemployed were given the opportunity to work for the assistance they received. 
They thus not only gained the means to support their families, but also the 
knowledge that their efforts were valued; they earned their wages and thus regained 
some sense of self-worth. Many unemployed men had a horror of accepting charity; 
it denoted failure, and was an admission of inadequacy which damaged self-esteem. 
Cries of "give us work not charity" were often heard at meetings of the 
unemployed.192 At one meeting of the unemployed of Durban in July 1931, a 
speaker said: ''The Benevolent Society has sent more men to hell than all the beer 
brewed in Africa." 193 
An elderly pensioner wrote in an article contributed to the Natal Mercury: 
They [the unemployed] do not want charity nor even sympathy, 
espeCially if the charity or syml?athy is patronising. They 
simply want ~ork. 9'Ihey recognise that unemployment is a 
national questlon ... 1 
However, there were many who saw relief works as a far from ideal solution. Many 
men, particularly those who had led sedentary lives, found the manual labour 
required on the relief works too arduous.195 Others found that manual labour was 
"degrading" and "depressing" and likened conditions on the relief works to 
"slavery".I96 Those unemployed originating from farms, in particular, found it 
difficult to accept that they were being asked to perform manual labour, which they 
regarded as "kaffir work".197 Such responses provoked angry reaction from llanga 
lase Natal in March 1931.198 The newspaper later carried an article signed 
"Methodist Church Man" [sic] in which the writer asked, "Who has "degraded" the 
white man by competing with the black man? Is it not the white man himself who 
192. Natal Mercury, 20 September 1930, 25 October 1930,2 July 1931, 10 August 1931. 
193. Natal Mercury, 8 July 1931. 
194. Natal Mercury, 16 September 1931. 
195. Natal Mercury, 26 February 1930,26 September 1930. 
196. Natal Witness, 5 February 1931. 
197. Mr F Botha, speaking at a meeting of the unemployed in Pietermaritzburg reported in Natal 
Witness, 10 September 1931. 
198. llanga lase Natal, 6 March 1931. 
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sees degradation in the work of his han"ds?,,199 Artisans felt that work in their 
trades should be provided for them, not road works,200 but neither Durban nor 
Pietermaritzburg ever instituted such forms of relief works. 
Most disputes over relief works were concerned with pay. As A J Odendaal, a 
former relief worker, wrote of his experience on the provincial road scheme: 
I went out under the belief that the work I was intended to do 
would bring me sufficient remuneration to keep my home in 
Maritzburg together ... My faith was rudely shaken and as long 
as I live I will never agree to work under those conditions for 
the pittance of a ~fge I received. There is nothing but sheer 
slavery out there.2 
This was also true of relief works in the major urban centres. In Durban, relief 
workers earned between 5s and 8s per man per day, while the council was paying its 
"European Labourers" who were not relief workers a wage of between 13s 4d and 
19s 1d per man per day in 1928/29.202 A relief worker would thus take home in a 
week what an ordinary white labourer would earn in a day.203 Others complained 
that when the weather turned inclement and they could not work, they were not 
paid, while others complained that relief workers were not given precedence when 
permanent council positions fell vacant.204 
Relief workers were in an extremely difficult position as they were engaged on a 
daily basis. The wages they earned were so low that they could not belong to 
existing municipal unions, and were not entitled to sick leave or any other benefits. 
In Durban, a union of relief workers was formed,205 but on all relief work schemes, 
throughout the province, there waS always the unstated understanding that if men 
became troublesome or too demanding they could be readily replaced. In 
199. /langa lase Natal, 12 February 1932. 
200. Natal Mercury, 8 July 1931, 10 August 1931, 11 February 1932, 16 April 1932. 
201. Natal Witness, 12 February 1931. 
202. Borough Engineer's Report, Mayor's Minutes 1929, p. 28. 
203. Edley, "Population", p. 81. 
204. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Works Committee, 27 October 1931. 
205. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Works Committee, 26 November 1931. 
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Pietermaritzburg between 1929 and 1932, some 109 men were "discharged" from the 
relief works.206 
Furthermore, relief works only provided employment for white, "coloured" and 
Indian adult males resident in the urban areas. No form of relief work was ever 
provided for women or for Africans in urban areas. Juveniles were assisted in some 
urban areas, but priority was always given to adult males. Despite representations 
from Juvenile Affairs Boards, the school-leaving age was not raised during the 
depression, but many praiseworthy schemes were initiated both in Durban and 
elsewhere, to keep young people occupied until they could find employment. The 
Natal Education Department also supplied meals to school children in less affluent 
areas.207 
Relief works were, however, not the only way of relieving distress caused by 
unemployment. Virtually every town had some form of charitable organisation. 
The major towns had many institutions and organisations designed to provide 
support in times of financial crisis. These organisations depended largely on the 
generosity of the public and on support from local government. During the 
depression, calls upon these organisations were naturally greatly increased, obliging 
them to seek alternative sources of funding. The Natal Provincial Administration, 
for example, made the sum of £97 265 8s 9d available to charities throughout Natal 
in the years 1928/29 to 1933/34.208 
The demand for assistance was obviously greater in the major urban area, because 
of its greater concentration of population. The Durban Town Council made services 
and donations to the value of £177 605 available to charitable organisations in the 
town between 1929 and 1933.209 So heavy were the demands on the largest 
charitable organisation in Durban, the Durban Benevolent Society (DBS), that it 
was forced to impose a two-year residential qualification for assistance in 1930.210 
This was subsequently raised to three years in 1932211 and to four years in 1933.212 
206. City of Pietermaritzburg, Annual Reports of the City Engineer, Corporation Year Books, 
1929-1932. . 
207. For details of this see Edley, "Population", pp. 85 • 86. 
208. Province of Natal, Annual Reports of the Provincial Auditor, 1928/29-1933/34. 
209. Mayor's Minutes for relevant years. 
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Some 100232 persons were assisted by the DBS between 1928/29 and 1931/32.213 
Costs to the DBS between 1930 and 1933 were in the region of £94744.214 The 
DBS was forced to limit the amount of money given to each case, and actually 
reduced this by 4s 7d per case, to £1 18s 4d.215 The DBS was constantly on the 
verge of bankruptcy and had to go cap in hand to the town council on numerous 
occasions.216 While the DBS did not assist single men, it did not restrict its activities 
to whites, but also assisted the distressed in the small "coloured" community. 
Assistance to the latter families consumed 21 per cent of the budget in 1932.217 By 
August 1932, the DBS was forced to close its doors to new cases as its resources 
were not equal to meeting the needs of the estimated 90 new cases applying for 
assistance each day.218 
The DBS was not the only charitable institution in the town, but a detailed 
discussion of all is not possible. Mention must, however, be made of the Durban 
Men's Home, which mainly provided assistance to single men. This institution 
assisted some 1324 men in 1929/30,219 but its most valuable contribution took the 
form of a soup kitchen, the response to which clearly illustrated the increasing 
poverty prevalent in the town. In 1931 some 34 234 free meals were supplied,220 
which figure rose to 48 208 in 1932221 and to 66 819 in 1933.222 
210. Natal Mercury, 17 May 1930. 
211. Natal Mercury, 24 October 1932. 
212. Natal Mercury, 7 April 1933. 
213. Natal Mercury, 15 September 1932 . . The fIgUre includes dependants. 
214. Natal Mercury, 8 October 1932. The costs (or 1933 were estimates. 
215. Natal Mercury, 16 August 1930. 
216. Natal Mercury, 13 September 1931,4 December 1931, 7 March 1932, 23 December 1932, 
1 February 1933,6 May 1933. 
217. Natal Mercury, 18 August 1932. 
218. Natal Mercury, 5 November 1932. 
219. Natal Mercury, 20 September 1930. 
220. Natal Mercury, 9 October 1931. 
221. Natal Mercury, 5 November 1932. 
222. Natal Mercury, 11 November 1933. In addition 17299 units o( sleeping accommodation «(ree 
beds) were supplied. The total cost to the Home in 1933 was £5 654. 
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Assistance to Durban's Indian community was co-ordinated by the Indian Social 
Service Committee, which was headed by a Durban lawyer, Mr V Lawrence.223 In 
1931, when distress among the Indian community assumed serious proportions, the 
Indian Agent-General, Sir Kurma Reddi, initiated the formation of the Sir Kurma 
Reddi Unemployment Relief Committee which collected donations and distributed 
relief to indigent Indians.224 This body also attempted to find employment for 
unemployed Indians,225 and ran a soup kitchen which dispensed some 133 000 
meals in its one-year life span, an average of 300 meals being served daily.226 
Temporary assistance to destitute Africans was provided by the Durban Town 
Council, which ran a soup kitchen to serve those who were not termed "undesirable" 
or "unemployable". The manager of the location, Mr S Howard had proposed 
restricting the service to a maximum of 30 Africans per day, but this the council 
refused to accept, instructing that the service be made available to all Africans in 
need.227 
One of the major consequences of the depression, and the very heavy calls upon 
charitable organisations in the town, was the formation of an umbrella body, known 
as the Community Chest, to co-ordinate charitable activities. This had become 
necessary because of widespread abuse of charity. S D Roberts, Employment 
Officer at the Department of Labour in Durban, outlined the problem: 
... a man arrives in Durban from another Province. He hears of 
the good work performed by the Benevolent Society and he 
goes to it and receiv~s assistance which tides him over for a 
week or longer. He then suddenly takes pride in the fact that 
he is English and off he goes to the Sons of England, who also 
assist him. Then he realises that his grandmother was a Scot 
223. Natal Mercury, 20 August 1930. 
224. Natal Mercury, 24 September 1931. 
225. Natal Mercury, 16 December 1932. 
226. Natal Mercury, 18 November 1932. 
227. Natal Mercury, 7 July 1932. 
and he tackles the Caledonian Society. Then he finds that the 
Durban Home is a nice place and he ~oes there for a little time. 
Finally, as a last 2~~ort, he regIsters his name at the 
Employment Bureau. 
296 
The town was also plagued with bogus street collectors, who simply pocketed the 
contributions of the public. Many others made a substantial living out of begging in 
the suburbs: 
The work before the Benevolent Society is growing, but not all 
the demands it receives are genuine. There are professional 
beggars, men and women who, with ill-clad children as stock-
in-trade, parade the suburbs, making appeals from door to 
door. Townspeople are advised to consult the Society before 
giving assistance. Bi~ cabinets hold the records of most of 
Durban's families which are ~enuinely in want. The Society 
urges householders to m~~gifts to an organised charity, rather 
than give promiscuously. 
As a result of these types of abuses, the Community Chest was initiated on 1 January 
1932, to co-ordinate charitable activities. It raised £15000 for the first year of 
operations in 1932, of which the DBS received half.230 The same amount was 
raised in 1933, but the calls upon charities, especially the DBS, made this sum 
inadequate and the society was forced to ask for £6 000 from the public to continue 
its functions.231 
In Pietermaritzburg, the Pietermaritzburg Benevolent Society (PBS) was in receipt 
of an annual grant from the City Council of £1 500, which was increased to £1 800 in 
1931,232 whereafter the council in conjunction with the PBS made relief work 
available to many on the bookS of the society, as an alternative to charity.233 The 
grant to the PBS was accordingly reduced." The heavy demands made on the society 
and the limited numbers of men who could be accommodated on relief works in the 
228. Natal Mercury, 14 May 1930. 
229. Natal Mercury, 15 July 1930. 
230. Natal Mercury,23 December 1931. 
231. Natal Mercury, 11 February 1933. 
232. See City of Pietermaritzburg, City Treasurer's Reports in Corporation Year Books for relevant 
years. 
233. See above, pp. 285 - 286. 
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city did, however, result in the council continuing to grant the society fairly 
substantial sums of money.234 There were suggestions that efforts to alleviate the 
distress in the city ought to be co-ordinated, as the Natal Witness put it: 
The disease of poverty, unemployment and the like are 
symptomatic of unscientific policy, so is. unscientific 
indiscriminate and uncorrelated dIstribution of reItef a token of 
our corporate unwisdom ... the ordinary citizen can hardly be 
blamed, however open his hand, however generous his heart, if 
he hesitates to disburse the mushroom appeal, starting he 
knows not whence, ending he knows not where ... The remedy is 
not a sudden and lonely sally to the rescue, but in marshalling 
all the available forces for the calculated and sage 
campaign ... The remedy lies in this very marshalling of all the 
agencies now workin~ and willing to work such as the churches, 
the phi~~thropic SOCIeties, the Grousers, the Toc H and many 
others. 
Nothing appears to have been done to this end during the depression years. 
Sometimes charitable works were resented by members of the community they were 
intended to benefit. A gesture by the Pietermaritzburg Welfare Society in which 
meat was distributed free to Africans upset African meat traders, who had expected 
to make a profit over the Christmas period, but instead were left with unsold meat 
which could not be stored, resulting in a loss of earnings.236 
In the smaller towns of Natal, the charitable organisations also appear to have 
operated under considerable pressure. A special door-to-door coUection for poor 
families in Colenso was authorised by the council.237 In Dundee, the Benevolent 
Society of the town received a special grant of £30 for the relief of distress,238 while 
the council increased its grant to the society by £2 per month to assist a distressed 
family.239 In August 1931, the Town Co~cil provided for an extra street collection 
to raise funds: 
234. See City of Pietermaritzburg, City Treasurer's Reports in Corporation Year Books, 1932/33 • 
1934/35. 
235. Editorial, Natal Witness, 27 January 1931. 
236. /langa lase Natal, 29 January 1932. 
237. NAD, 3/COL, Minutes of the Town Council, 14 February 1933. 
238. NAD, 3/DUN, Minutes of the Town Council, 27 May 1930. 
239. NAD, 3/DUN, Minutes of Town Council, 26 February 1931. 
... the Mayor referred to the urgent necessity for more 
assistance being given to the Benevolent Society ~d t~e 
desirability of providin~ for an additional street collection ill 
that cause if at all possible. It was thereupon agreed that the 
August street collection be allocated to the Benevolent Society, 
that for St Dunstans to be taken in September, a reply to be 
sent to the effect that as the Council is using every endeavour 
to assist the Benevolent Society to meetif~ heavy calls on 
account of the present state of depression ... 
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So serious was the situation that the council granted the Benevolent Society £100 in 
the year 1932/33.241 
In Eshowe, the town board granted permission for the Durban Benevolent Society 
to hold a street collection for the unemployed of Durban.242 In Estcourt, the 
Benevolent Society received an additional £25 to cope with calls for assistance in 
1931,243 while the council was "co-operating with the Benevolent Society" in the 
matter of a destitute woman and her children in town. 244 It also authorised the 
payment of £4 2s 9d by the Benevolent Society to a destitute man "picked up by the 
police on the streets of Estcourt and taken to hospital".245 
In Ladysmith, the Benevolent Society was forced to ask for an advance on its grant, 
" ... owing to numerous calls for help being made during the present time of 
depression". A sum of £30 was advanced to the society.246 Close co-operation 
between the society and the council was evident in the matter of relief works, 
although, as already shown, these were kept to a minimum in the town.247 The 
society received a grant of £150 for the year 1931/32, a substantial increase on the 
240. NAD, 3/DUN, Minutes of the Town Council, 13 August 1931. 
241. NAD, 3/DUN, Draft Estimates passed at Council Meeting, 27 October 1932. 
242. NAD, 3/ESH, Minutes of the Town Board, 6 July 1931. 
243. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Town Council, 17 February 1931. 
244. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Town Council, 3 March 1931. 
245. NAD, 3/EST, Minutes of the Fmance Committee, 24 March 1931. 
246. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the f'mance Committee, 27 August 1931. 
247. See above, pp. 289 - 290. 
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£60 normally received.248 By January 1932, however, the society was in dire straits 
and an extra £50 was voted by the council.249 
It is clear that charitable organisations throughout the province were sorely pressed 
to meet all the calls for assistance from members of the public during the depression 
years. Assistance was usually forthcoming from the public and from government, 
both at provincial and local level. Without such donations and grants, the societies 
would not have been able to contribute towards alleviating the distress caused by 
unemployment and drought. There were numerous individuals, however, who 
would accept neither employment on the relief works, nor charity. They preferred 
their independence, and it is for this reason that the informal sector of the economy 
flourished during the depression. Many of these activities were marginal, while 
others were clearly illegal. 
One of the most lucrative activities in the latter category was the sale of liquor to 
Africans. In terms of existing legislation in Natal, it was illegal for Africans to drink 
or to be found in possession of, spirituous liquors, and it was an offence to sell such 
liquor to Africans. Davies has stated that 41 per cent of all whites convicted in the 
law courts of the Union In 1932 were charged with being illicit liquor dealers.250 
The only evidence which could be found for Natal was that only 119 whites were 
convicted on this charge in the area of jurisdiction of the Durban Ci ty Police 
between 1929/30 and 1933/34. Indians were also involved in this trade, for 95 were 
similarly convicted in the same period.25t 
Africans too made a living out 'of liquor. Many Africans found in the province-wide 
boycott of municipal beer halls an opportunity to make money by illegally brewing 
"utshwala". llanga alleged that the replacement of African porters and sweepers on 
the South African Railways was a contributary factor. Commenting on the 
retrenchment and replacement of Africans by "civilised" workers, the newspaper 
stated: 
248. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the Town Council, 29 October 1931. 
249. NAD, 3/LAD, Minutes of the Finance Committee, 28 January 1932. 
250. Davies, Capital, p. 247. 
251. Annual Reports of the Chief Constable, Mayor's Minutes for relevant years. 
By this method numbers of unemployed Na~ives ~ere 
augmented with the result that many resorted to. a hfe ~f cnme 
and illic~s~quor dealing. The evil seems to be mcreasmg year 
by year. 
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Numerous complaints from municipalities throughout the province including 
Vryheid, Dundee, Durban and Pietermaritzburg indicate that there was a 
considerable decline in the sale of beer through accepted channels. Local 
authorities appear to have been convinced that this was due to an increase in illicit 
brewing and did not indicate that Africans had ceased to drink. The Town Clerk of 
Vryheid wrote to the Dundee Town Council: 
The Natives have realised: 
1. That there is good yrofit in illicit brewing 
2. That the chances 0 detection are remote 
3. That profits derived will easily pay any fines that may be 
imposed. 
The result is:-
1. The Native Beer Halls are no longer paying (illicit beer is 
stronger than is allowed by law). 
2. The Urban Areas are having to meet the loss on Locations. 
3. No money is available for the improvement of Locations or 
as grants towards the Education of Natives as in the past. 
The reason for the reduction of profits is attributed to the 
economic position but this is only partly true as in the case of 
this Borough during the weekends intoxicated Natives caJl5be 
seen on all roads and they do not get the beer for nothing ... Z3~ 
In Dundee, the local police commander . rejected allegations of widespread illicit 
brewing, 254 but there was no denying the considerable fall-off in revenue - to only 
£30 7s 2d in October 1932.255 In Durban, the problem was more serious, as 7344 
Africans were convicted of illicit brewing or of being in possession of the ingredients 
to brew in the period between 1928/29 and 1933/34.256 
252. /langa lase Natal, 6 March 1931. 
253. NAD, 3/DUN, Letter From Town Clerk of Vrybeid, included in Town Council Minutes, 
27 July 1933. 
254. NAD,3/DUN, Letter from the District Commandant (SAP) to Town Clerk, Town Council 
Minutes, 23 June 1932. 
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Other Africans made a living by selling meat in compounds, which aroused the ire of 
local butchers.257 Unemployed artisans often went into business for the-mselves, 
making furniture, for example.258 There was a considerable increase in the number 
of hawkers in all urban areas and all sorts of goods were sold in an effort to make a 
living. These included matches, razor blades, shoelaces, sweets, fruit and vegetables~ 
One S L Combrink applied for a licence to operate as a "boot-black" to clean boots 
and shoes on the streets of Pietermaritzburg, another example of the enterprise of 
the unemployed.259 Space does not permit a fuller discussion of the various 
individual initiatives in which people made a living in the informal sector of the 
economy during the depression years. 
Viewed overall, efforts to alleviate distress during the depression years were 
generally surprisingly uncoordinated, perhaps as a result of a lack of effective 
leadership from government at all levels. This was certainly a common perception 
among the distressed section of the community, whose growing disenchantment with 
established politicians and party politics was a growing feature of the depression 
years. This will be discussed in the following chapter. There can be no doubt that 
the Hertzog government did a great deal to assist farmers and the rural unemployed 
in the Union, but less was done in Natal than in the other provinces. By singling out 
the rural sector for special attention, the government thrust the major portion of 
responsibility for alleviating distress in the urban areas onto local authorities and 
thus, ultimately, onto the ratepayers of the various towns in the province. 
This responsibility the local authorities were reluctant to accept, because of the 
substantial costs involved and because many of them believed that the central 
government was shirking its responsibility. Yet for purely humanitarian reasons, the 
local authorities were forced to act. Most applied the government's "civilised 
255. NAD, 3/DUN, Minutes of the Town Council, 27 October 1932. 
256. Annual Reports of the Chief Constable, Mayor's Minutes for relevant years. 
257. Natal Mercury, 19 March 1931. 
258. See previous chapter. 
259. NAD, 3/PMB, Minutes of the Fmance Committee, 23 October 1930. 
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labour" policy and gave preference to the employment of whites over persons of 
colour, while others attempted to resist this policy as far as was possible. The lack of 
proper statistical information, and the uncoordinated nature of relief, reduced the 
efficacy of such relief as was provided. Furthermore, employment on the relief 
works, the major form of assistance, was not available to all the deserving, as the 
unfit and women were not eligible. This type of assistance obviously also 
discriminated against Africans, as relief works were generally not available to them 
in the urban areas. Conditions on the relief works were not ideal; they were 
purposely designed to be less-than-attractive temporary measures to assist the 
unemployed only so long as the situation warranted them. 
Charitable organisations also came under heavy pressure during the depression 
years, as cases of need grew sharply with each passing month. Most organisations 
were forced to ask for extra assistance from local authorities, the cost of which was 
inevitably passed on to the ratepayers. There can be little doubt that the depression 
sorely tested the capacity of all charitable organisations, and that some valuable 
lessons were learned. The Community Chest concept, which gained popularity 
during the depression years, is still in operation in most of the major urban centres 
of the province today. 
There were many who refused both relief work and charity, and who attempted to 
face the crisis by taking individual action. They were, however, a minority. Not 
enough is known of the relief efforts made in the reserves which, as has been 
demonstrated, suffered greatly through depression, drought and natural disasters 
and this may provide a fruitful avenue for future researchers. 
The majority of the white electorate looked to their government for assistance. 
Even though the electorate of Natal was generally highly suspicious of the Hertzog 
government, they were still disappointed at how little was done. No "dole" system 
was instituted, and it became painfully obvious that the government had little idea 
of the extent of unemployment in the province. It also failed to playa decisive role 
in finding creative solutions to the problems of unemployment and poverty. Only 
once the depression had passed, and the world was able to assess the efficacy of 
Keynesian economics and the "New Deal alphabet" solution of Roosevelt, was it 
realised that considerably more could indeed have been done for the unemployed 
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and the poverty~stricken. More which might not only have assisted the poor, but 
which might very well have reduced the length and the depth of the depression. 
This, however, was only possible with hindsight which those at the time did not 
possess. Nevertheless, most were extremely harsh in their criticism of the 
established political leadership, in common with most of the distressed communities 
throughout the world, and many saw the solutions of the economic problems they 
were experiencing as lying in ridding the province of a government that 
demonstrably cared little for it. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE DEPRESSION AND WHITE POLmCS IN NATAL 
The Great Depression was not merely an economic catastrophe, it was the most 
severe test that the capitalist system had yet faced.1 To many, deeply affected by 
the economic slump, it appeared that the entire system was about to collapse and 
tumble the capitalist world into chaos. The symptoms of the crisis were there for all 
to see: mass unemployment, poverty, and a consequent decline in the standards of 
living to which many had become accustomed.2 The economic crisis led almost 
inevitably to a critical questioning of the system which had defaulted so grievously, 
even on the part of people who were not directly affected by it: 
Nor was it only the direct victims of the depression who were 
affected by it. Others, observing what was happenin~ to their 
fellow-men, began to wonder what kind of justificatIon there 
was for a society which produced such results. The depression 
ceased to be merely an economic problem; it became a 
question mark directed at the values of western civilization and 
there were many who, finding no satisfactory answer, decided 
that there was no alternative ~ther than to build a new society 
on totally different principles. 
This feeling of discontent which pervaded most countries throughout the affected 
world resulted, in some cases, in the re-formation and realignment of political 
groupings to meet the challenge posed by both the crisis and the disaffection and 
alienation resulting from it.4 Existing political parties in several countries, whether 
in government or not, experienced a decline in popularity among the electorate as 
their inability to defuse the crisis became apparent and their actions degenerated 
into party-political squabbling.S Just one article from a Natal newspaper will suffice 
to illustrate this point: 
1. Rees, Great Slump, pp. 281 - 282. 
2. Cutforth, Later than we thought, p. 21. Cutforth argues that in sharp contrast to elsewhere in 
the capitalist world, standards of living in the United Kingdom were gC OI.:raUy rising 
throughout the 193Os. 
3. Rees, Great Slump, p. 88. 
4. Coalitions of major parties were effected in many of the English-speaking countri<.:~, including 
The South African Party's constitutional plank of 'Contributory 
Unemployment Insurance' had been accepted as. a better 
object that [sic] 'Work or a Dole', but the South Afncan Party 
are reminded that that is a matter for the future, and that the 
present immediate need is a remedy for the present 
unemployment, and the provision of immediate employment. 
The Nationalist party are reminded that their own Acts of 
Parliament have caused more unemployment in the towns than 
they have cured in the country, and they are asked what they 
are going to do about it. They are reminded while they preach 
thrift, they practise gross extrava&ance. The Labour Party are 
reminded of their failure to fulfll election promises, of their 
great and lost opportunities of their personal self-seeking, of 
the unscrupulousness of their present attempt to surpass the 
old immoral bribery of voters by politicians of the past with 
their own money by even more immoral bribery under 
democracy; the buying of votes by the promise of other 
people's money. They Lthe workless] say to all Parties: 'We are 
only the U nemployed. Unemployment is a state matter. A 
plague on all your Parties and Party bickering. You are all 
fiddling while Rome burns, although some of you even tgink it 
is inconsiderate of Rome to burn while you are fiddling.' 
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This inability to ameliorate the distressed conditions of the populace led almost 
inevitably to the rise of "extremist" movements which saw salvation as lying in the 
total rejection of the existing system and its replacement by a drastically altered 
form of society. Not all such movements were overtly anti-capitalist, but many of 
them were extremely vocal in their criticisms of the shortcomings of the system. 
Although, comparatively, the Union of South Africa did not suffer nearly as severely 
as many other countries, it did, lo some extent, experience the same type of reaction, 
as many of its inhabitants found themselves affected severely enough to warrant 
protest on a political level. Yet it would not be entirely accurate to claim that the 
economic situation completely dominated the political life of Natal and the Union 
during the depression years. There were other issues which could not be banished 
from centre stage, one of these being the "Native Question". 
Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, althQugh in the latter case, 
the depression had largely passed by the time coalition and fusion were achieved. 
5. This was the charge that led to the formation of the so-called "best-man" ministries in Britain 
and Australia and was also a common cry among the disaffected in South Africa. 
6. Natal Mercury, 5 November 1931. 
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The general election of 1929 had been fought almost exclusively on this issue. The 
National Party (NP) campaign, ably managed by Hertzog and Roos, had made 
political capital out of a speech made by Smuts, leader of the South African Party 
(SAP), envisaging a greater South Africa which would incorporate a number of 
"Native" territories. This was used by the NP to accuse Smuts of promoting the idea 
of a "Kaffir Republic" and of greatly increasing the "Native Problem"} These were 
classic "swart gevaar" tactics to which the electorate was responsive, for the NP was 
returned to power with an overall majority for the first time.8 In his first term of 
office as Prime Minister, Hertzog had proposed a number of bills to deal with the 
"Native Question". Due to opposition from the SAP, these bills had languished in 
various select committees, and there they remained, despite attempts to extricate 
them, and despite the mandate given to the NP in the 1929 election. The "Native 
Bills" were suspended like the proverbial sword of Damocles over the entire 
political arena in the Union throughout the depression period.9 
Another national issue, of real importance to Natal during this period, was the 
question of the relationship between the Union and Great Britain, and its position 
within the British Empire. Both Hertzog and Smuts had been in favour of the 
diplomatic moves which had resulted in the Balfour Declaration of 1926, but 
Hertzog and the NP appeared intent on further loosening the ties that bound the 
Union to Britain. Hertzog, however, privately disavowed being in favour of 
complete secession from the Empire.10 He nevertheless wished the exact 
relationship to be defined in. legislation, which resulted in the passing of the Statute 
?f Westminster by the British Parliament in 1931. Other measures in the campaign 
to loosen ties had included the removal of the King's image from coinage and 
7. See Lacour-Gayet, A History of South Africa, p. 271. 
8. Up to this point the National Party had been forced to rely on support from the Labour Party. 
The two parties had formed an election pact to displace the South African Party government 
headed by Smuts in the 1924 election. The pact saw several Labour Party members given 
cabinet portfolios. This was continued after 1929, although the NP no longer required their 
support, having secured an overall majority. 
9. For a fuller discussion see Haines, "Opposition". 
10. See above, p. 122. Hertzog replied to G N Hulett" ... the National Party has never stood for 
secession and most decidedly after the 1926 declaration by the lmperial Conference never 
will: CAD, A32, (Hertzog Papers) F96, Hertzog to Hulett, 31 August 1929. ' 
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stamps, and the creation of the Union's own flag and National Anthem. 11 These 
measures had significant political consequences in the Union, and in Natal, as many 
English-speakers saw them with some prescience as an attempt to abrogate their 
rights as citizens of the British Empire, and as the first steps towards the declaration 
of an Afrikaner republic. So ultra-sensitive did English-speaking Natalians become 
that almost any measure of the Afrikaner-dominated Hertzog government was seen 
as a threat to their unique English character .12 
Nearly all the political movements that sprang up in Natal during the depression 
years had some measure of jingoism in their composition or espoused exclusively 
English values. Natal was, in many ways, politically isolated from the real centres of 
power in the Union. This isolation led to feelings of alienation and fostered a sense 
of self-reliance: many Natalians appeared to believe that the Afrikaner-dominated 
Hertzog government was not merely neglectful of their interests, but was openly 
working against them. The lack of government assistance to the urban unemployed 
was often cited as an example of this. If Natalians were to survive, and preserve the 
values that .they held dear, action would have to be taken. These feelings fostered 
the growth of several movements which gained support among the unemployed and 
distressed section of the white community. 
The first of these movements has already been alluded to: the "Grousers" of 
Pietermaritzburg.13 On 1 December 1930 the Natal Witness carried a report of the 
establishment of a movement called the Grousers, to work for the alleviation of 
distress in the city. The movement began by initiating a soup kitchen and opening 
"an orderly room". The Grousers were quick to stress that their activities were not 
charity, " ... but a helping hand from the Grousers and the people of our city".14 
Public response was rapid and encouraging. By 3 December, the movement had 
11. See Vickers, "Provincial Councils", 1970, p. 6. 
12. Thompson, Natalians, and his prior paper "Province: Nation: Empire: Divided Loyalties in the 
English Polity", Paper given at Workshop on Natal History, University of Natal, 
Pietennaritzburg, 1980. 
13. See above pp. 233ff. 
14. Natal Witness, 1 December 1930. The distinction between "a helping hand" and charity was 
obviously a fine one. 
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already received funds and co-operation from local business; jobs had been found 
for 14 people and 193 persons had received free meals of soup and bread from their 
kitchen. 1S The Grousers appealed to local businessmen to employ more white 
workers and to the public to support only white stores: 
The Grousers hope that the public will from now onwards 
support only Europeans, and if possible on a cash basis. Bring 
down the cost of living; but remember that European 
storekeepers have to pay assistants enough to enable them to 
live up to the European standard. Make your stores ~OO% 
European and get 100% of the city European trade [sic].1 
The membership of the Grousers was diverse but appears to have been restricted to 
those inhabitants of the city who desired anonymity for their charitable works. In an 
appeal for new members the Grousers wrote: 
If you are E~?.r:an and in employment you can enlist. You 
will not be p~ and your name and good deeds will not be 
made public... . 
This quest for anonymity was a characteristic of the Grousers, and appears to have 
resulted from a rejection of the activities of publicity-hungry politicians. All 
members were obliged to remain anonymous and some members who advertised 
their membership of the movement were actually excluded from it. The Grousers 
said that they had " ... no room in their ranks for those who seek the lime-light and 
blow-hards are taboo".18 The aims of the movement were clarified in two 
statements issued by the movement: "Let no ~ woman or child go hungry, and do 
not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing." This appears to have 
been adopted as the motto ~f the movement.19 Later in December 1930, the 
movement issued a second statement that: 
We do not wish to interfere wit~h.~vate enterprise but work 
must be found for men who are . . g to work and cannot get 
it. Poverty, starvation, and crime are closely related, and if 
15. Natal Witness, 3 December 1930. 
16. Natal Witness, 3 December 1930. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Natal Witness, 27 December 1930. 
19. Natal Witness, 3 December 1930. 
employment is found for every man and woman who wants it, 
the people of Maritzburg would see an empty house on 
practically every d~O' When that day comes, the Grousing 
season will be over. 
309 
Within ten days of the establishment of the movement, the publicity it had received 
from the Natal Witness was such that enquiries from other centres throughout the 
Union had been received. The town of White River in the Transvaal even went so 
far as to ask for the establishment of a branch in their town.21 The activities of the 
movement were documented almost on a daily basis in the Witness, and the 
newspaper's columns contained many heart-warming stories of people who had 
been assisted by the Grousers.22 The movement expanded rapidly. By 11 
December 1930, they claimed a membership of 718 and said they could provide £715 
to help the poor. By 16 December, their membership stood at 850.23 By the end of 
December 1930, they claimed a membership of 1000 and were feeding 600 hungry 
people every day.24 The movement also gained popularity by planning to take the 
children of the poor on an outing to the Botanic Gardens,25 and to create 
employment by setting up a boot-repair business. This latter idea, unsurprisingly, 
evoked strong reaction from cobblers in the city, but opposition appears to have 
faded because of the popularity of the movement.26 Owen stated that their 
activities "dwarfed" all other attempts to relieve the problems of unemployment and 
poverty in the city.27 
In January 1931, the political climate in the city became far more heated, mainly due 
to the lack of employment opportunities and the failure of the city council to do 
anything meaningful to allev.iate the problem of unemployment through the 
20. Natal Witness,27 December 1930. It may be inferred that "empty houses" would mean that 
the inhabitants were out at work, although the exact meaning is unclear. 
21. Natal Witness, 10 December 1930. 
22. See in particular Natal Witness, 10 December 1930. 
23. Natal Witness, 16 December 1930. 
24. Natal Witness,27 December 1930. 
25. Natal Witness, 10 December 1930. 
26. Natal Witness, 27 December 1930. 
27. Owen, "White Unemployment", p. 39. 
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expansion of existing relief works. On 14 January 1931 a m.eeting of the 
unemployed in the city composed a telegram to Prime Minister Hertzog demanding 
that he come to the city and find them employment. The situation almost became 
riotous: 
By 6 o'clock no fewer than 143 men had made applications to 
the Grousers asking them to send a telegram to this effect to 
General Hertzog. Many of the men were in a bad humour and 
talked wildly of revolutIon, but wiser councils decided to hold a 
mass meeting of the unemployed at 7.30 tonight in the City 
Gardens. A tele~m will be sent only after a formal resolution 
has been passed. 
The meeting which passed the resolution was addressed by masked men, who 
claimed that there were 491 men registered as unemployed with the Grousers, of 
whom 73 per cent were residents of the city and 94 per cent were "Europeans", 
which would have meant that there was a total of 460 unemployed white men in 
Maritzburg. The resolution was that the government should be requested to 
recognise the seriousness of the unemployment problem in the country, and urged to 
provide work or maintenance for unemployed men, at rates which were compatible 
with "civilised standards". The unemployed believed that they were not being given 
enough attention, or a fair chance when applying for employment. Some in the 
crowd were in favour of marching on the city hall, but the masked Grousers appear 
to have dissuaded them in favour of "constitutional" means and promised to send a 
telegram to Hertzog.29 
A deputation of the unemployed, which included three Grousers was, however, later 
granted an interview with the Mayor. He indicated that the council believed that 
the responsibility for finding a solution to the problem of unemployment lay with 
the national government, and that the council in any case could not afford to 
accommodate any more men on the relief works. He added that the unemployed 
should be careful not to antagonise people.30 This final sentiment was later echoed 
by the Minister of Justice, Oswald Pirow: 
28. Natal Witness, 15 January 1931. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Natal Witness, 16 January 1931. 
One aspect of unemployment, however, was causing the 
Government considerable difficulty. This was through so-
called leaders of th~ un~mployed with employment un!~ns 
which seemed to eXist chIefly for the purpose of orgamsmg 
demonstrations... Genuine unemployed should not allow 
themselves to be led about in street processi~rs, which did not 
impress the Government in the least degree. 
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While this might have held true at a national level, the Grousers' campaign to 
publicise the extent of white unemployment in Pietermaritzburg, and the volatile 
nature of the situation, did lead to the speedy arrival of Mr S D Roberts, an official 
of the regional office of the Department of Labour in Durban, to investigate the 
problem.32 Significantly, Roberts met with the Grouser leadership, who appear to 
have reiterated claims that there were over 400 unemployed white men in the city.33 
Upon investigation, however, these claims were proved to be grossly inflated and 
this led to the Grousers being partially discredited.34 This coincided with the arrest 
of Captain Robert Brady, alleged to be the leader of the Grousers, together with 
other members of the movement, on charges of common assault. 35 
The final demise of the movement came after the Grousers had published their 
accounts for public scrutiny in the Witness. The accounts revealed little of their real 
financial position and, indeed, led to public questioning of the accounting 
procedures of the movement and their control over what were essentially public 
funds. Although not explicitly stated, it was implied that the movement had 
misappropriated funds.36 Brady and Kean, his co-accused, were found guilty of 
assault. Although the court accepted that they had reacted out of the purest of 
motives,37 the accused had acted wrongfully in taking the law into their own 
hands.38 The movement appears t~ have simply faded away after this judgement; 
the anonymity of the movement's members made it easy for this to happen. 
31. Natal Mercury, 6 October 1931. 
32. Natal Witness, 22 January 1931. 
33. See above p. 234, where the salient parts of the interview Roberts gave to the Natal Witness 
are reproduced. 
34. See above p. 233 • 235. 
35. Natal Witness, 26 January 1931. 
36. Owen, "White Unemployment", pp. 48·49. 
37. It was alleged that one of victims of the assault had stolen money out of a collection box, while 
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Despite the short-lived nature of this movement, it did enjoy a measure of success. 
Unfortunately, in common with many other associations in Natal at this time, the 
movement and its records vanished simultaneously, so no real analysis of its 
membership, including their class positions, can be attempted. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the movement exhibited certain militaristic characteristics 
common to fascist and quasi-fascist movements operating elsewhere in the Union 
and beyond at this time.39 The movement was led by a former military officer, 
Captain Brady; it opened an "orderly room" and talked of "ranks" within the 
movement. Physical violence and intimidation were also evident. It is not 
uncommon, when civilian leadership is lacking, or is perceived to be lacking, for 
military leaders to arise, and to attract a following. The chaos and disorder of 
civilian life, especially in this time of crisis, caused many an old soldier to hanker 
after the military-life, where decisions were left to an enlightened leadership in the 
blind hope that all would be well. In an army, men are fed and cared for; and there 
is a sense of camaraderie and sharing of a common burden. Racism was also a 
definite hallmark of this movement, as has been illustrated. 
These characteristics were shared by the People's Unarmed Force, which operated 
in Durban. This movement grew out of the Workers' Protection League, a 
movement set afoot by Major Francis Giles and Mr J B Rintoul, a prominent labour 
organiser in Durban. The Workers' Protection League first sprang to prominence 
when, in July 1931, members were invited into the council chamber while the town 
council was in session.40 The deputation accused the council of being "apathetic" 
and of not doing enough to assist the unemployed of the town. It demanded the 
resignation of the entire council, with the exception of the Mayor, the Revd A 
Lamont.41 It appears Lamont was singled out for favour as " ... he best understood 
another had sent suggestive letters to a young lady. See Natal Witness, 2 February 1931. 
38. Natal Witness, 2 February 1931. 
39. See Edley, "Population", pp. 107 - 108, where a precis is given of some (If the salient 
characteristics of fascism. 
40. They had threatened to invade the chamber unless they were given permission III address the 
council. 
41. Natal Mercury, 1 August 1931. 
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the unemployment position in Durban".42 The League moved quickly to establish 
itself and fired off a series of requests to the council asking for inter alia, free office 
accommodation, free transport on trams, a free telephone service and a donation 
from the council's grants-in-aid budget, all of which were merely noted by the 
council. 
When no positive reaction was forthcoming, the council chamber was invaded by 
workless members of the League, chanting in unison, "We want work!,,43 They 
urged the council to take a more sympathetic and pragmatic view of unemployment 
in the town: 
Pick and shovel schemes ... were necessary, but they were 
merely palliatives. On the other hand, housing schemes for 
Europeans, Asiatics and Natives, the beautifying of the town, 
would open up avenues of employment for all classes of 
workmen .. .it was further hoped that the Council would take a 
broad view and elaborate extensive annual improvements for 
the benefit of the town adding to its amenitiewd the pleasure 
of visitors and also maintaining employment. 
It appears that there were some membersof the Workers' Protection League who 
disagreed with the forceful leadership style and tactics of Major Giles, for the 
movement split; a faction headed by Giles hived off to become the Active 
Unemployed Workers' Association (AUWA), while the remainder chose Rintoul as 
their leader. Giles blamed the split on a "communist tendency" in the League.45 
The town council simply refused to deal with Giles, or any other movement 
allegedly representing the unemployed other than the Durban Trades Union 
Unemployment Committee.46 · 
The manifesto of the AUWA proclaimed that the movement had been established to 
uphold the cause of justness and right; to find work for its members; to ensure that 
42. Natal Mercury, 14 August 1931. 
43. Natal Mercury, 10 August 1931. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Natal Mercury, 17 August 1931. 
46. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 14 August 1931. Despite other 
references to this body, no records have yet been found. 
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no man or woman who was willing to work but could not find any, starved; and to 
pursue measures to accomplish these ends.47 The council continued to be 
discouraging: they again refused to recognise Giles as a leader of the unemployed,48 
to donate any funds to his movement,49 to allow him to rent the town hall,50 or 
even to supply free of charge the services of the town orchestra for a fund-raising 
dance.51 Despite this official disapprobation, the movement raised funds through 
unsanctioned street collections, which aroused the ire of councillors who demanded 
to know how the monies so collected were being spent.52 When Giles countered 
this by requesting a council official to audit the association's books and to monitor 
collections, the council refused. 53 
In February, the AUWA transformed itself into the People's Unarmed Force (PUF) 
and became more militant, as the unemployment situation in the town worsened. 
The "Adjutant" of the PUF, Mr L Glassberg, sent a letter to the council on behalf of 
the General Officer Commanding the PUF, Major Giles, demanding that he be 
allowed to address the council: 
Will you please arrange for myself and Staff Officers to 
interview ~he Committee of the Council at an early date as 
possible [sic] to discuss certain matters relative to and 
necessary for the welfare of this force? I wish to make it clear 
beyond doubt, without any attempt to appear autocratic, that 
unless reco~tion be given at once to this Force as a strong 
representatIve one, an immediate demonstration of the fact 
will be made by an incursion into the Council Chamber during 
the sitting of the Council. This action c;an be avoided by the 
granting of the request as made herein.54 
The Force was demanding that an area within the town be designated for the 
47. Natal Mercury, 17 August 1931. 
48. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 5 November 1931. 
49. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 30 November 1931. 
SO. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Counci1-in-Committee, 5 November 1931. 
51. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 30 November 1931. 
52. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 8 December 1931. 
53. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 5 February 1932. 
54. Natal Mercury, 18 February 1932. Note the militaristic terms employed. 
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accommodation of a tent or hut town, where the unemployed and destitute could be 
housed. This "camp" would be run on strict military lines and the "highest moral 
standards would be rigidly enforced". The site should preferably be near the sea, 
"bathing and sun-baths being essential". It was hoped to attract some 1 000 homeless 
and destitute persons to this site, and the letter continued: 
The objects under this scheme are directed essentially to the 
relief of distress and poverty, and families without food and 
shelter Will be assisted to obtain same. With so many houseless 
persons and families [sic] this state of affairs is intolerable and 
against all public morality. The abolition of street collections is 
to be commended, and this force proposed providing food by 
means of military kitchens run on proper lines, where 
wholesome food will be provided. The accommodation 
available at the various homes is inadequate, and for this 
reason this force invites the co-operat~ of the Town Council 
in a scheme to provide for the needy ... 
The Natal Mercury published a full-page interview with Major Giles, in which he 
successfully managed to portray himself as the rising Hitler in the town. Excerpts 
are reproduced below: 
The "Force" was founded three weeks ago. It is perfectly 
organised on strict military lines. It is disciplined, and every 
man, N.C.O. and officer has signed an oath of allegiance to me. 
We are barely 1 000 stron~ now, and in five weeks we will be 
5 000 strong ... The "Force" IS loyal to a man, and our first move 
will be the establishment of a camp in Victoria Park, where we 
will gather 1000 men with women and children. We demand 
from the Town Council the right to do this and such services as 
control of sanitation, light and water. If we are refused 
permission we will be forced to establish the camp. We have 
1 000 men. There · are 174 policemen, and besides, what 
policeman will stand against us? Who will dare to break up a 
happy, healthful camp of 1000 men and families? The camp 
will be established. 
Giles stated the necessity for the camp in the following terms: 
These unfortunate unemployed are being forced down into 
de~a.dation. ~omes are be~g sold up every day. European 
families are bemg crowded mto one room. Some are sharing 
accommodation with Natives and Indians. We will uplift them 
55. Natal Mercury, 18 February 1932. The reference to the abolition of street coUections refers to 
the measures adopted after the introduction of the Community Chest, on 1 January 1932. 
and give them happiness. To feed them we will rely upo~ . gifts 
and donations. We do not fear on that ground. A nuhtary 
kitchen will be run by experienced army cooks - indeed, most 
of our men are ex-servicemen. Every man will do what work 
he can about the camp. The women will sew their own clothes. 
Every member of the 'Force' will go into the camp. I will be 
there with my family. 
The "Force" would also have economic power: 
We will be strong enough to establish economic boycotts. ~e 
will picket shoes if we leel that the owners are not acceptmg 
their responsibility.to the une~ployed. There will be no ~rute 
force unless force IS used agamst us. In every shop, busmess 
and factory, every industrial concern we will have our 
representatIves - members of our Intelligence Staff - so that 
everything is known to us. Every member will wear a badge. 
Those who do not are not of the 'Force,' and anyone unlawfully 
wearing the badge will be most severely dealt with. 
Then the megalomania emerged: . 
If it is necessary we will take control of the whole town. There 
will be thousands behind us. Already men in work are joining 
up. We will get others from all branches of work. At the 
October municipal elections we will control the voting. We will 
put forward candidates and give our support to those who 
pledge us their support. The 'Force' will spread throughout the 
country. When we are organised properly here we will go to 
other towns. The 'Force' will be a great thin136 We will control 
the Provincial Councils and the Government. 
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The council was determined not to allow the PUF to gain a foothold in the town, 
~d refused permission for the establishment of the camp on the site requested by 
the movement. It was also decided that steps would be taken to prevent any 
incursions into the council chamber.57 Despite objections from local ·residents, the 
PUF did erect a marquee on privately owned ground near the Alhambra Theatre, in 
which members were housed. The Town Council immediately instituted court 
proceedings to secure the eviction of the PUF.58 Giles and his men were ordered 
off the premises and were held liable for the council's legal costs.59 They appear to 
have simply moved elsewhere. 
56. All quotations from Natal Mercury, 19 February 1932. 
57. Natal Mercury, 19 February 1932. 
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The PUF attempted to ingratiate itself with the council by posing as a disciplined 
para-military force which could be deployed to maintain law and order: 
The maintenance of law and order and an earnest disciplined 
control of its members under strict military rule will show 
conclusively that the 'Force' - far from being a militant one 
and imbued with gasconading and bellig~rent tendencies - is 
one making for Peace... The preservatlOn of law and order 
must follow, and the power of the 'Force' will be a valuable 
adjunct to the existin~ powers t~t be in the case of necessity, , 
should aid be at any tIme sought. 
Although the PUF publicly claimed that it was doing much to assist the unemployed, 
it admitted that it was not receiving the support it desired, for it had accumulated 
debts amounting to some £300.61 The thousand-strong force had either not 
appeared or had dissipated when a reporter visited the camp in June 1932, for he 
found only fifty men encamped.62 Nor, despite claims to the contrary, did the 
movement enjoy widespread support amongst the electorate, for when Giles stood 
for election to the town council in August 1932, he received only 136 votes and came 
a poor third, securing only 5 per cent of the votes cast. 63 
The PUF, quite obviously, exhibited traits similar to those of fascist movements 
elsewhere. It was perhaps in some measure due to the phlegmatic character of the 
majority of the white inhabitants of Durban that the PUF was simply tolerated and 
its appeal to the masses largely ignored. Equally valid, however, must be the 
argument that the PUF was not the only movement competing for public support at 
the time. Other movements, like the Natal Devolution League, also with economic 
issues as part of their platform, simply condemned the PUF to obscurity after its 
brief period of coruscating life. 
58. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Counci1-in-Committee, 1 March 1932. 
59. Natal Mercury, 30 March 1932. 
60. Natal Mercury, 26 February 1932. 
61. Natal Mercury, 18 August 1932. 
62. Natal Mercury, 22 June 1932. 
63. Natal Mercury, 4 August 1932. 
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Another quasi-fascist movement operating in Durban, the New Guard of South 
Africa, was associated with the British Union of Fascists led by Sir Oswald Mosley. 
The "Honorary Organiser" was another ex-serviceman, Major R E J Kay.64 This 
movement appears to have established close links with its British and Australian 
counterparts, through an association called "A New Empire Union of Fascists".65 
Little is known of the Natal branch, which is only mentioned in scattered references. 
Amos described it as follows: 
According to Liberty [a fascist journal] the Guards' South 
African counterpart was a movement founded in Natal under 
the original title of the 'British Guard'. In an experience 
resembling that of New South Wales, a group of Pro-British 
militants had broken away from the British Guard and had 
named themselves the 'New Guard'. Liberty states that an 
affiliation was effected between thi6South African and 
Australian New Guards in August 1932. 
The New Guard also appears to have been organised on military lines as there was a 
reference to "unit leaders".67 The movement sent a letter to the Community Chest 
in the town warning it that "more than half' of the recipients of aid were "not from 
this Province" and demanded that such pe,rsons should not be given aid from the 
Chest.68 Despite protestations to the contrary, the New Guard was a racist 
organisation, open only to "all men of British birth and extraction, and to all sons of 
naturalised Britishers".69 The movement appears to have concerned itself with the 
plight of the unemployed as a special meeting was called to discuss this question in 
September 1933.70 The New Guard took up the case of Natal's relationship to the 
rest of the Union after 1933 but, despite considerable support, little of concrete 
value was achieved.71 
64. Natal Mercury, 14 September 1933. 
65. Amos, The New Guard Movement, pp. 95 - 96. 
66. Ibid., p. 96. 
67. Natal Mercury, 14 September 1933. 
68. Natal Mercury, 24 September 1933. 
69. Natal Mercury, 24 November 1933. 
70. Natal Mercury, 14 September 1933. 
71. See Thompson, Natalians, p. 110 - 118. 
319 
The last of the fascist-type movements to be detailed here was the Greyshirt 
Movement set up by Mr Harold Dold. Dold was managing director of the Denis 
Chain Company in Durban 72 and an inveterate letter writer, not only bombarding 
the local press with frequent missives, but also pestering the Prime Minister, 
General Hertzog, with unsolicited advice.73 Dold began a journal, called The 
Industries of South Africa with financial assistance from W Seals-Wood of Lever 
Brothers and Malcolm Barker of the Durban Falkirk Iron Company, in 1932.74 In 
this journal he posited certain radical plans for the reshaping of South African 
economic life. The journal appears to have become a political mouthpiece for Dold, 
who used it as the basis for his entry into politics in October 1933. 
Dold stood for election to parliament as an "Independent Industrial Candidate,,75 in 
the Umbilo constituency, and appeared at the sitting of the nomination court clad in 
a grey shirt with a springbok badge on it. The Mercury reported that he intended to 
"storm the electorate with a greyshirt brigade".76 Economic issues were obviously 
of paramount importance to Dold: 
If matters are to continue as they are now, the coming 
generation will be thrown into the mire and will be mentally 
and physically degraded by our present financial system. Our 
present system is supported by the Government of the country, 
but the Greyshirt Movement will change it for a system which 
will mean the rebirth of a nation}T 
This appeal to youth was common to fascist movements and formed a significant 
part of the content of The Industries.78 Dold denied that his movement had links 
with other anti-semitic fascist movements in the country. His political manifesto 
72. G Coleman, "Harold Dold, the Industrial Movement and the Industries of South Africa", B A 
(Hons) Long Essay, University of Natal (Durban), 1982, p. 7. 
73. See frequent references in CAD, A32, Hertzog Papers. 
74. Coleman, "Harold Dold", p. 7. 
75. Natal Mercury, 16 October 1933. 
76. Natal Mercury, 31 October 1933. 
77. Natal Mercury, 2 November 1933. 
78. See Coleman, "Harold Dold", p. 22. 
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suggested not only the scrapping of the private banking system, but also the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the Reserve Bank. South Africa was a rich 
country which could finance its own development.79 
The movement's adoption of the Nazi salute was, according to Dold, of little 
significance: 
We must have a sign. At first we thought of raising the fist, but 
we realised that this might be taken as a sign of hostility. We 
could hardly adopt the British salute, or the Russian salute. 
After all, the movements of the body are definitely limited. 
The Nazi salute is a spontaneous move~6nt of the arm and we 
adopted that. It is as good as any other. 
It appears that Dold was advocating radical right-wing solutions to the problems of 
the Union. When asked if he intended to establish a dictatorship, Dold replied that 
his ultimate aim was "fascism".81 His manifesto alienated practically all the voters 
in the constituency, particularly as the use of the springbok badge was offensive to 
sportsmen, and Jews were uneasy with his Nazi-style tactics. He received only 53 
votes in the election, a result which cost him his deposit. 82 The Mercury termed his 
defeat 
indicative of the public's refusal to take him or his political 
militarism seriously ... people in this country are
8
.lOO sensible to 
treat would-be dictators as anything but a joke. 3 
Dold then faded into the background, although The Industries continued in 
publication until 1936, when it ~eased.84 
Right-wing politicians in the province failed to make any significant impact on the 
electorate. Their movements generally enjoyed a limited lifespan and, while they 
might have attracted the attention of those members of society (particularly ex-
79. Natal Mercury, 2 November 1933. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Natal Mercury, 10 November 1933. 
82. Natal Mercury, 25 November 1933. 
83. Natal Mercury, 24 November 1933. 
84. Coleman, "Harold Dold", p. 26. 
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servicemen) who hankered after any kind of strong leadership, they were not, 
apparently, able to sustain their attraction or to convert it into electoral support. 
They appear to have had some novelty value, but once the initial enthusiasm wore 
off and the movements proved unable to deliver on their grandiose promises, people 
seem to have drifted away. They preyed on the helpless and the hopeless; prime 
pickings for any over-ambitious politician. There can be no doubt that the economic 
crisis created a climate in which these movements enjoyed support, or which 
enabled them to gain momentary credence, but ultimately, the economic system in 
Natal did not fail on a truly massive scale and this may have robbed them of glory. 
On the other hand, perhaps Kingston-Russell . w~ right when he suggested that 
Natalians were simply too sensible not to see tin-pot would-be dictators as anything 
but a joke. 
The same attitude was not generally exhibited towards those of socialist, syndicalist 
or even communist bent. Both ~ban and Pietermaritzburg had members of the 
Labour Party on their councils and while, at times, some of the leadership of the 
"left" became a little strident or talked wildly of "revolution", they tended to be in 
the minority and did not gamer significant support. The economic situation was 
obviously of prime concern to them, but only the Communist Party advocated the 
protection and furtherance of the rights of all workers. Supporters of the Labour 
Party, and other trade-unionists, were generally advocates of the rights of white 
workers and actually strove to promote these over the rights of black workers. 
Perhaps the most significant achievement of the trade union movement was the 
~ormation of the Trades Union' Joint Unemployment Committee, also known as the 
Combined Trades Union Unemployment Committee (CTUUC), which was formed 
in 1930 to serve as a co-ordinating and monitoring body on unemployment in Natal. 
The committee included representatives from the councils of Pietermaritzburg and 
Durban, the Provincial Council, the South African Railways, the Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, the Motor Traders' Association, and the Durban 
Benevolent Society; as well as the Town Clerks and Borough Engineers of both 
towns, the Provincial Secretary and Treasurer, regional representatives of the 
Department of Labour and also of the unemployed.85 It is indeed significant that 
85. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Council-in-Committee, 14 August 1931. 
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the trade union movement was able to secure the support of all these bodies in 
attempts to monitor the unemployment situation of whites and to co-ordinate and 
oversee the relief provided. However, no records of the committee could be traced. 
It appears that the committee enjoyed a great deal of support, as it was the only 
body representing the white unemployed of Durban that was recognised by the 
Durban Town Council.86 
A prominent Durban labour organiser, Mr Frank Cheek, was appointed Honorary 
Secretary to the committee. In an interview in June 1931, he indicated that 
considerable delays were being experienced in the provision of relief to the 
unemployed, that patience was wearing thin, and that resort might have to be made 
to demonstrations.87 One such demonstration was, indeed, held in Durban in July 
1931 and was addressed by several prominent labour leaders: Councillor Wanless, 
Mr J B Rintoul, Mr J F Trembath and. Councillor Mrs A E Benson among them. 
The demonstration dispersed peacefully when Mrs Benson assured the unemployed 
that the council was doing all it could within the confines of its resources, and would 
soon be initiating several new projects to provide work.88 Encouraged by local 
labour leaders, a delegation of artisans in Durban waited upon the Mayor to ask that 
the "civilised labour" policy be more strictly applied to prevent Indians from 
undercutting wages.89 
In Pietermaritzburg, a local storekeeper, Mr L H Greene, appears to have set 
himself up as the champion of the unemployed. He advocated more radical 
measures: the unemployed should unite and organise themselves to demand a more 
:'equitable distribution of the wealth of South Africa and to eliminate 
unemployment from South Africa". He 'demanded that work, maintenance, food 
and shelter be supplied "at once".90 In a series of public meetings called to address 
the problem of unemployment, Greene suggested that the people of the city should 
86. Natal Mercury, 27 June 1931. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Natal Mercury, 2 July 1931. 
89. Natal Mercury, 7 July 1931. 
90. Natal Witness, 22 January 1931. 
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"force" the government to do something for the unemployed, as they had a right to 
assistance, having paid taxes in the past.91 Greene had strong socialist sympathies; 
he demanded the abolition of overtime, the end of piece-work and the reduction by 
50 per cent of all salaries over £25 per month. He wanted the concept of "one man, 
one job" entrenched.92 His socialist tendencies appear to have provoked the 
Grousers, for one of the charges against the Grouser leaders was "interfering with 
the liberty" of Greene.93 
Greene, however, does not appear to have believed that relief works were an 
answer to the problem of unemployment, as he said ~hat the unemployed "did not 
want relief or charity".94 Instead, he called upon the government to "unlock the 
land".95 Later in 1931, he called upon the unemployed of Pietermaritzburg to 
organise themselves into commandos to raid the Railways,96 and declared that 
"Oom Paul would disown this government". He stated that Natal was receiving the 
lamb's share of unemployment and benevolent relief and like a lamb Natal was 
being led to the slaughter.97 He declared that a great revolution would follow raids 
on the railways, and blamed the government for fanning the flames of revolution 
through their neglect of the unemployed.98 Despite the ever-worsening 
unemployment situation in the city, Greene appears to have faded from the picture 
after 1932. 
As the situation deteriorated in Durban, so left-wing political activists became less 
accommodating and more vocal. Mr Ben Matthews, a prominent activist in the 
town, told crowds that they should proceed by constitutional means, " ... but if the 
'.V0rst comes to the worst, ... we have not forgotten 1922 yet".99 Matthews, according 
91. Natal Witness, 22 January 1931. 
92. Natal Witness, 26 January 1931. 
93. Owen, "White Unemployment", p. 49. Exactly what was meant by this is unclear. 
94. Natal Witness, 24 February 1931. 
95. Ibid. 
96. The railways were reputed to hold in stock many of the items that the poor wanted but could 
not afford. See Owen, "White Unemployment", p. 66. 
rn. Natal Witness, 10 September 1931. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Natal Mercury, 8 July 1931. 
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to the Mercury, "confessed to being both a Bolshevik and a communist".IOO Another 
activist, Mr R H Goodrum, was quoted as saying that in order to solve the problem 
of unemployment, the men must have their own representatives on the town and 
provincial councils and even in parliament. lOl 
As a direct result of this agitation, the Durban Town Council announced new 
developments to cope with the crisis. These included the formation of the Mayor's 
Unemployment Relief Fund, an increased contribution by the Provincial Council to 
Durban, and a soup kitchen which was started at the Durban Home for Men. The 
council gave the JTUUC permission to hold a street collection, which brought in 
£204 3s 4d.102 
The unity of the JTUUC was shattered by the hiving off of Major Giles and his 
faction of the Workers' Protection LeaguelO3 and by Rintoul's faction which also 
left the ambit of the JTUUc.104 This splintering of the co-ordinating body led to its 
demise, and it handed over the balance of its funds to the Benevolent Society in 
Durban.lOS Thus ended the umbrella organisation with perhaps the most significant 
chance of dealing with the crisis. 
The Communist Party in the province, once largely the preserve of whites, had 
become enmeshed in difficulties through implementing the "native republic" policy 
handed down from Moscow.106 This led to the alienation of whites and the 
"Africanisation" of the party.107 One issue which briefly welded the unemployed 
into a cohesive force was the expulsion order served on the communist activist, 
~ddie Roux. Roux was workiDg as an industrial chemist in Durban and was very 
100. Natal Mercury, 8 July 1931. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Natal Mercury, 14 July 1931. Interview with Mr Cheek. 
103. Natal Mercury, 15 August 1931. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Natal Mercury, 19 September 1931. 
106. See La Hausse, "Ethnicity and History", p. 308, n40. 
107. This will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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active in the Communist Party in the town. A mass meeting of the unemployed was 
held which passed a resolution condemning the expulsion order. The meeting also 
condemned conditions on the relief works, which were described as "torture", "slave 
dealing" and "slow murder" .108 
Conversely, the issue of unemployment was one which united virtually all the 
socialists and trade-unionists in the town. At a meeting of one thousand people, 
many of them unemployed, in the town in 1932, the speakers, including Frank 
Cheek, Ben Matthews and H Dougherty, called on the town council and the 
government to do more for the unemployed. They advocated that the council 
should take out a loan to fund development which would provide relief for the 
unemployed in the town; that the government be urged to make £4 000 000 available 
to maintain the unemployed; and that housing and feeding schemes for the homeless 
and workless should be immediately implemented. 109 
Matthews recommended the setting up of a co-operative store, as Indian 
storekeepers were allegedly overcharging relief workers. Some trade unions 
implemented a "poor rate", whereby members of unions still in employment 
contributed a portion of their earnings to a fund to assist their unemployed brethren. 
The Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers paid some £520 to 200 unemployed 
members in a period of three months,110 while the members of the Typographical 
Union who were still employed, each paid 5s per week into a similar fund. 111 
The moderate left-wing politicians enjoyed some success in being elected to office in 
~ban and Pietermaritzburg,' in elections for the provincial council, and even in 
parliamentary elections during the depression period,112 but the more radical 
members were spurned by the electorate. Like the politicians of the "right-wing", 
the politicians of the "left-wing" suffered partial eclipse by other political 
108. Natal Mercury, 27 October 1931. 
109. Natal Mercury, 23 June 1932. 
110. Natal Mercury, 14 April 1932. 
111. Natal Mercury, 23 April 1932. 
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movements, notably the Natal Devolution League, which was able to sustain interest 
largely as a result of the continuous publicity afforded the movement by the Natal 
Mercury. 
The Natal Devolution League (NDL) grew out of the fear that the government 
intended to abolish the provincial councils. The provincial councils had been 
incorporated in the South Africa Act of 1909 mainly as a sop to Natal. 113 The 
councils had limited legislative and administrative capabilities and even more 
limited access to funding, being forced to rely on the central or Union government 
for subsidies to finance their activities.114 This arrangement was comfortable for 
neither the central government nor the Natalians, but the issue did not really 
become significant until the National Party (NP) began to question the efficacy of 
the councils in September 1929. Speaking at the Cape congress of the NP, Minister 
of Finance Mr N C Havenga said that the system might have to be re-organised for 
purposes of economy. He added ~hat the provincial system could pose a danger to 
the South African nation as a whole, as a single province might choose to isolate 
itself - especially Natal, whose geographical boundaries largely coincided with 
political and racial divisions.115 Similar sentiments were expressed at other 
provincial congresses of the party; even the Natal congress of the NP was in favour 
of abolition as they wanted the NP to take control of education in the province.116 
Nor was the South African Party (SAP), led by General J C Smuts, entirely 
convinced of the necessity for the provincial council system. Leading lights within 
the party, including Smuts, Deneys Reitz, Jan Hofmeyr and Patrick Duncan were 
~eputed to be against the system.117 In sharp contrast to this negative attitude, a 
faction of the SAP in Natal were generally in favour not only its retention but of the 
extension of the powers of the councils.118 Included in this group were Heaton 
Nicholls, Felix Hollander and Major G R Richards. Heaton Nicholls went so far as 
113. See Thompson, Natations, pp. 1 ~ 9. 
114. Ibid., pp. 50 - 53. 
115. Ibid., p. 55. 
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to form a federal wing within the SAP, and began pressurising the party to recognise 
Natal's rights.119 
Parallel with these developments within the ranks of the political parties, an 
alternative movement was set afoot by one Stuart Helps. Helps had been involved 
in a number of "imperialist" military adventures, notably the Jameson Raid and the 
Ndebele and Swazi Rebellions. He had also served in the South African War. He 
claimed to have been largely responsible for the exclusion of the "Native Territories" 
from the Union of South Africa in 1910. In 1911 he published The Imperial British 
Empire, an imperialist polemic calling for unity.120 He then apparently turned his 
hand to farming, before settling in Durban. He was described as "a government and 
military contr~ctor", 121 but may also have supplemented his income by working as 
an "itinerant oculist".l22 In J R Kingston Russell, editor of the Natal Mercury, 
Helps found a redoubtable ally. Imported from the Cape, where he had been 
associated with the Cape Times, Russell was thought by the Robinson and Collins 
families (who controlled a considerable proportion of Mercury stock) to be the ideal 
person to further Natal's interests. l23 
In 1931, discontent over the government's perceived "mishandling" of the economic 
crisis, and general unhappiness over "Afrikanerisation", began to crystallize into 
ideas associated with the secession of the province from the Union. Ill-formed at 
first, these ideas began to receive more and more prominence in the columns of the 
Mercury, prompting that newspaper to begin a public debate on the topic of "Home 
Rule or Separation?". The newspaper concluded that devolution represented the 
better of the two options. 124 On 9 April 1931 Helps, in a long letter to the editor of 
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the Mercury, was extremely critical of the Hertzog government's economic policies 
and highlighted the "threat" to the provincial councils. Helps advocated that Natal 
should first separate from the Union, and then renegotiate her association with the 
other states on a federal basis. He castigated the government: 
... since we cannot expect fair play, or prevent further spoliation 
by the present 'carpet bag' Government, it behoves us to 
safeguard our own interests by taking our affairs out of their 
hands. The right to secede was clearly defined at the last 
Imperial Conference, so we need not waste time arguin~ th~t 
issue; as it is clear that Natal can withdraw from the Unton If. 
she wishes to. Secession does not mean splendid isolation on 
. the part of Natal; we can still co-operate with our sister States. 
But we must manage our own ~ernal affairs and have 
absolute control over our finances.1 
He also suggested that Natal would not be saved by the SAP: 
It is useless relying on the chance of a change of Government 
to improve our position, as General Smuts IS as much against 
any system of decentralisation as the present Government. 
Indeed, it is doubtful if the Provincial Councils would still be in 
existence had General Smuts remained in office. Mr Havenga 
is well aware that he has a safe ally in General Smuts, and that 
is why he has invited him to join issue with the Government in 
solving the Provincial Council problem. Neither can we expect 
our Natal members of Parliament to take ~definite lead, as 
they have no mandate from Natal to act on. 
Setting out the economic position of Natal vis-a-vis the other provinces, Helps 
argued that it was "sheer lunacy for Natal to continue under the present system". He 
showed that although far more revenue was contributed to the coffers of the Union 
Via excise duty by Natal than by the other provinces, Natal received the least benefit. 
Even the Orange Free State received a larger provincial subsidy, and had more 
spent on her poor, than Natal. He also dwelt on the serious position of Natal's coal 
industry, which he said was suffering from the depression and from the 
"unbusinesslike administration of our railways and harbours", which included 
inequitable railway rates.127 




Helps found allies in Colonel E M Greene,128 Robert Mackenzie,129 and Percy 
Ridgway,130 all of whom appeared to share his disquiet over the subordinate 
position in which Natal found herself, and were urging action to remedy this. In 
early July 1931, the Home Rule Council was established at a public meeting in 
Pietermaritzburg. A resolution was passed which expressed somewhat less than 
Helps had advocated, for it made little mention of secession and was full of jingoist 
sentiment: 
Conscious of the sentiments of the majority of the Natal 
people, this meeting affirms that it is desirable and imperative 
to establish for Natal such a status and form of government as 
will preserve to them for all time their inalienable right of 
allegtance to their King, flag and language, and their freedom 
to remain an inte~al part of the British Empire. Recognising, 
however, the desrre of the peoples of the other provinces of the 
Union to decide their own destiny; recognising also the 
differences of opinion and sentiment existing on the question 
of independence [from the Empire] and higher status, and 
fearing that such differences must inevitably result in serious 
racial disagreement, this meeting is of the opinion that no 
friendly solution of the differences can be found other than by 
the forma~ion of the federal system of government, ensuring, 
subject to certain provisions agreed upon before a~ceptance of 
the federal system, home rule for each province. 1:5 
The council attempted to elicit support for the movement by issuing a manifesto in 
the form of a petition, entitled "Wake up Natal!"132 In a few days, 10 000 
128. Colonel Edward M Greene, CMG, KC, was a SOD of the former Dean of Pietermaritzburg and 
a fomer Minister of Railways and Harbours in the colonial administration of Natal. He 
undoubtedly brought a wide experience and influence to the movement. See Who's Who in 
Natal, p. 110; Vickers, ·Provincial Councils", p. 243; EdIey, "Devolution League", p. 22; 
Thompson, Natalions, p. 76. 
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signatures to this had been obtained after tables had been set up in the main streets 
of Durban to collect them. The police had to be summoned to control the 
crowds.133 The movement then gathered strength and in September 1931, the 
council was re-formed and renamed the Natal Devolution League. This 
reorganisation appears to have been a response to the perceived threat to Natal's 
hopes implicit in the legislation under passage through the House of Commons in 
Britain, which finally emerged as the Statute of Westminster in December 1931. 
The initial aims of the (NDL) were: ''To retain Natal within the Union and the 
Union within the Empire, and, in furtherance of this policy, strenuously to oppose 
the passing of the Statute of Westminster, under which Natal's rights would be 
jeopardised.,,134 The NDL were not successful in halting the legislation, or in 
lobbying the Hertzog government to follow Britain off the gold standard. Thus it 
appeared that the NDL had moved even more firmly into the imperialist camp. 
Beneath the surface, the Durban-based members of the NDL were beginning to 
exert more influence, perhaps as a consequence of the luke-warm reception 
accorded the NDL in Pietermaritzburg, where the Natal Witness remained opposed, 
and the local members of parliament remained largely committed to the SAP. 
Helps, Mackenzie and Ridgway formed a triumvirate in Durban, and began to 
agitate against the government's handling of the economic crisis, perhaps in an 
effort to gather support amongst the businessmen and the unemployed of the town. 
By October 1931, ''Wake Up Natal!" had collected 15000 signatures and Helps was 
agitating for a "national government" to cope with the depression.13S 
Helps began to suggest that 'the way out of current difficulties was to hold a 
"People's Convention" where the people of Natal could express their desires. It was 
obvious that the stance of the NDL was subtly altering, and that Helps was moving 
back to his initial point of departure, namely that Natal should first secede and then 
renegotiate a federal form of association with the rest of South Africa.136 At a 
meeting held in the Mayor's Parlour,137 Helps moved that the time had come to 
133. Natal Mercury, 17 July 1931. 
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"get down to business". The following resolution was put to the meeting and 
enthusiastically accepted: 
That this meetin~ of citizens of Natal fully realising the 
disastrous undermIning of our rights as British subjects and the 
economic ruin of the Province of Natal, by the Union 
Government, do hereby declare our intention of separating 
from the Union, and we hereby resolve to call a Convention of 
Natal citizens to be held in Maritzburg to consider Natal's 
relations to the Union and to the Empire, and decide the 
necessary action to be taken to brin~ about such separation at 
the earliest possible date and to deVise the m1~s whereby we 
can enter into a Federal form of Government. 
It was resolved to hold a public meeting in Durban to discuss the whole issue. Prior 
to this meeting, set for 31 March 1932, Helps gave several addresses and interviews, 
mainly on economic issues. At one of these he was recorded as saying: 
Under her own Government, Natal will soon put her house in 
order. One of our first aims will be to revive our coal industry 
and create a huge export trade. As our first step will be to 
come off the Gold Standard and link up with sterling, a big 
impetus will be given \~9 our four primary industries; coal, 
wattles, wool and sugar. 
Helps also suggested that the railways of Natal should be brought under the 
proposed new government and would then no longer be used to subsidise less 
economical branch lines elsewhere in the Union. He pointed out that under the 
colonial government, the Natal Government Railways " ... always paid dividends". 
"We can give better facilities ~d cheaper rates", he argued. Railway freight charges, 
he alleged, had increased by 50 per cent, but efficiency had declined at the same 
rate.140 
The meeting on 31 March was a great success. The crowd, between three and five 
thousand strong, packed into the Durban Town Hall, sang patriotic songs and waved 
137. The Mayor of Durban, the Revd A Lamont, was an enthusiastic supporter of the League. 
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Union Jacks. After addresses by the Mayor, Helps and Colonel Greene, a resolution 
in favour of secession from the Union was carried unanimously)41 A similar 
rapturous reception awaited the League in Pietermaritzburg a week later. There too, 
the crowd (estimated at over three thousand) passed the secessionist resolution by 
acclaim.142 Public meetings were organised in towns allover the province and in 
most resolutions along the following lines were adopted: 
That this meetin~ of citizens of Natal fully realising the 
disastrous undermming of our rights as British subjects and the 
economic ruin of the Province of Natal by the Union 
Government, do ~~reby declare our intention of separating 
from the Union ... 1 
By Apri11932, 15 out of 16 towns had passed such resolutions. By May, the Mercury 
reported that 27 towns in the province had pledged support, and Helps declared that 
two-thirds of Natal was with the League.l44 
There can be little doubt that the NDL flourished in the hard times of the 
depression and that it enjoyed widespread support among disaffected and 
unemployed whites of the province. The government's adherence to the gold 
standard and the general economic malaise, contributed to the popularity of the 
League, as a letter from "Out of Work" illustrates: 
Why, therefore, I ask, does South Africa not link with sterling 
and at least allow money to come back into this financially 
starved country. The result is obvious, all too obvious, almost 
utter stagnation in business, bankruptcies galore, and resultant 
suicides, etc. Th~ next question which arises is, how long must 
we, the general public, stand it? Unemployment is rife, there is 
no State relief, and no· attempt at any constructional 
Government policy. In the very near future trouble will start in 
141. See Vickers, "Provincial Councils", pp. 104 and 109; Natal Mercury, 1 April 1932. 
142. Vickers, "Provincial Councils", pp. 108 - 109. 
143. Natal Mercury, 17 March 1932. 
144. Thompson, Natalians, p. 75. In fact, not all the towns had expressed such scntim~nts. Of the 
27 towns, 24 had passed the secessionist resolution, but in the the r~maining three 
(Empangeni, Paulpietersburg and Vryheid) the NDL had run into determined opposition. In 
the Dundee-Glencoe district an anti-Devolution movement was organised. Thi!> would seem to 
indicate that both sugar and coal interests were against the League, while the pn:dominantly 
Afrikaner district of Vryheid was naturally opposed to any such "jingoist" mll\lement. See 
Vickers, "Provincial Councils", p. 162, Fn 71; Thompson, Natatians, p. 80. 
earnest, no man will stand and watch his wife and kids starve. 
It is all too plain and too close, to permit one to s~ut one's eyes 
to it. Something must be done, and at once, if not by the 
Government, then by the people. The movement on foot in 
Natal for Separation is a possible solution for us locally, and 
will undoubtedly soon be followed by other Provinces. Let us 
av~ our\~5es of it, but speed it up and get something 
achieved. 
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However, as Thompson correctly pointed out, the movement also fed on fears about 
the intentions of the Hertzog government towards the future of the provincial 
councils, and on the tradition of imperialist patriotism. 146 The NDL also exhibited 
several characteristics common to populist movements elsewhere in the Union147 
and in the world,148 although in the true sense of the term, the NDL was not a 
typical populist movement.149 Nor was it universally popular in Natal. The sugar 
barons set their minds against it, probably because they feared the loss of 
government support for their crisis-ridden industry. G N Hulett repudiated the 
movement on behalf of the sugar planters,150 while the SASJ, which tended to 
represent the millers rather than the planters was also scathing: 
It is not within the province ~f the Sugar Journal to take sides 
on political questions and it has always refrained from doing 
so, but when It- comes to a matter of superlative importance to 
the future of Natal and its most important industry, it is 
incumbent upon us, in response to numerous requests, to 
express the opinions which we believe will place on record the 
general attitude of the Sugar Industry towards separation from 
the Union of South Africa. When the movement first started it 
was not taken very seriously, but during recent weeks Natal 
people have expressed themselves in favour of the general 
145. Natal Mercury, 19 May 1932. 
146. Thompson, Natalians, p. 75. 
147. See A D Turrell, "The South African Party: · The Movement Towards Fusion", M A thesis, 
University of Natal (Durban), 1977, p. 77, where Turrell writes of the Farmers' and Workers' 
Bond and the Centre Party, formed in the Union during the depression years: "Common to all 
these rather bizarre parties was an economic programme populist in character and committed 
to the abandonment of the Gold Standard." 
148. See Edley, "Population", p. 99 for these references. 
149. Ibid., pp. 99 - 100. Most truly populist movements have a strong agrarian base, which the 
NDL was largely lacking. In fact, as will be shown, the strongest opposition to the League 
came from agricultural interests. 
150. Vickers, "Provincial Councils", pp 133 - 135. 
principle of some form of separation., popularly descri~ed ~ 
devolution, but in many pubhc questions the popular VIew IS 
not always the right one, and is not usually characterised by 
deep reasoning. Popular feeling is created to a large extent by 
the utterances of self-constituted leaders who are more 
actuated by motives more selfish than benevolent, who Pf~r 
upon the feelings of the multitude to serve their own ends ... 
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The motivation behind this attack also emerged clearly further on in the same 
article: 
We can scarcely believe that anybody with sugar interests 
would be so short-sighted as to favour the separation 
movement. The Sugar Industry has a lot to thank the 
Government for, which should be given the credit of being 
inspired by honesty of purpose and a desire to promote the 
well-being of the country throu2h its industries: and we will go 
further and say we believe the Hertzo~ Ministry has done more 
for sugar than any of its predecessors m office either before or 
after Union. The fact that they are ruining the country by their 
obstinate adherence to the ~old standard is another matter and 
is likewise a matter of conSIderably varied opinion. The Natal 
people are just as great racialists as the Dutch in the backveld, 
and their feelings are being played on by the devolutionist 
leaders, who are not altogether animated by the purest 
patriotism. We fail to see how Natal could secede from the 
Union of South Africa without suffering in a variety of ways: in 
short, she has everything to lose and nothing to gain, and if she 
is led away by the hysterical, sentimental nonsense expressed 
throughout the country during the last few months by certAiu 
irresponsible people, it cannot fail to react to her detriment.I~Z 
The SASJ continued to attack Helps and the NDL at every opportunity, and when 
Helps went so far as to suggest that the population were being "heavily taxed" to 
support the sugar industry, the SASJ said: . 
If the gentlemen engaged in flogging the Devolution horse are 
not. more sound in their J?Oli~ical arguments than they are in 
their references to sugar, It will be a bad day for Natal if they 
ever take over the reins of Government, which we are happy to 
think will never happen, notwithstanding the tumult . and the 
shou~ing which e.manate from the irresponsibles who pack their 
meetmgs. Here IS a sample of the unadulterated tosh which Mr 
Helps, the self-constituted leader of the movement delivered a 
few days ago at Pinetown ... I53 
151. SASJ, 30 June 1932, p. 312. 
152. SASJ, 30 June 1932, p. 313. 
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Helps was attempting to win support among the planters, for he suggested that any 
protection afforded the industry should go entirely to the producers of the cane. 
This strategy was also condemned: 
''The Planters have nothing to fear from a Natal Government" 
says Mr. Helps. We give the Planters full credit for having 
more than sufficient sense to avoid being led away by the 
specious arguments of men whose personal ambitions override 
all other considerations. Natal has everything to lose and 
nothing to gain by breaking away from the Union, and it is 
obvious the Sugar Industry would suffer very badly under the 
parochial ~g4ernment which the Devolutionists put forward as 
their ideal. 
When it became obvious that the sugar industry as a whole was not prepared to show 
any sign of. support for the NDL, both Helps and Greene launched attacks on the 
industry, saying it was exploiting the people. Helps accused the industry of being 
responsible for Natal having joined the Union: 
The Sugar Industry has now come out into the open. We can 
now speak out. You all know that before the National 
Convention it was the sugar interests in Natal that drove us into 
Union. They coerced the people 22 years a~~5and they are 
trying to coerce them now to stay in the Union. :J 
As has been shown,156 Greene even opposed the state assistance being given to the 
sugar industry, saying: 
~t ~,:es us no ~eat measure of satisfaction to see a few 
mdivtduals wax nch at our expense. 157 
Nor was it only sugar interests that opposed the NDL, as R Ellis Brown, Chairman 
of the Durban Chamber of Commerce, was quoted as sayirig that Commerce had 
153. SASJ, 31 July 1932, p. 371. 
154. Ibid. 
155. Helps speaking at a meeting in Northdene, as reported in the SASJ, 31 August 1932, p. 453. 
156. See Chapter Five. 
157. CAD, A32 (Hertzog Papers), F99, Colonel E M Greene (Natal Devolution League) to 
Hertzog, 7 October 1932. 
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never regarded the separation of Natal from the Union as a practical possibility. It 
would place business at a decided dis~dvantage.158 /langa also entered the debate: 
Our Natal citizens should know that they cannot have it both 
ways. If they are now South Africans they must bear up with 
South African conditions of which the Native is the greatest 
sufferer than those who are reays to leave the Union on the 
first occasion of discomfort [sic]. 9 
Helps appears to have been undaunted by such opposition. 
Prior to the convention of the NDL, called to meet in Pietermaritzburg on 31 May 
1932, Helps wrote to every sitting member of parliament in the province asking 
them to commit themselves to devolution and if necessary, to secession.160 This 
was a shrewd political move, for it put the SAP, which controlled the majority of 
Natal seats, in something of a quandary. It was clear that the NDL enjoyed sizable 
support at the grass-root level in the province. If sitting MPs pronounced against the 
NDL or its aims and objectives, such a pronouncement might very well count against 
them in future nomination contests or in the next election. On the other hand, 
however, the members of parliament were subject to party rules and discipline and 
the leader of the SAP, General Smuts, was not favourably disposed to the NDL's 
plans, or even to the idea of federalism. The MPs were damned if they did and 
damned if they did not. 
At a meeting of Natal MPs it was decided to leave the question of replies up to 
individual members. Worried ~hat the SAP in Natal might be eclipsed by the NDL, 
Heaton Nicholls attempted to clllTY favour with the NDL by taking the issue to the 
full SAP caucus. He won grudging permission to journey to Natal to see what could 
be salvaged.161 After considerable negotiation, it appeared that Heaton Nicholls 
had been successful in forging a modus vivendi with the NDL, for the Natal 
Convention of the NDL was fairly mild in its approach to the party. 
158. Thompson, Natalians, p. 80. 
159. llanga lase Natal, 1 April 1932. 
160. Vickers, "Provincial Councils", p. 187. 
161. Thompson, Natatians, p. 83. 
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The 53 delegates to the convention from 24 towns in the province, represented a 
fairly broad spectrum of white public opinion in the province, for among the 
delegates were civic leaders, businessmen, lawyers, doctors and farmers. 162 The 
convention affirmed the need for a devolution of power to the province and justified 
separation from the Union on the grounds that it would achieve this.163 
Committees on Legal Affairs, Finance, Native Affairs and General Purposes were 
elected, with mandates to investigate and report back on the implications of 
separation at the next sitting of the convention. l64 
The conciliatory tone adopted by the convention towards the SAP led to the 
formation of a loose alliance between the Natal faction of that party (the so-called 
federal group, headed by Heaton Nicholls) and the NOL. However, the SAP 
appeared to believe that by forming such an alliance, the NOL had changed its 
stance on secession, a notion which was angrily disavowed by Helps.165 In the 
event, the association of the SAP with the NDL was terminated by Smuts himself, 
who repudiated the idea of devolution of power by declaring that "federation is not 
the policy of the party". He further stated that the SAP would not tolerate any 
distinct federal group within the party, and that if members could not adhere to the 
party line, they were welcome to amicably part company with the SAP and form 
their own party.166 Smuts had chosen his time well, for Heaton Nicholls was 
overseas attending the Ottawa Conference, and the remainder of the "federal group" 
did not have his determination. Most came promptly to heel when the party whip 
was cracked. 167 
It appears that despite the importance of the Natal caucus of the SAP to the party, 
162. See Natal Devolution League, Report of the Natal Convention, Durban, 1932, for a list of 
delegates. 
163. Thompson, Natations, pp. 84 - 85. 
164. Edley, "Devolution", pp. 56 - 57. 
165. Ibid., pp. 86 - 87. 
166. Vickers, "Provincial Councils", pp. 183 - 185; /langa lase Natal, 1 July 1932. 
167. Thompson, Natations, pp. 89 - 90. Several MPs in the "federal group" did not recant. These 
included Marwick, Borlase, V L Nicoll and Richards. 
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Smuts was not prepared to tolerate any imperium in imperio. He admitted the right 
of Natal members to advocate federation, but declared that this could not be 
maintained contrary to the wishes of the party as a whole. This decision meant that 
no official support would be forthcoming from the SAP, and that instead of finding 
increasing common ground, the SAP and the NDL were fast becoming political 
opponents. The whip-cracking was not well received and popular support for the 
convention and the NDL remained. However, under the pressure of rejection, splits 
began to appear within the convention, with Col Greene wanting a closer association 
with the SAP and Helps angrily repudiating Smuts, calling him Natal's .greatest 
enemy. It appears that even amongst rank and file members of the SAP, the idea of 
secession and devolution had not died out, for at the provincial congress of the SAP 
in October 1932, several resolutions calling for one or the other were tabled.168 
The congress was also asked to consider a compromise, largely aimed at preventing 
an outright split in the SAP between pro- and anti-devolutionists, which had been 
developed by Felix Hollander. The Hollander Memorandum laid down, inter alia, 
that the rights of the provinces should be entrenched in the constitution, and was 
overwhelmingly endorsed by the congress.169 Helps and Mackenzie visited Smuts 
on his farm at Irene in an effort to get the SAP to withdraw their candidate in the 
forthcoming provincial by-election in Greyville, where the Revd Lamont, a firm 
supporter of the NOL, was standing as an independent home rule candidate. They 
were unsuccessful. Lamont was none the less elected by a slender majority of 44 
votes. Although this victory showed that the devolution movement was able to win 
electoral support, the character and personality of Lamont himself contributed in 
~arge measure to his success.170 
Lamont's victory gave added impetus to the campaign for the formation of a 
political party to fight for Natal's rights. Greene was opposed to this idea, preferring 
collaboration with the SAP under the terms of the Hollander Memorandum, while 
the more militant members of the NDL, including Helps and Mackenzie, favoured 
the formation of a "Natal Party". This disagreement resulted in the expulsion of 
168. G H Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, Allen & Unwin, London, 1961, p. 247. 
169. Thompson, Natations, pp. 93 - 94. 
170. Ibid., pp. 95 - 96. 
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Helps and Mackenzie from the NDL.17l Despite all Helps's earlier protestations 
that the NDL should be an apolitical movement, and his considerable misgivings 
about party government,172 he went on to form the Natal Devolution Home Rule 
Party. 173 The parting of the ways took place amid acrimony as Helps was 
successfully sued by Greene for the return ' of documents he had taken from the 
NDL's offices.174 The entire devolution movement was in disarray and had split 
into three distinct factions; Helps' Home Rule Party, Greene's NDL and the Federal 
League, based in Port Shepstone, under Major Knox-Gore. 175 
The sudden announcement of the formation of a coalition between the SAP and NP, 
and an impending general election, thus caught the entire "Natal Movement" 
unprepared and deeply divided.176 Although there is no direct evidence that this 
was a factor in the government's decision to go to the country so soon after the 
formation of the coalition, there can be no doubt that the swift arrival of the 
ultimate test of the "Natal Movement's" electoral strength was serendipitous for the 
SAP-NP alliance (especially for the SAP component of it»)77 The SAP took the 
opportunity to rid itself of some of the "troublesome': federalists in its ranks and 
refused renomination for four of them: Borlase (Umbilo), Anderson (Klip River), 
Acutt (Umlazi) and Major G R Richards (Greyville»)78 Heaton Nicholls's seat was 
not contested. The Home Rule Party led by Helps put up five candidates (all in the 
Durban region) and gave support to a further five "Home Rulers" contesting seats 
elsewhere in the province.179 
The Home Rule Party only won two seats, both in Durban, where separatist 
~entiment was greatest. The Durban (Greyville) constituency was won by Mr J G 
171. Natal Mercury, 11 January 1933. 
172. See Helps, Imperial British Empire, pp. 17ff. 
173. Natal Mercury, 14 January 1933. 
174. Natal Mercury, 9 February 1933. Exactly what these documents were is unknown. 
175. Edley, "Population", p. 101; Thompson, Natalians, pp. 101 - 102. 
176. Thompson, "Province", p. 3. 
177. Turrell, "Movement", p. 123. 
178. Natal Mercury, 13 Apri11933. 
179. Thompson, Natalians, p. 104. Interestingly, Helps did not stand as a candidate. 
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Derbyshire, while Mr S S Sutton won the Durban (Umlazi) seat.180 While the 
election had proved that the SAP was still the dominant party in the province and 
that the coalition with the NP was generally popular, the SAP had no room for 
complacency. As Thompson pointed out, only 32,2 per cent of the valid votes cast 
were for the SAP. Had the Natal Movement been better organised at a constituency 
level, it might very well have fared far better, for some of its candidates put up good 
showings. 181 
The tenuous alliance of the "Natal Movement" disintegrated after the election. 
While the Home Rule Party under Helps soldiered bravely on, Greene's faction of 
the Devolution League joined the Coalition Union to form the Provincial 
Government Union; within a month this grouping joined with Knox-Gore's Federal 
League and another minor grouping to form the Provincial Party, under the 
leadership of Major G R Richards and Major R E J Kay.182 This Provincial Party 
was to prove a significant force in the provincial council elections held in August 
1933. The Provincial Party had the same basic goals as the "Natal Movement"; it 
stood for the preservation of the uniquely English character of Natal.183 Despite 
the fact that the depression was on the wane, the party continued to make economics 
one of the key elements of its platform. It stood for 
a policy of Justice for all classes, the adoption of 
unemployment and disability insurance, and the pushing 
forward of a scheme .. having for its object the proVIsion of 
congenial employment under attractive and healthy conditions, 
as being the only solution of what has .now become a great 
National problem, viz. unemployment. HS4 
The party supported the "civilised labour" policy, as the following statement 
indicates: 
180. Union of South Africa, Government Gazette No. 2117, 2 June 1933, p. 352. 
18l. Thompson, Natalians, p. 105. 
182. Natal Mercury, 29 May 1933. 
183. Natal Mercury, 13 November 1933. 
184. Natal Mercury, 12 November 1933. This is an extract from the manifesto of Edgar 
Ashburner, who stood as a Provincial Party candidate in the Umbilo Parliamentary by-election 
of that month. It is the fullest account of the Party's principles and aims still extant. 
[The Party] is opposed ... to employing Europeans at miserable 
rates of pay, compelling them to herd together in slums and 
live under uncivilized conditions. The object and policy of 
[the] Party is to foster South African In~ustries. ~nd 
Agriculture, and by such and other means to proVIde suffIcIent 
employment in circumstances which will make our people and 
theIr c~ildI~~ happy and contented members of our 
communIty. 
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In the August provincial council elections, the Home Rule Party put up five 
candidates, while the Provincial Party fought eleven contests. The former retained 
its Greyville seat, won by Lamont the previous year, and also gained Durban North 
West, Mr R D Lavery winning this by 72 votes.186 The Provincial Party fared far 
better, winning the following Durban contests: Berea (Col T H Blew), Central 
(Major Kay), Gardens (Mr W S Payne), Point (Mr V L Shearer) and Toll Gate (Mr 
C H Stott). Most of the strength of the anti-SAP vote lay in the greater Durban 
region. The Labour Party also won the Congella seat, further reducing the SAP 
majority. In total, the SAP garnered only 43,5 per cent of the total vote, significantly 
less than the 59,2 per cent it had enjoyed in 1930, a year in which only 11 of the 25 
seats had been contested, the rest being retained unopposed by the SAP.187 It is 
quite clear that had there been more time available to the Provincial Party, and had 
the level of organisation been greater, the party would have fared far better.188 It is 
also undeniable that had some sort of election pact been effected between the 
Home Rule Party and the Provincial Party, further seats would have been won.189 
After the election, the "Natal Movement" was briefly united in the Democratic 
Party. It was unlikely that another opportunity to gain elected office would arise in 
~he next few years: the great opportunity had been lost. l90 
There can be little doubt that the "Natal Movement" did dominate the political scene 
185. Natal Mercury, 13 November 1933. 
186. Province of Natal, Of/icial Gazette 0/ the Province 0/ Natal, No. 1333, Provincial Notice No. 
388 dated 30 August 1933, pp. 80 - 81. 
187. Edley, "Population", p. 103. 
188. Thompson, Natalians, p. 106. 
189. Edley, "Population", p. 103. 
190. Thompson, Natations, p. 107. 
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in Natal during the depression years. The depression was not responsible fO,r this 
upsurge in "jingoist" sentiment, but it certainly provided sufficient economic grounds 
to sustain and enhance the movement's popularity. The leadership made constant 
reference to the state of depression prevailing in the province, and to the 
unprecedented level of white unemployment in the major urban areas. The 
unemployed, cleverly drawn in by the leaders of virtually every movement in the 
province, were clearly disenchanted with the lack of attention being paid to their 
needs by the Hertzog government. Many saw the government as not only remote 
from them, but as actively working against their interests through the maintenance 
of the gold standard and through not affording them effective assistance in their 
hour of greatest need. Ordinary Natalians, fiercely proud of their British heritage, 
and fearful of Afrikanerisation, looked with horror upon the steps being taken to 
loosen ties to the British Empire. The Provincial Councils issue seemed to simply be 
a further step along the path to the imposition of absolute control from Pretoria 
which, in the light of their current situation, was anathema. 
There is also little doubt that although the NDL and others of that ilk were sincere 
in preaching secession, they had only the vaguest idea of the economic 
repercussions; their zeal was matched only by the impracticality of the notion of 
secession. Natal simply could not "go it alone", despite all that the NDL argued. 
When this was pointed out to the leadership, they reacted by angrily turning on the 
"spoilers". The chief reason for the failure of the "Natal Movement" was the fact 
that even had the movement gained sufficient electoral support, this would have 
been entirely inadequate to bring about secession. Secession could only really be 
~ained through the medium of the NP or the SAP, neither of which was disposed to 
grant it. 
The NDL and its sister movements did have an impact on the political fortunes of 
the major political party in the province. The SAP bore the brunt of the disaffection 
with existing political parties which was rife in the province. Attempts to draw the 
SAP into the "Natal Movement" were ultimately thwarted by Smuts and, despite 
having its majority threatened, the party emerged bloody but unbowed from the 
struggle with the secessionists. The amount of support that the movement did 
manage to garner is, nevertheless, significant. With slicker party machinery and 
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finer organisational abilities, they might have fared even better. The formation of 
the coalition between the SAP and the NP, and the consequent fusion of the two 
parties, rendered the "Natal Movement" insignificant. With a huge majority in 
parliament, the United Party was able to dominate and the elected Home Rulers 
found themselves starved of speaking time to press their case. 
Looking at all the developments in white politics in Natal during the depression 
years, it is not difficult to see the influence that economic issues had on the body 
politic at that time. The growth of "extremist" movements (here excluding the NDL 
and its affiliates for the moment) must be seen as a partial result of the economic 
pressure that the white population was experiencing. While these movements 
gained little electoral support, the fact that they came into existence at this time and 
briefly flourished, must be seen as 'significant. It is equally true, however, that 
although Natal suffered greatly from the evil consequences of the depression, the 
economic system had not failed on the same massive scale as, for example, 
Germany's had, thereby bringing Hitler to power. It also seems that, while people 
were prepared to attend meetings and voice their unhappiness, they were not 
prepared to back their vocal support with their votes. The right wing were 
spectacularly unsuccessful at all levels of political electioneering in the province. 
Natal's experience in this regard was by no means unique, for in the rest of the 
western world, also bowed under the effects of the depression, many similar 
occurrences were recorded. 
Nor were the socialists and their allies much more successful. Although numbers of 
them were elected to public office, the more radical were spurned by the electorate 
in favour of the moderates. The disarray of the Labour Party at a national level 
indubitably also contributed to this state of affaits, and it appears that many of those 
who achieved election did so on the strength of their personal qualities rather than 
their affiliation to a particular party. The fact that most of them supported the 
interests of white workers also assisted them in the working-class areas which they 
tended to represent. 
A great drawback to any study of the political life of the province at this time is the 
lack of adequate records. Hardly any documentation relating directly either to the 
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"fringe" movements or the NDL could be traced, despite extensive searches. The 
only accessible information exists in the papers and records of other persons and 
organisations and in the newspapers. The inevitable result of this is that a complete 
picture is impossible to obtain. Until such materials are uncovered (if indeed they 
existed), all findings must remain merely provisional. 
The other interesting facet of political history at this time is how relatively divorced 
white political activity appears to have been from its black counterpart. The 
political life of Africans (and to a much lesser extent that of Indians) hardly raised a 
ripple of interest after 1931. Yet, as is obvious, the fortunes of all the population 
groups were intertwined, as will be shown in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF BLACK POLmCS IN NATAL 
DURING THE DEPRESSION YEARS 
The period of the 1920s was characterised by increasing political activity among 
Natal's African population. In both rural and urban areas, African political 
movements were remarkably successful. Not in terms of what was ultimately 
achieved, but in the mobilisation of many thousands of Natal Africans, for the first 
time since Union, into organised mass movements which sought the amelioration of 
the pitiful conditions under which they lived and laboured. 1 The success of the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) and its breakaway Natal branch, 
the ICU yase Natal, can be cited as an example of this, as can the rapid growth of the 
Communist Party in Durban between 1929 and 1930. Towards the end of the decade 
the mood among Africans throughout the province became more militant. 
This political activity led, inevitably, to conflict with the white state. It culminated in 
two bloody confrontations in the main urban centre of the province during 1929 and 
1930, leaving the face of black politics in the province and the entire Union changed 
forever.2 To many whites, it appeared that the swart gevaar chimera, so often glibly 
invoked to political advantage by conservative politicians, had taken flesh to 
confound its fabricators. The ghosts of Langalibalele and Bambatha roamed the 
land once more, and the spectre of bloody uprisings had been raised to haunt the 
~ranquillity of the garden province. Bolstered by their victory in the 1929 general 
election (which had, rather serendipitously, been fought on the issue of the "Native 
Question") the ruling National Party government acted quickly to bolster the local 
authorities, using the might of the state to counteract and quell any nascent 
"uprising". Once the immediate danger had been averted, the state set about 
devising strategies to defuse the situation. Yet even as these strategies were in the 
process of being implemented, the perceived "danger" receded somewhat and the 
mood of militancy and confrontation dissipated. This phenomenon has puzzled 
1. Bradford, A Taste 0/ Freedom, p. 2. 
2. See Hemson, "Dockworkers"; P La Hausse, "Struggle", pp.l71 - 240; T A NuttaU, "Class", 
pp.50 - 85. 
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many historians and has yet to be satisfactorily explained. 
It is not the aim of this chapter to detail and analyse all black political activity in 
Natal, for recent work has already focused attention on this.3 Similarly, the reaction 
of the white authorities to black political activity in this period will also be but 
briefly discussed. Rather, this chapter seeks to provide a fuller understanding of the 
socio-economic context in which African political activity took place. By 
highlighting the economic crisis, occasioned by the depression and drought, during 
the period 1929-1933 and showing how it contributed to the decline of political 
activity in the period atter 1930, it will, hopefully, shed new light on a sequence of 
events which has hitherto been largely unexplained. 
To begin this explanation, it is worth emphasising the uncertainties endured by 
Africans as they were harried from pillar to post in the name of the segregationist 
poiicy followed by the Hertzog g~vemment.4 This policy was designed to secure 
migrant labour and saw Africans as "temporary sojourners" in the urban areas, 
"ministering to the white man's needs", for as long as they were required, after which 
they were expected to return to the rural areas from whence they had come. African 
labour would thus remain cheap and essentially unskilled. The system hinged upon 
maintaining a healthy surplus of workers in the urban areas, which would continue 
to depress wage levels, without creating a situation in which too great a surplus 
could become a threat to the existing privileged positions of whites. It is obvious 
that control of the African workforce was essential if this delicate balance was to be 
maintained. This involved not only controlling the influx and efflux of Africans to 
and from the urban areas, but also monitoring practically every facet of the lives of 
Africans (even while only temporarily resident) in the urban areas.5 To the official 
mind it seemed: 
... only right that it should be understood that the town is a 
European area in which there is no place for the redundant 
native, who neither works nor serves his or her people, but 
3. See for example Marks, The Ambiguities; La Hausse, "Ethnicity"; La Hausse, "Struggle". 
4. See Ilanga lase Natal, 12 February 1932. 
5. Maylam, "Strategies", pp. 3 - 4. 
forms the class from which the professional agitators, the slum 
landlords, the liquor sellers, the prostitutes and other 
undesirable classes spring. The exclusion of these r~d~dant 
natives is in the interests of Europeans and Natives ahke. 
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The process of maintaining control has been well documented elsewhere 7 and it is 
not necessary to detail it again here; suffice it to say that if efficiently implemented, 
the measures were designed to deliver both the cheap labour and the security that 
the privileged elite considered essential. By the late 1920s, however, the system was 
showing signs of stress both from within and without: the pressure from the rural 
areas was growing ever greater as the reserves became less able to support both man 
and beast; while in the urban areas, some employers of African labour were 
beginning to see the advantages of a more settled and permanent workforce which 
would save transport and training costs. The result was that by the time of the Great 
Depression, there were already many thousands of Africans living in the urban areas 
of the Union on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. Natal was no exception to 
this.8 For a variety of reasons, not least of which was the lack of a proper "native 
village",9 it was in Durban that the seriousness of the situation which had been 
allowed to develop manifested itself in spectacular fashion in the Beer Hall riots of 
June 1929.10 
Once the riots had been quelled and the imminent threat to the existing order had 
been temporarily averted, the authorities at both local and central government level 
began to institute procedures aimed at preventing a recurrence. It is possible to 
argue that the Beer Hall riots reinforced in the "official mind" the already 
established connection between an excessive surplus of African labour and 
lawlessness. The actions of the authorities in the aftermath of the riots would 
appear to substantiate this contention. A series of lightning raids were conducted by 
a mobile contingent of policemen specially brought to Durban for the purpose by 
the Minister of Justice, Oswald Pirow. Pass offenders, tax defaulters and other 
6. Davenport, "Urban Segregation", p. 14. 
7. La Hausse, "Struggle"; Maylam, "Strategies". 
8. See Edley, "Population", pp. 7 - 8. 
9. Durban's first "Native Village" or urban location, Lamont, was only settled in I I ) .~ . 
10. The seminal work on this is La Hausse, "Struggle". 
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miscreants were summarily dealt with; specially constituted courts sat long hours to 
process the offenders. The raids were designed to have a "wholesome moral effect" 
upon the African population. 11 This they certainly did, at least from the authorities' 
point of view, for some £5 000 in arrear taxes were paid within a few days. 12 
The government was not content with a single demonstration of force; not only was 
the increased police presence in the town maintained for some time, but the state 
sought further powers from the Union parliament. Discussion of both the Riotous 
Assemblies (Amendment) Bill and the Natives (Urban Areas) (Amendment) Bill in 
the course of the sitting of 1930 show quite clearly that the Beer Hall riots and the 
agitator thesis associated with this continued to plague the minds of MPs. Oswald 
Pirow said: 
Recent events have made it quite clear that the position has not 
improved since the time the orismal Bill was before the House 
for a second reading. The positIon has now become aggravated 
and without being alarmist, I must state definitely that, unless 
steps are taken, as soon as possible, to put onto the statute 
book some measures which will adequately cope with these 
agitators among Natives, within six months we shall have to 
face the position that in many of our big centres we shall have a 
state of affairs which can only be compared to the oosition in 
Durban before law and order was established there .. :lJ 
Heaton Nicholls went even further when he said: " ... the Native population of this 
country has got out of hand ... ", 14 but it was left to the arch-segregationist, Colonel C 
F Stallard to make the connection plain: 
One of the facts which are outstanding in these circumstances 
is that the fuel which the agitators work on is mainly supplied 
from dense population. The fuel for the agitators comes from 
those who are unemployed, or those who are only temporarily 
employed, or the togt workers referred to by the Hon. Member 
for Pietermaritzburg (North) [Mr Deane]. If you were to 
remove these elements from the urban areas, you would take 
away the fuel, and the agitator would have nothing left to work 
11. Natal Mercury, 15 November 1929. 
12. Natal Mercury, 20 November 1929. 
13. House of Assembly Debates (hereafter Hansard), Col. 2152, 20 March 1930. 
14. Hansard, Cols. 2346 - 2347, 26 March 1930. 
upon. Before you take these arbitrary powers, you should do 
what you can to remove the redundant Natives from urban and 
densely settled areas. You have got the oPport~t5 now in the 
Urban Areas Bill which is now before the House. 
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Although, according to Mr A Eaton (Durban County), all the Natal MPs were 
" ... heartily in agreement with the Minister on the principle of the BilL.",16 some of 
the more draconian powers in the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill were 
unacceptable to them. Heaton Nicholls, however, summed up the attitude of the 
Natal members when he said: "I am prepared to accept this Bill rather than have no 
Bill at all."17 Both bills were passed and government ministers were given sweeping 
additional powers to deal with agitators by banning (deporting) them, by preventing 
meetings and by prohibiting the distribution of books, pamphlets or newspapers 
calculated to have the effect of "inciting racial hatred". Furthermore, government 
was empowered to remove from the urban areas all Africans declared to be "idle, 
dissolute and disorderly". The entry of African women into the urban areas was also 
made more difficult. 
Nor did the government long delay in using these newly conferred powers. The 
leader of the ICU yase Natal, A W G Champion, was ordered to leave Durban or 
face prosecution.18 It was hoped that by removing Champion from the political 
scene in Durban the volatile situation in the entire province would return to normal. 
It is now commonly accepted that Champion was not exiled because of his role in 
the Beer Hall riots which, as Cope and Marks 19 have shown, was an ambiguous and 
vacillating one, but as a result of a brief flirtation with the fount of rural power in 
the province, the Zulu king, Solomon kaDinuzulu.20 Exiling Champion was a 
iniscalculation, for it created a vacuum which the more militant Communist Party 
was not slow to exploit. The Communist Party organised a pass-burning campaign 
which culminated in a mass meeting on 16 December 1930. After a series of fiery 
15. Hansard, Col. 2414, 27 March 1930. Stallard was speaking during the debate on the Riotous 
Assemblies (Amendment) Bill. 
16. Hansard, Col. 757,15 February 1930. 
17. Hansard, Col. 2350, 26 March 1930. 
18. E Roux, Time Longer than Rope, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, reprint 1978, p. 246. 
19. Cope, To Bind the Nation, p. 252; Marks, Ambiguities, p. 7. 
20. Cope, To Bind the Nation, pp. 251·252. 
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speeches, a fracas with local police ensued during which a number of Africans, 
including Johannes Nkosi, the leader of the party in the town, were killed.21 
Further repressive measures followed and other communists were exiled.22 
However, not all measures aimed at containing the situation were directly 
repressive; it was also clear that the "unrest" in Natal was one of the prime reasons 
for the government's appointment of the Native Economic Commission. In urging 
such an investigation, the influential SAP MP, Patrick Duncan said: 
I am glad that the Minister frankly realises that all our 
difficulties with the Natives at this moment are not due to 
agitation. There are economic difficulties and grievances on 
the part of the Native which have also got to be enquired into 
and, as far as possible, remedied. After all, these wild 
doctrines find acceptance in the minds of the people v£Y 
largely according to how the seedbed is prepared for them ... 
At the local level, the town council sought to defuse further militancy by a whole 
host of paternalistic measures. Acting on the advice of Mr Justice De Waal, the 
chairman of the judicial commission of enquiry into the Beer Hall riots, the town 
council instituted a Native Advisory Board (NAB) to provide an avenue of 
controlled communication between Africans and the local state. The council also 
appointed a Native Welfare Officer and began a programme of action aimed at 
lowering the level of militancy by providing other, "more healthy", leisure time 
activities such as sport and entertainment. Not all the measures instituted by the 
local state were of this nature, some could certainly be termed repressive: the 
curfew for Africans was re-ins~ituted; the applicability of the Urban Areas Act was 
extended several times to encompaSs almost all of Durban; and the boundary of the 
town was extended in 1932 by provincial ordinance to enclose several bordering 
areas. The lack of significant control over the lives of the people who inhabited 
these border areas was the prime motivating factor for their incorporation into the 
borough. The borough police were several times instructed to "clean up the 
21. Hemson, "Dockworkers", p. 261. 
22. Amongst them Eddie Roux. Natal Mercury, 19 December 1931. Roux appealed to the 
Supreme Court, but lost his appeal and was forced to leave the town in February 1932. 
23. Hansard, Col. 742, 13 March 1930. 
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borough", by conducting pass and liquor raids, and to expel "undesirables". This was 
done on a regular basis throughout the period. Those Africans who had participated 
in the pass-burning campaign, or who had refused to pay tax, were especially 
vulnerable and liable to deportation if caught. 
Yet the impact of all these measures may be seen to have been not all that 
significant; they did not entirely prevent militancy and it was still possible for a 
crowd of some six thousand Africans to gather fairly close to the centre of Durban 
and listen to anti-white speeches,24 nor did they significantly hamper political 
activity - the exile of Champion and other le~ders and the death of Nkosi might 
have removed significant role players from the political scene, but political activity 
among Africans did not entirely cease. Even the conservative Congress leader, John 
Dube, became more and more strident about the injustices being perpetrated against 
Africans after 1930, and some of the articles published in Jlanga lase Natal were 
highly critical of the white regime. Similarly, his public evidence before the NEC 
might easily be interpreted as provocative and inflammatory. However, Dube's 
position was always ambiguous and self-serving. When it suited him to be critical of 
the radicals he could be scathing,25 but at other times his own actions could be said 
to have amounted to incitement to revolt. The activities of the Communist Party, 
while hampered, were not entirely quashed, as their involvement i'n the 
dockworkers' strike of 1932 clearly illustrates. 
Nor did similar measures elsewhere in the province have more effect; the boycott of 
municipal brewed beer was sustained throughout most of the province during the 
depression years, much to the chagrin of those local authorities which had come to 
depend on the revenue to fund the administrative machinery which controlled the 
lives of Africans. The evidence of L H Greene, given before the NEC in 
Pietermaritzburg, also shows that political activity in the provincial capital had not 
been significantly affected.26 Greene said that he had attended and addressed 
24. On 16 December 1930. 
25. See for example llanga lase Natal, 5 December 1930: "The Communists are hysterical about 
what ~ey . ~tend doing for Natives in ~mber during Dingaan's Day. What they really 
mean IS difficult to understand. H the Natives are silly fools enough to do as these people 
suggest there will be bloodshed again and hundreds of Natives will be killed or injured ... The 
White Communists know this perfectly well .. ." 
26. Greene was also active in white politics in Pietermaritzburg. See Chapter Nine. 
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several meetings of Africans, and had found them to be very similar to those 
organised by whites in that they were convened to discuss measures aimed at 
alleviating the distress caused by unemployment. These meetings were generally 
fairly calm, but there had been " ... some [who] say bloodshed is the only answer". He 
hastened to add, ''These sir, are not professional agitators, these are people who are 
feeling the burdon [sic] of depression ... " Sometimes discussions became more 
heated: 
... occasionally, at a meeting, a native will rush in, come to the 
table, thump the table and say, 'Th2,e is nothing for it but the assegai' and then he will run away ... 
Greene also testified to the fact that "Kaffer beer" was openly discussed at meetings 
of the proletariat28 and that Africans were " ... well aware of their bondage and ... 
waking out of it.."29 Similar sentiments were expressed by Mr Richard Stevens, 
Superintendent of Native Affairs in the city, when he told the NEC that he did not 
allow "Native agitators" to use municipal facilities such as halls for meetings, as 
Africans were using such forums to encourage the boycott of municipal beer halls 
and " ... even urging them [Africans] to violence ... ,,30 Nor were conditions in the 
rural areas around the city any better, as one farmer told the NEC: 
Now I say that Communist preachings in Natal are rife today 
and I am right up against communistic preaching because it will 
simply lead to trouble in the future, and I do feel that it will 
bring about bloodshed and I should like to see
3
tpe government 
take up a stro.ng attitude and put a stop to this. 
27. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Lawr~nce Henry Haughton Greene, Pietermaritzburg, 
9 April 1931, pp. 6591 - 6593. 
28. Ibid., p. 6603. This was Greene's own terminology. 
29. Ibid., p. 6593. 
30. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Richard Edward Stevens, Pietermaritzburg, 10 April 1931, 
pp. 6750 - 6751. 
31. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Robert John Speirs, Pietermaritzburg, II) April 1931, 
pp.6584 - 6585. Speirs also related a story about two "Kaffer girls" preaching the destruction 
of pigs in his district. If the pigs were not destroyed, " ... the lightening [sic) would come and it 
would strike the pig and the pig would run about with fire in its mouth and burn illllhe kraals. 
These emissaries were really sent by the ICU .. : The emissaries were also repulcd to have a 
talking cow, which was supposed to speak and warn the people. Bradford. A Taste of 
Freedom, pp. 228 - 230, discusses the significance of these "millenarian" phenomcna . 
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The Magistrate of Port Shepstone stated that " ... communism has been · at work here, 
and very much so ... "32 The Revd Kumalo claimed that economic forces were 
promoting militancy: 
The immorality among the Natives is due to the fact that they 
are all in want. They are all in want of money. ~~t naturally 
results in Natives gomg off and becoming riotous ... 
This is, however, exactly what Africans did not do. There are no records of 
significant militant action after the Dingaan's Day debacle of 1930 - even the 
highly politicised dockworkers who were driven to strike action by the deterioration 
of their working conditions in 1932, were relatively mild in their demands and meek 
when dismissed. Little violence (beyond intimidation) took place and there were no 
major confrontations with the police.34 Similarly, a call by the Communist Party in 
1931 for a boycott of the poll tax and exhortations to keep alive the "spirit of 
Johannes Nkosi" fell on deaf ears.35 The introduction of further exploitative 
measures by the harbour authorities, after the unsuccessful strike of 1932,36 also led 
only to "go slows", despite attempts to broaden and intensify the struggle against 
such measures.37 . 
African political activity, and especially militant action, did decline significantly 
after 1930. This fact was noted and deplored even by contemporaries, as the 
following Jlanga lase Natal editorial entitled ''Twenty years of Congress and little 
progress" illustrates: 
We hardly know to what we are to ascribe the blame for this 
lack of activity and of resUlts, whether it is the fault of the 
leaders or of the masses. We believe it is the former ... Some 
incapables and ne'er-do-wells have aspired to positions of 
32. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of R D Lyle, Port Shepstone, 7 October 1930, p. 2100. 
33. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of the Revd Alfred Kumalo, Ixopo, 9 October 1930, p. 2229. 
34. Hemson, "Dockworkers", pp. 274 - 277. 
35. Ibid., p. 268. 
36. Ibid., p. 279. 
37. Ibid. , p. 281. 
leadership, some of them Wgmd blocks in square holes with the 
result we see shaming us ... 
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Nor was this the first time that an article critical of African leadership had been 
published in llanga. Earlier in 1932, J H Masanganye had contributed an article 
entitled 'The Problem of Bantu Leadership", in which he claimed that leaders were 
"too divided", "selfish" and "pompous". This, he claimed, had led to the "sudden 
standstill of their organisations" and there was "no reason yet given for their 
silence".39 
It must be accepted that the fragmentation of African opposition during the 
depression years could have been a contributing factor to the decline of militancy. 
Political point-scoring and infighting between the various factions, whether Dube's 
Natal Native Congress, the African National Congress, the ICU yase Natal or the 
rural elite, did help to deflect some attention away from the struggle against the 
white authorities, as each organisation was pursuing its own agenda in its own way. 
Furthermore, the personal aspirations of the various leaders also led to 
fragmentation, and in some ways the situation did warrant the criticisms voiced in 
the pages of J/anga. It i.s worth pointing out, however, that such fragmentation was 
neither new nor confined to the depression period; almost all African organisations 
existed and engaged in rivalry prior to the depression, and most survived it. Thus to 
attribute the diminution of political activity to the existence and squabbling of a 
variety of African political movements would be simplistic. The frustration 
expressed in the pages of J/anga and elsewhere was, in many ways, similar to the 
criticisms voiced by disenchan.ted and frustrated white citizens against their own 
political leadership. It may be posited that such criticism was a feature of the 
depression, a thread of commonality running through a divided society. 
This still leaves the explanation for the relative decline of African militancy after 
1930 incomplete. It is only through a proper socio-economic contextualisation of the 
political climate in Natal that a satisfactory explanation may be arrived at. To that 
end it is necessary to bring together the disparate threads of the arguments and 
evidence presented in earlier chapters, but before doing so it is essential to define 
the unique position held by Africans in Natal society. 
38. /langa lase Natal, 23 December 1932. 
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Most Africans were in some way affected by the twin evils of the depression and 
drought as they, of all the peoples of Natal, had "twin identities". Almost all 
inhabited divided worlds; one part of their lives belonged to the world of the urban 
areas where many worked as migrant labourers (or increasingly by the 1930s, as 
permanent employees), and the other part to the rural areas (white farms or 
reserves) where they were based and their families resided, or where they held land. 
Even the most urbanised had some ties, no matter how tenuous, with the rural areas. 
Ties of blood, friendship or land linked the African inhabitants of urban and rural 
areas in a complex web. Often, this relationship was not established out of choice, 
but was forced upon them: Africans had to obtain paid employment, mainly in the 
urban areas, in order to earn cash to pay their taxes and support their families. 
Sometimes Africans chose to live on a semi-permanent basis in the' urban areas, but 
this did not mean that they severed all ties with the rural areas. Even if they chose 
to cut themselves off, their families remained in the rural areas; they were tied into 
a web of both support and responsibility. There was always some degree of 
movement between the two worlds and the interaction brought the two closer 
together; the trials and tribulations of one part affected the other. It is thus 
necessary, if one is to attempt to sketch the effects of the depression on Africans, to 
present a composite of both rural and urban conditions and not to see the parts as 
discrete entities.40 
Yet there is very little alternative for the historian, unless one chooses to trace the 
careers of individuals as they moved between the urban and rural areas.41 In 
~riting a general overview, however, this strategy cannot successfully be employed. 
So despite the stated need to present a complete picture, encompassing both 
"worlds" as perceived and experienced by Africans, for convenience and 
manageability, the two worlds have had to be examined separately. 
39. [langa lase Natal, 26 February 1932. 
40. Recent writers on Natal, especially La Hausse and Cope, have stressed this point. See for 
example P la Hausse, "1'h:e Dispersal of the Regiments: African Popular Protest in Durban, 
1930", Journal 0/ Natal and Zulu History, Vol. 10, 1987, p. 89: "In Natal during the late 
twenties and early thirties town and countryside were part of a single complex reality." 
41. This is precisely what La Hausse has done in his study of Lamula and Maling. 
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By the close of the 1920s, most Africans in Natal were in a parlous economic state. 
With few exceptions, the majority of the population of both the urban and rural 
areas had been exploited to the level of impoverishment. They were certainly 
unable to rely on any reserves of economic strength to see them through the traumas 
occasioned by the depression and drought of the early 1930s. Similarly, the 
comforting, segregationist idee fixe that Africans could simply move back to the 
rural areas from which they had come when their labour was no longer required in 
the urban areas has also been shown to have been an impossibility during the 
depression years. Lacey argued that this fact came as something of a shock to the 
government: 
The NEC's startling revelations on the reserves must certainly 
have entered into this. They described the dustbowl conditions 
of most areas in the reserves and tied these conditions to the 
uncontrolled influx of landless Africans to the towns, bypassing 
mines and farms. It must have shocked Hertzog and other 
committee members who, as late as 1930, had insisted that the 
reserves had r~m enough to take the 'redundant' population 
from the town. 
Those Africans who were labour tenants on white farms in the rural areas of the 
province were particularly vulnerable during the depression years. They were often 
faced either with the threat of eviction, or with a deterioration of their working and 
living conditions, as ~h-poor white farmers desperately tried to remain on their 
land by wringing every penny they could from it.43 In many cases this meant putting 
tenants' land under wattle or other crops, restricting grazing and the size of tenants' 
~erds and, ultimately, demandfug longer hours of service from the entire family, not 
just those initially contracted for. The evidence obtained by the NEe from the rural 
areas of northern Natal bears witness to the drastic deterioration in conditions 
there.44 So exploitative and unsatisfactory were these new conditions seen to be45 
42. Lacey, Boroko, pp. 298 - 299. 
43. Bradford, A Taste 0/ Freedom, pp. 23 - 40. 
44. See as an example of this CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Angus Wood, Chairman of the 
Ngongo Farmers' Association, Newcastle, 16 September 1930, pp. 1187 - 1188. 
45. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Thompson Tembe, Newcastle, 16 September 1930, pp. 1212 
- 1215. Tembe related a long litany of woes which included long working hours, lack of cash 
wages, delay in planting of tenant crops due to priority being given to those of the farmer and 
the victimisation or tenants and ex-tenants. 
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that the trickle of those fleeing certain white farms became a flood during the 
depression. Young male Africans, already discontented and disenchanted with 
working for boroko46 deserted the farms for the urban areas.47 This sometimes led 
to their parents being turned off the farmer's lands. The magistrate of Bulwer, Mr 
Franz, testified to the attitude of farmers in this regard: 
'Well, your sons have gone; I have no further use for you; y~f 
are too old; you cannot do the work' and he turns them off ... 
Others, motivated by sheer desperation, chose to stay and accept the deteriorating 
conditions: 
Dr Lucas: Have they [the African tenants] complained about 
the way in which they are treated in individual cases by 
farmers, abuse of powers over tenants and so on? 
Mr Hancock: They have got to that state now that if only they 
are ~ow~~ to live on the land, some of them will put up with 
anything. 
Against this backdrop it is not difficult to see why African political activity, and 
particularly militancy, among labour tenants in the rural areas diminished. The 
collapse of the direction and leadership given by the ICU campaign in the 
countryside, the vigorous anti-lCU propaganda launched by white agricultural 
interests aided and abetted by Solomon and Dube and, most of all, the rapidly 
deteriorating position of rural Africans, conspired to render such militancy 
inappropriate. Conditions were indeed desperate, and Africans found themselves 
being forced into meekly acquiescing or facing the threat of starvation. This is not 
to say that resentment did not remain; on the contrary, discontent festered beneath 
46. Literally, for "a place to sleep" or for nothing. 
47. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Mr Hudson, Magistrate of Newcastle. Newcastle, 
16 September 1930, pp. 1198 • 1199. Hudson described "frequent cases of desertion". 
Thompson Tembe, in reply to a question which suggested that tenants were forced to accept 
terms dictated by farmers said: "It may be that our forefathers and forebears submitted to that 
kind of life, but we, representing the younger generation, are now rebelling against it." CAD, 
NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Thompson Tembe, Newcastle, 16 September 1930. p. 1225. 
48. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Heinrich Karl Franz, Bulwer, 10 October 1 C)30. p. 2282. 
49. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Charles Edward Hancock, lxopo, 9 October 1 (n O, pp. 2216 
·2217. 
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the surface, but instead of open militancy, many resorted to desertion as a way of 
registering their protest. In order to combat this trend, and to stem the tidal 
movement away from white farms, the Native Service Contract Act was passed in 
1932.50 This law, amongst other provisions, made it an offence for an urban 
employer to employ a contracted farm labourer beyond the time of absence 
stipulated by his rural employer.51 
Conditions on the sugar estates were hardly any better. Work on the sugar estates 
had never been very popular with Natal Africans and large numbers of Africans 
from outside Natal, mainly from Mozambique, Basutoland and Transkei, were 
imported annually to work the estates. However, when conditions deteriorated in 
rural Natal and in the reserves, many more Africans endeavoured to find 
employment on the estates, especially when urban avenues of employment were 
simultaneously being closed to them.52 This surplus of labour and the precarious 
position of the industry during the depression (already described above )53 gave rise 
to significant cuts in wages and even to dismissals.54 Africans could thus not find 
shelter from the depression on the sugar estates. 
Conditions on other white farms throughout the province, while not as desperate as 
in northern Natal or the sugar estates, were also marked by deteriorating conditions 
of employment, wage cuts, evictions and retrenchments.55 Again the evidence 
presented to the NEe shows quite clearly that wages were low and working 
conditions harsh. There is also considerable evidence to suggest that these 
conditions were exacerbated by the depression and the drought. The number of 
so. Act no. 24 of 1932. 
51. For a discussion of the perceived necessity for this act and of its draconian provisions, see 
Lacey, Boroko, pp. 164 - 180. 
52. CAD, NEC, K26, F4, Evidence of Samuel Forest, Empangeni, 26 September 1930, p.183O. "I 
think that what is influencing our loca1labour at the moment is the difficulty of the Natives 
getting labour in the towns, because there are not so many Natives employed in the towns 
today as there used to be - or it does not seem like it...I think there are far less Natives 
employed today through the stringency of trade than there were ... " 
53. See Chapter Five. 
54. Minnaar, "Unemployment", p. 61. 
55. Bradford, A Taste of Freedom, pp. 21 - 62. 
359 
bankruptcies among Natal farmers, and their heavy indebtedness, inevitably 
affected the labour on these farms, which was largely African.56 Despite a slight 
increase in the number of Africans employed on farms throughout the Union during 
the depression years, the proportion of the total African population employed on 
white farms remained fairly static, indicating that an insignificant number of 
Africans were able to find shelter from the depression in such employment.57 
Those Africans unfortunate enough to be evicted from white farms, and those who 
chose to leave rather than accept less favourable conditions of tenancy or 
employment, found it difficult to secure land in the overcrowded reserves of either 
Natal or Zululand.58 Most chiefs simply had no more land to allocate,59 and 
normally hospitable relatives were unable to provide shelter and food for such 
landless Africans for any length of time. The reserves were increasingly unable to 
support the population they normally carried; declining food production, 
overgrazing and disease all undermined the reserve economy.60 When this already 
stressed economy was put under further pressure by the worst drought in living 
memory, the results were almost catastrophic.61 Thousands of head of cattle and 
other livestock died and the government was forced to supply maize to thousands of 
starving people; there was simply no alternative if mass starvation were to be 
prevented. Nor did the catalogue of disaster end there: locust invasions, outbreaks 
of cattle disease, malaria and profiteering storekeepers all conspired to make the 
early years of the 1930s the "years of red dust". Faced with this plethora of disasters, 
many Africans chose to leave the reserves for the towns, in direct opposition to the 
legislative and administrative measures then being employed to direct the flow of 
Africans in the other direction: The towns became for the Africans what they were 
for the white rural poor - havens of hope and places of refuge and escape from 
56. See above, Chapter Five. 
57. See Union of South Africa, Union Statistics for Fifty Years, A-8 and G-3. 
58. CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of John Whittle Bennett, representing the Khambula Farmers' 
Association, Vrybeid, 20 September 1930, p. 1542. Bennett said: "ff a Native is no good to us 
we kick him orr. Nobody wants him, and the result is that be goes to a mission station." 
59. See as an example of this the statement of Chief Mgugu Mkize of the Camperdown district. 
CAD, NEC, 106, F4, Evidence of Chief Mkize, Pietermaritzburg, 10 April 1931, p. 6825. 
60. See above, Chapter Six. 
61. See above pp. 256fr. 
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slow starvation. If Africans were fortunate enough to secure residence and 
employment in the urban areas during the depression, they tended to stay there for 
extended periods, both to earn more money and to avoid going back to the ravaged 
rural areas. 
Nor could rural Africans escape the ravages of the depression and drought through 
paid employment on the mines. It has already been shown that despite the fact that 
underground work had never enjoyed great popularity amongst the Zulu, there was 
such a flood of Africans presenting themselves for mine work that the depressed 
coal-mines of Natal, which were already retrenching workers, turned away scores of 
desperate potential workers. Most of these appear to have originated from the 
reserves.62 Even the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, which were in a better 
economic position because of the rising gold price and were hiring extra workers 
after 1931, could not cope with the flood of potential African workers. Reference 
has already been made to a countrywide circular issued by the Secretary of Native 
Affairs in which he instructed departmental officials to discourage Africans from 
going to the Witwatersrand gold mines in search of work.63 It is thus painfully 
obvious that the mines too, provided no opportunities for escape from the ravages of 
the depression and drought. In faC4 the retrenchments which had taken place on the 
Natal coal-mines gave mine owners and officials the opportunity to rid themselves 
of "agitators" amongst the African workforce, another factor contributing to the end 
of militancy among Africans.64 
Given all this evidence, it is hardly surprising that there was little political militancy 
~mong Africans in the rural areas of Natal during this time of deprivation. While it 
is certainly true that political activity did not cease, the heady days of mass 
organisation and protest by the lCU in the countryside were past. What little ICU 
activity still survived was both clandestine and rather ineffective.65 After the 
decline of the ICU, most political activity in the rural areas of the province was once 
again focused around the person of Solomon kaDinuzulu and his unceasing struggle 
62. See Chapter Seven. 
63. See Chapter Seven. 
64. See Chapter Four. 
65. Bradford, A Taste of Freedom, pp. 253 - 254. 
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to be officially recognised as king. However, as Cope has shown, Solomon's political 
career was "terminated" in 1930 when he allowed his increasing frustration, at the 
continued refusal of the state to recognise his claim to the title of king, to surface in 
a drunken insult to the Governor-General.66 Solomon, reprimanded and punished, 
retreated into "sickness". 
The Zulu nationalist movement, Inkatha kaZu/u, associated with Solomon and his 
claims, was also practically moribund by 1930.67 Solomon's brief flirtation with 
Champion's ICU yase Natal in September 1930 should be seen as simply that - a 
political somersault which could only have been dictated by a re-evaluation of the 
parlous position of the royal finances.68 It is well known that Solomon was a 
spendthrift and deeply in debt. What is less obvious is that much of the revenue 
which had flowed into the coffers of the ICU should have been payable (or so 
Solomon thought) to him as a form of "tribute".69 
It should not be seen only as a result of Solomon's liberal spending that the Zulu 
royal house was in dire financial straits; Solomon's government stipend had been 
halved as a punishment for the slighting of the Governor-General and there seemed 
to be no possibility of him achieving the recognition he craved. One can extrapolate 
from his actions of September 1930 and those that followed, a desperate need for 
cash. The increasingly difficult conditions in the region had cut deeply into 
Solomon's revenue, and all existing sources of income had to be tapped, even those 
which had formerly been unpalatable. 
~t has . been convincingly demonstrated by both Cope and La Hausse that far more 
effort and energy went into the collection of cash and cattle, to fund the ever-
escalating debts of the Zulu royal house in the period 1931-1933, than was expended 
on political activism. Once the funds of Inkatha were exhausted (Solomon himself 
66. Cope, To Bind the Nation, pp. 240 - 250. 
67. Ibid., pp. 249 - 258. 
68. Solomon was beavily in debt. Cope goes so far as to state that Solomon's purpose in "dropping 
in" on the ICU meeting chaired by Champion • ... was evidently to stake a claim to the 
organisation's revenue". Cope, To Bind the Nation, p. 251. 
69. Ibid. 
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was treasurer of the organisation and no doubt regarded the funds of the 
organisation as part of the privy purse) Solomon had to depend on a network of 
royal collectors for his income. The increasing levels of poverty, unemployment and 
the ravages of the drought meant that tribute could no longer be collected largely in 
cash. Instead, emaciated scrub cattle had to be accepted, transported and sold to 
provide Solomon with funds. The lack of control over these royal collectors meant 
that Solomon actually appears to have received only a small proportion of the 
money, the rest of which went to support the collectors during a time of crisis. 
This diminution of his expected income further aggravated the financial 
embarrassment of the king 70 and may have restricted his campaign for official 
recognition. Solomon, as traditional leader of the Zulu, was expected by his 
followers to maintain a court commensurate with his status. It is clear that after 
1930, Solomon was unable to do so, and his esteem in the eyes of both his subjects 
and officialdom, was suffering. It is possible that his increasing impoverishment 
might also have affected his self-esteem. By 1932 Solomon was, in La Hausse's 
words, "reduced to beggary" and was telling the Nongoma magistrate that he was 
" ... as a dead man ... ,,71 Perhaps the parlous state of the royal finances may provide 
the key to the explanation of Solomon's rapid decline into alcoholism after 1930. 
If the depression and the subsequent drought were to impinge so deeply on the 
fortunes of the head of the Zulu royal house, how much more deeply would the 
conditions have affected those who were relatively worse off, even discounting the 
fact that Solomon spent a great deal of money? 72 
This contention is borne out by La Hausse"s twin study of Petros Lamula and Lymon 
Mating. Both men had strong rural links and both became embroiled in a daily 
70. [bid., pp. 262 • 271. 
71. [bid., p. 326. 
72. This argument is somewhat speculative, for the whole issue of Solomon's income and 
expenditure during the last five years of his life is shrouded in mystery. Official statistical 
~vidence does ?ot begin to unco~er the many sources of income Solomon enjoyed. EquaUy, it 
IS .extrem~ly difficult to ascertain exactly what he spent. Furthermore, the ufficials dealing 
With the king were weU aware of their lack of complete information. La Haussc puts the total 
amount coUected by [nkatha at £20 000 and "thousands of head of cattle". St:c La Hausse 
"Ethnicity", p. 303. ' 
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struggle for survival as a consequence of the rapid erosion of their economic bases. 
Maling was one of the "royal collectors" who appears to have made a precarious 
living out of these transactions. Far from being the dangerous agitator that 
officialdom labelled him, Maling had developed a mutual dependence with Solomon 
which had become increasingly desperate by 1930.73 By 1931, La Hausse argued, 
behind his 
ruthless pursuit of personal material advantage through cattle 
collecting lay Maling's attempt to 7~verse an historical 
trajectory of downward social mobility ... 
His cattle collecting activities increased as Solomon's impoverishment increased. 
Maling was not the only example of those who had turned to cattle collecting 
ostensibly on behalf of Solomon, but who in reality were supporting themselves 
from the meagre profits; several whites and even royal izinduna were also involved 
in this.75 
Similarly, the fortunes of Petros Lamula showed a now familiar decline. In 1927, he 
was entitled to draw an annual income of between £36 and £60 from church 
contributions, but by 1932 his income had been fixed at £36, and with a whole host 
of expenses, Lamula's financial position was becoming desperate and he had to 
market a revised edition of his book UZulukaMalandela to make ends meet.76 He 
was constantly on the move throughout the country, marketing his books and prints 
of the Zulu royallioeage, in a desperate struggle to remain solvent. Far from being 
the religious and political firebrand of former years, Lamula was reduced to fighting 
~ot only for his own livelihood, but. to retain his position of leadership in the church 
he had founded. His experiences during the depression mirrored, in many ways, the 
experiences of the Christianised African elite of the province. 
The Natal kholwa elite, which had joined in an alliance with the more traditional 
73. Ibid., p. 314. 
74. Ibid., pp. 324 - 325. 
75. Ibid., p. 332. 
76. Ibid., p. 197. 
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Zulu leadership to form and sustain Inkatha in its earlier years (mainly due to their 
quest for land) 77 withdrew from that organisation, (possibly because of Solomon's 
spendthrift ways) and threw in their lot with Pixley Seme ~d the African National 
Congress (ANC).78 However, despite having important links in the rural areas of 
the province,79 Seme does not appear to have engaged in significant political 
activity in the rural areas once Solomon and Inkatha had faded from the political 
scene. In fact, as has been demonstrated, under pressure from the onslaughts of 
depression and drought and in the face of state repression, the political climate in 
the whole of rural Natal changed from one of radicalism to one of acquiescence 
after 1930.80 This change even affected Seme. La Hausse quotes Seme as saying 
that Africans should " ... work loyally with the Europeans".81 These are not the 
politics of confrontation but of co-operation; a co-operation aimed at manipulating a 
segregationist system to best advantage. Walshe argued that this was part of a 
countrywide policy which would become a feature of the later depression years.82 
In the urban areas of Natal, all eyes were focused on Durban where, in June 1929, 
the frustrations of the urban working class had found expression in the violence of 
the Beer Hall riots and in the subsequent boycott of beer halls.83 These boycotts 
spread throughout Natai and continued for most of the depression years and have 
been seen as a "politicizing experience for African workers".84 They were 
essentially a hangover from the riots but can also be seen as a reaction on the part of 
African women to increasing urban impoverishment. 85 
77. Cope, To Bind the Nation, pp. fJ7 • 98. 
78. Ibid., pp. 254· 257. Cope alleges that it was the Natal Kholwa vote which saw Seme elected 
President of the ANC. See p. 215. 
79. Seme was married to Solomon's sister, Princess Harriet kaDinuzulu. 
80. This is mirrored in the career of Petros Lamula. See La Hausse, "Ethnicity", pp. 196 - 200. 
81. Ibid, pp. 195 - 196. 
82. Walsbe, African Nationalism, pp. 229·231. 
83. See La Hausse, "Struggle", pp. 171· 183 and Nuttall, "Class", pp. 50 - 61. 
84. La Hausse, "Dispersal", p. 83. 
85. The brewing of utshwala was an important economic activity for women, both urban and rural. 
Many made a precarious living out of the brewing of beer for sale in the urban areas in 
defiance of the law. Conversely, there was also an element of temperance in the opposition of 
women to the sale of municipal beer. Women resented their men spending even part of their 
meagre wages on beer at a time when money was in short supply and there were children to 
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It is important to note that the riots took place before the Wall Street crash and 
before the full effects of the world economic slump were felt in the port town. This 
is not to suggest that the period was one of general prosperity, especially in the 
experiences of the African and Indian working classes, for it was not. It has already 
been shown that industrial wages, for example, were amongst the lowest in the 
Union86 and that living conditions in the town were appalling.87 A large surplus of 
labour,88 which resided in the town or inhabited the fringes of the town, kept wage 
levels low, much to the benefit of local employers. Conditions in other urban areas 
of the province were similar; wages were low and once the depression struck, the 
ranks of the unemployed grew by the day. 
When the effects of the depression did begin to manifest themselves in the province, 
it was not long before enterprises of all kinds began to reduce staff. Job losses for 
the depression period are almost impossible to quantify accurately across the 
province, but the little information that may be regarded as accurate shows that of 
all the population groups, Africans were the most likely to lose their employment 
during the depression. Retrenchment and consequent unemployment affected 
almost every sector of trade, commerce and industry. Not only did the threat of 
retrenchment hang over practically every employee in every enterprise, but always 
present was the sure knowledge that should current employment be lost, a 
considerable struggle would be experienced in obtaining other employment in the 
formal sector of the economy. The economy was not the only area dictating the 
retrenchment of black workers; government policy, as has been illustrated above,89 
was also encouraging the replacement of black workers by "civilised" labour. 
This policy, bolstered by white public opinion, had a considerable effect on the 
be fed and clothed. It was for this reason that women played such a significant role in the beer 
boycott, especially in rural towns in the province. See Bradord, A Taste of Freedom, pp. 247 -
250. 
86. Van der Horst, Native Labour, p. 263. 
87. Hemson, "Dockworkers", p. 265. 
88. Mayor's Minute, 1932, p. 6. This surplus was estimated at 70 000 prior to the depression. 
89. See Chapter Three. 
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racial composition of the workforce throughout the province.90 Wheth~r applied to 
state departments at alllevels,91 or to parastatals like the South African Railways 
and Harbours,92 or to ordinary business enterprises and industry, workers of colour 
(particularly Africans) found themselves under increasing threat of replacement by 
whites. Despite protests and a series of scathing articles in llanga lase Natal,93 the 
process of providing employment for whites at the expense of workers of colour 
continued throughout the depression years, greatly exacerbating the unemployment 
of Africans. As a consequence, those workers who, despite all these threats to their 
employment, managed to keep their jobs, were unlikely to exhibit any form of 
behaviour other than docility, even in the face of deteriorating conditions. In fact, 
Smith has shown that jobs begun in the depression years had a higher average 
duration than the norm, indicating that Africans were staying in employment with 
the same employer in the urban areas for longer periods than had been usual prior to 
the depression.94 This can only be seen as an indication that conditions necessitated 
the adoption of this strategy.95 
Wage levels were forced down during the depression as employers trimmed their 
expenditure,96 and conditions of employment became distinctly less advantageous. 
Smith detected a large increase in the number of Africans who fell into the lowest-
paid category of workers between the years 1930 and 1934 - these workers 
receiving less than 9s 6d per week.97 In some instances, working hours were 
lengthened; in other cases short time was introduced.98 Generally, working 
conditions for workers became more difficult and exploitative. The cost of living 
90. See Chapter Three above. 
91. Including, strangely enough given the politiCal climate, the plan by Pirow to retrench African 
policemen. See /langa lase Natal, 31 July 1931. 
92. For the extent of the application of this policy to the SAR and H, see Salmon, "Afrikaner 
Nationalism", pp. 234 - 235. 
93. See /langa lase Natal, 15 August 1930; 7 November 1930; 6 March 1931; 12 June 1931; 
12 February 1932; 11 November 1932; 11 August 1933. . 
94. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 413. 
95. Hemson, "Dockworkers", p. 265. 
96. Ibid. 
97. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 412. 
98. See Edley, "Population", pp. 132 - 133. 
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did decline a little but not to levels which could offset the decline in real wage 
levels.99 Yet despite this, there were only two notable incidences of strike action by 
workers in Durban - the ricksha pullers' strike of 1930100 and the strike by 
dockworkers in 1932101 - both of which ended in ignominious defeat for the 
strikers. 
In the former case, the ricksha pullers wanted the hiring comparues which supplied 
their rickshas to reduce their weekly fee from lOs to 5s, as a result of the fall off in 
custom due to the depression. Such a step had been taken in Pietermaritzburg, 
which no doubt stiffened the pullers' resolve to have the same measures 
implemented in Durban. In Durban the ricksha pullers were also facing increasing 
competition from faster and cheaper transport in the form of murucipal trams, and 
were also bound up in a number of "red tape" measures which prevented them from 
returning to their stands W'lless they had a fare who wished to go there. Some were 
forced into giving free rides in order to return to parts of the town where they were 
able to get fares, an imposition which was deeply resented. 102 The owners refused 
the demands and a strike was initiated on 19 May 1930.103 Some of the estimated 
1 300 pullers made their way to Pietermaritzburg where they found employment, 
while others simply decided to return to the reserves, saying that they would simply 
give up work rather than continue at their present rate of pay. 104 It appears that the 
ricksha pullers had genuine grievances and were indeed suffering as a result of the 
depression. The local state concurred that they were in some difficulty: 
.. the claim by the ricksha pullers that they were hardly waking 
a living at the present time, should be taken seriously. IO) 
The strike was shortlived, and most pullers had returned to work under the same 
99. Ibid., pp. 30 - 31. 
100. Ibid. , p. 126. 
101. Hemson, "Dockworkers", pp. 273 - 275. 
102. Edley, "Population", p. 126. 
103. Notal Mercury, 20 May 1930. 
104. Notal Mercury, 17 May 1930. 
105. NA, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Native Advisory Board (NAB), 21 May 1930. 
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conditions by the end of May 1930, as they could not sustain a lengthy period 
without any form of income.106 Significantly, there was very little violence and "no 
widespread militancy", according to Pose 1. 107 
The same factors operated against the dock workers in their clash with the harbour 
authorities. The dock workers were largely togt workers who were hired on a daily 
basis to load and unload cargo and perform other tasks requiring manual labour on 
the waterfront. The decline in the number of vessels calling at the port of Durban (a 
direct result of the world depression and the consequent falloff in coast-wise and 
international trade) meant that fewer workers were required and so competition for 
jobs took on serious proportions, as the following illustrates: 
Midnight sees a strange sight at the Point, at the dock gates 
near the Port Manager's department, since the shipping 
depression has set in. The watcher will see a Native labourer 
from one of the huge compounds in the area arrive on the 
scene and gravely place on the kerb, say, a hat, weighted with 
stones so that it cannot be blown away. After a look round the 
Native will make his way back the way he came. Then, a few 
minutes later, another native will amve and, in line with the 
hat put down a handkerchief .... By one o'clock there is a straight 
line of all sorts of articles stretching over lOO yards down the 
road. For about nine hours, these goods are totally deserted. 
Then about six o'clock in the morning hundreds of Native 
labourers arrive on the scene. The owners of the various 
articles then pick them up, and occupy the positions of their 
bricks, or hats, or bottles. The explanation of this unusual 
performance is the shipping depression. Since things have 
been so quiet in the harbour, not so many labourers have been 
require1ird the man who wants a job must be on the spot 
early... . 
The parlous state of the dock workers was further exacerbated by decisions to 
reduce wages, to cut food allowances, and to replace paid overtime with a 
compulsory sixty-hour working week.109 The workers were not prepared to accept 
these measures and so came out on strike on 2 April 1932.110 The strike was broken 
106. Natal Mercury, 30 May 1930. 
107. R Pose~ "The Durban Ricksha Pullers' 'Strikes' of 1918 and 1930", Jow-nalol Natal and Zulu 
History, Vol. 8, 1985, p. 92. 
108. Natal Mercury, 19 February 1931. 
109. Hemson. "Dockworkers", p. 273. 
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through the use of white "scab" labour and non-striking African workers, all of 
whom were paid considerably more than the strikers had been receiving. The 
thousand strikers were paid off on the 7 April 1932.111 Despite the exploitative 
nature of the changed working conditions, and the deleterious effect these would 
have on the workers, llanga lase Natal was critical of the strikers' actions. Dube 
wrote that their actions had merely added to the already high rate of African 
unemployment in Durban. 112 The Natal Mercury noted with satisfaction that when 
strikers were paid off, " ... scores of other Natives who were willing to take their 
places were signed on".113 The fact that there were "scores of other Natives" who 
were willing to replace strikers certainly restricted options for workers wishing to 
express their discontent and may have contributed significantly to the changing 
political climate in the province after 1930.114 
Nor could unemployed or destitute Africans depend on any significant assistance 
from local authorities. Even those reduced to penury and the indignity of begging 
on the streets found little sympathy: 
Native beggars find scant welcome in Durban. They are sent 
back to -their kraals as soon as the opportunity offers. 
Complaints have been made... of the presence in the town of 
crippled Native beggars, some revoltingly deformed. 'They get 
very little encouragement indeed in Durban', said Mr C J 
Layman of the Corporation's Native Administration 
Department ... 'They come down from the kraals because they 
110. Ibid., p. 274. 




/langa lase Natal,8 April 1932. The radicalised dockworkers were never a part of Dube's 
more conservative political constituency and he obviously used the affair both to score political 
points and perhaps to pander to his capitalist backers. He was constantly warning workers 
against involvement of "communists" in their organisations. 
Natal Mercury, 8 April 1932. From these accounts it appears the actions of the Railways and 
Harbours officials were definitely based on the principle that the strikers had to be fired "pour 
encourager les autres." 
The s~e by dockw?rkers was ve~ much the exception to the rule after 1930 and may partly 
be ascnbed to the high level of militancy amongst the most exploited of all Durban's workers 
and to the considerable efforts of the Communist Party to organise the workers. The serious 
~onsequences of the proposed alteration of their working conditions may also have played an 
lDlportant role. Hemson's comments on this aspect are insightful. See Hemson 
"Dockworkers", pp. 273 - 275. ' 
realise that in town i~eir chance of picking up a living as 
beggars is far rosier'. 1 
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Nor was the presence of large numbers of unemployed Indians any more welcome. 
A high level of anti-Asiatic sentiment was present throughout the period and was 
even present in government policy, as Minnaar points out: 
In the urban areas of Natal, especially in Durban, the Indians 
were the first and J?rincipal victims of unemployment during 
the Great DepresslOn. For the Indian community largely 
dependent on wage earning with no other resources (having no 
'reserves' to return to) there were two factors which intensified 
their misery. The first was the government policy of solving 
part of the white unemployment problem by giving to whites 
the jobs traditionally held by non-whites. ThIS ensured that the 
burden of unemployment fell mainly on the poorest sections, 
the non-whites. In this manner, many Indians were dismissed 
from the railways and the number of Indians employed by 
municipalities in Natal was restricted. Secondly, durmg the 
time of the Great Depression, no provision whatsoever was 
made by the government for unemployed Indians ... Indian 
unemployment, which was very considerable, was borne mostly 
by the tradition of the wider or extended family system - an 
II?-dian 1ygtd open his doors even to remote cousins in 
dIstress. 
Indians, it must be admitted, did receive some limited assistance from local 
authorities, but this only occurred after considerable lobbying.117 Furthermore, the 
measures implemented have to be regarded as inadequate in the light of the 
magnitude of the problem prevalent in that community. 
No relief works were ever begun for ~ricans in the urban areas of Natal; local 
authorities simply did the bare minimum to assist destitute Africans through soup 
kitchens or other schemes. 1 IS Local authorities, in line with central government 
policy, preferred to use various stratagems to force Africans to leave the urban areas 
115. Natal Mercury, 24 September 1930. 
116. Minnaar, ·Unemployment·, p. 63. 
117. See Chapter Eight. Minnaar does actua1ly acknowledge this, but states that • ... only towards 
the end of the Great Depression did both Durban and Pietermaritzburg begin offering relief 
work for unemployed Indians .. : Minnaar, "Unemployment", p. 63. 
118. See Chapter Eight. 
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and so reduce the surplus of labour and consequent unemployment. A direct link 
was established in the "official mind" between various urban problems such as 
strikes, crime and other manifestations of worker militancy and the "surplus" of 
Africans in the urban areas of the province. Africans were thus caught in a vice -
they were forced by circumstances to leave the rural areas, and were made to feel 
distinctly unwelcome in the urban areas. The Chief Constable in Durban, the focal 
point of militancy, was given repeated instructions to clear the town of surplus 
Africans.119 Comforting claims were published to the effect that the "large floating 
population" of between 60 000 and 70 000 Africans in Durban during the later 1920s 
had been reduced to some 20 000 during the depression years.120 No one who was 
acquainted with the workings of the municipal NAD would have placed much 
credence in this; all evidence actually points to the growth of the "surplus 
population" in the town during the depression years. 
The weight of evidence suggests that the economic climate in the urban areas of 
Natal was such that Africans experienced severe hardship during the depression 
years. As they constituted the lowest ranks of the employment hierarchy and as 
most of them functioned as unskilled labour, they were very vulnerable to 
dismissal. 121 Particularly vulnerable were the migrant workers who had no other 
urban support base. In this climate, the presence in the major urban centres of a 
floating population of surplus Africans did indeed put a significant damper on 
political militancy amongst ordinary workers. 
A similar case can be made with regard to the African elite - the bourgeois and 
~pirant bourgeois leaders of the urban African population. H ordinary Africans 
were severely affected by the depression, then the same factors must have had a 
considerable impact on the lives of the elite. They were too inextricably bound up in 
the complex set of relationships, socio-economic and political, which governed the 
lives of Africans in the urban areas of Natal, not to have been affected. The African 
businessmen, no matter what economic niche they filled in society, were largely 
119. NAD, 3/DBN, Minutes of the Native Administration Committee (NAD) , 15 May 1930; 
19 January 1931. Hemson claims that 1 000 Africans were expelled from the town during 
1930. Hemson, "Dockworkers", p. 267. 
120. Mayor's Minute, 1932, p. 6. 
121. Nuttall, "Class", pp. 143 - 144. 
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dependent on their fellow Africans for their economic well-being. Even those who 
were not businessmen in the strict sense such as the clergy of the myriad 
independent (and, for that matter, non-independent) churches, or members of the 
teaching profession, were still to some extent dependent on their fellow Africans for 
part of their financial support. 
Nuttall has stated that "the depression hit some of Durban's African traders hard" 
and this is certainly true. Some were forced to close their businesses, while others 
fought a rearguard action aimed at preserving their positions in the face of official 
disapprobation and the depression. African traders operated on the fringes of the 
economic world; they lacked sources of capital and networks of distribution and 
supply, and were constantly harassed as state policymakers had no wish to 
encourage a permanent class of urban African traders.122 It is indeed significant 
that in the economic climate of the depression years, so much energy should have 
been devoted to establishing and improving the rights of urban traders, particularly 
in Durban. The way to the achievement of these improved conditions was seen to 
lie not through confrontation, but rather through co-operation with the local state by 
making use of newly established structures. The formation of the Durban Bantu 
Traders' Association, and the significant number of traders represented on the NAB 
bear testimony to the accommodationist approach adopted by those members of the 
elite struggling to survive the harsh economic conditions. The evidence tends to 
bear this contention out. Municipal files of this time are filled with correspondence, 
much of it obsequious, requesting the improvement of conditions for traders. 123 
~aving given up their identification with the labouring masses to become part of the 
local state's machinery, the trader members of the NAB expected some sort of quid 
pro quo, but this was slow in coming. In fact, as La Hausse pointed out, the Native 
Revenue Fund (the chief account through which the town council funded African 
administration) was so reduced by the boycott of the beer halIs, that the council was 
considering raising the rents of alI its African lessees, including those on the NAB. 
The issue of a "Native Village" to house the African elite was also employed to bring 
122. Nuttall, ·Class·, pp. 119· 120. 
123. Ibid., p. 122. 
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pressure to bear on the traders and other petty bourgeois on the NAB to end the 
boycott. 124 Once this became apparent, the NAB obliged by calling for the 
suspension of the boycott. 125 The council did not approve any liquor licences for 
Africans, a matter of some concern to the wealthier traders, who had seen the 
lucrative possibilities of this trade and who had sought to capitalise on the crisis of 
the boycotts. 126 La Hausse sums up the activities of the traders on the NAB in his 
characterisation of the NAB's activities: 
A predominant concern of the NAB members had been, and 
continued to be, the attempt to se~~fetter conditions for a 
broad spectrum of traders in Durban. 
The very fact that the traders and their backers entered into a co-operative type of 
relationship with the local state must surely be an indication of their concern to 
better their economic conditions; something which could not be achieved through 
open confrontation, but only through accommodationist politics. 
The same conclusion appears to have been reached by the ANC's Natal-based 
leader, Pixley Seme. It must be pointed out that on a national level, the ANC was 
bankrupt as even funds, promised by various leaders in the constitution of the 
organisation, had not been paid. When Seme took over the reins of leadership in 
1930, he inherited a considerable load of debt. Walshe suggested that Seme was 
trying to revive the Upper House of the ANC (which consisted largely of traditional 
leaders) and wanted to place all financial control in their hands in return for greater 
financial support for the organisation. This would have made for more 
conservative, rural-based politics. . It is clear that even prior to the onset of the 
depression and drought, the ANC was in dire financial straits.128 This state of 
affairs could only be severely aggravated by the depression, as the meagre resources 
which sustained the movement all but dried up. This had important consequences, 
for the lack of finance and the organisational disarray of the movement, which was 
124. La Hausse, "Dispersal", p. 93. 
125. Nuttall, "Class", p. 214. 
126. La Hausse, "Struggle", p. 238. 
127. Ibid., p. 216. 
128. Walshe, African Nationalism, pp. 214 - 215. 
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split in most of the provinces, all contributed to the lack of meaningful activity at a 
time when increasing pressure was being applied to Africans. Walshe quoted Sol 
Plaatje as saying that 1931 was a "barren year" and Selope Thema as saying there 
had never been such " ... inactivity and apathy on the part of our leaders".129 Seme 
was actually struck off the roll of attorneys in 1932 for what appears to have been 
the misappropriation of funds from African clients. He alleged that he had used the 
retainer he had been given to fight an eviction case on behalf of the Africans on the 
farm Waverley, near Pretoria, to "fight the case politically" and to defray expenses 
he had incurred in the process of using " .. .influence to reach the authorities 
politically". His defence was rejected by the Supreme Court.130 It may be 
suggested that the retainer was used to fund his political activities. Couzens has 
been extremely critical of Seme's role during the 1930s, as the following opinions 
indicate: 
Sadly, too, the man who launched the ANC ship in 1912, nearly 
sank it when he was its president in the 1930s. A combination 
of letr~fgy and corruption nearly destroyed the organisation 
then. j . 
Seme's leadership was . conservative, lack-lustre and autocratic. He had grand 
designs of making the African National Congress an engine of economic self-help. 
He tried to revive the now defunct House of Chiefs with which the Congress had 
been burdened at its inception.132 
Cobley had a similar view of Seme, expressed in the following terms: 
Seme wished to ' move away from the realm of the 'common 
agitator who only wants to create strife and class hatred'. He 
wanted his Congress to foster 'Race Pride' by promoting 
economic self-sufficiency ... He expressly avoided (and 
abhorred) the obvious opportunities for mass mobilisation and 
radical action. Instead Congress would be dedicated to the 
foundation of a virtual 'parallel' black capitalist society. It was 
a strategy conceived within and for a tiny black petty 
129. Ibid., p. 254. 
130. R Riv~ and T Couzens, Seme: The Founder of the ANe, UWC History Series No.2, 
Skotaville, Johannesburg, 1991, p. 5. 
131. Ibid., p. 6. 
132. Ibid., p. 22. 
bourgeoisie, with more or less con.scious echoes of the plea~ of 
African traders for protected tradmg spheres. There was little 
of benefit to black wage labourers m such a strategy and, 
consequently, no politicised wage earner was likely to support 
it. This polItical reality, set against Seme's ~~d sch~mes for 
'national development', unde\~ the political fallure of 
Congress throughout the 1930s. 
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Part of the explanation of the dissipation of militancy at a national level is to be 
found in the above evidence. 
On the level of provincial politics a similar pattern emerged, for the same set of 
circumstances may be seen to have applied to that doyen of African political activity 
in Natal, John Dube. Evidence has already been presented of Dube's "alliance with 
capital", but perhaps the significance of this needs to be highlighted. Dube had lent 
his support to the campaign, by sugar farmers, coal-mine owners and other white 
capitalists, against the militants, especially the ICU and the Communist Party, even 
prior to the depression. While it is possible to suggest that Dube sought to clear the 
political scene of rivals and to ingratiate himself with the state by so doing, it is 
equally possible that Dube saw future financial possibilities in the relationship he 
was developing with capital. What little evidence there is appears to bear this out. 
The Ohlange Institute had been developed with the backing of white capitalists, 
including Marshall Campbell. 134 Even some British aristocrats had been collecting 
funds for the Institute in the 1920s.135 Reference has already been made to the fact 
that Dube had received cash from capitalists for his Native Affairs Organisation 
Fund prior to the depression, part of which he had used to purchase a new printing 
press and a "cheap motor car!' in which he could visit chiefs in the rural areas. 
Upwards of £1 ()()() had been subscribed to this fund even prior to the depression.136 
Such a sum of money was not insignificant, even to a man such as Dube, who had 
many irons in the fire at the time. 137 
133. Cobley, Class and Consciousness, pp. 162 - 163. 
134. R Hunt Davis, "John L Dube: A South African Exponent of Booker T Washington", Journal 01 
African Studies, Vol 2. No.4, Winter 1fJ75/76, p. 524. 
135. See M Marable, "African Nationalist: The Life of John Langalibalele Dube", Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Maryland, 1fJ76, pp. 290 - 320. 
136. See Chapter Four. 
137. Not. only was h~ owner of the newspaper /langa lase Natal and owner of the Ohlange 
inStitute, a technical school for Africans, but he was also involved in other ventures. 
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During the depression, it may be suggested, Dube suffered like all other 
entrepreneurs, black or white, from the falloff of trade and the general shortage of 
ready cash. Although llanga lase Natal was relatively cheap and was published only 
once a week, the costs involved must have been considerable. Whether those costs 
were recouped through sales is unknown, but it is significant that the newspaper 
carried column after column of advertising during the depression years.138 
Likewise, it is not known whether the Ohlange Institute was a paying concern during 
the depression years. British funding had been terminated in early 1929 and the 
Institute was desperately short of funds even prior to the depression.139 There is 
clear evidence to suggest that Dube was soliciting funds from local capital for both 
these ventures during the depression years. 140 He was also using his newspaper to 
carry advertisements for his book lnsila kaShaka 141 which he had written in 1930, 
and for a pamphlet Ukuziphakata kahle,142 which he had written during 1933. 
These endeavours may have been designed to raise money. Although the evidence 
is fairly sparse, it may be speculated that all was not well in Dube's financial empire 
during the depression, and that to preserve his position, both financial and political, 
it was necessary for him to turn for assistance to the allies he had made earlier.143 
That being the case, it is then equally possible to suggest that in order to preserve 
and maintain the alliances he had established, his actions and public statements 
would of necessity have been tailored to suit those who were backing him 
financially. 144 
138. An examination of the newspaper during the depression years will show that such advertising 
came not only from African enterprises but white ones too. It may be suggested that in order 
to retain such advertising, Dube woUld hav~ had to tread the "correct" political line. 
139. Marable, "African Nationalist", pp. 319 - 320. 
140. See Chapter Four. 
141. A S Gerard, Four African Literatures, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, p. 204. 
142. Ibid., p. 217. 
143. This aspect requires a great deal more research before anything definitive in this connection 
can be posited. 
144. WaJshe cites an interview with a later editor of /langa lase Natal, R Dhlomo, and a speech 
made by Champion as evidence that even feUow Africans were aware of the possible links 
between Dube and capital. WaJshe goes even further by suggesting that Dube's siding with the 
moderates in .1930 whic~ saw the elec~on of Seme, was as a result of Dube's links with capital, 
and. that " .. .his moderation was partlaUy conditioned by their financial aid to his Ohlange 
Institute". Walshe, African Nationalism, p. 230. 
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It may seem contradictory that earlier some of Dube's statements have been 
described as "inflammatory" and "strident",145 but Dube was on fairly safe ground 
in calling for an end to the "civilised labour" policy. Although there was general 
white public support for it, many of the larger capitalists of Natal were privately not 
in favour. They saw the policy as costly in terms of the increased tax burden, the 
threat of "Afrikanerisation", and the restraints that the policy imposed on the 
employment of cheap black labour during the depression. Many also were of the 
opinion that the government could be doing more to assist their enterprises (by 
leaving the gold standard, paying out subsidies, etc.) and spending less energy on 
promoting a policy which was actually inimical to the interests of capital during a 
time of crisis. Similarly, urban capitalists were beginning to see the advantages of a 
more permanently settled urban African workforce, counterbalanced by a healthy 
reserve supply of labour in the towns. Thus, any criticism of strategies likely to 
interfere with the current labour dispensation would also have been greeted with 
guarded approval. Overall, it may be suggested that the value to his capitalist 
supporters of Dube's anti-lCU and anti-communist propaganda far outweighed any 
nagging doubts they might have harboured about his intentions. 
Statements such as the following did help to allay suspicion of his motives: 
The ICU are exploiting poor Native workers ... The leaders are 
irresponsible, they do not understand the relation of capital to 
labour, the need for investment ... What workers are they 
looking for in the native areas and reserves? Are any of the 
leaders engaged in business employing a number of people for 
farming and paying-S shillin~ a day for their workers? How 
about that for men of Groutville, Amarnzimtoti and Ifafa! Are 
they prepared to pay their employee that wage? How long can 
they raise cane at a profit if they pay such wages?14b 
There is, at this stage, not enough direct evidence to claim that Dube was a capitalist 
lackey, but enough evidence does exist to suggest that Dube's actions and statements 
145. Acc~rding to Walshe, Dube was actually charged with inciting public violence in 11)33, but was 
acqwtted. See Walshe, African Nationalism, p. 222. 
146. llanga lose Notal, 12 August 1927, quoted in Marks, Ambiguities, p. 72. 
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might to some extent have pandered to the interests of capital in promoting co-
operation and not confrontation. Champion, in an obscure comment, not on Dube 
himself, none the less shows some insight into what may have motivated him: 
There are two kinds of leadership. There is immature 
leadership and there is mature leadership. Immatur~ 
leadership is when the man you have chosen to be a leader IS 
not independent. If ever he works, he works with those who 
are not going to agree with the way wanted by the [mature] 
leaders. Now you are in the dilemma of serving two masters. 
Or, if you are a man with a business, you live by the good will 
of those who coul~ cl0tt1t at any time if you slip out of line by 
your words or actions. 
This is not to suggest that Dube fitted exactly into the situation described by 
Champion, and it would be facile to suggest that Dube's political stance in the late 
1920s and early 1930s was motivated only by political self-interest. Neither can all 
the vituperation he poured upon the radicals, and his co-option of Solomon to join 
the struggle against the lCU, be simply ascribed to the preservation and 
maintenance of his political position as the conservative elder statesman. 
Marks has suggested that even the leader of the ICU yase Natal, Champion, was in 
financial difficulties during the depression years. In Champion's case, the influence 
of the depression is difficult to assess, as the decline of the movement seriously 
affected the membership subscriptions upon which Champion depended. However, 
it is worth mentioning that Champion's flirtation with the chiefs, and with Solomon 
in particular, was motivated as much by the need for cash as by a desire to broaden 
the political base of his decaying movement. In a report to the leadership of the 
ICU, Champion wrote: ''The greatest question is to get these people to contribute to 
our funds."148 Swanson stated that Champion's African Co-operative Society, a 
clothing manufacturing company, went bankrupt in the wake of the Beer Hall riots 
when its white clientele boycotted the sales outlet. Champion himself related how, 
despite having been moved to cheaper rented premises, this business failed. The 
same fate met another enterprise started by Champion after his return from 
exile.149 Whether either of these two failures was occasioned to any great extent by 
147. Swanson, Mahlathi, p. 111. 
148. Marks, Ambiguities, p. 108. 
149. Swanson, Mahlathi, pp. 164 - 165. See also Cobley, Class and ConSciousness, p. 160. 
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the depression is difficult to ascertain. Champion voiced the dilemma that faced 
African entrepreneurs who became involved in politics: 
Business affairs must not be mixed with politics. There are 
many well-to-do Europeans w.ho t;ven ~ithdraw fron:t 
parliament on the grounds that therr busmess will not prosper if 
they remain in parliament. How difficult it is for a person like 
me who fights the laws that control Africans while paying 
respect to the Municipality on account of my stores. Anyone 
who knew in what a dilemma I am in would feel sorry for 
me.150· 
Throughout all his activism, Champion remained an entrepreneur. It was at his 
urging that Clermont "township" was developed as an African freehold 
settlement.151 He was critical of the communists, saying in 1930: 
I speak. .. as what is known as a labour leader when I say that 
the communists are opposed to (Native) interests and that the 
capitalist class must be created among all non-European races 
in South Africa. Without such a class there would be no hope 
of liberation for history revealed that the 1§~italist is and 
always will be the backbone of every country. 
Such evidence suggests another dimension to the man, his policies and the times he 
lived ~ especially when it is recalled that he voted against Seme and for the 
communist Gumede, in the ANC presidential elections of 1930.153 
Similarly, the state of the Communist Party in the province also deserves closer 
scrutiny. It is not necessary here to delve into either the "Africanisation" of the party 
on the instructions of Moscow; or the effects of this on the machinery of the party, 
for both have been incisively examined elsewhere.154 What does require restating 
is that the President-General of the organisation elected in 1927, was a Natalian, 
Josiah Gumede. Gumede was simultaneously also the President of the ANC, until 
150. Swanson, Mahlathi., p. 166. 
151. Cobley, Class and Consciousness, p. 160. 
152. Ibid., p. 153. 
153. Walshe, African Nationalism, p. 181. 
154. Ibid., pp. 177 - 184. 
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his ousting by Seme in 1930. His ejection from the Congress, largely because of his 
more "radical" stance, brought about great division within the ANC and even within 
his own party. It was only in Durban that the communist-inspired pass-burning 
campaign of 16 December 1930 really amounted to anything. Thereafter, Walshe 
asserted, the party played only a "peripheral role" during the rest of the 1930s, 155 
the depression being a crucial factor in the decline of the movement.156 This 
assertion is borne out by Nuttall, who wrote: 
The Depression ... stifled militancy. Harsh economic realities 
reinforced the political effects of the suppression of 
communists after the 1930 Dingaan's Day 
demonstration ... There was little collective resistance in Durban 
against deepening misery. The capacity to resist was 
undermined by the economic and political vulnerability of 
unskilled workers. In the saturated labour market of the 
Depression, migrancy was weakened as a strategy of 
countering capitalist work routines. Increasing numbers of 
African workers were now totally reliant on urb~~obs, so 
withdrawal from wage labour declined as an option. 
The depression and its effects on African labour must indeed be seen as the key 
reasons why the Communist Party failed to keep the flames of militancy burning in 
the town. Even the fortuitous creation of an instant martyr in the death of Nkosi, 
had insufficient impact to sustain the movement's militant activities beyond 1931. 
This is not to suggest that the Communist Party ceased to operate, for as has been 
shown elsewhere, the arrival of Eddie Roux in the town did provide some impetus. 
This was insignificant, however; the depression and state repression had effectively 
tamed the party in Natal.158 
Having examined the fortunes of some 'of the leaders and the movements they 
headed, it remains to analyse the position of ordinary Africans in the urban areas of 
the province. It is immediately obvious that ordinary Africans were affected even 
more seriously by the depression. Dube wrote in lIanga lase Natal: 
155. Ibid., p. 184. 
156. Ibid., p. 171. 
157. Nuttall, ·Class·, pp. 143, 145. 
158. Ibid., p. 148. 
Some consideration at least should be given to the distress 
among Natives, the poorest section of the population of Sou~h 
Africa. If there should come upon the country any econonuc 
depression it must always play havoc upon the Natives in a 
severer manner than among the more affluent classes for the 
reason that they are the lowest paid in the U IVon and on top of 
that they are expected to provide for themselves and their 
families out of that meagre remuneration for their services. 
They no longer depend upon their Native food, which 
formerly was mainly the products of the soil and the chase as 
well as from their herds and flocks. They now live almost 
everywhf5§ upon food for which they pay in money and 
labour ... 
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It may be suggested that faced with the depression and drought, declining 
opportunities for employment, and a high level of unemployment, Africans seeking 
a haven in the urban areas would not only have been prepared to accept a 
deterioration in working conditions, but would have actually sought to obtain 
employment at a level which in ·normal times they would have shunned. This is 
certainly borne out in the work of Smith. Smith found that during the depression 
jobs commenced by Africans had a longer than average duration; 160 that there was 
a marked increase in the number of Africans seeking urban employment for the first 
time; that the proportion of Africans over the age of 45 years seeking employment 
also increased;161 and perhaps most importantly of all, that the proportion of 
Africans entering domestic service in the urban areas during the depression years 
showed a marked increase.162 
In analysing these findings, t~e following emerges: the rural crisis was such that 
many who had not yet worked in the urban areas were being forced by 
circumstances to do so. The increase in persons over 45 years of age would indicate 
that even heads of households (imizi) were being forced by the conditions to seek 
work - something normally left to younger members. It may be suggested that 
domestic service assumed greater importance not only because other avenues were 
closed or closing, but because most domestic servants not only received wages but 
159. /langa lase Natal, 16 June 1933. 
160. Smith, "Labour Resources", p. 413. 
161. Ibid., p. 381. 
162. Ibid., p. 350. 
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clothing, food and a place to stay as part of their conditions of employment. Such 
arrangements must have appeared very attractive in the economic climate of the 
times. 
However, there is an added dimension to this change in the patterns of urban 
employment. The older workers were likely to be more conservative and family-
orientated, more conscious of the responsibilities that weighed on them to earn 
money to support their families. Furthermore, great pressure would have been 
exerted by their employers on domestic workers to refrain from political activity, 
especially in a militant form. The large body of unemployed desperately seeking 
such relatively advantageous employment would also have restricted the latitude 
employers might otherwise have granted their servants - there were always scores 
eagerly waiting to fill the positions vacated by dismissed servants. All these factors, 
it may be posited, contributed to the decline and dissipation of the climate of 
militancy in the urban areas of the province after 1930. 
Political activity among the Indian population of Natal was similarly affected by the 
depression. Apart from a few meetings at which the "civilised labour" policy and the 
high rate of unemployment among Indians were discussed, little political activism or 
militancy was exhibited. A number of reasons may be suggested for this. Firstly, the 
attention of the Indian community of Natal was only partially directed to affairs in 
their own region.163 The early 1930s were years of increasing struggle for Home 
Rule in India itself, as Mahatma Gandhi and his band of passive resisters took on 
the might of the British Raj. The pages of Indian Opinion were filled with accounts 
~f Gandhi's exploits and the progress of the campaign was eagerly followed in Natal, 
which had the highest Indian population· in the Union.164 The re-integration of 
former South African Indians, who had returned to live in India, into that society 
also occupied much attention,165 in view of the then increasing trend for Indians, 
163. Indian voters had actually been disenfranchised at the municipal level when the Hertzog 
government had advised the Govemor-General-in-Counci1 to assent to a Natal Provincial 
Ordinance to this effect in 1924. It could be that Indian voters had lost some interest in this 
sphere of politics. See Calpin, Indians in South Africa, p.57. 
164. See as examples Indian Opinion,18 April 1930; 9 May 1930,25 May 1930: .~() May 1930; 
9 January 1931; 13 February 1931. 
165. In fact Mesthrie has shown how this issue did affect local politics, for the failure.: of the re-
integration process in India did encourage opposition to further attempts III "encourage" 
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especially from Natal, to emigrate. 166 The events taking place in India, whether 
Gandhi's campaign, or the fortunes of former Natal Indians, thus helped to distract 
attention away from local issues to some extent. 
Freund took another point of view by suggesting that the explanation for the lack of 
significant political militancy might lie within the nature of the community at this 
time: 
... the features of Indian life ... reinforced conservatism and 
created an inward-looking ethnic community within which the 
four-pronged identification of race, language'16fligion and 
family, served to define one's place in the world. 
Freund suggested that Indian militancy only really resurfaced in the late 1930s and 
1940s. Another significant factor may be found in the fact that the 1930s saw a 
concerted anti-Asiatic campaign throughout the province. Reference has already 
been made to this in earlier chapters, but it is worth observing that the sentiment 
was not restricted to the urban areas. Everywhere "Asiatic penetration" was an 
issue. Farmers' Associations, private individuals and even the central government 
were caught up in a campaign to contain and restrict Indians.168 In Durban, Freund 
asserted: 
Survival meant a deference in daily behaviQut. to whites - who 
controlled the streets in the centre of town. lOY 
It is no mere coincidence that anti-Asiatic legislation should have been proposed at 
this time. Both the Asiatic Land Tenure Bill and the amendments to the 
Immigration Act proposed by Dr Malan had dire implications for Indians in the 
province at this time. 170 Petitions were constantly in circulation calling for further 
Indians to return to India or to migrate elsewhere. See Mesthrie, "Cape Town Agreement", 
pp.8ff. 
166. See Indian Opinion, 20 November 1931. 
167. Freund, Insiders and Outsiders, p. 38. 
168. Calpin, Indians in South Africa, pp. 83 - 87. 
169. Freund, Insiders and Outsiders, p. 39. 
170. See Edley, "Population", p. 136. 
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restrictions upon Indian traders and farmers. 171 In the face of all this hostility, it is 
not surprising that Indian politicians should have adopted a low profile, avoiding 
both open confrontation with the state and further antagonisation of white public 
opinion. It was only when the depression was well advanced, and the prevailing 
anti-Asiatic sentiment had resulted in the large-scale retrenchment of Indians 
throughout the province,172 that Indians were moved to become more politically 
active in their campaign for fairer treatment from employers and the state. By this 
time it was generally recognised that all communities were suffering, so by adding 
their voice to the chorus of misery, Indians were not singling themselves out for 
special treatment. Alternatively, it may have been that the pressure from the 
retrenched among the politicians' constituencies was so great that some overt action 
had to be taken. 
When that action did take place, it was not in the form of antagonistic declarations, 
but rather in the form of requests for an end to measures which prevented Indian 
employment,173 or restricted Indian trade. 17 4 Special attention was devoted to 
lobbying for the creation of relief works for Indians175 which, as has been shown, 
were granted, despite the prevailing anti-Asiatic climate.176 The relief works were 
actually only instituted after the personal intervention of the Indian Agent-General, 
Sir Kurma Reddi. His intervention may be seen to have lent an apolitical, ' 
diplomatic flavour to the request which may have made it more palatable to the 
authorities. In fact, if the newspapers are closely analysed, anti-Asiatic sentiment, at 
least superficially, appears to have actually declined in the latter part of the 
depression period; it was forced out of the newspapers and off the political 
platforms of the ruling white elite by the formation of the coalition and later fusion 
governments. 
Three further possible explanations for Indian political apathy show some degree of 
commonality with the experiences of Africans at this time. The first of these 
171. Natal Mercury, 16 January 1932. 
172. See Minnaar's comments above. 
173. See Indian Opinion, 25 September 1931. 
174. Indian Opinion, 7 February 1930. 
175. Indian Opinion, 25 September 1931. 
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involves the leisure-time activities of Indians. During the 1930s, a great deal of time 
and energy was devoted by the more monied class to the viewing and discussion of 
films. This was so especially in Durban, where there were up to twelve cinemas 
solely for the use of Indians. Soccer and boxing, especially the latter, were 
passionately followed and matches attracted large crowds)77 Unlike the 
mechanisms of control through social activities for Africans, which were largely 
imposed and maintained by the local state, Indians appeared to have controlled 
these activities themselves. However, it may be argued that Indians also dissipated 
their "surplus ene.rgy" in this type of activity and that the eventual effect might have 
been the same. 
The second factor lies in an analysis of the economic situation of Indians in Natal at 
this time. In many ways, Indians were no better off than Africans. Freund argued 
that: 
Contemporary images of Indians as an intermediary stratum 
between white and African are inappropriate for the period 
before World War IT; most Indians were considered unskilled 
an~ had 'flieal purchase on wages any better than the Africans 
enjoyed. 
Wages were low and, furthermore, unemployment was rife and almost endemic. 
Poverty and poor diets resulting in malnutrition, disease and high infant mortality, 
were characteristic of this period.179 Ginwala's findings indicate that as late as 
1943/44, approximately 70,6 per cent of Indians lived below the established Poverty 
Datum Line.180 This is indeed a startling revelation, given the fact that the 
economic climate of the U nio~ had shown considerable improvement in the years 
succeeding the depression. Unfortunately, no accurate data exists to determine 
whether the economic position of Indians had shown any improvement in that same 
period, but it may be suggested that had such an investigation been undertaken in 
176. See Chapter Eight. 
177. Freund, Insiders and Outsiders, p. 39. 
178. Ibid., pp. 40 - 42. 
179. Ibid., p. 40 
180. F GinwaJa, "Class, Consciousness and Control - Indian South Africans, 1860-1946", D.Phil. 
thesis, Oxford University, 1974, p. 303. 
386 
the depths of the depression, the position would probably have been found to have 
been even worse. 
Finally, the fragmentation observed in African politics also manifested itself in 
Indian politics at this time. Reference has been made in the course of the thesis to 
the existence of bodies other than the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), but it is worth 
noting that even the NIC itself was riven with factions and that a split occurred in 
the movement in 1932, weakening the response of the Indian community to anti-
Asiatic agitation and contributing to the diminution of political activity.181 
Generally speaking therefore, Indian political . activity during the depression was 
notable more for its absence than for its presence.182 
As with Africans in the same period, it may be suggested that considerable energy 
had to be devoted to the daily struggle for survival in the face of harsh economic 
reality and that, as a result, In~ian political activity veered more towards co-
operation than confrontation. So many constraints operated on Indian economic 
advancement at this time (and so many more were in the process of formulation) 
that it would have ill-served the community to engage in any confrontation. Political 
activity was therefore rather restrained and constricted. 
The evidence presented does shed some light on the changing political climate 
amongst blacks in Natal during the depression years. Faced with economic hardship 
on a scale never before experienced, Africans (and for that matter, Indians) had to 
find ways and means of surviving or face starvation and death. Unlike their white 
~ounterparts, they could not depend upon the state for assistance, especially in the 
urban areas. Equally, it was to the urban' areas that Africans were forced, by rural 
poverty and drought, to come. As much as the state tried to stem or reverse the tide, 
there is clear enough evidence to suggest that, despite official declarations and oft-
quoted inaccurate statistical data, 183 the depression actually accelerated the .flow of 
181. See D Bagwandeen, "Historical Perspectives" in A J Arkin, K P Magyar and G J Pillay (eds), 
The Indian South Africans, Owen Burgess, Pinetown, 1989, p. 11. 
182. This is to be found even in the research undertaken specifically on the effects of the depression 
on this community. Singh's study in 1990 carefully avoided the political aspects. See Singh, 
"Effects of the Great Depression". 
183. See Chapter Seven. 
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Africans to the urban areas, especially after 1930 when the depression and the 
devastating drought began to bite. 
Survival in the urban areas in these times of economic crisis came to depend on the 
generosity of the ruling white employer elite who, because of the adverse 
circumstances, had acquired more power over the African workforce. This power 
can be seen both in the reduction of wages and in the deterioration of working 
conditions described above. Similarly, the tales of exploitation emanating from the 
white farms in the countryside also bear eloquent witness to the increased power of 
the white farming community to determine the conditions of labour of their workers. 
The large numbers of unemployed fruitlessly seeking employment, and the generally 
desperate conditions, did give the majority of employers great power over their 
African employees. In the absence of any meaningful support measures should 
Africans in employment challenge the power of the employer, most Africans were 
forced to kowtow and obey the demands of the employers for a docile and reliable 
workforce. If this increased power of coercion was not adequate, the state, on both 
the central and local levels, acted in concert with their white constituency to force 
the dissipation of worker militancy. Only during the apartheid era, did the power of 
the state grow at a comparatively alarming rate. The fears of a general uprising of 
Africans, in the wake of the Beer Hall riots, and the perceived potential for rapid 
growth of the militancy of Africans everywhere because of the deteriorating 
economic conditions, prompted the state to arm itself with a formidable array of 
legislative weapons with which to "deal" with such an "uprising". In the event, as has 
been shown, the "uprising" never materialised and the mood of militancy was swirled 
away on the winds of economic deprivation. 
Even the leaders of the various political movements found themselves caught up in 
a daily struggle for survival. Although nothing definitive caD be stated in this 
connection, there is enough evidence to suggest that several African leaders, 
including Solomon kaDinuzulu, John Dube and A W G Champion, were desperately 
short of ready cash during the depression years. Whether they were so short of 
money that they may have been forced to adopt survival strategies that 
compromised their previous political positions, or which dictated their political 
behaviour to some extent, must remain an area for further exploration. Whatever 
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the case, this chapter has shown that any explanation of the political life of black 
South Africans during the depression years, including such previously unexplained 
phenomena as the dissipation of militancy, can only be arrived at through a 





The purpose of this thesis has been to define and analyse the significant impact 
which 'the phenomenon known as the Great Depression had on the economic, social 
and political life of the then province of Natal in the years 1929-1933. This impact 
was accentuated by the devastating drought which struck the region in the later 
years of the depression. Natal's geographical position, the nature of the economic 
activities of the province and the diverse composition of its population, all played a 
part in determining the severity of the crisis. During the depression and drought 
Natal society underwent a number of significant changes. Urbanisation took place 
on a rapid and massive scale, changing the demographic composition and 
distribution of the population. Commerce, industry and agriculture of all forms 
were also affected; hardly a commercial undertaking of any sort remained immune 
and the thousands who laboured in these enterprises often bore the brunt as capital 
sought to minimise losses. Even those outside the ambit of commercial capital, in 
the reserves and on the fringes of urban society, felt the effects to some degree. 
Political activity reflected these tempestuous times and the heavy burden that the 
economic situation imposed. The years 1929-1933 live on in the collective 
consciousness as a memory of hardship, insecurity and desperation - justification 
enough for a thorough investigation of the nature of the phenomenon. 
Closer examination of the findings , shows that state policy and the inherent racism 
among whites in the province served to pass the major burden of the depression 
onto those who could least afford to shoulder it, the African majority. Harried from 
pillar to post in the pursuance of a segregationist ideal, Africans undoubtedly bore 
the brunt of retrenchments in commerce and industry in the urban areas. In the 
rural areas too, it was Africans who suffered ejection from white farms and a drastic 
decline in standards of living. Expected to return to their "country seats" in the 
reserves where their plight could be conveniently ignored by all but a few dedicated 
bureaucrats, Africans experienced considerable hardship due to unemployment and 
drought. It is no mere coincidence that segregationist legislation such as the Native 
Service Contract Act was passed during the depression years. Of all the citizens of 
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Natal, Africans experienced the worst consequences of the "years of red dust". 
In the urban areas, the "civilised labour" policy and tariff and wage legislation 
conspired with white public opinion to boost white employment at the expense of 
other groups, especially Africans and Indians. The selective use of tariff protection, 
and a host of other measures employed by the state, actively encouraged the 
employment of whites and relentlessly discouraged the employment of blacks, 
especially Africans, in many areas of economic activity, often flying in the face of 
sound capitalist business principles. Wages fell and levels of exploitation rose as 
employers tried desperately to keep their enterprises afloat. This situation was to 
continue until the economy had fully recovered. 
As many of these enterprises, especially those in the major industrial and 
commercial centre of t~e province, Durban, were related in some way or another to 
the shipping industry, the decline of both coastal and export trade hit local 
businesses hard. Durban continued to be the premier port of the Union, handling 
nearly 80 per cent of all seaborne cargo. However, the decline in world trade, and 
the high rates for services which had to be paid by freight companies because of the 
government's adherence to the gold standard, meant that fewer vessels called at the 
port and of those, even fewer made full use of port facilities. The trend towards the 
replacement of coal-fired steamers by oil-burning vessels also meant that demand 
for Natal's coal fell. Moreover, the shorter stay in port of oil-burning vessels and 
their greater cargo capacity meant that shipping repairs, chandling and other related 
activities also declined during the depression years, all of which had a negative 
~mpact on the regional economy. Once the government left the gold standard and 
the recovery began, the situation improved rapidly due to the increase in trade. 
In the coal-mines of Natal, for a variety of reasons, not least of which were the 
Hertzog governmenfs stubborn adherence to the gold standard and the fact that 
Natal's coal-mines were largely dependent on a highly competitive export market, 
hard times were experienced as export markets dried up and unsaleable surpluses 
mounted. The closure of mines and the introduction of short time meant hardship 
for miners, especially the thousands of Africans who laboured both above and below 
ground. The depression served to highlight the abuse of illiterate miners by 
unscrupulous mine stores through the hated token system, and brought the often 
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appalling living conditions of black miners under the scrutiny of the authorities. 
Interestingly, despite the general thrust of state policy, mine managers argued for 
the retention of skilled African labourers on the mines, and strove to keep such 
workers, even during the worst of the depression years. The formation of various 
associations to regulate aspects of the coal trade is significant, for these associations 
continued their work long after the depression had passed and it may be claimed 
that hard times had forced the introduction of monopolistic practices. It is 
interesting to note that while the Natal coal-mining industry did recover from the 
worst effects of the depression, the sales of bunker coal, which formed a significant 
proportion of the trade, only briefly regained tlteir pre-depression levels during the 
global conflict of 1939-1945, when a number of antiquated coal-steamers were 
recommissioned. After the conflict passed, the bunker trade resumed its downward 
spiral, forcing the acquisition of other market outlets. 
White commercial agriculture in Natal was among the worst affected sectors of the 
economy; the depression greatly exacerbated the already unhealthy state of most 
commercial farming in the province. The fact that the depression and drought 
followed a period of considerable difficulties, which had lasted throughout the later 
1920s, made it almost impossible for many farmers to continue. During the 
depression, many farmers, especially those who were under-capitalised, found 
themselves staring bankruptcy in the face. Falling demand and a consequent drastic 
decline in returns for many agricultural exports meant that farmers were also victims 
of the world-wide depression. A significant decline in income was experienced by 
most farmers, including those who served only the local market. This meant that in 
order to survive, strategies bad to be developed to increase income and raise 
profitability. Ironically, many of the strategies employed, such as the planting of 
additional lands to cash crops, or of increasing the yields per hectare, or per animal, 
actually contributed to the further decline of the fortunes of the entire farming 
community. Their net effect was to flood even local markets with surplus products, 
thus further minimalising the returns farmers received and aggravating their already 
precarious position. 
One of the extremely negative consequences of the pressure on commercial farmers 
was the impact their cost-saving strategies had on their workforces. These strategies 
often led to the ejection of tenants; to a drastic decline in the conditions of 
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employment of tenants who were fortunate enough not to be ejected; and to a 
general decline in already low agricultural wage levels. Fortunately for some 
farmers, there was ample state assistance in the form of low-interest loans from the 
Land Ban~ tariff protection and a host of other measures all designed to keep 
farmers on their farms both during and after the crisis. The depression was directly 
responsible for government efforts to bolster the agricultural sector of the economy 
in the later 1930s and measures to guarantee farmers a decent return for their 
produce were introduced. The Marketing Act of 1937, which instituted control 
boards to regulate prices and, to some extent, production, of almost all agricultural 
produce can be directly traced to the traumas suffered by farmers in the depression 
years. 
The state expended more time, energy and taxpayers' money on providing assistance 
to white farmers than on any other sector of the economy during the depression. 
Even when principle conflicted with practicality (as in the case of the decision to 
adhere to the gold standard), the state tried to make some amends to farmers by 
subsidising their exports through a levy on imports. This strategy failed due to the 
fact that the losses incurred as a result of adherence to the gold standard could not 
be adequately covered by dwindling state resources, especially at a time when 
demands for the funding of other deserving causes were increasing. Nevertheless 
there was no lack of effort on the part of the government to assist farmers. While 
the depression lifted in other sectors of the economy during 1932, the crisis in 
agriculture persisted, necessitating continued assistance. It may be argued that the 
depression was partly responsible for the increasing dependence of South African 
farmers on government assistance,. a trend which continued apace in the decades 
following "the years of red dust". 
In some cases, farmers were so grateful for the assistance they received that they 
became open supporters of the ruling political party, while others, angry and 
frustrated that government policy was actually defiantly pursuing policies known to 
be to their detriment, sought relief through protest and involvement in opposition 
politics. Unsurprisingly, those sectors which received greater state assistance were 
found to be less vocal and more forbearing of government policy than those who did 
not. 
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Some sugar farmers took advantage of the plight of their fellows; considerable 
growth was evident in the size of lands owned by millers-cum-planters as they 
bQught or foreclosed on land which had served as security for loans to smaller cane 
farmers. The difficulties of cane growers during the depression y~ars because of the 
necessity to export surpluses were also undoubtedly responsible for the introduction 
of the quota system in 1936. This had the effect of limiting the amount of cane that 
individuals could grow and definitely placed a check on the growth of millers-cum-
planters. Once again, hard times had resulted in greater regulation to bring about 
stability and ensure profitability. Constant anti-Asiatic agitation was evident in the 
rural areas where Indian farmers found themselves victims of prejudice. Schemes to 
introduce cane growing among Africans also suffered the disapprobation of white 
planters who wished to see Africans as labourers, not competitors. These schemes 
were frustrated and the level of exploitation intensified as the surplus of labour 
grew; wages were cut significantly because of the greater availability of labour. Nor 
were sugar farmers, for example, prepared to allow any alteration in working 
conditions which might have disadvantaged them at a time when they were in 
financial need. The influence of sugar farmers at national level was somewhat 
diluted by the formation of the fusion government, but they were still able to 
maintain a significant degree of influence in Natal after the depression had passed. 
Such influence was largely responsible for keeping the sugar industry largely in the 
hands of white farmers. 
If conditions in white commercial agriculture were bad, then the conditions in the 
reserves of Natal and Zululand can only be described as desperate. The long-
~reasured myth that the reserves were large enough to accommodate all Africans in 
the province and functional enough to . provide a secure financial base for the 
families of absent migrant workers, was finally exploded during the depression 
years. It has been shown that Africans harried from white farms, and from the 
urban areas when they were retrenched, could hardly find enough land in the 
reserves to farm adequately; furthermore, even without the absent migrant 
population of the period, the reserves could not support their resident population. 
Poor farming methods, exhausted soil and overgrazing meant that some areas were 
already verging on semi-desert even prior to the depression. When the depression 
resulted in an initial influx of unemployed from the urban areas and from white 
farms, and the devastating drought began to make its effects felt, more and more 
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areas of the reserve~ of the province became unable to sustain their inhabitants. 
Crops failed in many areas and thousands of cattle and other livestock died, greatly 
impoverishing Africans. Conditions were so bad in certain districts, especially in the 
reserves of Zululand, that the state had to distribute maize or see tens of thousands 
of impoverished Africans slowly starve to death. 
In their dire poverty, Africans were exploited by unscrupulous storekeepers and 
even the meagre relief efforts of the Native Affairs Department were heavily 
criticised as they were reportedly creating a dependence on state handouts. Farmers 
especially, expected Africans to work; if the depression and drought had increased 
the number of available workseekers, then wages had to fall and Africans were 
simply expected to accept what little the farmers were prepared to offer. When they 
did not and it became apparent that more and more Africans were deserting white 
farms, the state responded with draconian legislation to sustain the labour tenancy 
system. The decline in wages and the greater availability and exploitability of 
labour were seen to be the only positive consequences of an otherwise bleak 
experience for white farmers. 
The most significant result of an examination of the reserve economy of Natal and 
Zululand is the finding that the reserves could no longer sustain their normal 
population and that in order to survive, more and more Africans were migrating to 
the urban areas of Natal, where they eked out a precarious living, often in defiance 
of the law and of moves to repatriate them. It is not without significance that 
Africans in the urban areas held onto their jobs for longer than normal periods 
~uring the depression years, rior that there was a marked increase in older men 
seeking work in the urban areas, nor that domestic service became increasingly 
popular. All these factors may be taken as an indication that conditions in the rural 
areas were deteriorating. Whether the depression brought about other survival 
strategies such as the planting of vegetables or increased squatting on Crown or 
mission reserve lands remains an area for future investigation. There can be no 
doubt, however, that the depression and drought had served to highlight the 
desperate conditions of the people who inhabited the reserves. 
The government implicitly acknowledged that conditions in the reserves were 
appalling by adding a considerable amount of land to the reserves through the 
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Hertzog bills which were finally passed in 1936. To argue that this additional land 
was merely a pay-off for the loss of the Cape African franchise is to ignore the 
realities of the reserve economy throughout the country and especially in Natal and 
Zululand. Although an appreciable amount of land was added to reserves in the 
province, much of this land remained to be alienated from white owners and the 
situation did not improve to any significant extent. The reserves of Natal and 
Zululand remained rural backwaters where poverty and ignorance reigned supreme. 
The whole question of unemployment and the distress consequent upon it has 
proved difficult to quantify. The lack of accessibility of official records, and the 
restricted nature of such records, makes the task almost impossible. It is possible to 
state with certainty, though, that Africans were worst affected by unemployment, 
especially in the urban areas. No serious attempt was made to quantify the number 
of unemployed of any race or gender other than white males, who were considered 
to be the most important breadwinners. State assistance was also largely limited to 
that category of unemployed, despite some attempts later in the depression to assist 
white juveniles, "coloureds" and Indians. State policy in general was largely directed 
at assisting the "poor whites", who were mostly rural Afrikaner supporters of the 
government. As comparatively few such persons inhabited the province of Natal 
(except for those in the northern Natal region), little direct assistance of this type 
was given in Natal. 
In the urban areas, research has shown that the central state expected the major 
portion of the costs involved in providing relief works to be borne by local 
~unicipalities and thus dispensed smaller amounts to relieve distress and 
unemployment through the Department ' of Labour than it had done in times of 
relative prosperity. The major municipalities of the region came to resent this 
imposition, and the undue burden it placed on the ratepayers, and refused assistance 
to those who could not demonstrate that they were residents of some years standing. 
This meant that the many hundreds of poor people who had flocked to the urban 
areas in search of assistance were often denied such assistance and had to find other 
ways of surviving. Charities were likewise under extreme pressure to stretch scarce 
resources over a vastly increased number of applicants for relief. The lack of co-
ordination among charitable organisations was brought home forcefully during the 
depression, and it is significant that the Community Chest concept of pooling 
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collected resources for distribution among an approved list of charitable 
organisations should have found favour in the major urban centre of the province at 
this time. 
It has been found that for all their shortcomings, the relief efforts of municipalities 
in the urban areas were fairly effective in preventing starvation and did go some way 
towards relieving the misery and distress of the white population. It can also be 
categorically stated that the introduction of unemployment insurance for whites 
which took place in 1937, was a direct result of the hardship that was experienced by 
whites due to mass unemployment during the depression. This scheme sought to 
prevent a recurrence of the phenomenon during any future financial crisis - at least 
some sort of support would exist to tide families over such a disaster. As far as other 
population groups were concerned, however, relief measures during the depression 
were a dismal failure. Most municipalities were also constrained by the 
consciousness that over-lavish provision of relief might serve to attract more 
unemployed from other regions and make Natal's major urban centres "meccas" of 
the unemployed. At most, then, the bare minimum was done for some and nothing 
meaningful at all for Africans, a state of affairs which persisted well into the 1970s. 
In the rural areas, the provincial administration established roadworks aimed at 
absorbing unemployed whites before they became disheartened and left for the 
urban areas. The number of such persons in Natal was insignificant when compared 
to other regions, and places were given to young white males from urban areas who 
found themselves without employment. There was also an element of 
~errymandering in the provision of.relief in rural areas, for unemployed Afrikaners 
were brought into Natal to work on many of the schemes, and they remained which 
was to have important consequences in the period after 1948, when the Nationalist 
Party significantly increased its support in the province. In the reserves, apart from 
their efforts to provide basic sustenance to thousands of starving Africans, the state, 
in the person of the Chief Native Commissioner, did try to give priority to Natal 
Africans in certain forms of employment. These efforts were, however, frustrated 
by vested white interests, and as has been mentioned, even the programme to feed 
starving Africans was heavily criticised. Relief works on a small scale were 
established in some of the reserves but, unfortunately, little evidence of the exact 
nature of these works can be found, an indication, perhaps, of their insignificance. 
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Always sensitive to the demands of white voters on labour issues and alarmed at the 
level of distress among the white community, the_government curtailed spending on 
relief for Africans in 1932 and left them to survive almost entirely on their own 
meagre resources, during what were to be some of the worst years of depression and 
drought this century. 
Africans had little option but to incur debts, or to journey to the urban areas in 
search of employment and assistance. Despite statistical evidence provided by the 
urban local authorities suggesting that the number of Africans in the areas under 
their control was diminishing, other evidence indicates that there was a deliberate 
avoidance of established procedures of registration in the urban areas, and that the 
number of Africans in the urban areas of the province was actually growing during 
the depression years. It has been suggested that this discrepancy may be explained 
by the need for local authorities to placate concerned citizens and even the central 
government, for whom the large number of "surplus" Africans in the urban areas was 
a signal that trouble was not far off. 
Against this background of socio-economic change and upheaval, the political 
activities of the time were played out. It has been shown that in the arena of white 
politics, nearly all existing political movements (and those that briefly flourished 
during the crisis) were touched by the depression. All movements had to address 
problems of economic policy, unemployment and relief, for these were seen to be 
the real issues of the day. New political movements arose out of frustration with the 
existing political parties and their constant petty bickering. The failure of the 
~ertzog government to react more . positively to the needs of the English-speaking 
population of Natal, and the seeming inability or unwillingness of the South African 
Party to press more vigorously for the realisation of these aspirations, resulted in the 
formation of separatist movements to achieve such aims. 
Although Natal "jingoism" was indeed an element of some of these movements, as it 
continued to be long after the depression, the economic realities of the day provided 
the leaders of such movements with sufficient ammunition to attract large crowds to 
meetings. The Natal English-speaking polity experienced a heightened sense of 
isolation from the centre of political power in the Union; they had little in common 
with their "masters" in Pretoria, especially when it came to economic policy or to 
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state assistance to the unemployed. These differences had always existed but were 
greatly exacerbated during the depression. The chasm between English-speaking 
Natal and Afrikaners, although apparently temporarily bridged during the fusion 
years following the depression, was to widen again in the period after 1939. The 
activities of the jingoes during the 1950s which came to a head in the republican 
crisis of 1960/61, is proof positive of this. 
The frustration of Natalians also led to the formation of "extremist" movements 
which saw salvation as lying in the drastic restructuring of society along either fascist 
or socialist lines. Natal was not unique in this respect; both in the rest of the Union 
and in many countries elsewhere in the capitalist world, such movements flourished 
during this time of economic upheaval. 
Despite considerable popular support, however, these movements were not able to 
convert such support into votes; the extremists were, with a few notable exceptions, 
spurned by the electorate. The rapid improvement of the economy after 1933 and 
the internecine rivalry endemic in many of these movements led to their demise; a 
development undoubtedly hastened by the.decision of the government to leave the 
gold standard and by the "toenadering" between the main political parties on a 
national level. These latter factors changed the mood of white politics throughout 
South Africa and the atmosphere of doom and gloom which had fostered the 
formation of these alternative movements began to dissipate. 
Black politics was also severely affected by the depression. The mood of 
~onfrontation and militancy eVident in the early years of the depression gradually 
gave way to co-operation and accomm(j(jationist political behaviour. The state 
played a role in this. In the wake of the Beer Hall riots, the government was given 
sweeping powers which it was not reticent about using, removing some key black 
politicians from the scene t~ough banning orders. Other measures of social control 
were also instituted, but it has also been shown in this connection that the essentially 
bourgeois nature of most of the black elite determined that the protection and 
furtherance of their own interests came to enjoy more prominence than the 
aspirations of the oppressed labouring class. Exactly how effective state measures 
were has been questioned and an alternative perspective has been suggested to 
explain the decline of militancy throughout the province. 
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The mood of militancy, it has been suggested, came to be buried under the weight of 
the great economic crisis. Evidence has been presented to suggest that even the 
leaders of black political movements were experiencing financial difficulties during 
the depression. The lack of funds resulting from the unemployment of members and 
the general shortage of money meant that even previously flourishing movements 
such as the ICU and ANC were in great financial difficulties. Other leaders were 
forced into touting their books or extending their caps to white capital to acquire 
funds. The depression and the high levels of unemployment gave employers greater 
control over their workforce. Employers were able to cut wages, to make greater 
use of piecework and to either lengthen or shorten the working hours of employees 
with relative impunity. Employers were less open to pressure from employees and 
the greater supply of labour meant that employers were able to exercise greater 
control over the political activism of their employees. These factors, acting in 
concert, brought about the "lull" in black militancy that was to last for much of the 
rest of the decade. 
Viewed in totality, the Great Depression had a profound and significant effect on 
the lives of Natalians who lived through it. It is not for nothing that "the years of red 
dust" live on in the collective consciousness of the region. 
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